INDONESIA'S QUEST FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA:

A STUDY OF INFORMAL DIPLOMACY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE SOEHARTO ERA (1985-1998)

BY

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To: Dr. Alan Simpson and Dr. Mark Rolls for showing me the brightness of knowledge and giving me the encouragement through these years; and my beloved wife (Andis), our three boys, my mother and father for being with me always.

ABSTRACT

This study examines Indonesia's use of informal diplomacy between 1985-1998, to further its interests for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. This study argues that the adoption of informal diplomacy was in response to the structural limitation of ASEAN, the nature of the problems of regional conflicts and disputes, and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's desire to increase its leverage in foreign policy making and implementation within the Indonesian political system which promoted inter-elites competition. At the same time, internal dynamics within the Ministry from the late-1960s - internal consolidation and the development of a new cadre of trained diplomats - made the adoption of informal diplomacy possible.

This study develops an analytical framework derived from the principles articulated by various scholars and practitioners of Track Two diplomacy and on the conception of bureaucratic politics. The main purpose of this study is to outline and analyse the adoption and application of informal diplomacy in Indonesia's diplomatic activities from the mid-1980s onward, and also to test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on informal diplomacy. This study examines three cases where Indonesia used informal diplomacy as part of the overall diplomatic initiatives: in dealing with conflicts in Cambodia and in the southernpart of the Philippines, and in seeking to prevent armed conflicts revolving around territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The assessment of research materials and interviews during the fieldwork show that in the Indonesian context adherence to informal diplomacy principles was subject to the circumstances during the meetings, time pressures, and the availability of resources as well as the notion of bureaucratic politics. Overall, the interest of President Soeharto in the informal diplomacy process increased the status of the diplomatic endeavours, an important feature of conflict resolution approaches within the Asian setting.

This study makes extensive use of documents filed in Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and insights from interviews with theorists and practitioners at the time.

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Abbreviations

AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AMM	ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting
ANS	Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (Sihanoukist National Army)
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN SOM	ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting
BALITBANG	Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan (Research and Development Agency)
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariffs
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Cambodia
CIDA	Canada International Development Agency
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta
Deplu	Departemen Luar Negeri (Department of Foreign Affairs)
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
Dit. ASPAS	Direktorat Asia dan Pasifik (Directorate for Asia and Pacific Affairs)
Dit. OI	Direktorat Organisasi Internasional (Directorate for International Organisation)
Dit. PI	Direktorat Perjanjian Internasional (Directorate for International Treaty)
Dwi Fungsi	Dual Function
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asian Economic Grouping
EAGA	East Asian Growth Area
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
Fretilin	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
FUNCINPEC	United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
GOCCs	Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations
GOLKAR	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Hankamrata	Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (total people defence)
ICFM	Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers
ICM	International Control Mechanism
ICMI	Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
IGGI	Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia
IMC	Informal Meeting on Cambodia
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting

KADIN	Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
KOSTRAD	Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Command)
KPNLF	Khmer Peoples National Liberation Forces
Lemhanas	Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (National Defence Institute)
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)
Malari	Malapetaka Januari (January Disaster)
MIA	Missing in Action
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
Nasakom	Nasionalis, agama dan komunis (nationalism, religion and communism)
NEFOS	New Emerging Forces
NEKOLIM	Neo-kolonialisme dan imperealisme (neocolonialism and imperialism)
NUC	National Unification Commission
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
OLDEFOS	Old Established Forces
ORBA	Orde Baru (New Order)
ORLA	Orde Lama (Old Order)
P-5	Permanent Five
Permesta	Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Universal Struggle Charter).
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PICC	Paris International Conference on Cambodia
PMC	Post Ministerial Conference
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
Puskom	Pusat Komunikasi (Communication Office)
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PRRI	Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic)
Sekneg	Sekretariat Negara (State Secretariat)
SNC	Supreme National Council
SPCPD	Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TWG-LM	Technical Working Group on Legal Matters
UBC	University of British Columbia
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SEANWFZ	South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SLOCs	Sea-lines of communications
SOC	State of Cambodia
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
ZPDSP	Zone of Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III
ABBREVIATIONS V

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I.1. Scope and impetus for the study 1
I.2. Justification for the study 2
I.3. Framework of the study 3
I.4. The objectives of the study 9
I.5. The organisation of the thesis 10

CHAPTER II
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: INFORMAL DIPLOMACY, TRACK TWO AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

II.1. Introduction 13
II.2. Literature Review 13
2.1. The primacy of order: foreign policy in a regional context 13
2.2. Informal diplomacy and Track Two diplomacy conceptions 18
2.2.1. Track Two diplomacy: some variants of Track Two diplomacy methods and factors supportive of conflict resolution 21
2.2.2. The third party role in and their expectation of Track Two diplomacy 28
2.2.3. Track Two diplomacy - originator 32
2.2.4. Track Two diplomacy - objectives 34
2.2.5. Track Two diplomacy - process/skill 35
2.3. Foreign policy making and bureaucratic politics 37
2.4. Working definitions of informal diplomacy and bureaucratic politics 47
2.4.1. Informal diplomacy. 47
2.4.2. Bureaucratic politics 48
2.5. Summary of analytical framework and assumptions 50
2.6. Hypotheses to be tested 52
II.3. Methodology 53
3.1. Written information 54
3.2. The interviews 56
3.3. Research notes 58

CHAPTER III
INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SECOND-HALF OF SOEHARTO ERA (1985-1998): IN SEARCH OF REGIONAL ORDER THROUGH NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

III.1. Introduction 69

III.2. Indonesia's interest in order 69
III.3. Indonesian foreign policy in regional context: pursuing national interests beyond ASEAN 74
III.4. President Soeharto and Indonesian foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s: growing personal interest 77
III.5. Soeharto's Indonesia: foreign policy making and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 82
5.1. Foreign policy making: between process and the personality of President Soeharto 83
5.2. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry: the structure, process and the diplomatic machinery 89
5.2.1. The organisational structure of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry .. 92
5.2.2. Information flows and processing 95
5.2.3. Policy initiation and co-ordination (internal and external) 98
III.6. The strategic motives behind the adoption of informal diplomacy 101
6.1. The regional perspective 101
6.2. The domestic perspective 102
III.7. Conclusion 102

CHAPTER IV
IN SEARCH OF PEACE IN CAMBODIA: FROM JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING TO PARIS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA IN 1991

IV.1. Introduction 111
IV.2. The background of the Cambodian conflict 112
2.1. The root of the conflict and the reaction of the regional countries and China 112
2.2. The conflicting parties and the stakeholders from 1979 onwards 119
IV.3. The Indonesian peace initiatives 123
3.1. Indonesia as ASEAN Interlocutor 123
3.2. Preparing the ground work for the informal diplomacy process 126
3.3. Paving the way for the Jakarta Informal Meetings 130
3.4. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) 134
3.4.1. The First JIM in Bogor: 26-28 July 1988 134
3.4.2. The Working Group Meetings and the Second JIM in Jakarta 143
3.5. Post JIM: concerted international efforts for peace in Cambodia 156
3.5.1. Paris International Conference on Cambodia 159
3.5.2. Post-PICC: the concerted diplomatic initiatives that lead to the signing of the Peace Agreement in Paris, 23 October 1991 ... 162
IV.4. Conclusion 167

CHAPTER V
INDONESIAN DIPLOMACY IN FACILITATING THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) AND THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF)

V.1. Introduction 180

V.2. The background of the separatist problem in the southernpart of the Philippines 181
V.3. Indonesia's peace initiatives in dealing with the Moro problem 185
3.1. The formative years (1991 to early 1993) 186
3.2. The informal meeting in Cipanas Palace, 14-17 April 1993 192
3.2.1. The preparations stage 192
3.2.2. The Cipanas informal meeting, 14-17 April 1993 195
3.2.3. Reactions and assessments of the Cipanas informal meeting 199
3.3. The formal peace talks (1993-1996): informal diplomacy at work 202
3.3.1. The first formal peace talks in Jakarta, 25 October to 7 November 1993: setting the direction 204
3.3.2. Peace talks in 1994: flurries of diplomatic activities 209
3.3.3. Peace talks in 1995: building consensus around contentious issues 216
3.3.4. Peace talks in 1996: clinching the deal through high level diplomacy 221
V.4. Conclusion 227

CHAPTER VI
WORKSHOPS ON MANAGING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE SERIES OF INDONESIA'S INFORMAL DIPLOMACY (1990-1998)

VI.1. Introduction 238
VI.2. The background to the South China Sea issue 240
2.1. The strategic importance of the South China Sea: the territorial disputes and the stakeholders 240
2.2. The nature of the claims and the claimants efforts to reinforce their claims 245
2.3. Military build up and the potential for armed conflict in the South China Sea 250
VI.3. Indonesia's diplomacy to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea: the series of workshops 252
3.1. The informal workshop: its inception as a diplomatic means 252
3.2. The organisational aspect of the informal workshop: the problems of co-ordination and inconsistency of interests among the Indonesians 255
3.2.1. Co-ordination as a factor in informal diplomacy 255
3.2.2. Inconsistency of interests among the Indonesians and its impact on Indonesian informal diplomacy 257
3.3. The dynamics of informal workshop, and ways and means to develop co-operation and confidence-building measures 263
3.3.1. The informal workshop: settings and the strategy Indonesia developed 265
3.3.2. Indonesia's efforts to stimulate progress in the informal workshops: the issues of participants lack of commitments and meeting procedures 268
3.4. Competing interests and differing interpretations of the workshops: their impact on informal diplomacy 275
VI.4. Conclusion 286

CHAPTER VII
INDONESIAN DIPLOMACY IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES (1985-1998): EVALUATION OF INFORMAL DIPLOMACY

VII.1. Introduction 296
VII.2. Assessment of the Indonesian organisational aspect: the domestic context of the third party 297
2.1. The originator of informal diplomacy's conception 297
2.2. The building of the team and teamwork 300
2.3. Co-ordination as a factor in the informal diplomacy 306
VII.3. Assessment of process during informal diplomacy 311
3.1. The dynamics of informal meetings 312
3.1.1. The Cambodian conflict 313
3.1.2. The Moro problem 318
3.1.3. The South China Sea disputes 322
3.2. The meeting setting and its impact on the informal diplomacy process 326
VII.4. Assessment of the objectives of informal diplomacy and the outcomes 331
4.1. Shared objectives: between ideals and reality 332
4.2. Third party motives in facilitating informal diplomacy 339
4.3. The outcomes of the informal diplomacy 342
VII.5. Summary and Conclusion 348

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

VIII.1. The linkage between the analytical framework of informal diplomacy and the empirical findings from case study materials 353
1.1. Hypothesis No. 1 354
1.2. Hypothesis No. 2 361
1.3. Hypothesis No. 3 363
1.4. Hypothesis No. 4 365
1.5. Hypothesis No. 5 367
1.6. Hypothesis No. 6 368
VIII.2. Further lessons from informal diplomacy 369

POSTSCRIPT 378

APPENDIX NO. 1
List of Interviewees and Date of Interview 385

APPENDIX NO. 2
The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (the preamble) 388

APPENDIX NO. 3
Statement of the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meting (28 July 1988) 389

Appendix No. 4
Consensus Statement of the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting
(21 February 1989)..... 392

Appendix No. 5
The Tripoli Agreement (23 December 1976)..... 399

BIBLIOGRAPHY 406

Chapter I

Introduction

I.1. Scope and impetus for the study

This study examines the use of informal diplomacy by Indonesia, between 1985-1998 (the second half of the President Soeharto era), in pursuit of its national interests of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. It was during this period that informal diplomacy became a 'buzzword' in Indonesia's diplomatic efforts, particularly in dealing with three problems in the region, namely: 1) conflict in Cambodia, 2) the separatist movement in the southern part of the Philippines, and 3) territorial claims revolving around the South China Sea disputes. Through three case studies, this study identifies the common patterns of the informal diplomacy techniques, highlights their unique individual implementations and assesses their contribution to resolving the issues.

Whether the use of informal diplomacy was linked to Indonesia's aspirations to be a 'regional leader', as some studies have suggested,[1] is beyond the scope of the study. The use of this mode of informal diplomacy between 1985 and 1998 is of particular interests in this study because the informal diplomacy at this time adopted the principles and some techniques developed by Track Two diplomacy scholars to resolve conflicts and disputes. This distinguishing characteristic of informal diplomacy as a diplomatic approach is not shared by Indonesia's attempts to resolve conflicts before 1985. Prior to 1985, the informal approaches tend to be sporadic and rely more on behind the scenes intelligence operations. Hence, the informal diplomacy between 1985 and 1998 was a new innovative approach to deal with some dated regional problems.

Indonesia's selection of informal diplomacy is an intriguing topic for analysis considering that Indonesia adopted principles of informal diplomacy articulated by various scholars and practitioners of Track Two diplomacy. As a convention, Track Two diplomacy is regarded as the domain of non-state actors and, therefore, state sponsored informal diplomacy as happened in Indonesia's case not only

challenges the convention, but also raises two questions. The first question is why a state adopted the non-conventional approach of diplomacy - developed by Track Two diplomacy scholars and practitioners - and the second question is how useful the principles were when implemented by a state actor. These questions involve issues relevant to the adoption of informal diplomacy and the aspect of implementation of informal diplomacy to deal with regional problems are the main focus of this study.

I.2. Justification for the study

This study is important because although much has been written on Indonesian foreign policy, there is no major study on the characteristics of Indonesia's informal diplomacy between 1985 and 1998. The majority of studies on Indonesian foreign policy and diplomacy tend to concentrate their discussion on the formal aspect of the diplomacy and discussion of Soeharto's informal approach in diplomacy, such as it is, is treated more as illustrative than descriptive. Some analysts of Indonesian foreign policy do explore the aspect of informality in Indonesian diplomacy, but their discussions revolve mostly around the role of the military. Fore example, Leo Suryadinata discusses the way Soeharto use informal approach in dealing with some foreign policy issues, particularly by assigning military intelligence as points of contact.[2] Rizal Sukma also observes the way Soeharto used the military and Indonesian business communities to explore the possibility of renewing Indonesia's diplomatic relations with China.[3]

Likewise, no major study explores the dynamics of foreign policy making and implementation in the Indonesian political system, by examining closely the processes within the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Ministry) from the perspective of bureaucratic politics.

Furthermore, there are no major studies which (1) analyse the way in which Indonesia adopted and implemented principles of Track Two diplomacy in its diplomacy, or (2) assess the implications of state sponsored informal diplomacy for the study of Track Two diplomacy. This study aims to fill this gap. At the

same time, this study of informal diplomacy will provide new perspectives on Indonesian foreign policy in the Southeast Asian Region within and beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Lastly, this study provides an opportunity to examine a number of propositions/hypotheses derived from the Track Two diplomacy literature.

I.3. Framework of the study

From the very outset, it is necessary to mention that although the adoption of informal diplomacy to resolve regional conflict took place in the mid-1980s, this does not mean that Indonesia's interest in regional order started in that period. In fact, regional order was an ideal of Indonesian leaders from the early years of Indonesia's independence in 1945.

President Soeharto was deeply committed to the ideal and asserted that peace and stability was a prerequisite condition for Indonesia's economic development program and nation-building. To achieve this aim, Indonesia embarked on policies of developing good neighbourhood relations and promoting regional co-operation through ASEAN. These policies were designed to restore confidence among the neighbouring countries of Indonesia's good intentions in the region. The restoration was essential because, under Soekarno, Indonesia had embarked on 'high profile' diplomacy of confrontation (*konfrontasi*) against Malaysia which had imperiled the region. The Soeharto government adopted 'low profile' diplomacy in the late 1960s and the 1970s and, as a consequence, the neighbouring countries were gradually convinced that Indonesia was not wishing to play a 'big brother' role within ASEAN, nor did it have hegemonic interests.

Indonesia treated ASEAN as the primary vehicle to build trust and confidence among the members and, at the same time, to transmit Indonesia's concerns for issues affecting peace and stability in Southeast Asia. In their various statements, Indonesia's leaders had all expressed their confidence in the efficacy of ASEAN and its framework, and given the impression that ASEAN was at the centre of Indonesian foreign policy.[4] Indonesia promoted the need for stability among the ASEAN members as a means to achieve regional stability, that is, national

resilience for regional resilience. Essentially, each ASEAN member was responsible for developing its resilience by concentrating on its own nation-building program. At the domestic level, ASEAN members were to deal with their own politico-security, economic, and social issues. The end result of national stability would be regional stability.

However, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in the late 1970s challenged regional peace and stability, provoking a new cycle of protracted armed conflict in Cambodia which imperilled the region because, in sustaining their war efforts the parties to the conflict brought the two super powers, the United States (the US) and the Soviet Union, into the equation. Although the US did not employ its military power directly, it aligned its position with China, the regional power in Asia, and put diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to withdraw. The conflict strained ASEAN's relations with Vietnam while, at the same time, ASEAN's relations with China - Vietnam's nemesis - soared, due to ASEAN solidarity with Thailand. As a 'front line state,' Thailand relied on China's support to deter the potential threat posed by Vietnam's military forces along the Thai border. However, ASEAN's de facto alignment with China did not serve Indonesia's interest in having regional order and a strong Vietnam as a buffer against a potential threat from China.

The Cambodian conflict contradicted Indonesia's security perspective and interests with the interests of some members of ASEAN and also with the position of ASEAN as a group. Indonesia had no other option than to follow ASEAN's position. To balance its interests, Indonesia insisted that ASEAN maintain contact with Vietnam. Indonesia's persistence forced ASEAN to accredit Indonesia with status as ASEAN interlocutor with Vietnam, a status which provided Indonesia with a mandate to look for an alternative solution to the conflict within and beyond the ASEAN framework. Indonesia translated ASEAN's mandate and its interest for peace into a series of informal meetings in the late 1980s, known as the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs). The precursor of the informal diplomacy conception was Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's proposal for hosting a 'cocktail party' to effect a breakthrough in the stalemate by bringing all parties to the Cambodian conflict to Jakarta to meet in an informal setting.

The JIM gave Indonesia a first lesson on how to facilitate informal meetings aimed at resolving conflict comprehensively. Having confidence in the merit of the informal diplomacy approach, Indonesia used a similar approach in dealing with two regional problems. First, from 1993 to 1996, Indonesia facilitated informal exploratory talks and a series of meetings between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Second, from 1990 to 1998, Indonesia organised informal workshops to discuss possible co-operation in the South China Sea, downplaying the unresolved status of territorial claims.[5]

Although known by a variety of names (cocktail party, informal meetings, informal exploratory talks, and informal workshop) the common thread of Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives between 1985-1998 was informal diplomacy. Informal diplomacy adopted principles closely associated with approaches for conflict management and conflict resolution, referred to as Track Two diplomacy.[6] This Track Two diplomacy approach differed from the traditional approach of official diplomacy or 'track one,' which Edward Azar[7] argues, lacks the necessary orientation to generate conflict resolution breakthroughs because it puts more emphasis on "official contacts between the representatives of sovereign entities, governments and other parties to a dispute within a bargaining framework."[8] In contrast, an informal forum could facilitate a meeting between adversaries where no formal mechanism suitable for the differing parties exists. Hence, informal diplomacy was derived from the principles grounded in Track Two diplomacy.

The adoption of principles from Track Two diplomacy by a state actor raises doubts about the validity of the convention that Track Two diplomacy is the sole domain of non-state actors. The principles of Track Two diplomacy were developed and discerned by scholars who were dissatisfied with the failures of 'track one' diplomacy and mediation to resolve conflicts and disputes comprehensively. The involvement of non-state actors in Track Two diplomacy has its own merit because they are usually perceived as more neutral than governments and because they address the underlying issues of conflict and disputes which state actors often ignore.

The use by Indonesia of informal diplomacy was not an alternative to or a substitute for formal diplomacy, but a way to complement the diplomatic efforts at the more formal level. Hence, informal diplomacy was used within the bigger picture of Indonesian diplomacy and, therefore, in the three case studies, there was a linkage or synergy between informal and formal diplomatic processes. Indonesia employed principles of Track Two diplomacy, adopted a number of the techniques and understandings, but adjusted these principles when the circumstances required such actions. The Indonesian action raises questions about whether the Indonesians were fully aware of the Track Two diplomacy principles and techniques, and whether there were factors impeding complete adoption of these principles.

This study argues that Indonesia's informal diplomacy proved very helpful in paving the way for the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the subsequent signing of the peace agreement in 1991. Informal diplomacy was also very useful, and was used in tandem with formal negotiations, to deal with conflict in the southern-part of the Philippines and led to the signing of a peace agreement between the Philippines Government and the MNLF in 1996. Nevertheless, similar approaches in the South China Sea disputes had yet to achieve positive results. After nine years sponsoring Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Indonesia had to admit that the progress of the informal process had been very modest. Indonesia had not been able to formalise the informal process of the meetings, or even gain support from the participants to persuade their authorities to implement some of the agreements reached in the workshops.

Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives to deal with the three regional problems came under the scrutiny of domestic constituents. In particular, the commitment to hosting the series of informal workshop was questioned domestically by bureaucrats from departments outside the Foreign Ministry, who wished to see some more tangible outcomes from the informal undertaking and criticised the workshops as being nothing more than a talk shop.

This study argues that it would be premature to judge the effectiveness of informal diplomacy on the grounds of the lack of apparent positive outcomes. Adequate attention needs to be given to the philosophy and reasons behind the approaches, as well as to the objectives of the informal diplomacy set by their proponents from the Ministry. Overall, the choice of informal diplomacy raises a number of questions about why Indonesia took the initiative in the first place, and why in the form of informal diplomacy? Had Indonesia exhausted all available formal channels (the bilateral and the ASEAN framework) to deal with the problems? What were the limitations of the formal process? As an approach, did informality represent an ASEAN tradition for dealing with problems quietly behind closed doors or was it a reflection of innovation on the part of Indonesia? If it was an innovation, who were the main proponents of the approach within the Ministry?

Considering that all of the diplomatic initiatives were introduced during Soeharto's presidency clearly Soeharto's governing style had some influence on the choice of the informal format. Furthermore, Soeharto was known for encouraging competition among the bureaucracies and the military establishment to fulfil his domestic and foreign policy goals. With this in mind, a question arises as to whether the informal diplomacy was a result of bureaucratic politics in foreign policy making where elites were competing at all times for the President's favour. Furthermore, in the first two decades of his rule, Soeharto did not have confidence in the Ministry because of the allegiance of some high-ranking officials in the Ministry to Soekarno's cause. Sensing Soeharto's antipathy toward the Ministry, the new leaders in the Ministry took steps to improve their position inside the Indonesian political system. One of these steps was to develop a new cadre of professional diplomats who were trained and educated overseas and, therefore, were equipped with various perspectives on diplomacy. The informal format was the outcome of soul searching among Ministry personnel or a reflection of the Ministry's efforts to gain Soeharto's confidence.

Informal diplomacy suggests a revival of the career diplomats' position in foreign policy matters. With limited resources to compete with other resource rich bureaucracies and the military establishment, the Ministry was left with no other means but to be creative in trying to gain the confidence of the President. As

discussed in Chapter 3, foreign policy making in Indonesia was subject to rivalry among the bureaucrats (bureaucratic politics), as different ministries and sections of the military establishment tried to ensure that their interests were accommodated in foreign policy outputs. In one way or another, bureaucratic politics influenced not only the foreign policy making process, but also the way in which the Ministry designed and implemented informal diplomacy. It is therefore necessary to comprehend the nature of inter-ministry rivalry in Indonesia in order to assess the making and the implementation of informal diplomacy.

However, rather than focusing on these questions and considerations, some analysts perceived the plethora of Indonesia's initiatives within and beyond the ASEAN framework as a revival of an assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy.[9] For them, the initiatives represented a return to a 'high profile' stance as it was before under Soekarno. This study argues that informal diplomacy was prompted by limitations within ASEAN's framework which made it difficult for Indonesia to further its interests in regional order. This study considers that these limitations include the prevalence of the non-interference doctrine in the internal affairs of members, and ASEAN's reluctance to discuss disputes involving some member countries.[10] Indeed, ASEAN's reluctance to find solutions to the problems involving some of its members and also members' internal problems not only prolonged the status quo but also created uncertainty that had the potential to destabilise the region.

In the process of considering all the issues involved in the three case studies this study argues that in order to deal with political security issues at the regional level and noting some limitations in the ASEAN framework, Indonesia intentionally pursued informal diplomacy, to complement its formal diplomatic efforts at a regional level in ASEAN and at a bilateral level. The technique had been carefully designed to avoid neighbouring countries, many of whom were still feeling the negative effects of Indonesia's high profile diplomacy in the past,[11] and were apprehensive about Indonesia's intentions.

It will be argued that Indonesia adopted some Track Two diplomacy principles, assumptions and techniques because the nature of the conflicts and the disputes

required a different diplomatic approach. It will also be argued that the adoption of informal diplomacy was a result of bureaucratic politics within the Indonesian political system and the internal dynamics within the Ministry. Moreover, it will be argued that in the Indonesian context, informal diplomacy's contribution to the resolution of regional conflicts and disputes was dependent on the nature of the problems, the parties' commitment to the informal diplomacy process and the support from the President, the bureaucracies and the military establishment. Lastly, it will be argued that although state sponsored informal diplomacy benefited from propositions derived from Track Two diplomacy, in some cases the full adoption of the propositions was not desirable. Participants' lack of interest and motivation as well as efforts by some of them to derail the informal diplomacy processes illustrate why it was imperative for the third party to adapt the propositions according to the dynamics during the informal diplomacy process.

I.4. The objectives of the study

The primary objective of this study is to outline and analyse the adoption and application of informal diplomacy in Indonesia's diplomatic activities from the mid-1980s onward in dealing with conflicts and disputes in the Southeast Asian region. This study will also test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on informal diplomacy. The specific objectives of this study are:

(1) *To examine the background behind the selection of informal diplomacy as a diplomatic technique, including the reasons behind the adoption of the technique.* At issue here is why Indonesia selected the informal format.

(2) *To explore the objectives of Indonesia's informal diplomacy.* At issue is the main intention in pursuing informal diplomacy in the three case studies.

(3) *To analyse the achievements of informal diplomacy.* At issue is what factors helped or did not help Indonesia in achieving the objectives of informal diplomacy.

(4) *To assess the implementation of informal diplomacy from the perspective of Track Two diplomacy.* At issue is whether or not informal diplomacy was guided by principles grounded in Track Two diplomacy and what aspects of Track Two diplomacy Indonesia followed.

(5) *To assess the relevance of principles derived from Track Two diplomacy in the context of Indonesia's informal diplomacy.* At issue is under what circumstances can the principles associated with Track Two diplomacy contribute to the resolution of conflicts or disputes.

I.5. The organisation of the thesis

This study consists of eight chapters. The first chapter provides the background to the problem and outlines the objectives and the relevance of the study. Chapter 2 provides the framework of the thesis, including the theoretical foundation, and also proposes hypotheses derived from Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics in order to test aspects of Indonesia's informal diplomacy. This chapter will also explain the research method of the study.

Chapter 3 provides an historical outline and analysis of Indonesia's responses to issues affecting peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In particular, this chapter describes five issues: 1) Indonesia's perspective on order; 2) the regional context of Indonesian foreign policy, by looking at ASEAN and its policy of accommodation, and the notion of Indonesia's national interest; 3) President Soeharto's growing interest in foreign affairs and in sustaining Indonesia's economic growth; 4) foreign policy making in Indonesia, including the structure and process of foreign policy initiation in the Ministry and in the Indonesian political system in general; and 5) the strategic motives behind the adoption of informal diplomacy.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 outline and analyse the three case studies at the regional level which Indonesia had tried to resolve or manage through informal diplomacy. Each chapter outlines the historical background of the problems and assesses how regional configurations and the deep-seated distrust among the parties affected the prolongation of the unsettled issues. The implementation of the informal diplomacy on each issue is also analysed and observations made on the objective of informal diplomacy, the intention of the technique, the strategy developed to pursue it and the outcome of the informal diplomacy. In this chapter, the issues of context are analysed to see the extent to which the context variable influenced the course of Indonesian diplomatic initiatives. However, as the focus of this study is

on informal diplomacy, the issues of context are discussed as a background in analysing the informal diplomacy.

Chapter 7 assesses the common threads of Indonesian informal diplomacy in the three case studies. This chapter provides a summary analysis of how Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy and examines the way the Indonesian team exercised informal diplomacy in the three case studies. This chapter focuses on three major themes. The first theme is the organisational aspects of co-ordination, building the team and bureaucratic politics. The second theme examines processes that took place during the informal diplomacy, particularly the meeting dynamics. The analysis of the process during the meetings considers the interplay between the core-participants, that is, representatives from the parties involved in conflicts and disputes, and the facilitators: the Indonesians and others, such as the Canadians in the South China Sea workshops and French in Cambodia. The third theme is to do with the objectives of informal diplomacy. From the discussion of the objectives, this chapter assesses factors that helped or did not help Indonesia to achieve the objectives of informal diplomacy.

Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this research in the light of theoretical arguments about Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics, and assesses their usefulness in understanding and assessing Indonesia's informal diplomacy between 1985-1998. This chapter summarises the analysis of the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2.

Notes

[1] See, for example, Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983) and Leo Suryadinata, *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Soeharto* [*Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soeharto: aspiring to international leadership*] (Jakarta: PT Pustaka, LP3ES,1998).

[2] Suryadinata, ibid.

[3] Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999).

[4]The terminology most commonly used in Indonesia's ASEAN foreign policy is "Soko Guru for Indonesian foreign policy". "Soko Guru" is a *Sanskrit* word, which can be translated as centre or basis.

[5] It is important to mention that the two post-Soeharto governments - the 17 months' transitional government under President B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and the 21 months' government under President Abdurrahman Wahid (elected on 20 October 1999) - also had adopted informal diplomacy in dealing with disputes in the South China Sea.

[6] According to Nadim N. Rouhana, the whole range of unofficial intervention is often dubbed as Track Two diplomacy. Nadim N. Rouhana, "Unofficial Intervention: Potential Contributions to Resolving Ethno-national Conflicts", in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), p. 111.

[7] See for instance Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1990), p. 19. Also Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach* (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 5.

[8] Loc cit.

[9] See for instance Terence O'Brien, "Indonesia in the Region: Leadership or Declining Influence", in *Indonesia After Soeharto* (Auckland: New Zealand Asia Institute, 1999), p. 157. Also Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 42.

[10] A recent study has argued that despite some inconsistency in the practices over the past 30 years, non-interference remains sacrosanct for ASEAN. See Robin Ramcharan, "ASEAN and Non-interference: A Principle Maintained", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No.1, April 2000, p. 60. During ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, 25 July 2000, the principle of non-interference was reconfirmed (*The Australian*, 26 July 2000). Developments in late 1990s indicated that new ASEAN leaders, in this case President Habibie of Indonesia and President Estrada of the Philippines, after taking office had to adjust their attitude according to the non-interference tradition. Initially, when elected the two leaders had openly criticised the way the Malaysian Government had treated Mr. Anwar Ibrahim.

[11] Indonesia was aware that some of its neighbours remained sceptical toward Indonesia's regional role, and therefore Indonesia has to deal, at all times, with a dilemma of pursuing its interests effectively, but not to appear overtly ambitious. See Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995), pp. 60-1.

Chapter II

Analytical Framework: Informal Diplomacy, Track Two and Bureaucratic Politics

II.1. Introduction

How a state responds to developments in its immediate region that are detrimental to its interest in having a stable and peaceful environment is central to this study. In its efforts to resolve the regional problems, Indonesia employed informal diplomacy during the second half of President Soeharto's administration (1985-1998) - a period known for competition among ministries and the military establishment on some foreign policies issues.

This study develops an analytical framework based on international relations theories and concepts relating to international order, security perception, foreign policy making and bureaucratic politics and, in particular, on concepts derived from the study of Track Two diplomacy. In a number of contexts Indonesian diplomats adopted several of the approaches and techniques developed by scholars of Track Two diplomacy. A number of hypotheses are derived from the literature on Track Two diplomacy, and from bureaucratic politics for testing in the case studies.

II.2. Literature review

2.1. The primacy of order: foreign policy in a regional context

Foreign policy is a widely discussed topic in international relations. In their study, Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe adopt Cecil Crabb's definition of foreign policy as follows:

> Foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and means for achieving them. The interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft.[1]

What constitutes national objectives is, at times, difficult to assess. If, as argued by Hedley Bull,[2] national interest is the main reason for a state's existence then it is logical that the main purpose of foreign policy is to secure that interest.[3] However vague it may appear, to the proponents of a realist approach national interest is the single concept that can help a realistic understanding of international politics.[4] Realists assume that because of the anarchic international system a state has to rely on itself in order to survive usually by increasing national power, including military capability. Unfortunately, armaments are not always a viable option, especially if their acquisition is perceived as a threat by neighbouring countries, which then respond by acquiring or adding to their own armaments. This is the classic action-reaction process associated with arms races and emanates from the so-called security dilemma.[5] For a developing country, buying a large quantity of armaments can be economically unsound. According to Indonesia's former Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, such an act diverts resources away from national development efforts without resulting in greater security.[6] Considering the negative impacts of arms acquisition, a state has to be creative and search for other options to enhance its sense of security and, at the same time, stay focused on its national development program.

The so-called English School of International Relations, although concurring with the realists on the potential for disorder arising from the anarchy in international relations, prefers states to cultivate their common interests. They see this achieved through co-operation in the working of institutions such as international law and the machinery of diplomacy.[7] However, there are limitations in the ability of international law and diplomacy to secure an orderly, peaceful and stable world. International law does not appear to be very effective without an enforcement capacity: for instance, the capacity to implement sanctions or embargoes effectively.[8] According to Jost Delbruck, another element that limits the enforcement capacity of international law is state consent. He states that international law, as a normative binding legal framework, "is functional only if its normativity is not made dependent on the consent of a particular state or actor at a particular time."[9] This statement implies that a sovereign state might easily reject any international ruling which contradicts its interests. In addition, as indicated by James Hsiung, international law does not require states to resolve

their disputes by peaceful means.[10] As a consequence, states sometimes resort to war as a final arbiter of their disputes and that implies that international law still has some shortcomings in securing international order.

In the case of diplomacy, limiting it to a mere dialogue between independent states within the state system, as suggested by Adam Watson, would reduce its capacity to maintain order.[11] In this case, there is a limitation to formal diplomacy in the absence of recognition of non-state entities in international relations, or, where the status of entities as autonomous states is disputed. In the same light, Watson's suggestion that the central task of diplomacy is not mainly the management of order, but more the maintenance of order in the midst of change can be seriously questioned, especially if the way diplomats conduct diplomacy remains conventional and emphasises state-to-state relations.[12] The effectiveness of diplomacy as a tool in statecraft is also questioned by John Spanier and Robert Wendzel who argue that diplomacy alone would not be effective without the support of military and economic instruments.[13] This sentiment is shared by Henry Kissinger who asserted the importance of non-diplomatic pressure in diplomacy and argued that in the absence of any penalty for non-compliance, there is no incentive to reach agreement from diplomatic negotiation.[14] Some analysts even criticise diplomats for being too conservative and "concerned more with procedure than the substance of talks, with taking part rather than doing."[15] This discussion suggests that diplomacy can not perform its functions well if the approach remains conventional and the players or the diplomats themselves remain conservative. Moreover, a state that uses diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument might not achieve its objectives if the state has limited resources to support its diplomatic efforts.

Given their limited resources to back their diplomatic efforts, some developing countries have considered regionalism as a building block to achieve an orderly environment. The concept of regionalism, based on a functionalist point of view, has added political weight to the diplomatic efforts of the member states -- not to mention other benefits they can gain from joining such organisations. In the case of ASEAN, its concerted diplomatic initiatives in the wake of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, enabled the group to garner international support for its

position in the United Nations (UN) forum.[16] However, as observed by Sheldon Simon, ASEAN responds to regional security issues usually in a reactive way.[17] This view is also shared by Michael Leifer, who considered ASEAN more as a diplomatic community, which is often reluctant to deal with problems of regional peace and stability.[18] This attitude is perhaps a reflection of each member's preoccupation with domestic priorities to maintain national security and to develop their economies. ASEAN also operates under the presumption that members' adherence to the codes of conduct within the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) will contribute to peace and stability.[19] The strategy to give priority to internal stability is in line with ASEAN's doctrine of national resilience contributing to regional resilience.

Arguably, the inward looking nature of the doctrine represents the focus on internal security by Third World countries in general. According to Mohammed Ayoob, in contrast to the western conception of an external threat, many Third World countries are more concerned with security problems from within.[20] Indonesia's military capability is aimed "more to maintaining internal stability and security and to warding off local threats than to meeting the requirements of external defence against a major power."[21] Here, local threats imply various threats, not just military threats. In this sense threats can originate from economic, social, political and environmental problems. Furthermore, some Asian countries have been reluctant to follow the European tradition of forging military alliances and seeking external assistance during a conflict. Since gaining independence in 1945, Indonesia has championed a strategy whereby regional countries first try to settle their problems within the region. However, Indonesia's motives for preventing non-regional countries meddling in regional problems were often questioned on the basis of Indonesia's confrontation policy against Malaysia in the late 1960s. Some regional countries suspected Indonesia of wishing to play a 'big-brother' role in ASEAN and the region by limiting the role of major powers. To put the issue in perspective, Soedjatmoko, a leading Indonesian thinker, provides reasons for not involving non-regional actors in regional problems:

> [It] is in the interests of the developing countries to wean themselves from external military support and involvement, for two compelling reasons. One is that external involvement almost always increases the scale and destructiveness of violent conflicts

> ... The second compelling reason to forego external assistance is that such assistance undermines the autonomy of the recipient.[22]

In any case, regionalism through ASEAN has, to a certain extent, contributed to regional order. In this case, order refers to a more predictable and peaceful relationship among the members and the absence of domination and imposition by any single country. According to Adam Curle, a condition of peaceful relationships exists when there is mutual assistance, understanding, concern, and collaboration founded on this mutuality.[23] Indeed, harmonious relations among ASEAN's member countries have given each of them an opportunity to concentrate on national economic development programs and have also made the Association appear more cohesive. At one extreme and for the sake of harmony, ASEAN countries are willing to shelve discussion on sensitive issues, such as border disputes, until they feel comfortable to engage in such discussions.

It may be the case that ASEAN cohesiveness is also influenced by culture specific factors that puts faith in networks of communication and consultation to reach consensus. The habit of consultation inhibits member-states from using the military option in settling their disputes. This mutual-trust and confidence have guaranteed the survival of ASEAN despite the fact that members are hesitant to use legal mechanisms to settle their disputes. Discussions to settle disputes or to manage conflicts were usually held in secret and involved only small numbers of high level officials.[24] ASEAN's ways of operating do not favour a legalistic governing relationship, since trust and confidence are seen as far more important than a rigid arrangement and hasty negotiation. On the whole, ASEAN's tradition can be seen as both an asset and a liability (bearing in mind the potential friction from shelving sensitive problems for indefinite, future consideration). These ASEAN traditions that have cemented the organisation since its inception in 1967 might not operate smoothly in the future, especially if the new generation of ASEAN leaders consider the traditions obsolete.[25]

Regionalism, however, could pose a dilemma for the integrity of the individual member-states: for example, where a member perceives its interests as being subordinated to the group's interests. Still, for the sake of unanimity and cohesion, this member state has to follow the group's decision. As an organisation, ASEAN

faces many limitations as member states are still reluctant to provide it with the two most important functional characteristics of any international organisation, that is, centralisation and independence. According to Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, centralisation and independence are the most important features of a formal organisation that enable it to achieve its objectives and values, because the members have granted the organisation a sufficient mandate to function on their behalf.[26] Indeed, ASEAN members' reluctance to provide the organisation with the two functions of centralisation and independence stemmed from their concern about the state sovereignty issue. Furthermore, despite closer co-operation and interdependence among association members, geographical proximity also increases the potential for disorder at both regional and domestic levels as a result of the spillover effects of instability in neighbouring countries. The ASEAN tradition of non-interference in the internal problems of member countries limits the ability of the group, as well as the members, to assist in the early settlement of problems.

It is a challenge for any country, especially a developing one, to seek the means and policy options for coping with potential anarchy in its strategic environment, particularly when conflicts of interest, limitation of resources, and stigma from past political adventures become prominent. This thesis argues that despite its limitations, diplomacy remains a viable option and a flexible state instrument, especially if that state can introduce soundly developed innovations in its diplomatic practices.[27] In this regard, "[the Soeharto government] has, for most part, tried to neutralize possible threats from outside through regional cooperation and diplomacy."[28] Diplomacy, including informal diplomacy, was Indonesia's means of responding to destabilising problems in the region between 1985 and 1998.

2.2. Informal diplomacy and Track Two diplomacy conceptions

Informal diplomacy is not a well-defined concept and is not widely used in the diplomatic field. There are a number of concepts used in combination with the word informal, such as informal sectors in the economic field and informal politics. Informal politics connotes the kind of politics which are not governed by rules and institutions, but evolves as 'conventions and codes of behaviour.'[29]

Because informal politics are not based on rules, "the workings of such politics tend to be sporadic, erratic, and invisible, making them much harder than formal politics for the outsider to observe in detail, describe accurately, and explain coherently."[30] In the economic field, informal economic sectors are closely identified with a society based economy where small and medium scale enterprises flourish. The following discussion looks at the use of the word 'informal' in the context of diplomacy and examines the ways Indonesians comprehend the concept.

Two main interpretations of the term informal diplomacy are evident in the literature. First, the concept is used to explain the activities of an entity that are not formally recognised by most countries as an independent state. For instance, the 'diplomatic' activities of Taiwan are usually called informal diplomacy.[31] Indeed, diplomacy is used mainly to refer to a foreign policy instrument of an independent state, and as a state centred concept diplomacy is concerned with politics between state actors.[32] Secondly, informal diplomacy is concerned with innovation in diplomacy to deal with some conflicts and disputes where the traditional form of state to state diplomacy was no longer considered suitable. The informal diplomacy of Indonesia, as further discussed, belongs to the latter interpretation.

The traditional form of diplomacy has the following characteristic. It has an element of national power[33] (from a realist perspective) and also signifies "a regulated process of communication between at least two subjects, conducted by their representative agents over a particular object."[34] According to Der Derian, diplomacy is not only a communication process, but it is specifically linked with "mediation of estranged peoples organized in states which interact in a system."[35] This interpretation of Derian revolves around the centrality of mediation and the state system. In reality, however, mediation is not an easy task. Some of the difficulties are caused by the complexities of the issues themselves, while in other cases the negotiators have to face divergent values,[36] which make their efforts to bridge the differences difficult. According to Jay Rothman, this issue of value is the very reason why new approaches in dealing with conflict become necessary. He states that "[d]iplomats and policymakers often pay little attention to the host

of other factors that also underlie international conflict, such as values, history, and culture of opponent communities."[37]

Similarly, the traditional form of diplomacy is closely associated with the interrelationship between official representatives in a state system and the notion of diplomatic representation. The reality of contemporary international relations, especially in the economic sphere, suggests an increase in the role and power of non-state actors and, therefore, confining diplomacy exclusively to states no longer holds ground. This reality has left the state with no other option but to engage itself in direct negotiation and bargaining with private firms, in addition to their traditional intergovernmental forms. The triangular diplomatic system of negotiation and bargaining, that is, between state and other states, states and private firms and between private firms themselves is known as new diplomacy.[38] Moreover, the growing role of private citizens, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and society at large in international relations create new dynamics that diplomats need to take into consideration. Co-operation between the state and the private sector became more obvious and, at times, state actors can benefit from the resources of the non-state actors.[39] Hence, the new linkage between state and society has also forced the state to negotiate and deal directly with non-state actors.

Given the conventional concept of diplomacy and the notion of new diplomacy, a question arises as to how to understand Indonesian informal diplomacy. For Indonesia, informal diplomacy was state-based with the element of communication,[40] although the executing agency, the Foreign Ministry, asserted that the efforts were not aimed at mediating the conflicting or disputing parties. Some prominent Indonesian diplomats stated that informal diplomacy was not a substitute for formal diplomacy, but it was a prerequisite due to the nature of some conflicts and disputes that they had to deal with.[41] However, the limitation of resources left Indonesia with no alternative but to look for support from potential third country or non-state actors in implementing parts of the informal diplomacy.[42]

This interpretation of informal diplomacy has two main components. First, informal diplomacy was part of formal diplomacy and designed to reinforce it. Second, the nature of the conflicts and disputes that Indonesia tried to resolve required different diplomatic approaches because the conventional mode of diplomacy was considered inadequate. Indonesia saw informal diplomacy as a method of conducting diplomacy in a non-conventional way whereby the rules of recognition and protocol were flexible, the atmosphere at the meetings was informal, parties to the conflicts and disputes met without preconditions, and innovative ways to seek breakthroughs in the problems were encouraged during the meetings.[43] Various participants saw the role of the Indonesians in the informal diplomacy process as mainly facilitative, ranging from selecting venues for meetings to chairing meetings. They also saw informal diplomacy as a means of building confidence, of searching for possible co-operation among the parties, and of facilitating consultation to promote consensus.[44]

2.2.1. Track Two diplomacy: some variants of Track Two diplomacy methods and factors supportive of conflict resolution

Indonesia's method of conducting informal diplomacy bears a close resemblance to the Second Track, or Track Two diplomacy, defined by Joe Montville as "unofficial non-structured interaction. It is always open-minded, often altruistic and strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis."[45] He further defined the field as follows: "[it is] unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict."[46] Christopher Dupont and Guy-Oliver Faure consider Track Two as normal practice in "international encounters, especially in the diplomatic arenas" which function as "preliminary contacts, either unofficial or informal".[47] They further state that "[t]rack II talks start before the formal opening of the negotiations and take on special importance during the course of negotiation; in fact, recesses and social events are especially designed to encourage the dual development of contacts and negotiation."[48]

However, as a new approach Track Two diplomacy is not necessarily a mundane process revolving around recesses between a conference and a meeting because "Track Two is designed to establish a pre-negotiation stage in which analytical 'breakthroughs' by the disputants themselves are encouraged."[49] Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald Fisher define pre-negotiation as a "process that begins when one or more parties considers negotiations as an option and communicates this intention to other parties."[50] They note that "pre-negotiation ends when one party abandons negotiation as a policy option or when the parties agree to formal negotiation."[51] Hence, pre-negotiation in Track Two diplomacy is concerned with conditioning; that is, preparing the parties before they move on to formal negotiation. At the same time, the third party also focuses the forum's attention in the pre-negotiation stage on "building relationships that can be sustained over the long term."[52] The key issue that confronts the third party in this stage is to find the best moment to move the parties to a negotiation stage.[53]

Harold Saunders considers that the pre-negotiation stage is an integral part of the overall peace process (including formal negotiation) because in this stage the conflicting parties can deal with three important issues. First, finding a common definition of the problem. Secondly, producing a commitment that a negotiated solution is better than continuing the conflict. Thirdly, preparing the negotiation, that is, deciding how to negotiate.[54] Hence, Track Two diplomacy is not only concerned with establishing contacts, but also in finding breakthroughs indicated by careful analysis of the problem and the processes applied to it.

In order to provide the conflicting parties with the processes to discuss, analyse and find a possible solution to their problems, scholars and practitioners introduced various approaches or techniques known as 'problem-solving workshops', 'interactive problem solving',[55] 'interactive conflict resolution'[56] and 'third party consultation.'[57] Although the various techniques essentially evolved from the problem-solving workshop engineered by John Burton and others, the proponents of each approach introduce a different technique on how to make a contribution to the resolution of the conflict. Concerning the problem-solving workshop, Burton explains, "[p]roblem solving implies exploration and not merely the simple process of bargaining. 'Workshop' is similarly useful because it

suggests that all the parties concerned have to get down to the analytical job of problem solving."[58] Hence, the essence of problem solving activities within the workshop setting is to explore possible solutions to the problem through careful analysis.

Alarmed with the broad definition of Track Two diplomacy provided by Montville and also with the proliferation of techniques under the Track Two diplomacy, Nadim Rouhana proposed to use the term 'unofficial third party intervention' instead. This term suggests an intervention made by non-official agents to help resolve a conflict. Montville's generic concept of Track Two diplomacy is more concerned with using different approaches to deal with conflict. Consequently, official agents representing a government can use ideas derived from the concept in their diplomatic activities.

To distinguish between what he calls 'unofficial third party intervention' and 'unofficial activities,' Rouhana makes the following statement:

> For an effort to be termed "unofficial third party intervention," some specifications are required: first, that the effort is expressly designed and carried out by a third party to contribute to the resolution of an ethnic or international conflict; second, that none of the parties participate in the effort as official representatives of governments or parties to the conflict; and third, that the theoretical relationship between the intervention and the potential contribution to the resolution of the conflict is clearly delineated.[59]

The proliferation of techniques under the Track Two diplomacy umbrella suggests that scholars and practitioners of the approach have yet to reach consensus, particularly on the best approach to implement Track Two diplomacy. Rouhana admitted that in the case of problem solving workshops, scholars and practitioners of workshops themselves are not unanimous with regard to the terminology, the method and goals of their approach or the techniques to be used.[60] In his opinion, "[t]he absence of a demonstrated and acceptable set of methodologies opens the door for practitioners to use whatever techniques they judge to be useful, often relying on their own instincts and goodwill."[61]

Although he agreed with Rouhana's assessment on the non-unanimity in the present state of unofficial problem solving approach, Saunders considers that each

technique can make a contribution to the overall peace process. Saunders argues as follows:

> No one program will achieve peace by itself. The impact will lie in combining complementary approaches. To build strategy around such a combination requires starting from the broadest possible choice among instruments and then knowing what each instrument can do and how instruments might reinforce each other.[62]

Based on his long experiences in peace efforts,[63] Saunders argues that "[p]ractitioners must also know when to use each instrument. That will be helped by thinking of a peace process as moving through stages."[64] Hence, following Saunders' argument, each technique - under problem solving workshop or Track Two diplomacy in general - can contribute to the peace process, as long as the practitioners know what technique to use at each stage.

The opinions of Rouhana and Saunders confirm that the problem solving workshop and its variants are still evolving and the element of experimentation remains observable. For instance, some scholars support the validity of the 'contact hypothesis', where adversaries coming together will reduce stereotypes and change their perceptions of the enemy[65] whereas some others use methods of psychoanalytical frames of analysis to guide their intervention in interethnic and international conflict. Those who champion psychoanalytical frames of analysis are confident in the efficacy of the "healing function of mourning, grieving, and apology in political conflict resolution".[66] According to Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, the first stage of most workshops is characterised with an outpouring of emotions which the third party should not "try to cut it short."[67]

However, Rouhana doubted the effectiveness of psychoanalytical frames of analysis in a conflict such as the former Yugoslavia.[68] In contrast, Saunders appears more optimistic and is confident that insights from psychiatrists, social psychologists or cultural anthropologists are important elements in helping the conflicting parties break their impasse.[69] Paul Salem also criticised the psychoanalytical technique as being less applicable, particularly, in the third world context:

> [I]n many non-Western negotiation situations, it might be wiser to increase the level of formality and social role-playing in order to get the negotiations going, rather than to increase the level of

personalization and individual self-revelation or to engage in game-playing.[70]

Indeed, being open and frank as part of the healing process might not fit well in a culture or society not accustomed to revealing emotions openly, such as in Indonesia's Javanese traditions.[71] At issue here is the timing of intervention, because when volatility is high, the efforts to reduce the animosity by psychoanalytical techniques might not be acceptable to the participants who believe that they are being victimised by the conflicts.[72] Thus, the timing of intervention and the techniques employed should also take into consideration the stages of the conflict.

According to Jacob Bercovicth, conflict has a life cycle: "conflict formation, goes through maturation and escalation, and terminates with stagnation, resolution or renewal."[73] Analysts give special attention to the stage or cycle of the conflict because in their analysis intervention at particular stages of the conflict tends to yield a positive result.[74] For instance, Hugh Miall argues that there are two phases in conflict when resolution appears more promising. "The first is at an early stage, before attitudes become too fixed and behaviour too hostile. The second is at a latter stage when the conflict has become a costly stalemate and the parties are exhausted."[75] In a mediation context, Bercovitch notes that "the longer a dispute lasts, the less amenable it is to mediation."[76] Other scholars give lesser consideration to the notion of stage and instead assume that an intervention by a third party to help resolve the problem will be more effective whenever a conflict has reached its ripeness.[77]

Ripeness in this case means that a conflict has reached a plateau or a level of 'hurting stalemate' where the parties "no longer feel they can use force to gain a unilateral advantage and, therefore, become willing to consider other options."[78] However, at times, a condition of hurting stalemate is more a perception than objective reality.[79] This notion of ripeness is also related to political changes which take place within the parties or countries, such as leadership change.[80] Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg describe this aspect of change as 'channel factors' (that is, critical facilitators of change). There are "people or processes that act as catalysts for new behaviour. They 'tunnel through' residual barriers to

change, initiating chain reactions that progressively build, leading to seemingly disproportionate results."[81] They also mention that the Oslo peace process was facilitated by a neutral facilitator (Norway) of which a Norwegian national, Terje Larsen, played a critical role in the early stage of the process through Track Two diplomacy.[82] Nevertheless, there are cases when the notion of asymmetry hinders the resolution of the process and, at times, prevents the conflicting parties from meeting face to face. Asymmetry in this case includes the issue of legal asymmetry (the issue of legitimacy) and structural asymmetry refers to "key differences in the internal structure, conditions and processes of the adversaries."[83] Two examples of structural asymmetry are the 'salience of goals' where the issue of the conflict is not high on the agenda of the parties, and the notion of 'survivability' in which the parties prefer the status quo in order to survive.[84]

From the above discussion of dynamics surrounding a conflict and the parties involved in it, a question arises on the efficacy of Track Two diplomacy. Rouhana suggests that proponents of each single approach in conflict resolution:

> ... define their goals, propose how to achieve them, and present systematic evidence that these goals are achievable. This will require the empirical demonstration of such interventions, beginning with what takes place in the initial meetings between adversaries and moving on to the impact on the conflictual relationship between the parties.[85]

Rouhana further states that to assess these approaches it is necessary to answer the following questions: is a new learning process taking place among the participants?; is there a new discourse after participants return to their home environment?; and are there new interactions among the participants?.[86] However, Burton, a leading figure of Track Two diplomacy, claims that the analytical framework of the Track Two approach itself always guarantees a positive outcome and states:

> [e]xperience has shown that when parties to disputes come into an analytical and exploratory framework they discover that their definitions of the conflict are false, that they are pursuing what are essentially common goals by adversary tactics, and that once their fundamental goals are defined accurately, options can be deduced by which they can be achieved in cooperation.[87]

Herbert Kelman also demonstrates a similar optimism when he states:

> [b]y helping to establish communications between parties at the sub-elite level and typically at the prenegotiation stage, these workshops undermine the 'we-they' image of conflict, begin a discussion of framework solutions, identify steps that will break the impasse, and create some understanding of the processes that will lead the parties out of the conflict.[88]

However, the meetings' convenor needs to ascertain that the new learning took place between the participants would have an impact on the relationship between the parties at the macro level. There were cases where the issue of a gap between the micro level of interaction between parties to a conflict and the macro level of conflict at societal level tempered Kelman optimism.[89] Success of addressing conflict situation in the 'micro' level of workshop does not guarantee that the achievement will affect the conflict at the 'macro' level if the participants fail to channel their new perceptions to the decision making elites.

Success or failure in any peace initiative is a concern of international relations' scholars who evaluate the role of the third party in helping the conflicting parties and the disputants resolve their problems.[90] The very notion of success itself is an ideal that according to John Kaufmann, "[e]ven the best of diplomatic techniques, whether in a multilateral, a bilateral, or a 'mixed up' set up, cannot ensure." [91] He also argued that "[s]uccess requires the finding of mutually acceptable solutions to what may at the start of a negotiation appear to be intractable problems and disagreements."[92] Although Kaufmann developed the argument from his long experiences as diplomat and negotiator, his concern about 'a mutually acceptable solution' as an indicator of success is also shared by conflict resolution scholars. From informal diplomacy's perspective an acceptable solution takes place when the parties emerge from the meeting with "*an outcome that satisfies their underlying interests and their goals.*"[93] However, as discussed earlier, some conflict resolution scholars and practitioners do not favour negotiation because they disapprove of the use of power and bargaining techniques in the negotiation process. Instead, they prefer problem solving techniques because "[w]ith problem solving, both sides may achieve favourable results, may prevent future conflict, and may maintain their relationship. Thus problem solving actually resolves conflict."[94]

However, there are many instances where the desired outcomes of a lasting peace generated from problem solving exercises failed to materialise. One example is the breakdown of the Israel and Palestine peace agreement from the Oslo' process signed in 1993.[95] The question arises whether the breakdown in the peace agreement from the Oslo' process invalidated the earlier success? This example illustrates the difficulty in assessing success from peace initiatives to deal with conflicts and disputes. Could the third party's goals, objectives and motives in assisting the peace process be used as a basis for evaluation? According to Tamra Pearson d'Estree, et al, "if we evaluate processes based upon their goals, then the concepts of success will be one that is easier to define and a less fearful or contested claim for practitioners to make".[96] However, an assessment of success would not be easy if the goals, objectives or even motives of the peace initiatives were not clearly spelled out. Thus, there are many issues that should be addressed in assessing the outcomes of any peace initiative, including the process stemming from informal diplomacy.

2.2.2. The third party role in and their expectation of Track Two diplomacy

In terms of third party roles in the problem solving process, almost all of the scholars agree that the third party should function mainly as a facilitator.[97] According to Ronald Fisher, the third party in the problem solving process should not be passive, but should implement strategies of inducing and maintaining mutually positive motivation, improving the openness and accuracy of communication, diagnosing the conflict, and regulating the interaction.[98] Herbert Kelman, however, postulated that the third party, especially in the workshop process, might engage themselves in one of the three forms as follows:

> (1) *theoretical inputs*, which help participants distance themselves from their own conflict, provide them conceptual tools for analysis of their conflict, and offer them relevant illustrations from previous research;
> (2) *content observations*, which suggest interpretations and implications of what is being said and point to convergences and divergences between the parties, to blind spots, to possible signals, and to issues for clarification; and
> (3) *process observations*, at the intergroup level, which suggest possible ways in which interactions between the parties 'here and now' may reflect the dynamics of the conflict between their communities.[99]

Kelman provides further clarification on the nature of the facilitator function of the third party and remains adamant that, as facilitator, the third party could intervene in the discussion process as long as the intervention was still within the rules of engagement he established earlier (the three forms above). Kelman defined the role of the third party as follows:

> The third party in our model does not take part in the substantive discussion; it does not give advice or offers its own proposals, nor does it take sides, evaluate the ideas presented, or arbitrate between different interpretations of historical facts or international law. The task of the third party is to create the conditions that allow ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. The facilitation of the third party, however, is an important part of the process. The third party sets the ground rules and monitors adherence to them; it helps to keep the discussion moving in constructive directions, tries to stimulate movement, and intervenes as relevant with questions, observations, and even challenges.[100]

Scholars and practitioners see the advantages of Track Two diplomacy from different angles. Track Two diplomacy and the problem solving workshop technique in particular could help scholars enrich their knowledge of international conflict, its dynamics and the potential for resolution.[101] In a larger spectrum the process could also be used as a 'laboratory' to study ethnic particularities, such as their behaviour, strength and weaknesses that might be used as an assumption of the negotiation or diplomatic style of the particular ethnic group. Practitioners find the approach supportive to the objective of developing proposals and de-escalating a conflict, in away not associated with formal channels. Indeed, the informal character of Track Two diplomacy has made discussion on some sensitive issues possible due to the non-binding character of the approach. Kelman is confident that the non-binding character of workshops "is their special strength and their unique contribution to the larger process: they provide an opportunity for *exploratory* interaction, which is essential to negotiation at all of its stages, but which is usually difficult to arrange in an official context, especially around the negotiating table."[102] He also added "[the] workshop can deal with issues that are not yet on the table, providing an opportunity for the parties to pre-negotiate some of these issues so that, by the time they get to the table, they can be framed in ways that are conducive to successful negotiation."[103] The advantage of the

process is that it is not confined to only changing the perceptions of the participants at the inter-personal level.

According to John McDonald, a former American diplomat, Track Two diplomacy "is designed to identify the policy differences and the nonnegotiable issues that divide the parties in conflict and then try to impact their solution."[104] He also stated that "[p]ersons involved in Track Two efforts have as their objective the reduction or de-escalation, of conflict within a country or between countries by lowering the anger, tension, or fear that exists, by facilitating improved communication, and by helping to bring about a better understanding of each party's point of view."[105] He valued creativity as an essential qualification for those practising Track Two diplomacy and indicated that "[o]ne of the strengths of the Track Two diplomacy is that it encourages an innovative and unconventional approach to old problems."[106] Arguably, creativity and innovation are significant for Track Two practitioners, and also qualities important for any person engaged in diplomatic or mediation efforts.[107]

According to Burton, third party members should have the following qualifications: "well informed on all available insights into patterns of behaviour, theories of behaviour, human motivations and goals, the political values attached to status and role and just about everything available in experience and in theory."[108] Burton also argues "it is preferable that those comprising the third party do *not* have a specialized knowledge of the area and of parties involved in the disputes. ... They are required to be, and to be seen to be, supportive of all parties."[109] The very nature of the informality of the method and the relatively limited role of the third party, mainly as facilitator, is disputed by Salem on the grounds that participants might have different values about the concept of seniority and leadership. He states that "the attempt of anonymous moderator/facilitator to establish leadership and authority over a negotiation process may cause resentment and may become part of the problem in the form of a struggle for power between the moderator/facilitator and various participants."[110] In his opinion, in some societies the position of the traditional authority figure as moderator/facilitator is more acceptable and in the same token,

the traditionally accepted rules of conflict resolution, that is, mediation, is more applicable.[111]

Scholars of Track Two diplomacy share several assumptions on how to conduct such diplomacy, but they are not unanimous with regard to the best method of conducting their peace initiatives or of the intentions of the Track Two approach. Interestingly, Edward Azar (a Track Two diplomacy advocate) considers the approach suitable for both the management and the resolution of conflict, although the majority of the scholars remain adamant on the exclusiveness of the approach for conflict resolution (see more discussion on this matter in the next section). Azar's broader expectation of the approach is reflected in the following:

> The applied conflict management approach works well if one holds to certain premises, namely, that politics and diplomacy are about building consensus between contending parties and that this process involves a long and complicated series of tasks. In almost all cases of protracted social conflict, the use of Track Two diplomacy is a crucial first step. Track Two is designed to establish a pre-negotiation stage in which analytical 'breakthroughs' by the disputants themselves are encouraged. ...Track Two and other forms of alternative diplomacy have become increasingly visible and popular during the last twenty years and have made contributions to the concepts and vocabulary of conflict analysis and management.[112]

The conventional wisdom suggests that as long as the intention of the approach, to analyse the needs, values and interests of the parties is fulfilled, then the method to achieve the intention is open to the practitioners' own judgement. As discussed earlier, there is a tendency among the practitioners of Track Two diplomacy to embark on trial and error (experimentation) based on instinct and goodwill.[113] Consequently, former diplomats who became Track Two practitioners also bring with them the skill and knowledge obtained during their careers in government.

Bearing in mind that the intervention of non-regional actors or 'complete strangers' in some conflicts might bring unrealistic expectations from the conflicting parties[114] or create distrust on the sincerity of the intention,[115] scholars like Salem argue that the conventional model of state based intervention in some third world societies remains appropriate. Although Salem's point of view merits consideration, in some cases a breakthrough in a conflict or a dispute can only be

stimulated with an informal process sponsored by non-state actors, especially if the warring factions do not feel prepared to embark on formal interactions. In this case, the familiarity with the regional setting, such as culture and influential individuals in society, could be added as a required qualification of the Track Two practitioners. To illustrate, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Track Two diplomacy set a platform toward the signing of the peace accord in Washington (1993), mainly because the process was initiated by Terje Larsen (a Norwegian) who was knowledgeable about local dynamics and who knew individuals who had access to decision makers.[116]

In summary, Track Two diplomacy remains an evolving approach to deal with deep-rooted conflict situations. To fulfil the intention of analysing the problems and finding their solution, scholars and practitioners brought with them their expertise, educational background (and method based on this) and skill. The motivation to intervene is not always based on a desire to find a solution to international conflict. Some of the efforts are motivated by a wish to test theories, approaches and techniques in real situations of international conflict.

The main themes of Track Two diplomacy, then, concern the uniqueness of the approach (referred to as originator), the objectives and the process of the Track Two diplomacy, and the skills of the practitioners. The following sections look at these themes more closely.

2.2.3. Track Two diplomacy - originator

Track Two diplomacy was introduced as an alternative to the traditional approach of official diplomacy, which was power based and often rigid.[117] Azar notes that official diplomacy "lacks the necessary orientation to generate conflict resolution breakthroughs,"[118] because Track One diplomacy gives emphasis to official contacts between the representatives of sovereign entities, governments and other parties to a dispute within a bargaining framework. Originally, the new track was designed to fill the gap left by official state agents, concerning the many protracted social conflicts in which the issue of state sovereignty usually limited the possible intervention by a state actor. Even if the official representatives did

interfere in the conflicts, their intention was mainly to stop the conflicts or to stop the escalation of the conflicts in an effort to promote settlement, and not to find a lasting solution to the problems. The settlement processes invariably involved selected members of parties to the conflicts, and the role of the third party was perceived as being based on the state interest.

Burton argues that the roots of international conflicts are similar to those of social conflicts at other levels, that is, a "situation in which ontological needs of identity and recognition, and associated human development needs, are frustrated. These conflicts cannot long be contained, controlled, or suppressed, but can be resolved and prevented by the satisfaction of such needs."[119] Track Two diplomacy was designed to assist the conflicting parties to address their problems and work together toward relationship improvement and problem solving.

The new track was also introduced, primarily, to deal with conflicts and not disputes. According to Miall, although there is a tendency to use the word conflict and dispute interchangeably, the two words involve a different set of issues. In this case, dispute is concerned with interests, which are prone to compromise, whereas conflict is concerned with more deep-seated issues, such as needs and values, and is therefore more difficult to reconcile.[120] As a consequence, Burton argues, conflicts and disputes should be approached differently, that is through dispute settlement and conflict resolution.[121] These scholars believe that awareness of the contrast will avoid a potential third party making the mistakes of traditional third parties, in failing to address the root of a problem. Hence, Burton, Miall and some other scholars agree that the existing mechanisms, such as diplomatic bargaining, judicial settlement and arbitration cannot settle problems satisfactorily.[122] They argue that existing mechanisms are not suitable, because: (1) the third party does not appear neutral to the conflicting parties; (2) the process tends to be power-based or dependent on the capacity of the mediator to put pressure on the parties; and (3) the mechanisms, sometimes, have to face the issue of legitimacy, and consequently the rulings are always at stake.[123]

Hugo Van der Merwe, however, questions such rigid separation between disputes and conflicts. He considers the needs as one aspect of a conflict, rather than the

defining characteristic of conflict, and therefore considers that both the analytical and bargaining approaches could be used in tandem.[124] Joseph Scimecca also questions the dichotomy, especially of non-power approaches to resolve dispute. For Scimecca, since power - following Weberian thinking - is omnipresent, any attempt to compromise interests and dissociate the efforts with power would not be effective.[125]

The broader interpretation of Track Two diplomacy given by Dennis Sandole can accommodate the differing perspectives mentioned above: Track Two diplomacy is an "attempt to achieve peace through cooperative processes, either by means of training, problem solving workshops, facilitation, conciliation, or mediation."[126] What really matters to Sandole is the ability of the third party "...to create the 'magic' by which *Realpolitik*-driven *competitive* processes can be replaced (or supplemented) by *Idealpolitik*-based *cooperative* processes of conflict resolution."[127]

2.2.4. Track Two diplomacy - objectives

As mentioned by Montville, Track Two diplomacy is often altruistic and includes the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising human and material resources in such a way to help the resolution of the conflict. With such broad goals or objectives, the scholars and practitioners of Track Two must have some priorities on what they would like to achieve with their particular interventions. They also have to take into consideration whether or not they can guarantee the sustainability of the Track Two diplomacy process from the standpoint of availability of funding and expertise. These two factors determine the third party commitment to the Track Two process and, therefore, determine the objectives of the diplomacy.

The third party needs to assess the constraints set by their budget and whether the informal meeting they organise is able to generate interest among the participants.[128] Due to participants' lack of enthusiasm, some unofficial interventions only last for a few series, or are even only a one-time exercise.[129] Consequently, scholars and practitioners could not expect that they would be able

to improve a relationship among the participants from an 'ad hoc meeting.' However, even from limited interactions among the conflicting parties, the meeting's convenor could increase their knowledge and scholarship on international conflict. Although the scholastic interest seems rather 'parochial', the objective of testing theory in the field is still a legitimate exercise. Nevertheless, an 'ad hoc' and 'parochial' exercise has the potential for creating difficulties for the participants and being counter-productive to future efforts with a long cycle program that attempts to interlock the informal and the formal processes.[130]

In the same way, state sponsored informal diplomacy could also have a range of objectives from settling the problem, to more parochial objectives, such as increasing the country's international standing or even raising the stature of those organising the peace initiatives. However, in any case and similar to the private sponsored Track Two diplomacy, state sponsored Track Two diplomacy also has to define the objectives of the exercise according to the capacity of the sponsor, and whether there are sufficient resources, in terms of funds and human resources, to facilitate the informal diplomacy process.

2.2.5. Track Two diplomacy - process/skill

The Track Two diplomacy process refers to three aspects: procedures, dynamics and strategy. Procedures refer to the standard principles of a problem solving exercise or other modes of intervention in general.[131] In this case, Rouhana mentions three important aspects. First, participants and third parties are unofficial representatives of their societies and not designated by their governments. The third party recruits the participants on the assumption that the participants "represent their society interests and should be legitimate within their own community."[132]

Secondly, the workshop consists of a small group and the participants are involved in group-dynamics. They interact in the following order: "parties first analyse the needs that have to be fulfilled and concerns that have to be addressed for a solution to be acceptable in each society, and only later examine possible solutions that respond to both sides' needs and the constraints that have to be

overcome."[133] However, the third party should be able to balance the agenda and the dynamic emanating from the interaction. Thirdly, the third party establishes ground rules as a requirement for the workshop to take place, that is, the meetings are private and confidential, the third party acts only as a facilitator not a mediator, and there are some expectations about what the meeting will achieve, such as thinking of new ideas, reaching agreement on one issue, or formulating a joint concept paper.[134] In particular, a meeting setting is regarded as critical for the overall Track Two diplomacy exercises and the ideal format would be a neutral and isolated setting: a meeting setting where the participants feel comfortable during and between the meetings.[135] According to Lynne C. D'Amico and Robert A. Rubinstein, the meeting setting at the pre-negotiation stage also has to pay special attention to cultural aspects of those in conflict, such as language and social identity.[136] The second aspect of process is concerned with the dynamics during the Track Two diplomacy exercise,[137] since the established procedures have a significant impact on the problem solving exercise.

The third party should give careful attention to the dynamics taking place during the Track Two exercises, and play its role according to the principles of Track Two diplomacy as discussed earlier, that is, mainly as a facilitator who observes the dynamics and only intervenes to provide theoretical inputs. Hence, the emphasis of the Track two diplomacy is to let the conflicting parties themselves find a resolution to their conflicts and, therefore, the third party should refrain from intervening in the exercise,[138] or even from fixing meeting's agenda.[139] As argued by John Burton, "problem solving means leaving decision making in the hands of the parties until an agreement is reached which satisfies the needs of all concerned."[140]

In the Track Two diplomacy context, the notion of strategy revolves around 'controlled communication.'[141] Controlled communication provides the facilitator with an opportunity to steer the discussion by way of directing the participants to discuss and analyse their problems issue by issue. In the process, the facilitator should discourage any effort by the participant to table any proposal for resolving their problem before the completion of the analytical process.[142] Strategies are also concerned with how to achieve objectives. However, the Track Two scholars

prefer the third party as facilitator which limits their role during the overall process to operating largely as a channel of communication. Therefore, the third party has very little control over the interactions between the parties.[143] Bercovitch states that "[scholars and Track Two practitioners] approach an international dispute as private citizens only, not as official representatives, and their efforts are designed to utilize their competence, credibility and experience to create contexts and occasions in which communication may be facilitated, and a better understanding of a conflict may be gained."[144]

Bercovitch makes clear that the skills of the practitioners are derived from their competence, which stems from their scholarship. However, as discussed earlier, the skills of the practitioners should also include creativity and innovation. Furthermore, as recently introduced and acknowledged, Track Two practitioners should also be aware of the dynamics of the conflict, so their efforts could contribute positively to the work at the formal level of the first track.[145] At the same time, the third party also has to couple their skill with "extensive knowledge and sensitivity regarding the social processes of human interaction,"[146] Ideally, each of the two tracks should be able to fill the gaps left by the other. Hence the two tracks reinforce one another and build peace cumulatively.

2.3. Foreign policy making and bureaucratic politics

The consideration of bureaucratic politics in foreign policy formulation is aimed at ascertaining the nature and extent of the involvement of bureaucrats in the formulation process. At issue is whether bureaucratic politics is a factor in Indonesian informal diplomacy. If bureaucratic politics is a factor, it is important to determine to what extent it influenced the informal diplomacy process, especially the attainment of the objectives set by the professional diplomats. The following discussion examines, in brief, the theoretical perspective of foreign policy making and bureaucratic politics.

Foreign policy making is a fluid and context bound subject, and is subject to the form of government (whether democratic or authoritarian, presidential or parliamentarian), to the domestic system (whether open or closed), to tradition and

culture, and to level of economic development.[147] The realist tradition assumes that, as a unitary actor, the state responds "rationally to the imperatives of the international system."[148] Lu Ning outlines the realist assumption of a state as a rational actor as follows:

> The classical schools [the realist] assumes that decisionmakers strive to be consistent, to make optimal choices in narrowly constrained, neatly defined situations, and to rank and maximise values by choosing the most efficient alternatives. It assumes that decisionmakers discern clearly their objectives, the options available, and the likely consequences of each alternative choice before making their decision.[149]

The rationality in the decision making process is enhanced by the roles of the bureaucrats within the political system. Therefore, foreign policy making is always predictable and follows a common pattern. First, the various layers of the bureaucracy process data gathered, but not all the layers process similar data because bureaucrats at the lowest level in the strata usually have no access to classified information. Then, the bureaucrats at the higher levels are able to propose foreign policy options to their superiors by combining the classified information they can access with the information gathered by their subordinates. Next, when the foreign policy options reach the desk of the highest level bureaucrat, that is, the Minister[150] his responsibility is to refine, reformulate or to approve the proposed policy. The Minister also receives foreign policy inputs from the 'attentive public' who are informed and show interest in foreign policy problems.[151] However, there are cases where the foreign policy establishment could "with no special efforts develop and maintain consistent international policies for many years."[152] This happens when the role of the attentive public is minimal.

Overall, the Minister is responsible for bringing the matter - after considering the various inputs from the various sources - to the attention of his superior, the Chief Diplomat (either the President or Prime Minister). Hence, the process flows up from the lower layers of the bureaucratic structures to the top-level bureaucrats, because the top echelons in the bureaucratic structures usually have little time to follow specific issues closely. Henry Kissinger stated to this effect as follows:

> The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems. A

> bureaucracy is efficient if the matters which it handles routinely are, in fact, the most frequent and if its procedures are relevant to their solution. If those criteria are met, the energies of the top leadership are freed to deal creatively with the unexpected occurrence or with the need for innovation.[153]

Kissinger suggests that the top leadership deal more with broad conceptual or hypothetical policy, requiring less knowledge of the details. At the same time, the top leadership also relies on the bureaucracy to implement the foreign policy outputs efficiently. Hence, at times, the flow can reverse when top officials give direction to sub-ordinates on issues requiring close attention. However, in any case, the nature of the process of data analysis is also subject to the management style of the leaders in the bureaucracy.

Overall, the rational actor model suggests that those responsible for foreign policy have ample opportunity to discuss the problems, based on the extensive information they have, and to make a decision from a range of alternative policy options to deal with or to respond to the problems. It is also acknowledged, however, that such luxury of time to discuss and contemplate options in the most rational manner is not always possible, because in some cases a decision has to be taken in a very short time, in a narrow interval such as during an international crisis. The most frequently cited case is the Cuban missile crisis. Graham Allison pioneered a work to reconstruct the decision making process during the crisis. In his seminal book 'The essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,' Allison proposed several models to understand foreign policy making; the rational actor model, the organisational process model and the governmental (bureaucratic) politics model.[154]

Clearly the aim behind proposing such models is not limited to reconstructing what takes place during a decision making process, but it also signifies an effort to analyse the process for the sake of greater understanding. Scholars of foreign policy making, at times, have no valid data to sustain their argument on how exactly a certain policy was formulated. Therefore, model and abstraction are an invaluable means for understanding the decision making process. The overall effort proves that foreign policy making is a complex process, and to deal with such a dilemma as not knowing the process has meant that the policy making

process itself is treated as a 'black box.' In this case, the scholars can only make assumptions about the process by analysing the policy outputs and the people whom they have determined were involved in the decision making process.[155]

However, according to Edward Morse, the major contribution of Allison's models (especially of bureaucratic politics) to the study of foreign policy making is for being critical to the very notion of rationality in the policy making process.[156] Morse notes that bureaucratic politics is a logical consequence of policy making in modern bureaucracies which "involves both lateral bargaining among the members of various administrative units and vertical or hierarchical bargaining among members of various strata in a single organization."[157] Lincoln Bloomfield shares this opinion and states that the bureaucratic politics model "illuminate[s] the nonrational influences that bear on steps in the policy process, and acknowledge the compromises real-world people make when they work through the policy machinery to a point of decision."[158]

Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf highlight the notion of parochialism in bureaucratic politics from Graham Allison's study as follows: "many participants in the deliberations that lead to policy choices often defined issues and favor policy alternatives that reflect their organizational affiliations."[159] Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe share the sentiment and state that:

> ... most policies reflect the conflicting interest of various government bureaus, military services, and subdivision thereof, which constantly compete to maintain their narrow bureaucratic survival and growth and to maximize their involvement and influence in the policy making process.[160]

In the efforts to secure their parochial interest, various bureaucratic elements often attempt to develop access to the Chief Diplomat (the President or the Head of Government). This is the reason behind the interests of some foreign policy analysts to assess the correlation between the degree of proximity/closeness or trustfulness between the Chief Diplomat and his confidant in foreign policy circles to certain policy outcomes.[161]

Clearly that as with all policy consideration, foreign policy is a contested matter, as evidenced by the ongoing competition among bureaucrats and the Chief

Diplomat's foreign policy aides for his/her favour or policy preferences. Following the bureaucratic politics' scenario, the policy making process involves a bargaining process among the foreign policy elites of which the outcomes from the deliberation is then presented to the Chief Diplomat. Bloomfield describes the complexity of the process as follows:

> The process of bargaining involves forming coalitions among players, and it is a familiar game for all bureaucrats down the line. Those coalitions cut across formal organizational lines and boxes. The process happens not at formal meetings but on the phone, by the water-cooler, or at lunch. Someone at one level may join up with someone at a different level, outside the chain of command, in different agencies, in order to create a coalition that can work things out to mutual benefit, then confront both bosses with an attractive policy.[162]

In some other cases the Chief Diplomat may request inputs separately from foreign policy elites on the kind of policy to be pursued, but the final decision rests on his judgement.[163] This notion of 'consultation' suggests a constant competition among the elites for their Chief Diplomat's favour, because being able to be heard and trusted will guarantee a positive reward.

Although bureaucratic politics is a useful framework for analysing the development and implementation of policy,[164] consideration should also be given to the state's ideology, as well as to traditions and practices developed in the individual political system.[165] For instance, Barton Bernstein expressed his concern about Allison's method of explaining the substance of policy by way of an abstraction of process mainly on the organisational and bureaucratic aspects, with little attention to the ideological aspects of the country.[166] It may be the case that in an open political system (democratic system) where public scrutiny of policy is high, the decision-maker must take into account the reactions of constituents, members of parliaments or interest groups, before initiating a policy. By way of contrast, in a more closed political system, such as an authoritarian system, the foreign policy elites have less obligation to consult other institutions during the decision making process. As a consequence, they have relative autonomy to propose a course of action.

However, the dichotomy of open and closed political systems does not always mean that foreign policy making is the product of the political system's particularities. There are cases when the leaders of the authoritarian system have little interest in foreign policy matters. In other cases, the leader or the elites in one political system have a great interest in foreign policy decision. The final decisions are, therefore, subject to the motivation of the elites, whether or not the decision serves designated national interests or serves mainly the parochial interests of the elites, such as for prestige or regime survival. The case of serving the parochial interests of elites is not limited to a closed political system because this attitude is also observable within an open one. For example, the U.S. State Department frequently competes with the White House National Security adviser for securing their position on foreign policy matters.[167] Similarly, the authoritarian system is not always characterised with leaders' domination in foreign policy making; General Franco of Spain left much of the foreign policy making to his foreign and economics ministers.[168] Hence, the aspect of leader or elite interest is a factor in foreign policy making whether the political system is open or closed.

The various models discussed above provide a framework to explain foreign policy making, but the researcher also needs to consider other factors which influence the process. In particular, Christopher Hill argues that applying the foreign policy making models developed in the Western tradition to the third world context requires open-mindedness.[169] He notes that in Indonesia's case, the analysis of foreign policy should go "beyond the rational actor approach"[170] and, following Franklin Weinstein's argument, that Indonesian foreign policy should be understood according to "the functions that foreign policy performs, whether internationally or at home, for the nation as a whole, and for sectional interests."[171] In fact, Weinstein's contribution to the study of Indonesian foreign policy is grounded on his consistency in showing that Indonesia's foreign policy was determined by the Indonesian foreign policy elites' view of the world. He also shows that the elites compete to influence the direction of foreign policy based on their particular view of the world.[172]

However, it is important to note that Weinstein conducted his study in the early years of the Soeharto presidency when the majority of Indonesian foreign policy

elites perceived the international environment as hostile to Indonesia's national interests. Their attitude stemmed from a combination of factors, including their revolutionary experiences of gaining independence, their struggle to win West Papua, and the abortive communist coup, allegedly linked to Communist China. Hence, by then, Indonesian foreign policy was clouded by the aspect of subjectivity of the elites stemming from their perceptions or misperceptions of their regional environment.

At the same time, these elites faced a dilemma concerning the course of foreign policy that they had to follow. On the one hand, their distrust of the external environment prevented them from 'bending' Indonesia's foreign policy to one of the two poles, the communist or the Western pole. On the other hand, the post-1966 government under Soeharto had to deal with an economic development program whose implementation depended on international economic assistance from the West. In fact, by then, economic assistance from the West was readily available. Hence, in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, the shape of Indonesian foreign policy was determined by: (1) the elites distrust of the international environment; (2) pragmatism and the need for economic assistance; and (3) a desire not to depend on foreign assistance, knowing Indonesian society's sensitivity about such dependency.

Those involved in inter-elite rivalry on foreign policy matters were mainly the military, technocrats and professional bureaucrats, and President Soeharto sat at the apex. The main characteristic of the bureaucratic politics of the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s is that the various elites were competing for the President's favour and maximised any opportunity to participate in the policy making process and implementation. However, of all the elites the military, especially the army, dominated the Indonesian political scene. From late 1960s to late 1980s, the military was considered as *primus inter pares* because they penetrated all state institutions, including the Foreign Ministry. The army had a strong presence in the Ministry partly because they distrusted the professional diplomats who, prior to the 1965 coup, were led by a pro-Soekarno Foreign Minister, Soebandrio.[173] Obviously, after the first few years of the army's purge against professional diplomats - allegedly sympathetic toward Soekarno and the communists (leftists) -

the Ministry was paralysed because some of their most qualified diplomats were detained or asked to take early retirement.[174] As a consequence, the new Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, had to cultivate a new cadre of professional diplomats and, at the same time, work in a context where the majority of the professional diplomats in the Ministry were reluctant to challenge the army in foreign policy matters.

Foreign Minister Malik, a senior politician, led the Ministry from 1967 to 1977. Clearly, the Ministry benefited from Minister Malik because he was well respected and, importantly, President Soeharto was not very interested in foreign policy matters and allowed the professional bureaucrats under Minister Malik to deal with foreign policy matters. However, the President did not let the professional bureaucrats (diplomats) gain autonomy in the foreign policy making and implementation. The President used his trusted aides to keep the professionals in check, including giving the differing groups overlapping assignments.[175] For instance, he assigned the intelligence apparatus and the professional diplomats to end the 'confrontation' with Malaysia.

This inter-elite competition on foreign policy - especially concerning economic policy - was prone to conflict. The most frequently cited case was the *January Disaster* (known by Indonesians as *Malapetaka Januari* or *Malari*) when students took to the streets in 1974 to protest against Indonesia's dependency on Japanese economic assistance and condemned President Soeharto's trusted aides who masterminded the policy. The riots in Jakarta following the student protest were allegedly organised by military and technocrat groups who were dissatisfied with the policy of close alignment with Japan.[176] Indeed, the lack of transparency of the decision-making process left the general public with no knowledge whatsoever of the decision making process and who was accountable for the policy outputs. As a consequence, the general public was easily used as a pawn when inter-elite competition surfaced.

At issue here is whether the characteristics of decision making in the 1970s can be applied to the decision making process in the 1980s and 1990s. In many ways, there were no significant changes within the domestic configuration in the

1980s and 1990s because of two central characteristics of the Indonesian political system. First, President Soeharto operated a closed political system in which he theoretically had maximum control of the domestic environment surrounding foreign policy making. Secondly, the President was a dominant figure in deciding the direction of Indonesia's politics, in terms of domestic and foreign policies. At the same time, he maintained his strategy of dispersing the process of policy framing and foreign policy implementation among a number of trusted aides, mostly from the military circle, and bureaucrats from several ministries. Hence, Soeharto maintained the pattern of inter-elite competition in order to keep his aides and subordinates in check and, at the same time, maintained his supremacy in the decision making process and as the chief policy maker.[177] Harold Crouch states that: "[b]y weakening the internal coherence of his regime, Soeharto was able to protect his own personal power."[178]

Competition among groups in policy framing and making was a central feature of Indonesian bureaucracy in the Soeharto era. However, in general, bureaucratic institutions in any political system experience similar kinds of competition and have to tackle problems of co-ordination and fragmentation.[179] These problems are observable in Western political systems and also in those of the Asian tradition, for instance in Japan. In Japan's case, C. S. Ahn notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) tends to control incoming information from its overseas posts and only shares limited information with other ministries. With this strategy the MoFA is able to surpass the other ministries on foreign policy issues.[180] The element of bureaucratic politics is a common feature in modern organisations. Paul 't Hart and Uriel Rosenthal explain the phenomena as follows: "the BP [bureaucratic politics] perspective depicts a country's foreign policy making system as a pluralistic arena where policy is a resultant of political interaction between multiple stakeholders within the government bureaucracy."[181]

Political interaction in this case can have positive or negative results. At one level, competition opens the possibility for innovation and creative thinking among the elites involved because they want recognition from their superiors. At another level, the negative side of competition comes as some bureaucrats are tempted to undermine their rivals, for instance, by not sharing data or even trying to derail the

implementation stage. Arguably, bureaucratic politics is a factor in Indonesian foreign policy both in terms of policy framing and policy implementation.[182] The President promoted bureaucratic politics and benefited from the process, especially when his personal interest in foreign policy matters increased.

Clearly an ability to deliver result as demanded by President Soeharto was the Ministry's only alternative for improving its position within the political system governed by inter-elites competition which was instigated by the President himself. For informal diplomacy to evolve during the 30 years of the New Order's regime, especially from the mid-1980s onward, the Ministry went through a 'soul searching' process to define their role and position in the Indonesian political system. They noted that the President always used a number of channels to achieve his foreign policy objectives, and that the Ministry was only one of these. Moreover, the Ministry had limited resources to compete with resource rich institutions such as the military and the State Secretariat. The only means for the Ministry to gain the President's confidence was through creativity, professionalism and, most importantly, by fulfilling the President's assignments. The limitation of the Ministry resources is more or less equivalent with their limitation of 'power' within the political system.

In order to overcome this resource gap, the Ministry could only compete by proposing ideas or alternative policy choices.[183] Ideas, including innovation in diplomacy, was the only relative 'power' that the Ministry had in its competition with other institutions. However, in order to fulfil the President's task, the Ministry had to maintain a good working relationship with other foreign policy elites, especially the military and the State Secretariat. Another way to secure support was by making the other institutions aware that the President himself was behind the diplomatic initiatives or to make it clear that the Ministry had gained 'the confidence' of the President.'[184] A good working relationship and 'the confidence of the President' was a means to increase the Ministry's flexibility to pursue diplomatic initiatives, particularly informal diplomacy.[185] Failure to obtain this confidence would have meant that support from other institutions would be minimal and the Ministry would have been left alone to pursue diplomatic

initiatives and, that the diplomatic initiatives themselves would have been prone to interference by other elites.

In summary, to a certain extent, Indonesia's experiences in foreign policy making and implementation reflected the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and the normal process of a rational organisational process, where inputs flow from the lower layers to the top layer. President Soeharto was a factor in Indonesian foreign policy because he intentionally let his subordinates compete with one another. Although the President was clearly a dominant figure in Indonesian foreign policy, the extent to which his personality was a dominant feature of Indonesian foreign policy would be hard to ascertain taking into account that, according to former Minister Ali Alatas, the former President would listen to the suggestions of his minister.[186] Thus, the personality factor in this thesis is treated as an intervening variable that would have influenced Indonesian diplomacy from 1985 onward, particularly in relation to the informal diplomacy conception. The President himself took a greater personal interest in foreign policy matters from the mid-1980s onward when he had achieved some success in establishing strong domestic foundations, that is, political stability and economic development. The Ministry took into account Soeharto's concerns, preferences and interests for the sake of gaining his support in pursing foreign policy objectives, including informal diplomacy.

2.4. Working definitions of informal diplomacy and bureaucratic politics

The following working definitions of informal diplomacy and bureaucratic politics have been derived from the discussion above.

2.4.1. Informal diplomacy

Informal diplomacy is both an approach to the conduct of diplomacy and a process whereby the diplomacy is conducted.

Informal diplomacy is free from the regulated and highly prescribed processes of formal diplomacy and is, therefore, non-conventional; it is an approach which

seeks to explore more freely the range of possible outcomes available than is envisaged under formal and conventional approaches to diplomacy; it is a process whereby the understandings of parties and the exploration of options are pursued through facilitating communication between parties; the facilitated communication is usually non-binding and often non-attributable; it is a process to encourage informal communication between parties; it is comprehensive in its approach and is designed to assist parties in conflict or serious disagreement to mutually agreed, supported and sustainable outcomes.

The parties may be found within one or more states; the parties may also include non-state actors.

These defining characteristics serve to identify informal diplomacy from formal diplomacy. Informal diplomacy does overlap with related notions, such as unofficial diplomacy or flexible diplomacy, but is more specific in the attributes of informal diplomacy.

In the case of Indonesia, informal diplomacy incorporates each of the attributes above, but specifically became part of the endeavours of the Ministry to support the President in efforts to ensure Indonesia could make a significant contribution to peace and stability in South East Asia.

2.4.2. Bureaucratic politics

Bureaucratic politics is the identification and analysis of the different bureaucratic elements, together with their interactions, in the development and implementation of policy.

Bureaucratic politics considers the policy making process to be characterised by many elements, including parochialism, conflicting interests and competition to secure particular organisational interests and needs, bargaining, and involves interaction across formal organisational lines and outside formal organisational structures.

As a concept bureaucratic politics connotes the elements of both positive and negative interactions. Positive interactions refer to the condition whereby those who participated in the foreign policy making process were concerned with attaining the most agreeable outcomes to be presented to the Chief Diplomat, the President or the Head of State. Negative interactions refer to a condition where some foreign policy making elites intentionally share only limited information and build cross-cutting coalitions with particular sections within other bureaucracies to achieve their preferred goals, to the exclusion of other goals.

In the case of Indonesia, the development and implementation of foreign policy reflect the main notions of bureaucratic politics. Specifically, it was part of the Ministry's endeavours to enhance its profile within the political system so strongly shaped by inter-elite competition. The primacy of domestic politics, and particularly the primacy of President Soeharto, were key elements in understanding the bureaucratic politics from which informal diplomacy emerged as a preferred approach when seeking to promote peace and stability in South East Asia. There can be no doubt that the President's views played a leading role in shaping the general direction; but it came after the Ministry had been successful in presenting him with a policy approach which he then supported.

It was evident that President Soeharto had considerable influence in foreign policy making and its outcomes. In order to maintain his control over the Indonesian foreign policy making elites, the President intentionally instigated inter-elite competition and this was indeed a feature of President Soeharto's governing style.

This reality did not make the use of bureaucratic politics conception in this thesis obsolete. On the one hand inter-elite or inter-bureaucracy interaction to produce foreign policy implies co-operative efforts to achieve the most agreeable policy. On the other hand, the policy making process itself is not free from the rivalry of those involved and who, at times, have conflicting interests.

2.5. Summary of analytical framework and assumptions

To achieve regional order a state can select a number of means, including regional co-operation and diplomacy. However, there are cases when regional co-operation has lacked a capacity to deal with issues affecting peace and stability because of the principles and norms that the organisation had adopted. At the same time, the traditional format of diplomacy and mediation can be less effective in dealing with deep-rooted conflicts or issues involving non-state actors. Track Two diplomacy was introduced as an alternative to the traditional form of diplomacy and mediation which was often based on power politics. As a new approach, the aim of Track Two diplomacy was to resolve conflicts and disputes comprehensively through co-operative efforts involving the main parties with resolution of the problems following from the interactions between the conflicting parties or the disputants facilitated by the third party in a setting of informal meetings. Track Two diplomacy scholars and practitioners usually favour an informal workshop as an ideal setting to analyse problems and to effect a breakthrough. The meeting setting and the skills of the third party facilitating the informal process are two important components of Track Two diplomacy.

In contrast to the above consideration of Track Two diplomacy, bureaucratic politics provides a different explanation as to why a state innovates an alternative form of diplomacy. Bureaucratic politics suggests that the dynamics within the domestic context influence foreign policy making. In the bureaucratic politics model, the head of the state (the President) instigates inter-elite competition in order to have the best policy options and, at the same time, to sustain his or her supremacy within the political system. Inter-elite competition is a norm of bureaucratic politics and, therefore, to survive the foreign policy elite or bureaucratic institution has to compete with the single objective of winning the favour or confidence of the President. To secure this confidence, the foreign policy elites must show that they are able to fulfil his/her task or to excel over other institutions. One way of surpassing other institutions is through proposing policy initiatives where special skills are required and no other institutions are equipped with such skills. Moreover, it is also important to look

for avenues where the initiatives upheld the priority of the President and, in Soeharto's case, his priority was to achieve order for the sake of national development. The support of the President for diplomatic initiatives left other institutions with no other options but to support them because they wanted to be part of activities which had the President's favour.

This summary of the theoretical framework provides two scenarios for Indonesia's proposal of informal diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts and disputes during the last two decades of Soeharto era. On the one hand, the adoption of Track Two diplomacy principles, assumptions and techniques was essential due to the nature of the regional conflicts and the disputes. On the other hand, bureaucratic politics put pressure on the Ministry to excel over other institutions and to gain the confidence of the President. Informal diplomacy was the Ministry's means to achieve these objectives.

Based on this analysis, the following assumptions about the Indonesian informal diplomacy can be made.

1. Informal diplomacy was selected given the nature of the conflicts and the disputes and the structural limits of ASEAN, as well as being an outcome of inter-elite competition within the bureaucratic politics model. The adoption of informal diplomacy signified that the Ministry wished to surpass other institutions in an effort to gain the President's trust and confidence.

2. The Ministry had confidence in the informal diplomacy approach because they were knowledgeable about the principles, assumptions and techniques of Track Two diplomacy. Moreover, the Ministry had the human resources with which to pursue objectives of informal diplomacy.

3. The element of bureaucratic politics could support or constrain the implementation of informal diplomacy due to the notion of inter-elite competition. Informal diplomacy receives more support from other institutions, both bureaucratic and military, if they know that the President has given it his full support. In contrast, such support would be less

forthcoming if the President only gave tacit approval to the informal diplomacy initiatives. These variations in the degree of support are a logical consequence of bureaucratic politics.

4. To maintain the support of the President, those who pursued diplomatic initiatives were very concerned with attaining tangible results from the informal diplomacy process. The pressure emanating from bureaucratic politics, and the Ministry's own wish for results, increased the likelihood that those who lead the informal diplomacy process were not thinking primarily of fully implementing the principles of Track Two diplomacy. They adjusted the Track Two approaches based on the dynamics during the informal diplomacy process.

2.6. Hypotheses to be tested

The followings hypotheses derived from the propositions about Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics will be tested in the three case studies of this research.

1. A third party's adherence to principles, assumptions and techniques derived from Track Two diplomacy will ensure positive results (this hypotheses is derived from John Burton's and Herbert Kelman's propositions, see footnotes 87 and 88).

2. The non-binding character of informal diplomacy and a third party's discipline in upholding its facilitation function are positively correlated with the participants' willingness to explore options (this hypotheses is derived from John Burton's, Herbert Kelman's and Barbara Hill's propositions [see footnote 97], and also Herbert Kelman's propositions [see footnotes 99 and 102]).

3. The participants' commitment to the informal diplomacy process is positively correlated with their preparedness for, and interests in, change (this hypotheses is derived from Fen Osler Hampson's proposition [see footnote

78], Daniel Lieberfeld's proposition [see footnote 80], and C. R. Mitchell's proposition [see footnote 84]).

4. A third party's creativity and innovation is derived from their scholarship and stature as private citizens, not from their official status or authority (this hypotheses is derived from John McDonald's proposition [see footnote 106], and Jacob Bercovitch' proposition [see footnote 144]).

5. Those practising informal diplomacy should set altruistic objectives and strive for the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising human and material resources, as well as their interests (this hypotheses is derived from Joe Montville's propositions [see footnotes 45] and Franklin Weinstein's proposition [see footnote 171]).

6. The level of support from bureaucratic and military institutions for informal diplomacy depends on the interest of the President in informal diplomatic initiatives. The more these institutions are aware of the President's support, the more forthcoming is their support for informal diplomacy (this hypotheses is derived from Thomas Preston and Paul 't Hart's proposition [see footnote 161], I. M. Destler's proposition on bureaucrats source of power [see footnote 184], and Johannes Botes and Christopher Mitchell's proposition on flexibility of a 'third party' [see footnote 185]).

II.3. Methodology

This research adopts an eclectic approach and employs standard research methods such as historical and geopolitical-strategic analyses, and other methods developed in the social sciences. Specifically, this study follows the qualitative method through case study analysis of Indonesia's informal diplomacy in dealing with the three regional problems between 1985-1998. Quantitative methods were not appropriate for this study because, as mentioned by Stephen Krasner, "quantification forces explicit rules for defining variables and explicit assumptions about the way variables relate."[187] This study is not seeking to affirm the relationship among all the variables because of the uniqueness of the issues

involved, that is, of the conflicts and the disputes. Political science scholars themselves also have not reached consensus on "how these rules were chosen or how the relationship should be tested, [that is, of quantitative methods]."[188] Hence, the qualitative method is undertaken in this study rather than the quantitative one because the qualitative method can provide a "holistic overview of the context under study: its logic, its arrangements and its explicit and implicit rules."[189]

This study develops a conceptual framework together with a range of arguments, and identifies main elements from propositions on Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics. The main elements from propositions on Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics function as suppositions of causal relationship among variables that led Indonesia to initiate and implement informal diplomacy. According to Robert Jervis, "fleshing out our theories and thinking of as many of the links in the causal chains as possible is a good way to make our theories more satisfying, more testable, and more productive."[190] In this connection, documentary research and interviews are the two major components of the qualitative research of this study, especially for collecting and interpreting data. Most importantly, from the two instruments (documentary research and interviews) this study is able to understand the issues in a more comprehensive way.

3.1. Written information

The major part of the data was gathered from primary sources: official documents published by the relevant agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the research centre of the Ministry of Defence (Lemhanas), and official news releases. The published materials from the respective ministers are treated as official policy lines concerning the diplomatic initiatives, which are part of the public record. Logically, the releases contained the kind of information that the Indonesian Government wished to project, such as why they conducted the diplomatic initiatives, what had been achieved during the activities and other general information about the issues themselves. The releases, including information provided to the public during press conferences (usually being conducted prior to

and after the events), mostly involved the kind of information that had been carefully scrutinised and the Ministry felt comfortable with sharing openly.

The official documents or the published documents also include the results of all the joint studies between the Ministry and some Indonesian universities and think tanks on some of the regional problems of this study. In many cases, the Ministry shared some information on the issues with their counterparts. In most cases, the studies were also held under the terms of reference prepared by the Ministry and therefore the project was designed to meet certain interests of the Ministry. These interests ranged from gaining their support for the government's policies (official lines) or seeking policy advice from the universities and think tanks.

As an official from the Ministry, the writer had been given access to study the unpublished records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, this research was also enriched by information gathered from unpublished internal documents, such as diplomatic reports, verbatim records and internal notes. The unpublished information gives a broader picture of the initiatives and the processes which were not clearly spelled out in the published official documents and press releases. However, due to the nature of the documents, which were mainly to serve the interests of government or organisations, the writer had taken care to observe the requirements of confidentiality to the documents' content and, therefore, the information obtained is paraphrased, taking the essence of the substance.

It is also important to mention that this study gives close attention to the documents and information from officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because the Ministry was responsible for the implementation of the informal diplomacy in each of the three case studies.[191] Considering the sensitivity of some data from primary sources, in particular some government documentation, the recorded information has been verified by those involved in the informal diplomacy, both governmental and non-governmental actors.

In order to have a balanced perspective, particularly in reviewing the objectiveness of the intentions and the interests of the participants in informal diplomacy, the views of a range of analysts and experts on Indonesian foreign

policy have also been sought. These experts provided their independent assessments of Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives in the three case studies discussed. In addition, data from secondary resources were also studied from major newspapers and magazines both in Indonesian and English, as well as from international journals.

The main parts of the primary data (documentary research) were gathered during fieldwork from 24 September 2001 to 14 January 2002 in Jakarta. The documentary researches were held mainly in the documentation holding of the Ministry and for each case study the average time allotted to the data gathering was between two and three weeks. This study obtained data concerning Cambodia from the documentation holding of the Directorate for Asia and Pacific Affairs (Dit. ASPAS). Data concerning Moro (the Philippines) was gathered from the documentation holding of the Directorate for International Organisation (Dit. OI) and Dit. ASPAS, both under the Directorate General for Political Affairs. Data concerning the South China Sea workshops was gathered from the documentation holding of the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry (BALITBANG Deplu).

Noting the limitation of old data on Cambodia in the documentation holding of the Directorate for Asia and Pacific Affairs,[192] the last two weeks of the field work were devoted to acquiring more data from the archive section of the Communication Office of the Ministry. In that particular office, the writer was given access to the classified cables and diplomatic communications between 1985 and 1991, involving four of Indonesia's diplomatic posts: Bangkok, Hanoi, Paris and the Indonesian Permanent Representative in the UN (New York).

3.2. The interviews

Interviews were an essential part of this study for three main reasons. First, this research aims to understand issues such as the reasons behind the selection of informal diplomacy, the objectives of the diplomatic initiatives and assessment of the processes taking place during the diplomatic exercise, from those who took part in or were involved in the undertaking. In this case, it is important to mention

that Indonesians are generally not fond of writing memoirs; in most cases they would rather give a lecture and share their life experiences.[193] Secondly, the elements such as bureaucratic politics and individual motivations of the initiators of informal diplomacy were not clearly spelt out in the written documents. Thirdly, this study considers that to gain a better perspective of Indonesia's foreign policy, particular attention should be given to culture specific dimensions (especially of Java), because the culture has undeniably influenced the way governmental officials (especially during the Presidency of Soeharto) expressed their opinions, in both verbal and written forms. Careful interpretation, to understand the nuances behind statements, was therefore essential, and interviews were a means to verify the meaning of ambiguous statements. Thus, the interview was a means of reconstructing the events and scrutinising information which is not expressed in the written records.

This study observed the unstructured interview technique and followed the open-ended (in-depth) interview in order to understand the issues in context "without imposing any apriori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry."[194] The intention was to let the interviewees (particularly those who took part in the diplomatic initiatives) provide their personal accounts of the informal diplomacy with regard to the process, including the preparation stage and the post-diplomatic exercises (evaluation stage). Basically, the intention was to let the interviewees recount issues that they felt were important. To have a more productive discussion, before every interview, extra times were devoted to familiarise the interviewee with the research objectives and issue areas that the study would like the interviewees to comment on.[195] In order to have a frank and open discussion, the interviews were not recorded. In addition to direct interviews, this study also conducted written or correspondence interviews, in which the interviewees were given a set of questions for comment. The latter were mainly aimed at the potential interviewees who did not reside in Jakarta during the field-research.

During the fieldwork, the writer interviewed 42 people. The composition of the interviewees were government officials, including those in active duty as well as those already retired; and Indonesian experts or specialists on Indonesian foreign policy and strategic issues in Southeast Asia. The majority of interviewees were

from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, including the main players who took part in the diplomatic undertakings and those who had some knowledge of the informal diplomacy process due to their participation in the Ministry's team. In order to have a variation of opinion, the range of interviewees were spread from those who, during the conduct of informal diplomacy, were the most senior to those who, at the time, were junior officials. Their names were obtained from the written documents and from recommendations made by some of the interviewees.

Prior to any interview, the writer sent each potential interviewee a letter requesting an appointment, including an attachment which explained the intention of the interview and the issues or information sought. Almost all of the interviews were conducted in Indonesian Language (*Bahasa Indonesia*), except one retired diplomat who preferred to speak in English. However, in many instances some interviewees preferred to use English words or sentences to emphasise certain points. In general, the atmosphere during the interviews was very open and the interviewees spoke frankly on various issues raised.

The exact composition of the interviewees was as follows: (1) still active officials included Foreign Minister, 2 senior officials at the level of Directorate General, 5 senior officials at the level of Director, 5 officials at the level of Deputy Director; 5 desk officials; 1 staff (2) already retired officials included former Foreign Minister (1988-1999), 12 former Ambassadors (five of them once holding a position of Director General of the Ministry and the rest at the level of Director), 1 former Directorate General and 1 former Director; (3) 7 experts on Indonesian foreign policy and security issues; and (4) 1 senior journalist. The list of interviewees' names and date of interview is attached in **Appendix No. 1.**

3.3. Research notes

In view of the limited time available to conduct the field-research, the compilation of data was guided by the research objectives; the conceptual framework, and some questions organised based on the propositions. This strategy helped in placing the information under separate headings relevant to conceptual frameworks or propositions. However, this study was careful not to let the

research become totally imprisoned by the conceptual framework. New insights gathered during the field-research were used to improve the concepts selected in this study.

The main part of the data for this study was gathered from the Soeharto era, taking into account that the informal diplomacy was initiated during his presidency. It is important to mention that the main feature of the Soeharto era was the element of secrecy and, as a consequence, government officials were by then very reluctant to talk openly to the media. Although they made some statements, the wording was usually vague and subject to interpretation. Indonesian journalists were known for their talent in making inferences from government statements, as well as in publicising information along the 'unwritten norms', that is, following the preferences of Soeharto's government. The writer consulted one senior journalist to seek his opinion or interpretation concerning some 'between the line' statements made by some government officials of the Soeharto era.

Lastly, to understand a state's behaviour and the policy options within a regional context, this thesis combined both the governmental and regional levels of analysis. The governmental level of analysis focused on the assessments of policies made by different segments within the Indonesian Government, to identify and examine the prevalence of competition in the country's bureaucracy, which led to the conduct of Indonesia's informal diplomacy in the selected case studies. The regional level of analysis involved a critical assessment of the strategic environment surrounding Indonesia, which was affected by the prolongation of unsettled issues and which also influenced Indonesia's way of designing informal diplomacy.

Notes

[1] Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice* (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 1981), p. 89.
[2] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1977), p. 246. Similarly, Kenneth Thompson argues that state interest, which is linked to national survival, will be more durable. Kenneth W. Thompson, *Morality and Foreign Policy* (London: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), p. 19.
[3] Harold Nicolson states that the greatest of all national interests is peace, and governments would do their utmost to preserve it. Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy,* 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 2.

[4] Friedrich Kratochwill, "On the Notion of 'Interests' in International Relations", *International Organization*, Vol. 36, Winter 1982, p. 1. To a certain extent, Kratochwill's argument of the correlation between national interest and public interest does not apply to the authoritarian system of government, due to the lack of public participation in the decision making. In this system of government, the ruling elite usually pursues its own foreign policy agenda.

[5] Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), Chapter 6.

[6] Ali Alatas, *The Role of Regional Organizations in the Maintenance and Promotion of International Peace and Security*. Speech at the 'Regional Symposium on Cooperative Peace in Southeast Asia', Jakarta, 11 September 1998, p. 4.

[7] Bull, op cit., p. 13.

[8] See Rosalyn Higgins, *Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 13. Despite the notion of state sovereignty being under challenge, in many ways most nation states will always attempt to protect their interests under the notion of state sovereignty. Therefore, states' allegiances on their national sovereignty will always challenge the enforcement capacity of international law.

[9] Jost Delbruck, "Peace through Emerging International Law", in Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), *The Quest for Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War among Societies, Cultures and States* (London: Sage Publication Ltd, 1987), p. 134.

[10] James C. Hsiung, *Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1997), p. 73.

[11] See Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (London: Routledge, 1991). Another narrow interpretation was given by Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said who defined diplomacy as "a method of negotiating between sovereignties." Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said, "Diplomacy – Political Technique for Implementing Foreign Policy", in Elmer Plischke (ed.), *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and The Artisans* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 20.

[12] Watson, ibid, p. 223. One of the statements which really reflects a state centric perspective is given by Harold Nicholson who states that "each party to a negotiation should know from the outset that the other party really represented the sovereign authority in his own country." Harold Nicholson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, 5th ed. (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1960), p. 52.

[13] John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1996), p. 312.

[14] Henry Kissinger, "Power and Diplomacy", in Johnson, E.A.J (ed.), *The Dimension of Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 18.

[15] Chris Farrands, "Perspectives on Negotiation", in Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones (eds.), *Change and the Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension* (London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1981), p. 89. Also Jay Rothman, "Supplementing Tradition: A Theoretical and Practical Typology for International Conflict Management", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 1989, pp. 266-7.

[16] See Sheldon W. Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 93. See also Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995), p. 62. Although limited, ASEAN's concern on security-related matters is discussed within three institutions, the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Track Two Forum that discusses security-related matters is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).

[17] Simon, ibid, p. 11.

[18] Michael Leifer, "The Role and Paradox of ASEAN", in Michael Leifer (ed.), *The Balance of Power in East Asia* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), Chapter 10. The argument is supported by the fact that the sense of community in ASEAN is more dominant among governmental officials who frequently interact within ASEAN's web of meetings. Unfortunately, people to people contact in ASEAN is still moderate and therefore the development of a sense of community among the ASEAN tends to be very slow.

[19] Amitav Acharya provides a comprehensive analysis of the role of ASEAN's norms in the context of managing regional order and in the development of collective interests as well as identities. Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order* (London: Routledge, 2001).

[20] Ayoob, op cit., pp. 62-3.

[21] A. Hasnan Habib, "Indonesia's Defence Industry: Its Role, Mission, and Set-Up", in Chandran Jeshurun (ed.), *Arms and Defence in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 79.

[22] Soedjatmoko, "Violence in the Third World", in Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), op cit., p. 297. Soedjatmoko, like many Javanese, has only one name.

[23] Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock Publication Ltd, 1971), p.16.

[24] See Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanism of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 61-2.

[25] In a way, this development indicates a change in ASEAN's culture. In fact, a desire to develop a new ASEAN culture to adjust to new realities and challenges was observable since the mid-1990s when some ASEAN leaders questioned the merit of maintaining the non-interference principle. They referred to some issues affecting the interest of the ASEAN members, but they were unable to vocalise their position openly because of ASEAN traditions. For example, some ASEAN countries were reluctant to criticise Indonesia openly on the haze problem stemming from forest fires in Borneo. However, the 'behind the scene criticism' made the governments appeared weak on the eyes of their domestic constituents. Interestingly, research held by BALITBANG Deplu suggests ASEAN promotes conflict resolution exercises to deal with problems involving some ASEAN members and to adjust the non-interference principle so that ASEAN can deal with problems in one member country that affect the interests of other members. See BALITBANG Deplu, *Visi Politik dan Keamanan ASEAN-10 Memasuki Abad ke-21* [*ASEAN 10's political and security vision in entering the 21st Century*] (Jakarta: BALITBANG Deplu, 1999), p. 85 & p. 113.

[26] See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 42, No. 1, February 1998, pp. 3-32.

[27] It is important to mention here that despite the large numbers of studies on diplomacy, there is relatively little discussion on the subject of new initiatives or alternative diplomacy. Writings on the subject of diplomacy mostly fall under the following classification: books written by diplomats which are mainly concerned with the development of the diplomatic institution and, in some cases, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this case, they usually explore the development of the subject within the context of European history. Historians and international relations theorists also show interest in diplomacy, but from different perspectives. According to Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman, historians study diplomacy to explain reasons behind particular events, whereas international relations theorists seek to make generalisations about why classes of events occur. The latter try to demonstrate that the outcome of a particular event is merely an example of an established pattern. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 22, Summer 1997, p. 10. Some forms of the innovation in diplomatic practices are highlighted in the book edited by Jan Melissen. See Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999).

[28] Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security", in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 479.

[29] Haruhiro Fukui, "Introduction: on the Significance of Informal Politics", in Lowell Dittmer, et al. (eds.), *Informal Politics in East Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 2-3.

[30] Ibid, p. 3.

[31] Linjun Wu, "How Far Can the ROC's Informal Diplomacy Go?", *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 7, July 1994, p. 82. The writer's attempts to search the key word (*informal diplomacy*) through the internet hit several articles/statements that centred on Taiwan 'diplomatic' activities and usually emphasised Taiwan economic strength and propaganda efforts.

[32] Roberto Toscano, "The ethics of modern diplomacy", in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner (eds.), *Ethics and International Affairs: Extent & Limits* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2001), p. 44.

[33] Hans Morgenthau, "The Future of Diplomacy", in Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds.), *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 3rd Ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), p. 79. According to Morgenthau "the means at the disposal of diplomacy are three: persuasion, compromise and the threat of force", p. 80.

[34] Costas Constantinou, "Diplomatic Representations or Who Framed the Ambassadors?", *Millennium*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 23. Some scholars noted that traditional or conventional diplomacy revolves around the elements of a state domain, concerned with relations between state actors in the international system, where the process of communication and the function of mediation or negotiation are essential. See for instance, Michael Palliser, "Diplomacy Today", in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1985), p. 25; Jan Melissen, "Introduction", in Jan Melissen (ed.), op cit., pp. xvi-xvii; and Lerche and Said, in Elmer Plischke (ed.), op cit., pp. 20-1.

[35] The definition is quoted in Toscano, in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner (eds.), op cit., p. 44.

[36] See Arthur Schlesinger, "The Measure of Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, pp. 147-8.

[37] Jay Rothman, "Supplementing Tradition: A Theoretical and Practical Typology for International Conflict Management", p. 266.

[38] See Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (London: MacMillam Press, Ltd., 1997), p. 181.

[39] See, Brian Hocking, "Catalytic Diplomacy" Beyond Newness and 'Decline", in Jan Melissen (ed.), op cit., pp. 21-42. Somé American diplomats noted that because of the reduction of their Ministry's budget, they could benefit from the network and resources of businesses, academics and NGOs' connections. Cynthia J. Chataway, "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1998, p. 272.

[40] On the centrality of communication in diplomacy see note 34, especially Costas Constantinou.

[41] Based on interviews with a number of Indonesian diplomats, including former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (14 November 2001) and Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda (3 November 2001).

[42] Interview with Dr. Hasjim Djalal, 23 November 2001. The informal workshop to deal with South China Sea disputes received support from Canada International Development Agency (CIDA).

[43] Interview with Dr. Marti Natalegawa, 5 December 2001.

[44] This opinion was shared by some interviewees, among others Mr. Andreas Sitepu (2 October 2001), Mr. John Louhanapessy (16 October 2001), Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab (4 October 2001), Mr. Juwana (19 October 2001), and Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad (1 November 2001).

[45] Quoted by John McDonald, "Observation of a Diplomat", in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Book, 1986), p. 143.

[46] Joe Montville, "Transnationalism and the Role of Track Two Diplomacy", in W. Thompson and K. Jensen (eds.), *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1991), p. 262.

[47] Christopher Dupont and Guy-Oliver Faure, "The Negotiation Process", in Victor Kremenyuk (ed.), *International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), p. 43.

[48] Loc cit. Louis Kriesberg introduced the notion of quasi-mediators, to distinguish official and unofficial negotiators. The quasi-mediators include persons who are not officials but have close ties with officials and act as their agent; and non-official groups without close ties to any governmental officials. She incorporated scholars and practitioners of Track Two diplomacy in this category. She also mentioned that "officials representing one of the disputing parties may act as quasi-mediators and provide some mediating services for some of the time." Louis Kriesberg, "Formal and Quasi-Mediators in International Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, pp. 23-4.

[49] Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1990), p. 3.

[50] Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald Fisher, "A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions; Theoretical and Practical Considerations", in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 246.

[51] Loc cit.

[52] Daniel Druckman, "An analytical research agenda for conflict and conflict resolution", in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 36.

[53] Ibid, p. 37.

[54] Harold Saunders, "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-negotiating Phases", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1985, pp. 255-261. Jay Rothman identifies three stages of pre-negotiation: the diagnostic, the procedural and agenda setting. Quoted in Keashly and Fisher. Keashly and Fisher, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), op cit., p. 246.

[55] According to Herbert Kelman, "[I]nteractive problem solving is a variant of what is now called *track II diplomacy*." Herbert Kelman, "The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 1, Issue 3, December 2000, p. 274.

[56] See Jay Rothman and Marie Olson, "From Interests to Identities: Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 3, May 2001, p. 300. Specifically, Rothman develops a four stages of conflict resolution, the so-called ARIA (Antagonism, Resonance, Action and Invention) model, that follows the stage of *adversarial framing* (what of the conflict), *reflextive-reframing* (focuses on why and who of the conflict), *inventing* (focuses on the how of cooperatively resolving the conflict) and *agenda-setting* (consolidation for plans for action), p. 298.

[57] The proponent of this approach is Ronald Fisher. See Keashly and Fisher, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), op cit., Chapter 11.

[58] John Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), op cit., p. 95.

[59] Nadim Rouhana, "Unofficial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: Between Legitimacy and Disarray", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1995, pp. 257. Concerning the third characteristic of the unofficial intervention, Christopher Mitchell argued that in the mid-1980s the Track Two scholars and practitioners begun to give more attention to factors that could give more predictibality to the result of their unofficial intervention. Mitchell considered that the new interests fall into 'meso-level theorising exercise'. See Christopher Mitchell, "Problem-solving exercise and theories of conflict resolution", in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), op cit, Chapter 6.

[60] Rouhana, ibid, pp. 255-268.

[61] Loc cit.

[62] Harold Saunders, "Possibilities and Challenges: Another Way to Consider Unofficial Third-Party Intervention", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1995, p. 274.

[63] Between 1974 and 1979, Harold Saunders was a member of the US team, under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which dealt with Arab - Israeli conflict, and he was also involved in the Camp David peace process.

[64] Saunders, "Possibilities and Challenges: Another Way to Consider Unofficial Third-Party Intervention", loc cit.

[65] However, the effectiveness of 'contact hypothesis' in reducing stereotypes and improving relationships are not always conclusive. It could be effective at inter personal level, but not at inter groups level. For a comprehensive discussion of inter groups contact in several political settings, see Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown (eds.), *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986).

[66] Quoted in Rouhana, op cit., p. 260.

[67] Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach* (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 104.

[68] Loc cit.

[69] See Saunders, "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-negotiating Phases", p. 249.

[70] Paul Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1993, pp. 366-7.

[71] On the importance of observing culture in the context of resolving conflict through Track Two diplomacy, see Kevin Avruch, "Introduction: Culture and Conflict Resolution", in Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), Chapter 1.

[72] See Mitchell, in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), op cit., pp. 86-9.

[73] Jacob Bercovitch, *Preventive Diplomacy and International Mediation: Assessing the Condition for Successful Conflict Management*, A paper for the ASEAN Regional Forum on Preventive Diplomacy, 8-10 May 1995, Seoul, Korea.

[74] See for instance Hugh Miall, *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945* (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1992), p. 61; and Fen Osler Hampson, "Third-Party Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict", *Millennium*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997, p. 735.

[75] Miall, loc cit.

[76] Quoted in Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure in Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 2, June 1996, p. 363.

[77] See Kleiboer's discussion on the various scholars' opinions on condition conducive for third party intervention. Loc cit.

[78] Hampson, op cit., p. 734.

[79] See Michael E. Salla, "Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1997, p. 451.

[80] See Daniel Lieberfeld, "Conflict 'Ripenes' Revisited: The South African and Israeli/Palestinian Cases", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 63-80.
[81] Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg, "Getting to the Table in Oslo: Driving Forces and Channel Factors, *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1999, p. 117.
[82] Ibid, p. 128.
[83] C. R. Mitchell, "Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolution", *Annals*, November 1991, p. 31.
[84] Ibid, pp. 32-3.
[85] Rouhana, op cit., p. 264.
[86] Ibid, pp. 264-5.
[87] John Burton, "Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics", in John McDonald and Diane Bendahmane (eds.), *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1987), p. 69.
[88] Quoted in Hampson, op cit, p. 743.
[89] Loc cit.
[90] See for instance Daniel Lieberfeld, "Evaluating the Contribution of Track Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 3, May 2002, pp. 355-372; Tamra Pearson d'Estree, et all, "Changing the Debate about 'Success' in Conflict Resolution Efforts", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2001, pp. 101-113; and Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, "Evaluating Interventions in History: The Case of International Conflict Resolution", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Spring 2000, pp. 33-63.
[91] Johan Kaufmann, *The Diplomacy of International Relations: Selected Writings* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 65.
[92] Loc cit.
[93] Mitchell and Banks, op cit., p. 6. Italics in original.
[94] Douglas P. Fry and C. Brooks Fry, "Culture and Conflict-Resolution Model: Exploring Alternatives to Violence", in Douglas P. Fry and Kaj Bjorkqvist (eds.), *Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution: Alternatives to Violence* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1997), p. 12.
[95] For discussion on the failure of conflict resolution process of Oslo, between the Palestinian and Israel, see Nadim Shehadi, "Talking about Talks", *The World Today*, Volume 58, No. 7, July 2002.
[96] d'Estree, et all, "Changing the Debate about 'Success' in Conflict Resolution Efforts", p. 103.
[97] For instance, see Burton, in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), op cit., p. 96; Barbara Hill, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem Solving Workshop to Theory", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1982, p. 118; also Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 66.
[98]Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, "Third Party Intervention in Intergroup Conflict: Consultation Is *Not* Mediation", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 4, October 1988, p. 386.
[99] Quoted in Hill, "An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem Solving Workshop to Theory", p. 126.
[100] Kelman, "The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution", p. 276.
[101] See Hill, op cit., p. 130.
[102] Kelman, "The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution", p. 282.
[103] Ibid, p. 283. Some scholars also support this point of view and argue that parties to the informal process can in fact negotiate issues that not yet possible for negotiation in formal forum. See Lawrence E. Susskind, Abram Chayes and Janet Martinez, "Parallel Informal Negotiation: A New Kind of International Dialogue", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 19-29.
[104] John McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy", in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart Thornson (eds.), *Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 205.
[105] Ibid, pp. 202-3. Besides the role of third party, de-escalation of a conflict can also be stimulated by internal process of the parties, that is, their effort to reassess their expectation. There is also event called 'shocks' that alter the parties' expectation. See Karen Rasler, "Shocks, Expectancy Revision, and the De-escalation of Protracted Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 6, November 2000, pp. 699-720.
[106] Ibid, p. 216.

[107] See for instance Cynthia Chataway, "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1998, pp. 269-284.
[108] Burton, in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), op cit, p. 105.
[109] Loc cit.
[110] Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective", p. 367.
[111] Loc cit.
[112] Azar, op cit, pp. 3-4.
[113] Rouhana, op cit, pp. 260-1.
[114] See Chataway, "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective", loc cit.
[115] See Salem, loc cit., Also Leonard Doob (ed.), *Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermada Workshop* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
[116] See Michael Watkins and Kim Winters, "Intervenors with Interests and Power", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 1997, p. 121. According to Dean Pruitt, Larsen is a "bridge people with prior understanding [of the conflict] and trusted access to both sides." Dean Pruitt, "The Tactics of Third-Party Intervention", *Orbis*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Spring 2000, p. 250. See also Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg, "Getting to the table in Oslo: Driving Forces and Channel Factors", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1998.
[117] See Mitchell and Banks, op cit., p. 5.
[118] Azar, op cit, p. 19.
[119] John Burton, "Conflict resolution as a political philosophy", in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), op cit, p. 55.
[120] See Miall, *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945*, pp. 53-55. Also Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 20.
[121] Burton, in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), loc cit.
[122] See for instance Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, op cit., pp.15-6; Miall, op cit., Chapter 5; and Nadim Rouhana, "Unofficial Intervention: Potential Contributions to Resolving Ethno-national Conflicts", in Jan Melissen (ed.), op cit., p. 112.
[123] See C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb, "Mediation in International Relations: An Evolving Tradition", in C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), *New Approaches to International Mediation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 4.
[124] Hugo van de Merwe, "Relating Theory to the Practice of Conflict Resolution in South Africa", in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), op cit, p. 266.
[125] Joseph Scimecca, "Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Contradiction in Terms", in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), op cit, Chapter 14.
[126] Dennis Sandole, *A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach*, http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/smoker.htlm (10 May 2000).
[127] Dennis Sandole, "Paradigm, Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence and Confusion", in Dennis Sandole and Hugo van de Merwe (eds.), op cit, p. 21.
[128] See Doob, *Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermada Workshop*.
[129] See Herbert Kelman, "Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), op cit.
[130] See Rouhana, in Jan Melissen (ed.), op cit., p. 126
[131] Ibid, pp. 117-120.
[132] Ibid, p. 118. Also Burton, in Edward Azar and John Burton (eds.), Chapter 7.
[133] In Rouhana, in Jan Melissen (ed.), loc cit.
[134] Ibid, p. 119.
[135] See for instance, Keashly and Fisher, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), p. 238; Doob, op cit.; John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), Chapter XII; and Kelman, in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), op cit.
[136] Lynne C. D'Amico and Robert A. Rubinstein, "Cultural Considerations When 'Setting' The Negotiation Table", *Negotiation Journal*, October 1999, pp. 389-395.
[137] See Kelman particularly in "The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution"; and Herbert Kelman and Stephen Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, 1976.
[138] See Edward Azar and Chung In Moon, "Managing Protracted Social Conflicts in the Third World: Facilitation and Development Policy", *Millennium*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1986, pp. 402-3. Also John Burton, *Conflict Resolution and Provention* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), p. 205.

[139] John Burton, *Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.: 1996), p. 72.
[140] Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*, p. 37.
[141] John Burton originates the idea of controlling communication during the workshop's process to resolve conflict. See John Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
[142] See for instance Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*, p. 60; Burton, *Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes*, pp. 72-3; and John Burton and Frank Dukes, *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement & Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 202-3.
[143] Jacob Bercovitch, Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette Wille, "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-7. According to Dean Pruitt, the third party as facilitator, usually in mediation efforts, can employ communication tactics, that is, "arranges the disputants to meet, tries to improve their relationship, or at least transmits messages between them." Pruitt, op cit., p. 245.
[144] Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations", in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubins (eds.), op cit., p. 11. See also Keashly and Fisher, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), op cit, p. 235.
[145] See Kelman, "The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution."
[146] Keashly and Fisher, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), op cit, p. 237. In broader perspective, Jeffrey Z. Rubin argues that all mediators must have a combination of process skills (e.g. to listen and to reframe issues) and content skills (in the form of understanding of the particular issues in conflict). Scholar/practitioner engage in Track Two diplomacy should also have these qualifications. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Conclusion: International Mediation in Context", in Jocob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.), op cit., p. 252.
[147] See Robert Wendzel, *International Relations: A Policymaker Focus* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), Chapter 7.
[148] Paul 't Hart and Uriel Rosenthal, "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, Supplement 2, November 1998, pp. 234.
[149] Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 174.
[150] In some political systems, a Minister is mostly a political position, and, therefore, a Minister is not a career bureaucrat. The President or the Prime Minister appoints him or her as a Minister. Within the Indonesian political system, there are two Foreign Ministers whose background are career diplomats or bureaucrats from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Those Ministers are Ali Alatas (from 1988 to 1999) and Dr. Hasan Wirajuda (appointed in 2001).
[151] Chadwick F. Alger, "Foreign Policies of US Publics", in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds.), *Perspectives on World Politics* (London: The Open University Press, 1987), p. 174.
[152] See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 111.
[153] Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1974), p. 18.
[154] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 5-7.
[155] For discussion on 'black box' and how to move beyond the tendency to put the policy making process as a 'black box,' see Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993), pp. 36-52.
[156] Edward Morse, "The transformation of foreign policies: modernization, interdependence and externalization", in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), *Perspective on World Politics*, 2nd ed (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 176.
[157] Loc cit.
[158] Lincoln Bloomfield, *The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), p 160.
[159] Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 4th ed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 51.
[160] Couloumbis and Wolfe, op cit, p. 93.

[161] For illustration in the US context, see Thomas Preston and Paul 't Hart, "Understanding and Evaluating Bureaucratic Politics: The Nexus Between Political Leaders and Advisory System", *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 49-98.
[162] Bloomfield, op cit, p. 162.
[163] Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 306. From his study on foreign policy making in the American context, Morton Halperin suggests that "no single actor's views of what should be done dominated, although the President's views played a major role in shaping the general direction in which American actions moved".
[164] Policy implementation is a part of the bureaucratic politics. According to Halperin "the implementers are likely not to have fully understood what was decided, and they are constrained by the standard operating procedures of their organization. They also might have the desire and the ability to resist orders and to do something else. Thus actions which appear to be designed to influence another government actually have much more complicated origins." Ibid, p. 312. He argues further that "they [those who implement policy] will interpret the action according to the shared images of their own society. They will view the action in light of their own interests within their own bureaucracy and society.", loc cit.
[165] Christopher Hill suggests that in using bureaucratic politics approach, one needs to "take into account of the variability of contexts in which bureaucratic politics are played out – there are many different levels of state power and economic development – as well as varying particular circumstances, historical periods and political cultures." Christopher Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 90. He argues that Morton Halperin was rather myopic by suggesting that all Governments are similar to the United States, ibid, p. 86.
[166] Barton Bernstein, "Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, p.136
[167] See Juliet Kaarbo and Deborah Gruenfeld, "The Social Psychology of Inter- and Intragroup Conflict in Governmental Politics", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, Supplement 2, November 1998, pp. 228, and also Preston and 't Hart, "Understanding and Evaluating Bureaucratic Politics: The Nexus Between Political Leaders and Advisory System", p. 53.
[168] Margaret Hermann, et al., "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, Summer 2001, p. 85.
[169] See Christopher Hill, "Theories of foreign policy making for the developing countries", in Christopher Clapham and William Wallace (eds.), *Foreign policy making in developing states* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1979), p. 1.
[170] Ibid, p. 4.
[171] Ibid, p.10. On sectional interest, David Brown pointed out that the "[m]ost pervasive characterization of the Indonesian state has rather been that which stresses elite factionalism and personalistic use of governmental power." David Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 112.
[172] See Franklin Weinstein, *The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia*. Ph.D Thesis, Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1972), pp. 646-7. In essence, any decision reached was the 'outcome' of the political process of bureaucratic politics. See I. M. Destler, "Organization and bureaucratic politics", in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), op cit, pp. 186-7.
[173] Soebandrio, like many Javanese, has only one name.
[174] See for instance a memoir of Ganis Harsono, *Cakrawala Politik Era Sukarno* [*Recollection of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era*] (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1985). Harsono was the second most senior official in the Ministry (Deputy Minister) before the coup in 1966. A number of retired diplomats interviewed by the writer confirmed the argument that President Soeharto, at first, distrusted the professional diplomats because of the Ministry's role in propagating Soekarno's ideal.
[175] For discussion on this, see Hermawan Sulistyo, "Biografi Politik Adam Malik: Dari Kiri ke Kanan" [Political biography of Adam Malik: from left to the right], *Prisma*, Edisi Khusus 20 Tahun Prisma, 1991, pp. 81-102.
[176] See Michael Sean Malley, "Soedjono Hoemardani dan Orde Baru: Aspri Presiden Bidang Ekonomi, 1966-1974" [Soedjono Hoemardani and the New Order: President's special assistant for economy, 1966-1974], *Prisma*, Edisi Khusus 20 Tahun Prisma, 1991, p. 119. See also: David Jenkins, *Soeharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, Monograph Series No. 64 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).
[177] For discussion on Soeharto's supremacy in foreign policy making, see Teuku Rezasyah, "Changing the Guards in Indonesian Foreign Policy Making: From Cold War into Post Cold War

Configuration", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, XXIII, No. 2 (Second Quarter), 1995, pp. 239-252. On Soeharto role in Indonesian foreign policy in general, see Leo Suryadinata, *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesian di Bawah Soeharto [Indonesia's foreign policy under Soeharto: aspiring to international leadership]* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996).

[178] Harold Crouch, "Indonesia's 'Strong' State", in Peter Dauvergne (ed.), *Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Societies* (St. Leonard: Allen & Unwin, 1998), p. 101.

[179] Wendzel, op cit., pp. 264-8.

[180] See C. S. Ahn, "Interministry Coordination in Japan's Foreign Policy making", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 41-60.

[181] 't Hart and Rosenthal, "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics", pp. 234-5.

[182] This thesis argues that the bureaucratic politics framework can better explain the aspects of development and implementation of policy in the Indonesian political system than the bureaucratic polity concept. Fred Riggs refers to bureaucratic polity as "a strict separation between the states and its own society." Quoted in Teuku Rezasyah, "Changing the Guards in Indonesian Foreign Policy Making: From Cold War into Post Cold War Configuration", p. 240. Whereas, Karl Jakson refers to bureaucratic polity in the Indonesian context as "cliques, circles, and patron-client ties [which] overrode the importance of institution." He asserts that "power in the New Order [the Soeharto Era] reflected the indispensability not of bureaucratic organizations but of ruling personalities." Quoted in Donald Emerson, "Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia", *Asian Survey XXIII*, no. 11 (November 1983), p. 1221. These definitions of bureaucratic polity suggest exclusiveness of elites and the supremacy of ruling personalities; this definition denied the role of bureaucracies in policy making. In contrast to this, in the Indonesian context, the bureaucracies did contribute to foreign policy making along the lines of the bureaucratic politics' perspective.

[183] On discussion of ideas and innovation in governmental politics see Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek, "Whither the Study of Government Politics in Foreign Policymaking? A Symposium", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, Supplement 2, November 1998, pp. 207-8.

[184] On a discussion of the bureaucratic sources of power see I. M. Destler, "Organization and Bureaucratic Politics", in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), op cit.

[185] A comprehensive discussion on the issues of a third party's flexibility in dealing with international conflicts, see Johannes Botes and Christopher Mitchell, "Constraints and Third Party Flexibility", *Annals*, AAPSS, 542, November 1995, pp. 168-184.

[186] Interview with former Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001. In some foreign policy cases, President Soeharto also considered policy alternatives from his foreign policy elites, such as in the case of the termination of IGGI (Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia) in 1991 and the cancellation of the purchase of the F-16 from the US in 1997 (information based on confidential sources). However, in the assessment of William Liddle, Soeharto has the capacity to decide on important policy options in the economic field. See William Liddle, "The Relative Autonomy of the Third World Politician: Soeharto and Indonesian Economic Development in Comparative Perspective", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 403-427.

[187] Stephen Krasner, "Toward Understanding in International Relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 1985, p. 142.

[188] Loc cit.

[189] Matthew B. Miles and A Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publication, Inc., 1994), p. 7.

[190] Robert Jervis, "Pluralistic Rigor: A comment on Bueno de Mesquita", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 1985, p. 147.

[191] In this case, the emphasis on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the important features of qualitative method. See Miles and Huberman, op cit, p. 27

[192] The Directorate has a limitation of archive room and therefore, they only keep data from 10 years back or from early 1990s.

[193] Generally speaking the 'telling cultures' rather than the 'writing cultures' is still more predominant in Indonesia. Some public figures are reluctant to expose their career achievement in writing because they do not want to appear to be showing pride.

[194] See Andrea Fontana and James Frey, "Interviewing: The Art of Science", in Normal K. Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1994), p. 364.

[195] Prior to the interviews, the researcher sent the potential interviewees some written information, outlining the research objectives and some issues that the study would like the interviewees to comment on.

Chapter III

Indonesian Foreign Policy in the Second-Half of Soeharto Era (1985-1998): In search of regional order through new diplomatic initiatives

III.1. Introduction

This chapter describes and examines Indonesian foreign policy in the second half of the Soeharto era (1985-1998). It focuses on the new diplomatic initiatives pursued by the Soeharto Government within this time frame to achieve Indonesia's core foreign policy objective of regional order.

This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first provides background information on Indonesia's interests for order at domestic, regional and international levels. The second describes the regional context of Indonesian foreign policy by looking at ASEAN and especially at the notion of Indonesia's national interest and the policy of accommodation. The third looks at the Soeharto era and examines more closely the aspect of the President's growing interest in foreign affairs and his concern with sustaining economic growth. The fourth section examines the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (the Ministry) in the context of growing confidence among the professional diplomats in the 1980s and 1990s. This section also outlines the structure and process of foreign policy initiation inside the Ministry. The fifth outlines the strategic motives behind Indonesia's adoption of informal diplomacy.

III.2. Indonesia's interest in order

The early years of independence helped Indonesian leaders to shape their outlook of order, in particular the inter-linkages between the interest of order at national, regional and international levels. Although most of the founding fathers realised that order at all levels was necessary to build the nation, their concern during the early years of independence was mostly with domestic disorder. The issue of

separatism required their immediate attention. However, they were also concerned that order at regional and international levels had been dictated by the strategic interests of the two superpowers under the bipolar structure. The antagonistic atmosphere at regional and international levels posed a serious challenge to Indonesia's efforts to build the nation and fulfil an ideal of a just and prosperous Indonesia as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution.[1] Mohammad Hatta stated that "only in a peaceful atmosphere can [Indonesia] rehabilitate its war-damaged economy and lift its citizens out of poverty."[2]

Seeing the risks of aligning Indonesia to one of the superpowers, Hatta pronounced that Indonesia should pursue 'an independent and active foreign policy' (*bebas-aktif*). Independent meant that the new republic would not bend itself to any of the opposing blocs, while active suggests efforts to help achieve a peaceful world and to help relax international tension emanating from the polarisation of world politics.[3] As a concept, an independent and active foreign policy invites a number of interpretations, such as a policy of "equidistance between the superpowers,"[4] and a foreign policy "based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and noninterference."[5] In essence, an independent and active foreign policy was a reflection of Indonesia's desire to act independently in international politics and not to simply follow the preferences of the major powers.

However, maintaining an independent posture did not free Indonesia from major powers meddling in Indonesia's domestic affairs. An example of this was the US support for the 1958 rebellion: PRRI (*Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia - Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic*) in Sumatra, and Permesta (*Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam - Universal Struggle Charter*) in Sulawesi. The US channelled weaponry for the rebel forces in Sumatra from Taiwan, and smuggled the weapons to the island from Singapore and Malaysia.[6] The evidence of external support to the rebel forces which including providing rebels with sanctuary raised Indonesians suspicions about the US, as well as concern about Malaysia and Singapore who had, in Indonesia's view, acted as foreign stooges. The Indonesian leaders also had similar suspicions of Britain who

"made [its] airfield facilities in Singapore and North Borneo available to the rebels [of 1958]."[7] The suspicions, fuelled with internal struggle for power in Indonesia, led to the adoption of a confrontation policy toward the British plan to form a Malaysian Federation in early 1960s.

Soekarno had taken power in the late 1950s and dissolved the parliamentarian system which he considered as a factor responsible for the weakening of the central government. Soekarno's perspective of order was shaped by his assessment of development at regional level and, in particular, by his scepticism toward the intentions of the Western powers in Southeast Asia. His scepticism toward the West and the efficacy of the United Nations to win the liberation of West Irian[8] from the Netherlands underpinned the adoption of the 'confrontation' policy toward the Netherlands. By choosing confrontation Indonesia was clearly subscribing to the view that the international system operating at the time was a revolutionary system in which the UN as an international organisation was ineffectual. Stanley Hoffmann describes this state of a revolutionary system as follows:

> A revolutionary system wracked by inexpiable power rivalries and ideological conflicts is one in which international organisation is reduced to impotence as a force of its own and to the condition of a helpless stake in the competitions of states.[9]

Having adopted such a perspective, Soekarno returned Indonesia to the 'rails of revolution' (*jalan revolusi*). By committing the nation to a revolutionary path, Soekarno deliberately radicalised Indonesia's posture, both domestically and internationally.[10] Soekarno's perspective of order was also shaped by his revolutionary point of view and his suspicions of the external powers' intentions regarding Indonesia.[11] For instance, when speaking before the UN General Assembly in 1960, Soekarno referred to the West Irian as a "colonial sword poised over Indonesia. It point at our heart, but it also threatens world peace."[12]

The conclusion of West Irian's chapter in 1962 did not pacify Soekarno. He challenged the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia on the grounds that Indonesia was not consulted when the decision to establish the Federation was made.[13] Soekarno, again, adopted a policy of 'confrontation' to challenge the

Federation of Malaysia and as a consequence, more resources were diverted from economic development and welfare to armaments. On December 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio claimed that the government was deliberately neglecting the economy for the sake of regaining Indonesia's national identity and reviving the 'iron spirit of the people.'[14] Soekarno's confrontation policy and his attempt to restructure order at the international level through the New Emerging Forces's proposal (NEFOS),[15] came to an end after the abortive coup in October 1965. After 1965, Soeharto took the leadership of the nation.

Soeharto dedicated his administration to order at all costs. Internally, he gave the military responsibility for maintaining order so that the development programs were not disturbed. The military and the intelligence apparatus were also responsible for monitoring the society from any efforts to destabilise the government, from both the extreme left (communist) and the extreme right (radical Muslim).[16] The military establishment considered the Indonesian political system was weak because the Indonesian society had yet to achieve cohesiveness and the nations faced an acute issue of national integration horizontally.[17]

The success of the military in maintaining stability[18] and the success of his economic development program (until 1997) gave Soeharto the opportunity to concentrate power in his hand. According to Jamie Mackie, this success gave Soeharto what he called "performance legitimacy."[19] From 1965 to the late 1990s, Soeharto's power was so decisive because there were no groups or individuals capable of effectively challenging his governing system. His system was authoritarian with strong emphasis for an orderly, harmonious and tolerant relationship within the pluralistic society of Indonesia.[20] As mentioned by Donald Emmerson, Soeharto "has not only built a government but around it a regime, whose structures are more solid than a purely personalistic or Javanese-cultural conception of power in the New order would allow."[21]

Order at the regional level was also essential in creating a more predictable environment in the area surrounding Indonesia's territorial border. To secure regional order, Soeharto adopted two strategies: he ended confrontation with

Malaysia and supported the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. In fact, Soeharto as a commander of the Army Strategic Command (*KOSTRAD – Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat*) had established contact with the authorities in Malaysia to end Confrontation, even when Soekarno was still hammering his Crush Malaysia's Campaign (*Kampanye Ganyang Malaysia*).[22] The use of an informal channel and trusted confidant to further Soeharto's objective, as in the case in Malaysia, became a common feature of Soeharto's style of administration, at both domestic and international levels.

Indonesia did achieve the two most significant issues in the context of its strategic interest within the ASEAN framework: first on the stipulation that all foreign bases were temporary in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967,[23] and second, the adjustment of the final concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declared in Kuala Lumpur in 1971. On the latter, the neutrality conception of ZOPFAN was closer to Indonesia's strategic thinking of denying external powers influence in the region. In the earlier version, Malaysia proposed neutrality with the proviso that the major powers would guarantee not to compete in the region.[24]

However, the nature of Indonesia's preoccupation with domestic problems led it to promote the national and regional resilience conception as a prescription for maintaining regional order. With national resilience, each member is responsible for strengthening its domestic capacity, in all aspects: economic, political, social and cultural, as well as security and defence. Conceptually, the totality of national resilience of all ASEAN members would form a regional resilience. President Soeharto was involved in introducing the concept to other ASEAN members and systematically, the National Defence Institute of Indonesia (*LEMHANAS – Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional*) conducted a series of workshops, involving military and civilian leaders of ASEAN countries, to disseminate the ideas.[25] At the end, ASEAN member countries accepted the ideas.

ASEAN did increase Indonesia's sense of security at the regional level. To enhance regional trust and confidence and Indonesia's sense of security, the

Soeharto government embarked on boundary delimitation programs with its neighbours and supported regional economic co-operation.

III.3. Indonesian foreign policy in regional context: pursuing national interests beyond ASEAN

As discussed in the first section, Indonesia under Soeharto gave priority to pursuing the establishment of an orderly system, at both domestic and regional levels. At the regional level, Soeharto considered ASEAN as Indonesia's main instrument to achieve regional order and, therefore, ASEAN was designated as the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. However, Indonesia's interest in having a peaceful and stable regional environment clashed at times with the ASEAN group position on some issues. One case in point was the Cambodian conflict between 1979-1991. Here ASEAN had to accommodate Thailand's stand on the conflict because Thailand felt threatened by the presence of Vietnamese troops along Thai and Cambodian borders. As a loyal member, Indonesia had to accommodate Thailand's interests and follow the collective position set by ASEAN. Former Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja expressed Indonesia's feeling at this time by stating "ASEAN and especially Indonesia had no choice other than to stand firmly against the armed intervention of Vietnam in Kampuchea."[26] His statement stressed ASEAN's interest in maintaining its credibility, but it also emphasised that Indonesia was left with no option other than to follow ASEAN's position.

The ASEAN tradition of accommodation was considered as the backbone of the association. Michael Antolik regarded accommodation as a factor that contributed to the successful outcomes of ASEAN co-operation and stated that "[t]he continued success of the ASEAN process depends on member governments' ability and willingness to continue accommodation."[27] Hence, on the issues of accommodation, Indonesia faced a dilemma between observing the ASEAN tradition of accommodation and, at the same time, looking for ways to further Indonesia's interests.

ASEAN also subscribed to the non-interference principle and was not willing to intervene in the domestic problems of the member states or with issues of bilateral concerns, such as territorial disputes. However, non-interference did not necessarily mean that the ASEAN countries prevented other members from responding to requests for help from member countries. In some cases, ASEAN countries did help each other with internal problems, but mostly where there were mutual interests and consent for such assistance or co-operation. An example of this was the joint border co-operation between Indonesia and Malaysia to eradicate the remnants of the communist groups in Borneo.[28] Furthermore, ASEAN and their members had developed a tradition of postponing discussion on sensitive issues involving the member states to the indefinite future, to a time when the member states would feel comfortable about discussing the issues, either bilaterally or as a group within the ASEAN forum.

On the one hand, both the traditions of accommodation and non-interference served Indonesia's interests. For instance, Indonesia had been able to rely on support from individual ASEAN members and from ASEAN as a group on the East Timor issue at the UN and other international forums. The non-interference principle on the domestic problems of other members had given the Soeharto government a free hand to deal with any domestic problem, including those in East Timor, as well as separatism in West Irian and Aceh. In fact, Indonesia's dispute with Portugal on East Timor had jeopardised the external co-operation between ASEAN and the EU in the 1990s. This meant that ASEAN members had no other option but to follow Indonesia's position on East Timor in the 1990s.[29] On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Indonesia was also concerned about some problems at the regional level that had the potential to jeopardise Indonesia's interest in having a stable regional environment to support its economic development program. For instance, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea had the potential to upset the exploration of liquid natural gas in Indonesia's Natuna Island, but ASEAN was not in a position to address these disputes within its framework. Nana Sutresna, former Director General for Political Affairs of the Ministry, provided his assessment to that effect as follows:

> Indonesia is aware that any development in Southeast Asia, whether positively or negatively, will have a direct bearing on its

> natural development. Prospects of political stability and economic progress within each individual country cannot be separated from the prospects of peace and stability in the surrounding region.[30]

Hence, Indonesia was left with the option of letting some regional problems run their own course or pursuing diplomatic initiatives of its own. Indonesia was able to address some issues of regional concern beyond the ASEAN framework. In the case of Cambodia, with a mandate from ASEAN to act as ASEAN's interlocutor, Indonesia organised Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM). Later on, as a Co-Chair of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) with France, the two countries elevated the discussion of the problem to the international level. PICC as a framework to discuss the Cambodian problem is an example of Indonesia moved beyond ASEAN in its diplomatic efforts. Similar to JIM, all ASEAN countries took part in PICC as individual countries and, therefore, each of them had no obligation to uphold ASEAN's positions.

As will be explained in Chapter 4, some ASEAN countries took a rigid position during JIM and PICC and this attitude had a negative impact on the dynamics during the meetings. These realities further convinced Indonesia that the ASEAN tradition of accommodation was incompatible with Indonesia's interest of having a speedy resolution to the Cambodian conflict. One retired senior diplomat from Indonesia mentioned that, at one time, he had criticised his counterpart from Singapore for being very hostile toward Vietnam and the Hun Sen led-government. He stressed that such hostility contributed to the deterioration of the meetings' atmosphere.[31] The parochial attitude of some ASEAN participants had convinced Indonesia that their colleagues were only concerned with their own interests. As a consequence, Indonesia considered it acceptable to strive for its own interests by initiating new diplomatic initiatives.

As PICC had set a precedent of Indonesia pursuing new diplomatic initiatives at the regional level, Indonesia proposed two further diplomatic initiatives at this level. Indonesia received a mandate from the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) to help resolve the Moro problem, and engaged ASEAN countries in informal diplomacy processes through informal workshop on the South China Sea

disputes. These three cases demonstrated that in the desire for regional order, Indonesia was willing to use ASEAN as a vehicle and, if necessary, move beyond ASEAN. Informal diplomacy was Indonesia's means to effect a breakthrough on these problems.

III.4. President Soeharto and Indonesian foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s: growing personal interest

When he assumed leadership of Indonesia in the 1960s, Soeharto displayed a low profile posture on foreign policy and even let Thailand gain the credit for the establishment of ASEAN, despite the fact that the association was Indonesia's brainchild.[32] ASEAN was closely associated with Thailand because the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, signed in Bangkok, was also named the Bangkok Declaration. Soeharto did not wish to take personal credit for ASEAN's establishment, even though he had assigned his lieutenant, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and a small team to develop a concept paper of ASEAN as a regional framework for co-operation and later on persuaded neighbours to accept its ideas. This low profile posture of Soeharto can be explained in two ways. First, the President wished to establish a new posture for Indonesia post-Soekarno. He wished to portray an image of a co-operative Indonesia which did not wish to play a 'big brother' role in the region. Second, at that stage the President was preoccupied with the domestic problems and had had little exposure to international affairs. Soeharto saw the merits of the idea of regional co-operation and let Minister Malik work intensively to gain support for the idea from the neighbouring countries. Hence what really mattered to Soeharto was the acceptance of the concept of regional co-operation and agreement for the establishment of ASEAN.

Soeharto let Minister Malik and his small team of professional diplomats from the Ministry develop the concept paper of ASEAN. Soeharto also assigned a number of army officials closely associated with him to work with the team.[33] On the one hand, the assignment of military officials could be interpreted as a means to increase the efficiency of the diplomatic efforts because the military had networks

among their military counterparts in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Soeharto could have been also indicating to Minister Malik and his team that they should not claim credit for their diplomatic efforts because the army officials were assisting them in their work. Overall, Soeharto's actions signify his strong control of the process around the establishment of ASEAN, and both the Ministry and the armed forces were simply executing his orders. However, at the same time, Soeharto maintained his low profile during the process.

Soeharto kept this low profile on foreign affairs throughout the 1970s, mainly because his government was busy concentrating its energy on the national development program. The improvement in the economic situation in the 1970s helped the regime gain broader acceptance, even among groups initially opposing it.[34] However, the stabilisation and development programs were implemented at the price of a harsh policy at the national level. As noted before, during the early years of the Soeharto government, the military gained more leverage in domestic politics because it acted as Soeharto's main instrument to achieve national stability.[35]

The 1980s marked a new chapter of Soeharto's Indonesia, especially in the fields of domestic politics and the economy. Some developments had profound impacts on Indonesia's politics in the 1990s and, therefore, will be examined closely in this chapter. Overall, Soeharto was able to manage these developments and, as a consequence, his pre-eminence in Indonesia between 1980s to the first half of 1990s was not challenged. In the 1980s, Soeharto was very confident about his supremacy in the domestic political system. Mackie summarised Soeharto's profile in the 1980s onward as follows:

> ...Soeharto found himself in a position of unprecedented personal preeminence in the early 1980s, completely dominating the political system and imposing his own personal style on it increasingly from then on. Decision-making authority came to be concentrated more than ever in and around the palace circle of the president and his immediate associates.[36]

In the political field, the most significant developments in the late 1980s concerned Soeharto's relationship with the military and the Islamic interest

groups. In the early 1980s, Soeharto had legitimised the military's dominant position of the Indonesian political system through legislation No. 20, 1982. Some Indonesian analysts, such as Riefqi Muna, argue that the new bill entitled 'Basic Provisions for the Defence and Security of the Republic Indonesia' had legalised the 'dual function' of the military, and, at the same time, increased the role of the military into a 'multi-function' one.[37] The bill gave the military the licence to penetrate all aspects of Indonesian life, not only in security and socio-political affairs, but also in economic, cultural and other affairs. Micheal Vatikiotis argues that the bill was Soeharto's means of "distributing patronage to his supporters and silencing his critics."[38] With the military gaining a dignified grip on the political system, many in Indonesian society regarded the military as a tool of the Soeharto regime.[39] The sense of antipathy toward the military became deeply embedded within the society.

Sensing the growing resentment toward the military, in the mid-1980s Soeharto appeared gradually to distance himself from it. He did not prevent some civilian leaders from questioning the military's perspective of stability and also their domination in domestic politics. While the military continued with their focus on maintaining stability through vigilance toward the 'communist threat' and of maintaining 'national discipline,' civilian intellectuals were promoting the necessity of pursuing a democratisation program.[40] This episode signified a period when civilians began to assert their position in the Indonesian political system. Although the civilians were not always successful in their efforts - because the military was always adamant about their prime position - what was impressive was that civilians had the courage to challenge the military's rigid security outlook.

At the same time and also not to the military's liking, Islamic leaders and intellectuals began to look for a greater role in domestic politics. By the late 1980s, Soeharto was looking for an alternative power base among the Indonesian Moslems to balance the army's power.[41] One of Soeharto's sources of support was *Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI or Association of Indonesian

Muslim Intellectuals) which was established in December 1990, and led by Soeharto's protégé, B.J. Habibie. Douglas Ramage argues that:

> It is well known that because Soeharto's support from the armed forces has somewhat diminished since the late 1980s, he has actively sought to co-opt the Indonesian Islamic movement to bolster his legitimacy.[42]

For their part, the military in the late 1980s were made aware that the President was prepared to be bold in his dealings with some domestic affairs, even if that meant contradicting the position of the military. The most obvious case was Soeharto's appointment of a former army lawyer, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudharmono, as Vice President in 1988, despite the strong objections from the military.[43] In the early 1990s, Soeharto made a statement asking the military to limit their involvement in the internal affairs of other institutions: governmental and non-governmental organisations.[44] In 1993 Soeharto did not endorse the appointment of military candidates for the position of general chairman of GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya* – Functional Group).[45] Harmoko, a civilian, was elected to this position and as a result the rivalry between the civilians and the military intensified and became public knowledge.[46] Clearly, controlling the power of the military was a calculated move by Soeharto of and was followed by the gradual decline in the military's role in Indonesia's politics.

In the mid-1980s, Soeharto had adopted *politik keterbukaan* (political openness) which had helped loosen some of the tension within the political system. Under the 'political openness' policy, new Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) flourished and those organisations provided Indonesia's younger generation with alternative political outlets.[47] In the political openness era, journalists also found new freedom to express their opinions, although they had to express their opinions carefully so that they did not offend the government.[48] Economic growth during the Soeharto years also stimulated the emergence of Indonesia's middle class.[49] The new middle class was a product of government protective measures and easy access to government funds and therefore, they gave their support to the Soeharto government.[50] Bob Lowry provides his assessment of these economic elites as follows:

> Many of the current indigenous capital holders have family or patronage relationships with the bureaucracy which provide access to government contracts and protection from Chinese and foreign business.[51]

Starting in the 1980s, Indonesia embarked on an export led growth strategy and, to stimulate the strategy, the government gave the private sectors and foreign investors more incentives, such as tax holidays. Hence, from 1980s onward, the Soeharto government's outlook in the economic field was more open as Indonesia hoped to integrate its economy to the Asia and Pacific markets.

This study argues that having the domestic sphere in control and having economic progress in hand, Soeharto began to give more personal interest to foreign affairs. President Soeharto became actively involved in deciding foreign policy direction. He had showed interest and gave moral support to JIM (in the 1980s) and the Moro peace process (in the 1990s). Moreover, he was directly involved in another two of the most high profile international events in Indonesia, the NAM Summit in 1992 and the APEC Leaders Meeting in 1994.[52]

In dealing with the NAM and APEC issues, Soeharto also adopted a policy of dispersing assignments. He relied on the professionals from the Foreign Ministry and, at the same time, appointed some trusted aides as Soeharto's alternative channel to deal with particular issues. For instance, in the case of APEC he appointed Prof. Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, a technocrat, as his liaison with APEC members.[53] The appointment of trusted aides duplicated the work of the Ministry, the formal institution responsible for dealing with day to day operations related to the issues.

Although Soeharto maintained his habit of using a number of channels to pursue foreign policy objectives, the role of professional diplomats did gradually increase. Soeharto needed the professional diplomats to deal with the delicate negotiations surrounding the NAM and APEC processes, a role that his personal aides were unable to fulfil. Arguably, Soeharto's confidence in the diplomats' ability had increased because of their success in various international assignments, such as during the negotiations of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on Law

of the Sea) where the conception of archipelagic states was acknowledged by the international community.

Soeharto's growing interest in foreign affairs gave the Ministry an opportunity to increase its profile through professionalism. Clearly, the President needed the help of the professionals to achieve his interest of playing some roles internationally. The skills of the Ministry's personnel in negotiation, organising international meetings and conferences, and in dealing with intricacies surrounding protocols, cannot easily be replaced by other civilian bureaucracies or the military establishment. At the same time, the moderation of the military's role domestically meant that the President had tempered his favouritism and was willing to rely on the civilians for pursuing his interests at the domestic and international levels. Hence, the timing between the mid-1980s to the late 1990s was ripe for the Ministry to gain the confidence of the President through ideas and performance.

III.5. Soeharto's Indonesia: foreign policy making and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Indonesian foreign policy in the second half of the Soeharto era (1985-1998) was marked by a number of diplomatic initiatives. This study is concerned with some initiatives at the regional context, that is, Indonesia's preparedness to move beyond the ASEAN framework, if necessary, to secure its interest of regional order. As indicated earlier, Indonesia pursued new initiatives as a result of a number of factors, including the limitation of ASEAN and the growing personal interest of President Soeharto in foreign affairs. This study argues that the dynamic at the Ministry also influenced the profile of Indonesia's diplomacy from the mid-1980s onward.

This section discusses and outlines the following issues. The first one relates to the Ministry's position within the bureaucratic structures overall, the foreign policy making process and those involved in it (especially in the 1980s). The second issue concerns the structure of the Ministry and some developments within

the structure that were supportive of the adoption of informal diplomacy. The third one concerns the process of policy initiation within the Ministry and the aspect of policy co-ordination with other bureaucracies, including the military establishment.

5.1. Foreign policy making: between process and the personality of President Soeharto

During the Soeharto era, foreign policy making in the Indonesian context was undoubtedly elitist and characterised by bureaucratic politics. The President allowed the foreign policy making elite to compete for his favour and, in the end, he decided which course of action would be taken. The domination of the President was a result of the pyramidal shape of Indonesia's political structure in which Soeharto sat at the apex making him very influential in the policy making process. William Liddle describes the political structure of the Soeharto government as follows:

> The political structure of the New Order can be described as a steeply-ascending pyramid in which the heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency. The president commands the military which is *primus inter pares* within the bureaucracy, which in turn holds sway over the society.[54]

The elitist nature of the policy making process under Soeharto had some resemblance to that of the Soekarno era. In contrast, in the early years of independence from 1945 to 1958 foreign policy outputs were subject to parliament's scrutiny and, therefore, the process of formulating the policy was more transparent.[55] In Soekarno's case, he defined Indonesia's foreign policy and then the Foreign Ministry and the military implemented the policy.[56] In his early years in power, Soeharto gave the military and the Ministry's officials responsibility for shaping and implementing foreign policy. By assigning these two institutions with such responsibility, Soeharto maintained a check and balance mechanism, thereby retaining his control of foreign policy matters.

Although, the elitist nature and exclusiveness of foreign policy making would seem to make any assessment of the foreign policy making's process seem easy to

follow, in reality the process itself was difficult to understand. The lack of clarity of the process was aptly put by Robert Tilman: "the forces shaping Indonesian policy making, including the making of foreign policy, are subtle, deeply imbedded in a very complex and sophisticated Indonesian/Javanese culture, and rarely what they appear to be on the surface."[57] The elitist nature of the process made foreign policy making distant from the society at large. To deal with the difficulty in assessing the foreign policy making process, some analysts have tended to consider the process took place in a 'black box.' They have made assumptions about the process within the box by first identifying those whom they considered were involved in the process and later on they observed the foreign policy outputs. In their opinion, the outputs would have had some correlation with the power of the actors who took part in the process, that is, the more powerful the actor the more their interests would be reflected in the policy. However, they mostly agree that Soeharto had the position as the Hegemon and he had the ultimate power in deciding the final outputs from the foreign policy making process.[58]

At times, the President made decisions merely to appease the various interest groups or the competing elites. Tilman argues that decisions on foreign policy were not necessarily taken for the sake of national or societal interests, but to accommodate or balance the competing interests among factions, usually among government bureaucrats.[59] In this case, President Soeharto made the final decision to satisfy the competing elites, so that the substance of the policy was not too important. Hence, what was important was the symbolism that the President was wise and could make a decision to satisfy all parties in domestic politics.

This domestic balance came at the price of confusion on the part of the foreign counterparts. An example of this was Soeharto's commitment to let Indonesia join in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) process in 1992, but only on condition that the liberalisation process was done gradually to allow those involved in the domestic economy to adjust. Indonesia was adamant that AFTA be held according to the CEPT scheme (Common Effective Preferential Tariffs) which clustered manufactured products into tariff groups. Each participant of AFTA had to decide

which of their products they considered eligible for tariff reduction and included into the scheme, the inclusion and exclusion lists.[60] The decision to join AFTA satisfied the ASEAN circle in the foreign and trade ministries who felt it was necessary to support regional initiatives. Likewise, the CEPT scheme satisfied the business community and state enterprises, which were heavily protected during the Soeharto years. By making such a condition, Indonesia had, in fact, restricted the progression of AFTA, disappointing some members of ASEAN, particularly Singapore and Thailand.

This ambiguity of the decision making process gave analysts no other option but to concentrate on the structure of elites and their interests on particular international relations issues. For instance, for politics and defence issues, they would look at the elite from the Foreign Ministry (the Ministry), the military establishment (Ministry of Defence and Intelligence Agency), State Secretariat (Sekneg) and research institution such as CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies).[61] For economic issues, they would single out the Ministry of Trade, business community (KADIN – *Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia* or Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Sekneg and to a lesser extent the Ministry and CSIS. The role of think tanks such as the CSIS depended on their patron and the particular elite or power group in the government at the time. The CSIS was considered very influential during the peak of the late-Ali Moertopo, a member of Soeharto's inner circle who at the time was responsible for intelligence and security.[62] However, CSIS was instrumental in producing policy papers on political, security and economic issues on a regular basis.[63] Similarly, the concerns of interest groups like the business community were also reflected in policy outputs according to their closeness with elites in the economic portfolio, and more importantly with the President's family.

Generally, interest groups in Indonesia only expressed interest in foreign related affairs if the issues involved their specific concerns. For instance, as noted earlier, the economic groups lobbied for foreign policy if their trade and market access were at stake. Some NGOs concerned with workers' rights, at times, pressed for government intervention when there were consular problems involving

Indonesia's workers overseas. The Moslem clerics asserted pressure on issues sensitive to their *ummah* (followers), such as the atrocities against the Moslem community in Bosnia. Hence, the interests of the non-governmental entities were sporadic and not well structured. None of the interest groups took part in the policy making process and therefore the only available instruments to direct their concerns to were the media, parliament or developing a relationship with those in the foreign policy making elite. Teuku Rezasyah argues that the role of those outside the policy making process, such as KADIN, CSIS, the ruling party (GOLKAR), the media, members of parliament and the society at large ranged from mainly passive or supportive to raising concern or commenting on foreign related issues.[64] In Soeharto's Indonesia, at least until the mid-1990s, the interest groups did not dare to press their concerns by holding demonstrations because the government was very sensitive about maintaining stability and order.[65]

Overall, domestic stability created an environment wherein the government apparatus was able to structure, formulate and pursue their ministries' programs. In a sense, the bureaucrats were able to pursue a policy relatively free from interference from other centres of power, such as from members of parliament and opinion makers, because the political environment favoured the continuation of policy from year to year. Moeljarto Tjokrowinoto noted that the various references to Indonesian bureaucracy during the New Order, such as bureaucratic polity and bureaucratic authoritarian regime, were all basically referring to a bureaucracy which dominated the decision making mechanism and insulated the mechanism from popular participation.[66] However, bureaucratic politics also signified constant competition among the foreign policy making elite within the government bureaucracy in attaining some policies. Although foreign policy making went through a complicated process, the final say of the outputs always rested with President Soeharto, based on his prerogative right. Logically, in the cases where the initiative taken by the bureaucrats would have enhanced the President's profile internationally and domestically, the President would have given it his full support.

Although most analysts concurred on the pre-eminence of the President, neither the foreign policy elite nor analysts were able to identify which one of the many actors the President favoured. As noted earlier, Mackie argued that the decision making authority was concentrated around the palace circle.[67] Similarly Liddle pointed out that in the pyramidal structure of the New Order, the presidency dominated the whole structure.[68] However, the President and his close aides around the palace did not always have full cognisance of foreign related matters and, therefore, had to rely on inputs from the bureaucracy. In fact, the capacity of a bureaucratic institution to propose foreign policy options is a logical consequence from the general nature of bureaucracy. Robert Wendzel provides the following rationale:

> Every chief policymaker in every country operates within a bureaucratic political context. Because there are simply too many decisions for any person to make and because such a wide variety of expertise is required, an organization exists, the purported purpose of which is to help the chief policymaker rationally formulate and efficiently implement his optimum foreign policy.[69]

At issue is which one of the many institutions involved in foreign related affairs - bureaucratic institutions, military establishment or interest groups - the President listened to the most. The difficulties in determining this stem from two factors; the personality factors of Soeharto, and his management style. First the President received inputs from different sources at different times[70] and, at times, he only listened to the inputs and did not make his opinion explicit. This noncommittal attitude left the elite confused as to whether or not the President had given his consent to their proposed policy options.[71] Second, as indicated earlier, the President always assigned different institutions to deal with the many foreign policy matters. This management style can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the President did not fully trust his aides and, therefore, he intentionally let his aides compete in fulfilling his tasks. In the end, none of the actors would have been able to claim credit from the success of their diplomatic missions because of the many actors involved in the process.[72] On the other hand, Soeharto might have wished to gain the most from the expertise or skills of the different actors. Hence, he encouraged co-operation because he knew that any successful outcome from the diplomatic missions would have enhanced his status. The second explanation

can be applied to the JIM on Cambodia and the peace process to deal with the Moro problem because the Ministry received substantial support from other bureaucracies and the military establishment. However, from a different perspective, such support for the Ministry was a logical consequence of their realisation that Soeharto had put his weight behind the diplomatic initiatives proposed by the Ministry. [73]

Such realisation of the President's support implied that the Ministry had been successful in gaining the confidence of the President from the mid-1980s onward. The sign of Soeharto growing trust to the Ministry was the appointment of Ali Alatas (a professional diplomat) in 1988 as a Foreign Minister. Although this did not mean Soeharto trusted the Ministry as an institution, the appointment sent a symbolic signal to the Ministry's bureaucracies (and to other bureaucratic institutions) that he had given the Ministry an opportunity to function under the leadership of its own people.

The implications of Ali Alatas appointment to the Ministry were twofold. First, it increased the Ministry's confidence on their capacity to act as a lynchpin within the Indonesian bureaucratic politic setting, in terms of proposing foreign policy options and implementing them. Second, he imprinted idealism into the Ministry's mainstream. Ali Alatas introduced the concept of 'just peace', which he was exposed to in the United Nations, into the thinking within the Ministry. The notion of 'just peace' or resolving problems comprehensively which balance between freedom and responsibility had a lot to do with the personality of Minister Alatas, Indonesia's Ambassador to the United Nations for several years before being appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs for eleven years. He described the term as follows:

> Only peace based on justice, on a recognition of the equal worth of all human lives, the equal validity of all human aspirations, can become true peace. And because it is based on justice, true peace is durable. In a regime of peace founded on justice there is a harmonious balance between freedom and responsibility and in that balance the human potential and human creativity can soar. Cooperation among individuals and among nations becomes the natural course of human activity.[74]

5.2. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry: the structure, process and the diplomatic machinery

As noted in Chapter 2, when Soeharto came to power, he showed a lack of trust toward professional diplomats from the Ministry. In order to 'cleanse' the Ministry of those whom he perceived as leftist or Soekarno followers, Soeharto installed military personnel in the Ministry. The military were placed in some strategic positions in the Ministry: as Secretary General and Inspector General. Similarly, some important overseas posts were given to the military, among others, ambassadorships in ASEAN capitals, Tokyo and Washington.[75] The domination of the military in the Ministry suggests that in his early years Soeharto was more concerned with the stabilisation program and securing various bureaucracies, military establishment, political parties and social organisations from the remnants of the PKI. However, it is clear that Soeharto also realised the importance of foreign policy to secure his development program and to renew regional and international confidence in Indonesia post-Soekarno.

To secure his foreign policy objectives, Soeharto assigned Adam Malik, a senior politician, as Indonesian Foreign Minister. Minister Malik, who led the Ministry from 1967 to 1977, nurtured a new cadre of professional diplomats after the military had purged a number of senior diplomats from the Ministry.[76] Minister Malik was successful in achieving Soeharto's objective of creating a new image of Indonesia in the region, particularly through the establishment of ASEAN.

The success of Minister Malik with the help of professional diplomats did not necessarily raise the Ministry's profile in Soeharto's eyes. Up to the mid-1970s, the military establishment had Soeharto's favour and retained its favoured position. An example of this was the Ministry's position vis-à-vis the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia in 1976. To the Ministry's embarrassment, they were left out of the loop of the *operasi Komodo* (Komodo operation), that is, when the 'Indonesian volunteers' infiltrated East Timor in 1976.[77] Even by then, Minister Malik and some diplomats were in the process of dialogue with Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) and

the Portuguese government. Because they had not been appraised of the operation, the Indonesian diplomats in the UN were dumbfounded when the Portuguese diplomats presented the case before the UN General Assembly and showed the Assembly with photographic evidence of the military incursion.[78] Although withholding information about the invasion from the Ministry could be seen as part of the military or intelligence strategy of clandestine operation, the Ministry's ignorance of the operation spoilt Indonesia's image in the UN in the early years of the East Timor fiasco.

The case of the invasion of East Timor haunted Indonesia's profile internationally and, at the same time, damaged the reputation of the Ministry domestically. The parliamentarians, media and the military establishments often accused the Ministry of failing to defend Indonesia's position on East Timor at the international level. However, according to Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, East Timor presented Indonesian diplomats with an indefensible case because they did not know what happened in East Timor between 1976 to the late 1980s. Between these years, the area was insulated from the rest of Indonesia and became the military's fiefdom.[79] Minister Alatas aptly called East Timor as a 'pebble in the shoe'[80] that brought pain to the diplomats wherever they went. With the Ministry's limited capacity to solve the East Timor problem and their desire to renew Indonesia's profile internationally as well as the Ministry's stature at domestic level, the Ministry came up with a number of diplomatic initiatives to deal with regional issues. This observation is confirmed to a certain extent by former Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, who spoke about the success of Indonesia's diplomacy in dealing with some regional issues. From this he concluded that the East Timor problem had not undermined Indonesia's profile internationally.[81] The success of the Indonesian diplomats in dealing with some international issues and regional conflicts did increase the profile of the Ministry at the national level and in particular, in the eyes of President Soeharto.

At the same time, the notion of success has a lot to do with the skills of those who pursued the diplomatic initiatives. As mentioned earlier, Minister Malik inherited a bureaucratic system where their personnel had gone through security clearance,

and, therefore, were somewhat dispirited. Clearly, the Ministry did regress after some of its professionals had been purged and, at the same time, foreign policy was not high on the agenda of the New Order government which gave priority to stabilisation of the domestic front. In dealing with this apathy among the personnel, Minister Malik nurtured a new cadre of professional diplomats among those who remained in the Ministry and embarked on a policy of recruitment. Those who were recruited had undergone intensive training and were encouraged to pursue post-graduate studies overseas.[82] All ministers, after Minister Malik, continued the Ministry's policy on training and education.

For instance, Minister Kusumaatmadja, a former Dean from a State University in Bandung, gave special attention to the education of the diplomats.[83] Minister Kusumaatmadja gave further academic flavour into the Ministry when in early 1980s, he recruited Prof. Fuad Hassan, a lecturer and trained psychologist, as a Head of the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry.[84] During Minister Alatas' tenure more diplomats were sent overseas to undergo post-graduate studies. Clearly, training and education became essential components of the Ministry's human resources development programs. The importance of training and education was also reflected in the fact that those who led the Training Centre in the Ministry were mostly senior diplomats with ambassadorial rank.

Theoretically, by the time the Ministry engaged in informal diplomacy in the mid-1980s, they had sufficient cadres who were skilful diplomats and, at the same time, some of them were exposed to various perspectives on diplomacy and conflict resolution from their overseas studies. With the pooling of trained human resources and skills personnel in the Ministry, the adoption of informal diplomacy became susceptible. Former Indonesian Ambassador to Beijing, Juwana, confirmed this assessment and stated that Indonesia was able to organise JIM because by then Indonesia had skilful diplomats and understood the issues comprehensively, which also meant they were equipped with a theoretical perspective.[85] In contrast, former Indonesian Ambassador to Ottawa, Budiman Darmosutanto, argued that in some cases there were tendencies to recruit member of a team to deal with some issues, mainly based on his or her portfolio in the

Ministry.[86] Therefore, at times, skills were not a determining factor in the recruitment of members of a team. It is to be seen in the three case studies chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) which of the two opinions confirmed with reality within the Indonesia teams to deal with the three regional problems.

The following discussion outlines the organisational structure of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the decision-making processes in the Ministry. Special attention is also given to the dynamics of information flows within the Ministry and how the process of assessing information and policy initiation influenced foreign policy options and the diplomatic designs to deal with international issues. Hence, organisational aspects also influenced foreign policy making in Indonesia and more importantly to the adoption of informal diplomacy.

5.2.1. The organisational structure of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry

Within the period of this study (between 1985 and 1998), the formal structure of the Ministry consisted of eight main offices each of which supervised several directorates or bureau. Those main offices were a Secretary General, an Inspector General, a Directorate General for Political Affairs, a Directorate General for External Economic Relations Affairs, a Directorate General for Social and Cultural Affairs, a Directorate General for Protocol and Consular Affairs, the Indonesian-ASEAN Affairs and the Research and Development Agency.[87]

Internally, the office of the Secretary General was considered to be the most 'influential' office in the Ministry, because it oversees not only the personnel matters, but also all communication flows from the Ministry to the overseas posts and vice-versa, including the confidential communication. The Secretary General was also responsible for the Foreign Minister's special administration (office) with the main function involving correspondence, scheduling of meetings, and preparing for daily and weekly briefings. By custom, the office was led by one of the most senior diplomats in the Ministry who was a trusted aide of the Foreign Minister.[88] The office of the Inspector General was also internally powerful, but its concern was mainly with personnel and the rules of compliance.[89]

The Directorate General for Political Affairs was responsible for all political issues at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. The regional and bilateral matters fell under the responsibility of four directors with the following portfolios: Asia and Pacific, America, Europe, and Africa and the Middle East. All multilateral affairs were under the jurisdiction of the Director for International Organisation. It is interesting to note that the office responsible for the Cambodia's diplomatic initiative was the Asia and Pacific Directorate, whereas the International Organisation Directorate supervised the diplomacy concerning the southern-part of the Philippines.[90]

The non-political issues were dealt by the Directorate General for External Economic Relations Affairs, the Directorate General for Social and Cultural Affairs, the Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs and the Directorate General for Protocol and Consular Affairs. However, one Directorate under the Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs was responsible for ASEAN political co-operation and, to a certain extent, their area of jurisdiction overlapped with those in the Asia and Pacific Directorate under the Directorate General for Political Affairs. The Director for Information, under the Directorate General for Social and Cultural Affairs, was responsible for providing information to journalists and issuing news releases. At times, the director acted as the Ministry's spoke-person, but the role was optional and subject to the Minister's approval.

The Research and Development Agency (the Research Agency) was in charge of the long term strategic policies of the Ministry and also responsible for developing links between the Ministry and the government or private universities, think-tanks and various research centres of international relations in Indonesia and overseas. This link helped the Ministry understand the concerns of various interest groups in Indonesia about foreign related matters and the Ministry also benefited from their perspectives. The Ministry, through the Research Agency, also used these interest groups to sound out policy options. For instance, in the mid-1980s CSIS proposed a number of policy options on how to deal with the Cambodian problem whereas,

in the late 1980s,[91] the Research Agency used CSIS as a spring board to gain domestic support for informal workshop on South China Sea disputes.[92]

The implication from the Research Agency's interest in strategic issues was that their work, at times, overlapped with the work of other Directorate Generals. An example of this was the South China Sea issues. Besides the Research Agency, the Asia Pacific Directorate and the Directorate responsible for ASEAN political co-operation also showed their interest in the South China Sea issues. The roles and the interests of the Head of the Research Agency were very instrumental in deciding the strategic issue under research.[93] It was Dr. Hasjim Djalal's interest in the issue and his role in initiating the informal workshop in the early 1990s that made the Foreign Minister give the Research Agency custody of the workshops series on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea.[94]

Hence, the designation of diplomatic tasks to particular directorates and agencies suggests that foreign policy assignments did not always necessarily correspond with the 'area of jurisdiction' of particular directorates. To a certain extent, such assignment was influenced by factors, such as the cognisance of the directorates or certain individuals with certain issues, and this had a lot to do with the aspect of information gathering and assessment. Policy initiation was also a factor that the Foreign Minister took into consideration when he gave certain individuals responsibility.

Overall, the organisational structure of the Ministry between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s distributed responsibility based on issue areas: whether political, economic or social issues. At the same time, there were cases where unclear demarcation in areas of jurisdiction made a number of offices or directorates dealt with similar issues. On the one hand, this created dissension, but this is a normal feature of any organisation. As long as the Minister and the first echelons in the Ministry were able to manage the problems stemming from dissension and co-ordinate the work, the problem did not disrupt the Ministry's program too greatly. However, there were cases where such animosity prompted some officials to give only minimal support to the diplomatic initiatives. On the other hand, any

overlapping of interest opened a window of opportunity for creativity among the Ministry personnel: some of the offices and individuals wished to excel over others. In this case, some individuals skills, overseas training, networking and wide exposure to diplomatic activities were their asset in proposing policy initiatives and in winning the support of the Minister. Hence, albeit imperfect and not by design, the organisational structure of the Ministry was receptive for new ideas on how to deal with regional problems: including the ideas to use informal diplomacy.

5.2.2. Information flows and processing

Information flows and processing were closely related with the aspect of policy initiation and formulation within the Ministry. By gaining advance information, some offices were able to formulate and suggest well structure policy recommendations for the Minister. The office could propose the recommendations in written form through internal memorandum or share them with other offices during regular policy discussion meetings. Advance information gave some offices more opportunity to surpass the other and, consequently, they would be able to play a leading role in dealing with some problems.

In general, the regular sources of information in the Ministry were from cable communication from the overseas posts, which mostly contained information about political, economic and social issues concerned with bilateral or multilateral relations. The incoming cables also highlighted some issues in the host country that Indonesia should be aware of, that is, their implication for Indonesia's national interest. In addition, the Directorate for Information was responsible for collecting information from the international wire services and local news agency.

The Communication Centre, under the aegis of the Secretary General's office, distributed all the incoming information to the designated directorates and bureau. Although the Ministry adopted the one-door policy concerning the sending and receiving of cables, that is, through the Communication Centre, this did not preclude some offices in Indonesia's overseas posts, such as the defence and trade

offices, from maintaining their own channels of communication.[95] With this distinctive information flow inter-bureaucracy co-ordination function became essential.

Not all information received by the Ministry was processed. Some information required their immediate response, while other information was treated as news for general information. In particular, the designated offices, where the cable was addressed, processed the information. In some cases, upon receiving the cables, some directorates took the initiative to arrange internal co-ordination and meetings. The aim for such meetings was to clarify the kind of responsibility of each the directorate with regard to the issues they discussed. The internal meeting was also aimed at assigning a particular directorate with responsibility to deal with some issue. However, at times the final say for such assignment rested in the hand of the Minister. He had the authority to assign particular directorate to deal with certain issues. At times, the assignment of particular office based on this prerogative right of the Minister was not well taken by the competing office. They resented the decision and, as a consequence, their support would be less forthcoming during the implementation of the diplomatic initiatives.[96]

In general, there were two mechanisms within the Ministry for delegating such responsibility. The first mechanism was a weekly meeting involving the secretary of each Directorate General (second echelon in rank) under the supervision of the Head of Foreign Minister's office, a co-ordination meeting involving all the Directorate Generals (first echelon in rank) under the supervision of the Secretary General. The second mechanism was 'leaders meeting' involving all the Director Generals, the Secretary General and the Foreign Minister.

The 'leaders meeting' was also a forum for the Minister to brief all the first echelons with information and any assignment that the Ministry had received during a full Cabinet meeting under the President or a co-ordination meeting, supervised by the Co-ordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs. The co-ordination meeting chaired by the Co-ordinator Minister for Political and Security Affairs involved ministers responsible for security and defence issues. In a case

where the Minister was not able to take part in a co-ordination meeting, he assigned official at the level of first echelon to represent him. The representative then reported to the Minister about the outcomes of the meeting and in such a case where the Minister was not available, he or she consulted the matter with other first echelons or the director responsible for the subject maters, directly.[97]

However, in some cases the opportunity to hold a 'leaders meeting' depended on the availability of the Minister, and, therefore, the most frequent meetings in the Ministry were the weekly meetings. The co-ordination meeting was held at least once a month. Due to the closeness of the Head of Foreign Minister's office and the Foreign Minister, the outputs of the weekly meeting become important, because the results usually reached the Foreign Minister's ear.[98]

Within the period of this study (1985 to 1998), it was not known whether a daily briefing mechanism took place in the Ministry. There was a precedent of daily briefing during Adam Malik's term as a Foreign Minister (1966-1978). In this case, it was the Director for Information/the Ministry's spokesperson who updated the Minister on issues of the day that required his attention and vice-versa, the Minister informed the Director of some information that the spokesperson should be aware of.[99] It is quite plausible that the Head of the Foreign Minister's office also played a role of updating all the Foreign Ministers after Minister Malik, in the absence of a special mechanism of daily briefing. The head of the office relayed the Minister's decision to the designated officials.

From the above discussion, two kinds of information are evident: one gathered by the Ministry's mechanism and the other, information shared by the Minister. In addition to this, it is also known that during the co-ordination meeting and the 'leaders meeting,' those who took part in the meetings, at times, shared information gathered from non-formal sources, such as from think tanks, non-governmental organisations and the media. In any case, during information sharing those who shared the information had to be prepared not only to explain the information in detail, but also to recommended policy options. [100]

5.2.3. Policy initiation and co-ordination (internal and external)

Foreign policy initiation was a delicate subject in the Ministry. The policy initiation process could take two forms, that is, top down and bottom up. However, the centralised mechanism that places the Minister and the first echelons in the apex of the pyramid made the bureaucrats from lower echelons very cautious in proposing initiatives. In the bottom up process, proposals reached the top only after the lower echelons were confident of the significance of the issues and the policy recommendations they made. Overall, the initiative was shaped and went through several stages. First, an internal discussion took place within the directorate. Second, the Director followed up the results of the internal discussion with the Director General. Third, the Director General raised the matters through an internal memorandum, incorporating the background of the issues or problems and suggesting the policy recommendations. Another avenue to address the matters was the 'leaders meeting.' By sending a memorandum or raising the issue during the leaders meeting, the Director General wished to receive comment and approval from other first echelons and the Foreign Minister. In some cases, some officials having close relation with the Foreign Minister broke the rigidity of the bureaucratic system by channelling their initiatives directly to the Minister. The problem with this strategy was that the initiatives might not receive adequate support from other structures within the Ministry who would have felt by-passed.

The top down process was more straightforward, that is, the Minister assigned the Director General or Director or even trusted officials to carry out a special mission. Such an assignment meant that the Foreign Minister generated the policy initiative and the bureaucratic system carried out the mission. In this case, the bureaucratic system had to provide their full support, because such assignments usually involved a decree from the Minister. Clearly, both the top down and the bottom up flows of initiatives needed internal co-ordination, as well as co-ordination with external ministries, in order to maximise the capabilities in achieving the foreign policy objectives.

Internal co-ordination was an essential part of policy initiatives. In some cases, several directorates or bureaus responded separately to some issues based on the incoming cables. They tended to respond to the issues and provided policy options from their point of view (portfolios), and, therefore, the approach was far from comprehensive and integrative. Hence, without co-ordination, there was a risk of redundancy in policy initiation between some directorates. Moreover, internal co-ordination helped reduce competition within the Ministry in taking the leadership on some issues where the potential for overlapping in 'area of jurisdiction' was feasible. For instance, the Directorate for Asia and Pacific and the Directorate responsible for ASEAN political co-operation might have proposed, at the same time, initiatives to deal with issues affecting an ASEAN country or ASEAN relations.

External co-ordination was required when the issues were connected with the interests of other ministries and the military establishment, such as on trade related and security issues. In the mid-level of inter-ministries, co-ordination took place regularly in such forums as 'the intelligence community.' In some cases, the designated Directorate within the Ministry organised a meeting involving other ministries to discuss issues of mutual concern and to obtain inputs or support in a case where the Ministry led some activities. As mentioned before, at the top level, co-ordination took place under the supervision of the Co-ordinating Minister and involved several ministers. These ministers discussed issues affecting national security at large. Some ministers also used this co-ordination forum to inform other ministers about any assignment that they had received from the President.

External co-ordination did not necessarily take place within the setting of a formal meeting. The most routine form of co-ordination was through formal correspondence between the Foreign Minister and other ministries. Correspondences with the President were channelled through Sekneg which functioned as the office of the President. In any case, the Ministry's staffs developed networks or contacts with their counterparts in different ministries and Sekneg, to make sure that the correspondence received proper attention. Maintaining open communication, especially with Sekneg was essential

considering their power under Soeharto.[101] According to Liddle, Sekneg was "the office through which the President controls the civilian bureaucracy."[102] Robinson Pangaribuan shares Liddle's opinion and argues that Sekneg was very powerful, especially under Sudharmono who presided over the office from 1972 to 1988. He states further that:

> Sekneg not only provided administrative services the President required, but also examined all plans and recommendations that were offered to the President. Thus, Sekneg was often characterised as being the eyes, ears and hands of the President. The more the President relied on the administrative functions of Sekneg, the greater Sekneg's power became.[103]

Overall, the only means for the Ministry to perform their role effectively - with relatively limited interference from other bureaucracies and the military establishment - was by gaining the confidence of the President. The Ministry used two different channels to gain this confidence. The first channel was through the Minister's personal visit to the Palace, to report to the President about the diplomatic initiatives that the Ministry wished to undertake. In this case, as further discussed in Chapter 4, Minister Alatas visited President Soeharto in the Palace and sought for his support in organising JIM.[104] The second channel was by way of formal correspondence through Sekneg. As shown in Chapter 5, the diplomatic initiative to deal with the Moro problem was sought through this channel. Although, there was no evidence that the proposal for the informal workshop on the South China Sea also went through either of these channels, the Minister must have informed the President about the workshop, especially taking into consideration the high profile nature of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and also of the extensive media coverage of the informal workshops during their first years.[105]

Some sources familiar with Soeharto's style stated that the President always read correspondence from the Ministry and also the accompanying briefing paper, which was attached to the letter.[106] In particular, Mr. Kusnadi, former Director for Asia and the Pacific of the Ministry, stated that when using either one of the two channels the Ministry always provided the President with a briefing paper, detailing the issues and the policy recommendations. Mr. Kusnadi also stated that

the President always read the briefing papers provided by the Ministry and, at times, gave his personal opinions when he met with the Minister.[107] As already stated, all the insights suggest that from the mid-1980s onward, President Soeharto showed more interest in foreign related affairs and, at times, he even gave his personal opinions on the policy recommendations of the Ministry. The President, therefore, took a more active role and did not simply rely on policy options derived from bureaucratic politics. Moreover, his willingness to present a personal opinion indicated his growing confidence of the Ministry.

III.6. The strategic motives behind the adoption of informal diplomacy

The strategic motives behind the adoption of informal diplomacy stemmed from the regional and domestic perspectives.

6.1. The regional perspective

Indonesia was concerned on the limitations of ASEAN as a regional framework to deal with regional problems of conflicts and disputes. ASEAN was not able to provide leadership to deal with the three regional issues under study, primarily because ASEAN not neutral image in the eyes of some parties in the Cambodian conflict. In the other two problems, separatism problem in the Philippines and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN appeared reluctance to offer alternative solution because the problems involved its members.

In the 1980s, the prolongation of the Cambodian problem posed difficulty to the region, not least because of the way in which major powers had became associated with particular factions. The continued involvement of major powers in the Cambodian conflict would not serve Indonesia's interest for promoting regional solution to regional problems. Informal diplomacy was Indonesia's means to promote peace dialogue at the regional level.

In the case of separatism problem in the Southern part of the Philippines, the problem remained volatile and had not shown any improvement. Indonesia was seeking through informal diplomacy to move the problems toward possible

solution. Being a fellow ASEAN member who always supported the Philippines concerns of the Moro's problem in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) discussion, and being a country with a large Moslem population, Indonesia had the advantage of being perceived as more acceptable to the conflicting parties.

The South China Sea disputes pose ASEAN with the potential of divisiveness and regional instability. Therefore, Indonesia was seeking whether strategically the use of informal diplomacy could assist in the settlement process with positive outcomes.

6.2. The domestic perspective

Having led the nations for almost two decades, President Soeharto wished to increase his international stature, being part of his performance legitimacy, and Indonesia's international profile. Therefore, he was searching for possible avenues to attain his desire.

In responding to the President's desire, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry which was desperate for assuming prominence on foreign policy issues at the domestic level, proposed informal diplomacy as a diplomatic means and was endorsed by the President.

As a diplomatic instrument, Track Two diplomacy promised a possible breakthrough and a prospect for resolving the problems comprehensively. Upon the endorsement by the President, the approach was applied in the three cases.

III.7. Conclusion

With his pre-eminence within the Indonesian political system coupled with the positive economic growth in hand, President Soeharto in the 1980s began to give considerable attention to foreign policy matters. He had shown interest in and gave moral support to JIM and the Moro peace process. Indonesia's interests to achieve its foreign policy objectives at the regional level also stemmed from the

limitations of ASEAN as the regional framework. Hence, Soeharto's confidence of his pre-eminence at the domestic politics and the limitations of ASEAN were the basis of Indonesia's new diplomatic initiatives from the 1980s onward. The new initiatives were necessary to effect a breakthrough on some regional problems that inhibited Indonesia from having a regional order, a prerequisite condition for Indonesia's development program.

Although factors responsible for the initiatives can be identified, the process leading to the formulation of the foreign policy options were difficult to trace. The difficulty was caused by the lack of clarity of the foreign policy making process in Indonesia's political system. President Soeharto was a dominant figure in the policy making process and he operated through bureaucratic politics in which he let his bureaucracies competed one another for his favour. He also liked to give similar foreign policy tasks to a number foreign policy actors and, as a consequence, the Ministry had to work hard to gain the President confidence.

In the early years of Soeharto's Presidency, the Ministry was battered because of the alleged support some personnel gave to the left cause and of the Ministry's support for Soekarno's policy. When he led the Ministry, Minister Malik nurtured a new cadre of professional diplomats through recruitment, training and education. Internal consolidation helped increase the Ministry's confidence and, at the same time, the Ministry was able to produce skilled diplomats who were also had a wider perspective of diplomacy and conflict resolution. These human resources were the Ministry's assets in pursuing informal diplomacy.

The policy initiation intern of the Ministry followed the organisational process (as discussed in Chapter 2), but in some cases the interests of a number of directorates overlapped. Internal co-ordination was essential to clarify each directorate's responsibility in dealing with particular issues or diplomatic initiatives. External co-ordination with other bureaucracies and the military establishment were also important in order to gain their support in the implementation of the diplomatic initiatives. Some elements of the bureaucracy, such as Sekneg, were very powerful and therefore the Ministry had to develop good rapport and networks. However,

the Ministry attempted to gain the confidence of the President to avoid the problem arising from inter elite competition. From the mid-1980s onward the President's confidence in the Ministry did increase to a certain extent and this took place when the President himself showed greater interest in foreign related affairs. Such confidence gave the Ministry the ability to initiate and implement informal diplomacy within the context of bureaucratic politics in Indonesian political system.

Notes

[1] See **Appendix No. 2.**

[2] Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, April 1953, p. 441.

[3] Ibid, p. 444.

[4] See Anthony Smith, "Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 2, August 1999, p. 239. Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas does not consider the term 'equidistance' aptly explains the independence and active foreign policy because to him equidistance implied passiveness. Ali Alatas, *Kebijaksanaan dan Strategi Politik Luar Negeri RI [Indonesian foreign policy and strategy]*, speech presented for the students of National Defence Institute (Lemhanas), 24 August 1998.

[5] See Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945-1965* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), p. 178.

[6] For discussion on this American support, see Dino Patti Djalal, *The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1996), p. 41. Also, Willem Oltmans, *Di Balik Keterlibatan CIA: Bung Karno dikhianati? [Behind the involvement of CIA: Was Mr. Soekarno betrayed?]* (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2001), Chapter 3.

[7] George McT. Kahin quoted in Soedjati Djiwandono, *Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soekarno*, (Jakarta: CSIS, 1996), p. 52.

[8] See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Nasution, Sukarno and the West New Guinea Disputes", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1, No. 4, June 1961, pp. 20-4.

[9] Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System", *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1970, p. 390.

[10] On discussion on this, see Rizal Sukma, "The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No.3, March 1995, pp. 309-310.

[11] For a discussion of Soekarno's distrust of the Western Powers which prompted him to tilt Indonesia more to 'the left of nonaligned', see M. Caldwell, "Nonalignment in South East Asia", in J. W. Burton (ed.), *Nonalignment* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966), p. 46.

[12] Soekarno, *To Build the World Anew*", speech before the UNGA, 30 September 1960. Dokumentasi Asdep 4/II Pollugri, Kantor Menko Polsoskam, p.19.

[13] Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 80.

[14] Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the Changing Balance of Power", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, Winter 1964-1965, p. 369.

[15] Soekarno labeled the US and its allies 'Old Established Forces' (OLDEFOS) who wished to re-colonise the new countries, born after the Second World War.

[16] On the dual function role of the Indonesian military see: David Jenkins, *Soeharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, Monograph Series No. 64 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984). See also Soedjati Djiwandono, "The Military and National Development in Indonesia" in Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong (ed.), *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1988), Chapter 4.

[17] Jenderal TNI Widjojo Soejono, *Peranan Kopkamtib dalam Penegakan Stabilitas Nasional [The role of Kopkamtib in establishing national stability]* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, 1981), pp. 31-5. In early 1980s, Gen. Soejono was the Head of KOPKAMTIB (Operations Command for the Restoration of Order and Security).

[18] Noam Chomsky provides a critical interpretation of stability as follows: "The term 'stability' has long served as a code word, referring to a 'favorable orientation of the political elite' – favorable not to their populations, but to foreign investors and global managers". Noam Chomsky, *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 55.

[19] Jamie Mackie, "Indonesia: Economic Growth and Depoliticization", in James W. Morley (ed.), *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Revised Edition (New York: An East Gate Book: 1999), p. 125.

[20] However, the political system that Soeharto helped create was mostly by design and, therefore, was not natural. In the post-Soeharto era, some conflicts took place because during Soeharto era there were limited opportunities to openly discuss the sensitive issues of inter ethnic, religious, race and inter-groups relations. These four issues are the characteristics of pluralism within Indonesian society. In the past, any discussion of the issues only involved elite groups and not society at the grass roots level. Such practices proved ineffective because generally the elite share similar concerns and frame of reference, because they were the products of the New Order system.

[21] As quoted in Jenkins, op cit., p. 17.

[22] See Bilveer Singh, *ABRI and the Security of Southeast Asia: The Role and Thinking of General L. Benny Moerdani*, Monograph Series (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 72-3

[23] However, according to one senior retired diplomat (interview with Mr. Kusnadi, 9 October 2001), Mr. Adam Malik did threaten that he would leave Bangkok if the declaration did not incorporate Indonesia's position concerning the status of the foreign bases in the region.

[24] Indonesia's success to tamper Malaysian version of ZOPFAN has to a certain extent influence Malaysia's initial reluctance to support Indonesia's proposal of making the region free from nuclear weapons (Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone - SEANWFZ). This information is given by former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, during a foreign policy discussion in Bandung, 26-27 August 1994. Based on discussion proceedings in a document entitled "Post-Cold War's regional politic and security issues," 1994 (undated). For internal use of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.

[25] Mayor General Haryadi, *Konsepsi Ketahanan Regional ASEAN [ASEAN regional resilience conception]* (Jakarta: Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional, 1995). Limited publication for internal use of the Lemhanas.

[26] Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, "ASEAN and the Pacific in the 1990s", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Second Quarterly 1991, p. 133.

[27] Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), p. 161.

[28] See Antolik, ibid, p. 158.

[29] During the first informal ASEAN leaders meeting in Jakarta (1995), President Soeharto asked 'unreserved' support from other ASEAN members on Indonesian position in East Timor. Dr. Soejatmiko provided this information during interview (22 November 2001). The interviewee also granted the writer permission to read the transcript of the ASEAN leaders' discussions on the East Timor's matter during their informal summit. All the leaders had expressed their unequivocal support for Indonesia.

[30] Nana S. Sutresna, "Indonesia and its Multilateral Diplomacy", *Jurnal Luar Negeri*, No. 3, Maret 1986, p. 42.

[31] Interview with Mr. Juwana, 19 October 2001. However, another senior retired diplomat provided a unique insight when he said that the strong position taken by Singapore on Cambodia in any international forum was a strategy shared between Indonesia and Singapore. Singapore played a tough stand against Vietnam and Hun Sen, while Indonesia adopted a conciliatory profile (interview with Mr. John Louhanapessy, 16 October 2001. Information from Mr. John Louhanapessy was difficult to substantiate because, on the one hand, it could be the case that such an arrangement was made in private between the two countries' Foreign Ministers. However, on the other hand, some internal documents of the Ministry expressed bewilderment at Singapore's harsh attitude toward Vietnam and this comment appeared in the Ministry's report on the PICC in Paris to President Soeharto, dated 2 August 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[32] See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia and ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), Chapter 2. Also interview with Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad, 1 November 2001.
[33] Anwar, ibid, p. 53.
[34] See Mackie, op cit., p. 127.
[35] See Kusnanto Anggoro, "Gagasan Militer Mengenai Demokrasi, Masyarakat Madani dan Transisi Demokratik" [*The military's ideas on democracy, civil society and democratic transition*], in Rizal Sukma and J. Kristiadi (eds.), *Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer* [*Civilian-military relations and democratic transition in Indonesia: the perception of civilian and military*] (Jakarta: CSIS, 1999), p. 16.
[36] Mackie, in James W. Morley (ed.), op cit., pp. 131-2.
[37] See M. Riefqi Muna, "Persepsi Militer dan Sipil tentang Dwifungsi: Mengukur dua kategori Ganda" [Military and civilians' perception on dual function: assessing dual category], in Rizal Sukma and J. Kristiadi (eds.), op cit., p. 36.
[38] Michael Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Soeharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 71.
[39] See, "Soeharto's Indonesia: In the Spirit of Garuda", *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, February 1989, p. 10.
[40] Michael Vatikiotis, "The Military and Democracy in Indonesia", in R. J. May and Viberto Selochan (eds.), *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific* (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), p. 39. For a reference on the debate about development and democracy, see Elza Peldi Taher (ed.), *Demokratisasi Politik, Budaya dan Ekonomi: Pengalaman Indonesia Masa Order Baru* [*Democratisation of politic, culture and economy: Indonesia's experience during the New Order*] (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 1994). In this book, a number of prominent Indonesian intellectuals, among others Nurcholis Madjid, Jakob Oetama, Umar Kayam, Emil Salim and Soemitro, shared their opinion on the issues of development and democracy under the Soeharto government.
[41] See for instance Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), Chapter 7, pp. 162-193; and Makmur Makka and Dhurorudin Mashad, *ICMI, Dinamika Politik Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia* [*ICMI, the dynamic of politic Islam and democratisation in Indonesia*] (Jakarta: ISAI, 2001), pp. 42-3. According to Leo Suryadinata, Soeharto initialy hoped to use ICMI as his power base, but it was turned out that ICMI became Habibie's power base. See Leo Suryadinata, "Nation-Building and Nation-Destroying: The Challenge of Globalization in Indonesia", in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), *Nationalism and Globalization: East and West* (Singapore, ISEAS, 2000), p. 51.
[42] Douglas Ramage, "Indonesia at 50: Islam, Nationalism (and Democracy?), *Southeast Asian Affairs 1996* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1996), p. 153. Abdurrahman Wahid considered the ICMI sectarian and opposed its establishment. He argued that Moslem intellectuals supported the organisation because they wished to channel their personal interests by using ICMI as their political vehicle for power. See Abdurrahman Wahid, *Islam dan Negara Dalam Masa Orde Baru* [*Islam and state during the New Order*]. Paper presented during an SPES discussion in Jakarta, 27 November 1991.
[43] See Vatikiotis, in R. J. May and Viberto Selochan (eds.), op cit, pp. 39-40. It may also be the case that the military hostility toward Sudharmono was caused by his success in limiting the military's clout in the economy by transferring the power to the State Secretariat (in Indonesia this was popularly called *Sekneg*). Sudharmono presided over Sekneg from 1972-1988. See Robinson Pangaribuan, *The Indonesian State Secretariat 1945-1993* - translated by Vedi Hadiz - (Perth: Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change, Murdoch University, 1995), p. 7.
[44] Mayor General (Ret.) Naryadi, SE, *Politik dan Strategi Pertahanan Keamanan Negara: Suatu Analisa Hakikat & Perkembangan* [*Politic and strategy for defending and securing the state: an analysis of meaning and development*] (Jakarta: Lemhanas, 1995), pp. 22-6. Limited publication for internal use of the Lemhanas.
[45] GOLKAR was a fusion of mass-organisation, students group, and intellectuals who were against the PKI. GOLKAR worked not only as electoral machine for Soeharto's regime, but also, as a body to promote the political culture of the New Order, that is 'Democracy Pancasila.' See Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989). Monographs in International Studies.
[46] See Ryaas Rasyid, "Indonesia: Preparing for Post-Soeharto Rule and Its Impact on the Democratization Process", *Southeast Asian Affairs 1995* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1995), p. 153. Harmoko, like many Javanese, has only one name

[47] Andra L. Corrothers and Esti W. Suryatna, "Review of the NGO Sector in Indonesia and Evolution of the Asia Pacific Regional Community Concept among Indonesian NGOs", in Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.), *Emerging Civil Society in The Asia Pacific Community* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1995), p. 124.

[48] See Amir Santoso, "Democratization: The case of Indonesia's New Order", in Anek Laothamatas (ed.), *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), pp. 26-8.

[49] See Ahmad D. Habir, "The Emerging Indonesian Managerial Elite: Professionals amid Patriarchs" in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1993* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), pp. 161-181.

[50] Jamie Mackie argues that the conglomerate and private business firms in Soeharto era did not dare antagonise the government, because of their dependency on their patron. Mackie, in James W. Morley (ed.), op cit, p. 134. As a benefactor for easy access to funds and government licensing, these new economic elites were crumbled when their patron, the New Order government, collapsed in 1998.

[51] Bob Lowry, "Indonesia: Towards Transition", *Southeast Asian Affairs 1998* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1998), p. 129.

[52] For a discussion of President Soehartos's growing interest on foreign policy see Rizal Sukma, "The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View", pp. 312-3. Particularly on Soeharto's interest on APEC and NAM, see Ben Perkasa Drajat, "The Sources of Indonesian President Soeharto's Contradicting Attitude in the APEC and NAM in the Mid 1990s", *Journal of International Development and Cooperation*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, pp. 317-334. It is important to note that Indonesia under Soeharto had shifted the emphases of NAM from political to economic, specifically on possible North-South co-operation. See Leo Suryadinata, *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Soeharto* [*Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soeharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*] (Jakarta: PT Pustaka LP3ES, 1998), Chapter 11.

[53] See Drajat, ibid, p. 326. Drajat stated that officially, there were 2 tracks of APEC management in 1994, that is, Prof. Bintoro's track and the existing MoFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) track.

[54] William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1, Spring 1985, p. 71.

[55] See for instance the book on Indonesian foreign policy written by former Foreign Minister, Anak Agung Gde Agung, op cit.

[56] See for instance a memoir of Ganis Harsono, a former 'second man' in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry during the Soekarno era. Ganis Harsono, *Cakrawala Politik Era Sukarno* [*Recollection of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era*] (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1985).

[57] Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and The Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 37.

[58] See for instance, Tilman, ibid; Leo Suryadinata, *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Soeharto*; Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999); Teuku Rezasyah, "Changing the Guards in Indonesian Foreign Policy Making: From Cold War into Post Cold War Configuration", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, XXIII/3, 1995, pp. 239-252; and Ben Perkasa Drajat, "The Sources of Indonesian President Soeharto's Contradicting Attitude in the APEC and NAM in the Mid-1990s", pp. 317-334.

[59] Tilman, ibid, p. 39.

[60] See *Kerjasama Eksternal ASEAN dan Manfaatnya Bagi Indonesia* [*The benefit of ASEAN's external co-operations for Indonesia*] (Jakarta: Ditjen Kerjasama ASEAN, Deplu, 2000). The expected tariff in AFTA is between 0 to 5 % and this end objective is to be reached in 2003.

[61] Rezasyah, "Changing the Guards in Indonesian Foreign Policy Making: From Cold War into Post Cold War Configuration", pp. 250-1.

[62] On the profile of Ali Moertopo and his relationship with Soeharto, see Krissantono, "Ali Moertopo di Atas Panggung Orde Baru: Tokoh Pembangunan dan Pembaharuan Politik" [Ali Moertopo on the New Order stage: advocate for development and political reform], *Prisma*, Edisi Khusus 20 Tahun Prisma, 1991, pp. 136-157.

[63] Bantarto Bandoro of CSIS argued that by being professional, CSIS no longer wished to be associated with particular power group in Indonesia (interview, 21 November 2001). Similarly, Rizal Sukma of CSIS showed a case where the role of CSIS was instrumental as an independent institution. He mentioned that the CSIS proposed to mollify Prime Minister Mahathir's proposal of EAEG (East Asian Economic Grouping) into EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) a caucus within APEC (interview, 22 November 2001).

[64] Rezasyah, "Changing the Guards in Indonesian Foreign Policy Making: From Cold War into Post Cold War Configuration", loc cit. Also interview (28 December 2001). However, foreign policy making from 1998 onward is influenced by a significant change in the domestic political landscape. The new political landscape has the following characteristics: (1) the presidency was no longer a sacrosanct institution and not immune from open criticism; (2) the weakening credibility of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and civil servants (bureaucrats) in general; and (3) in contrast, the role of the members of parliament, pressure groups, public figures, opinion makers has significantly increased.

[65] During the New Order, mass gatherings, unless they had already received authorisation from the police, were prohibited. The government did not allow mass demonstration and always insisted that any interests or concerns should be channelled though the parliament.

[66] Moeljarto Tjokrowinoto, "Bureaucracy and Social Change: Repositioning the Bureaucracy within the Context of Reformation", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1998, p. 383.

[67] See note 36.

[68] See note 54.

[69] Robert Wendzel, *International Relations: A Policymaker Focus* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), p. 257.

[70] During the New Order, there was a saying of 'KISS' (*Ke Istana Sendiri-Sendiri*) which meant to pay a separate visit to the palace (on an individual basis). Ministers or elites met the President in the Presidential Palace separately either to consult the President on some issues or to receive his assignment.

[71] There were cases when some individuals thought that President Soeharto had given his consent when he nodded or smiled to the issues they raised. In reality the nodding and smiling did not always mean agreement, but instead an expression that he had listened to the person's opinion. A confidential source informed the writer that Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia thought that President Soeharto had agreed to his proposal of EAEG (East Asia Economic Grouping) to compete APEC because Soeharto was nodding and smiling during their bilateral talks. In fact, when Mahathir left the meeting, Soeharto expressed his reluctance to support EAEG. Based on private communication in 1997 and on confidential basis.

[72] See Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of Troubled Relationship*. Sukma provided an interesting case of Soeharto using many channels, including KADIN, in the process leading to normalisation of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China. Similarly, Ben Perkasa Drajat also provided a case of APEC, where Soeharto gave overlapping assignments to some bureaucracies and individual (Prof. Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo). See Ben Perkasa Drajat, Doctoral Thesis, *The Change of Indonesia's Policy toward APEC (1989-1994): President Soeharto's Role in Foreign Policy-Making and Diplomacy*, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University, Japan, March 2001.

[73] In many instances, the President's support was a key factor that drove other bureaucracies and the military establishment to accept and support the Ministry's policy options. An example of this is as follow. In the late 1980s, the Ministry proposed two policy options at the domestic level which had implications at international level. The first proposal was to create a national commission for human rights. The President appeared supportive of the merits of the proposal, and the commission that the Ministry helped engineer was successful in dealing independently with a number of human rights cases in Indonesia, even during the Soeharto era. The second proposal was to give East Timor greater autonomy and to open the region from isolation. The second proposal was partially adopted. The government did make the region more open, but overall the military establishment opposed the proposal. At the same time, President Soeharto was also offended by the lack of enthusiasm from the East Timorese for the autonomy's proposal because they insisted on being independent. This reality suggests that first, the military was dominant on an issue affecting their interests and second, the personality of the President played some role in the adoption and implementation of any policy option

[74] Ali Alatas, *A Voice for a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches by Ali Alatas* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), p.xxvii. Most officials of the Ministry also shared this ideal of a lasting peace. Those officials did believe that conflict resolution would last longer if the parties to the conflicts or disputes were satisfied with the outcomes of the conflict resolution efforts. Those who shared similar perspectives include, among others: Mr. Abdul Nasir, interview, 5 December 2001 (at the time of interview, Mr. Nasir's position was Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister); Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab, interview, 4 October 2001; and Mr. Mohammad Yusuf, informal

consultation, 26 December 2001 (at the time of informal consultation, Mr. Mohammad Jusuf was the Head of research and Development Agency of the Ministry).

[75] However, for some military generals ambassadorial posts did not necessarily mean promotion or they had received President's personal favour. There were cases where an ambassadorship was Soeharto's effort to distance some generals from domestic politics and was popularly called in the Indonesian language as *pos pembuangan* (asylum post). An example of this was General Soemitro who was offered ambassadorship after Malari's affair, but he declined the offer. In a different case, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sarwo Edhie was sent as Indonesian Ambassador to Seoul, South Korea, because he had criticised Soeharto's policy. See Peter Kasenda, "Sarwo Edhi Wibowo dan Operasi Militer: Penghancur Gestapu/PKI dan Pendobrak Orde Lama [Sarwo Edhi Wibowo and military operation: destroyer of Indonesian Communist Party and the Old Order], *Prisma*, Edisi Khusus 20 Tahun Prisma, 1991, pp. 159-176.

[76] One prospective diplomat Minister Malik helped nurture was Ali Alatas. In 1975, when Adam Malik was appointed as Indonesian Vice President, he recruited Alatas as his personal secretary. Hence, Alatas from 1975 onward was involved in the inner circle of Indonesia's decision making at the highest level. Based on interview between Alatas and Toshihisa Komaki from Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo. The interview took place from 24 to 28 January 2000.

[77] See James Cotton, "Parts of the Indonesian World: lessons in East Timor policy-making, 1974-76", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 1, April 2001, p. 121. Cotton mentions that Lim Bian Kie [of CSIS], private secretary of General Ali Moertopo, as the 'best informed' about the East Timor affairs because the Indonesian Foreign Minister was "neither fully informed nor in sympathy with his leader's policy."

[78] With no prior knowledge of the incursion, the Indonesian diplomats in the UN naively disputed whether such infiltration had taken place. Recollection of Dr. Boer Mauna (interview, 15 November 2001).

[79] Interview, 22 October 2001. Mr. Juwana mentioned that when he and other new appointed ambassadors paid a courtesy visit to President Soeharto in mid 1990s, he raised the issue of East Timor to the President. He recalled that the President admitted that a factor prolonging the East Timor's problem was the Indonesian armed forces (interview, 19 October 2001).

[80] See Schwarz, op cit., Chapter 8.

[81] Interview with former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[82] Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda (appointed as Foreign Minister in 2001) was among those recruited in early 1970s. Overall, those who lead the numerous directorates in Ministry in 2002 belong to the group recruited in the late 1970s and mid-1980s. Concerning academic qualification, by the end of 2001, there were 20 diplomats with Doctoral qualifications (including Minister Hassan Wirajuda) and 235 with Masters qualifications. The data is from the Bureau for Personnel affairs.

[83] Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad provided this information (interview, 1 November 2001). In the mid-1980s, Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad was Minister Kusumaatmadja's private secretary. In the early 1960s, Minister Kusumaatmadja held a position as Professor and Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Padjadjaran in Bandung.

[84] In 1988, President Soeharto appointed Prof. Fuad Hassan as Minister for Education.

[85] Interview with Mr. Juwana, 19 October 2001. Juwana, like many Javanese, has only one name.

[86] Interview with Mr. Budiman Damosutanto, 3 October 2001. This opinion was also shared by a number of mid-career diplomats (confidential interviewees) and was also confirmed by a senior diplomat (confidential consultation).

[87] In 1997, the office of the Secretary General of the Ministry initiated a number of meetings to restructure the Ministry's organisation. The new structure took effect from January 2002 onward.

[88] The holder of this position was very influential not only with regard to substantive matters, but also concerning career promotion within the Ministry, because his or her opinion was listened to by the Foreign Minister and also the Secretary General. During Ali Alatas's tenure in the Ministry, the head of this office was a senior career diplomat, Ms. Laurens Wiryosaputro. Her successor was Ms. Adiyatwidi Adiwoso who held this position during Minister Alwi Shihab and until early 2002, under Minister Hassan Wirajuda.

[89] It is important to note that for some years (between 1966-1986) the Secretary General was filled by an active or retired General. From 1966-1999, the post of Inspector General was also filled by military personal. Another post in the Ministry, traditionally was the domain of the military, was the Directorate General for Social and Cultural Affairs. One of the Directorates under this Directorate General was responsible for security, including the 'clearance' of the Ministry's

personnel from criminal offense or from having political affiliation with groups or organizations which were anti-government at the time.

[90] The reason for this particular assignment is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

[91] Based on interview with Mr. John Louhanapessy, 16 October 2001.

[92] See discussion in Chapter 6.

[93] Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto argued that the personal factor of some leaders within the Ministry's structure played a dominant role in overall Ministry's works. He stated that in some cases, new leaders did not want to follow up the programs of their predecessors because they wanted to establish their own 'hallmark' (interview, 3 October 2001).

[94] More information of the background of this matter is provided in Chapter 6.

[95] In some cases, the head of the Indonesian overseas post (the ambassador) had no knowledge on the content of the information.

[96] Information provided by several confidential interviewees.

[97] Information provided by Mr. Abdul Naser, interview 29 November 2001. Former Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab, appointed Mr. Abdul Naser as his special adviser and to liaison with the Parliament. Mr. Abdul Naser continued his responsibility under Minister Hassan Wirajuda.

[98] Interview with Mr. Ahmad Jatmiko, staff at the Foreign Minister Office, 30 October 2001. The other known meetings in the Ministry are concerned with personnel matters, that is, on overseas postings and filling official positions in the Ministry. Other meetings depended on the circumstances, such as co-ordination meetings prior to conferences or for the purpose of establishing a joint committee responsible for particular events.

[99] A daily briefing between Director for Information with Minister Alatas, although irregular, took place when Mr. Irawan Abidin assumed the responsibility as Director for Information in mid-1990s. Mr. Irawan Abidin positioned himself as the Ministry's spoke-person. According to Mr. Wahid Suprijadi, no regular consultation took place in late 1990s and early 2000 (informal consultation, 30 October 2001). When consulted, Mr. Wahid Supriyadi held a position of acting Director for Information and was later on appointed for this position in early 2002.

[100] Interview with Mr. Ahmad Jatmiko, 30 October 2001.

[101] Interview with Mr. Chalief Akbar and Mr. Fikri Cassidy, 31 December 2001.

[102] Liddle, op cit, p. 73.

[103] Robinson Pangaribuan, op cit, p. 7.

[104] Interview with Mr. Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[105] Asep Setiawan, a former journalist from the daily *Kompas* - Indonesia, stated that the informal workshop on the South China Sea received wide media coverage because of the nature of the issues. He also argued that the overall diplomatic initiatives had increased Indonesia's profile internationally and as a consequence the profile of President Soeharto. When interviewed, through e-mail on 15 August 2002, Mr. Asep Setiawan worked in the BBC London.

[106] Dr. Ben Perkasa Drajat (interview, 24 October 2001), Mr. Kusnadi (interview, 3 and 9 October 2001), Mr. Yusbar Jamil (interview, 10 January 2002) and Mr. Taufik Soedarpo (interview, 13 January 2002).

[107] Interview, 9 October 2001. During the interview he gave an example of the President gave his personal opinion somewhat differently to the policy recommendation given by the Ministry. The President asked the Minister about the possibility of settling the territorial disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia (Sipadan and Ligitan Islands) by way of using the High Council mechanism of ASEAN, instead of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 17 December 2002, the ICJ awarded the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to Malaysia.

Chapter IV

In Search of Peace in Cambodia: from Jakarta Informal Meeting to Paris International Conference on Cambodia in 1991

IV.1. Introduction

Historical analysis suggests that efforts to find a solution to the Cambodian conflict were not confined to a particular country or organisation. Each of the players in the peace process made some contribution to the settlement of the problem.[1] The intention of this chapter is to analyse the informal diplomatic approaches of Indonesia with regard to the Cambodian conflict. This chapter will describe and analyse the aspects of informal diplomacy in the context of the Cambodian conflict, why informal diplomacy was required, and how Indonesia exercised informal diplomacy. The main argument of the chapter is that Indonesia was able to play a critical role in the peace process because, first, ASEAN provided Indonesia with a mandate to act on its behalf and, secondly, the majority of the protagonists in the conflict considered Indonesia more neutral than other ASEAN countries.

Indonesia designed informal diplomacy to facilitate a breakthrough in the Cambodian conflict. Thus, informal diplomacy was an important aspect of the overall peace processes because it complemented the initiatives sponsored by individuals, states, and regional as well as international organisations. Informal diplomacy took the form of informal meetings functioning at intervals to discuss points of contention prior to formal negotiations. Moreover, informal diplomacy had substantial support from bureaucrats within and outside the Ministry. The informal diplomacy was concerned with the processes of establishing contact, building personal rapport, and networking behind the formal and informal setting of interactions and negotiations. In this case, such processes took place among the conflicting parties, and also between the conflicting parties and the third parties, within the Indonesian ranks, within ASEAN, and between Indonesia and the French Government.

The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides a background to the Cambodian conflict and identifies the parties directly involved, and also those countries with a stake in the prolongation or settlement of the problem. As the conflict took place during the Cold War era, the stakeholders in this problem were not limited to the regional countries and China (the major power in the region), but also included the superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Southeast Asia was one of the arenas where the two superpowers were competing for their respective spheres of influence. The second section analyses the Indonesian peace initiative to understand the internal dynamics behind the initiative, the implementation of the informal diplomacy, the techniques adopted, the strategy developed, and the outcome of the peace initiative.

IV.2. The background to the Cambodian conflict

2.1. The root of the conflict and the reaction of the regional countries and China

The focus here is the Cambodian conflict that occurred after Vietnam, one of the regional powers, occupied its neighbour in 1979. However, to gain a fuller picture of the problem, the conflict needs to be examined in terms of a domestic struggle for power or an internal feud that took place almost ten years before Vietnam moved into Cambodia in the late 1970s. The internal feud arose from the differing perceptions of Prince Sihanouk Norodom Sihanouk and his armed forces in coping with the impact of the Vietnam war on their country in the 1960s. The Second Indochina war, from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, was between North and South Vietnam involving the US, China and the Soviet Union.

It is clear that Cambodia was a victim of an ideological contest during the Indochina war in the 1960s and thus was forced to side with one of the two blocks, although the government in power under Prince Norodom Sihanouk wished to maintain Cambodia's neutrality.[2] The diplomatic skills of Prince Sihanouk that balanced the interests of the major powers came to an end when he was ousted from power in March 1970 during an overseas visit to the Soviet

Union. The coup was masterminded by Cambodians from among the armed forces who opposed the policy of allowing Vietnamese communists (the Vietcong) to operate from within Cambodia's interior to infiltrate South Vietnam. The armed forces did not accept the Prince's argument that the aim of his policy was to keep Cambodia out of the war.[3] The new government under General Lon Nol sided with the US and adopted a hostile policy towards the communists of North Vietnam and Cambodia.

From 1970, Cambodia was plunged into civil war. The armed conflict and cycle of violence in Cambodia were made worse through the involvement of the major powers who used the factions in Cambodia as their proxies. The Lon Nol government (1970-1975) faced insurgencies from the coalition forces of the National Liberation Front under Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge.[4] The coalition forces received military training and assistance, and were given sanctuary by China and North Vietnam. The US backed the Lon Nol government by providing military assistance including launching a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia to destroy the resistance forces, in particular the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge blamed Vietnam for Cambodia's devastation from the US bombing raids in 1973 on the grounds that the bombing took place after Vietnam and the US had agreed on a partial cease-fire in South Vietnam and a permanent one in Laos.[5] Although this alleged 'sell-out' to the US was regarded as a factor that triggered hatred among the Khmer Rouge leaders towards Hanoi,[6] the fact was that the Khmer Rouge leaders since mid-1972 had treated their Vietnamese compatriots with hostility. According to Stephen Morris, by then the North Vietnamese did not react strongly because their immediate goal was to conquer South Vietnam.[7]

In 1975, the Khmer Rouge successfully overthrew Lon Nol and established a communist government led by Pol Pot. During the period from 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge government of 'Democratic Kampuchea' established closer bilateral co-operation with China and adopted China's model of communism, including copying Mao Zedong's ideal of self-sufficiency.[8] In their remodelling of Cambodian society, the Khmer Rouge forced the cities' inhabitants to move to the rural areas. The social reform experiment resulted in an unprecedented

humanitarian tragedy and 1.7 million Cambodians died within a four-year period.[9] At the same time, while the bilateral relationship between the Khmer Rouge led government and China had increased, the Khmer Rouge's relationship with Vietnam deteriorated. This relationship was made worse by the Khmer Rouge's attempt to 'purify their ranks' through 're-educating' those who had been closely associated with Vietnam. To escape re-education some factions closely affiliated with Vietnam, including Heng Samrin and Hun Sen, fled to Vietnam and took sanctuary there.

An increased number of border disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam in late 1977,[10] including the Khmer Rouge's notorious attack on Vietnam's border in September 1977 and the killing of civilian farmers,[11] coupled with the expulsions of around 50.000 Vietnamese settlers from Cambodia[12] provided a pretext for Vietnam to invade Cambodia in 1979 and install the Heng Samrin-led government. The Khmer Rouges' belligerence toward Vietnam seemingly prompted the invasion, but concerning Vietnam's motives for the invasion some scholars, the ASEAN members and China interpreted the motives differently. The following discussion looks at some scholars' interpretations of the Cambodian imbroglio following the invasion and identifies the reactions of the regional countries and major powers, especially by observing their threat perception.

Some scholars interpreted the invasion, followed by China's punitive military action against Vietnam between February and March 1979, as a repetition of a historical antagonism between the three countries. They referred to the triangular relationships between the three kingdoms in the past, that is, the Chinese emperor had treated the Kingdom of Vietnam as its vassal and likewise, Vietnam had also treated its weaker neighbours, the Kingdoms of Champa and Cambodia, as its own vassals. Both the Kingdoms of Champa and Cambodia had sought protection from the Chinese emperor.[13] Hence, Vietnam's motive for the invasion was simply to subjugate the Cambodians under its sphere of influence, a repetition of ancient history. The invasion and the appointment of Heng Samrin to lead 'Vietnam's puppet government' in Cambodia were taken as evidence of this aims.

Stephen Morris contradicts historical antagonism as the main factor behind the conflict. He considers the antagonism stemmed from the three countries' ideological orientations and the intrinsic political culture of the Cambodians and Vietnamese. The polarisation of ideological orientation, that is, Vietnam following the Soviet Union and the Khmer Rouge following China, fuelled their antagonism. In having a similar ideological orientation with China, the Khmer Rouge believed that China would help them in their conflict with Vietnam. Vietnam also had similar expectation of support from the Soviet Union. In fact, since the late 1960s, the Vietnamese communists no longer trusted China and accused China of betraying the communist world, especially by China's strategic realignment toward the United States to counter what China's communist leaders perceived as the Soviet Union's threat. Hence, while Vietnam suspected that the Khmer Rouge were China's tool to destabilise Vietnam, China also believed that Vietnam was a pawn of the Soviet Union and part of the Soviet's grand design to encircle China. In terms of political culture, the Khmer Rouge believed that the Cambodians were superior to the Vietnamese. By treating the Vietnamese of ethnic Chinese origin as second class citizens and forcing them to flee the country, Vietnam showed little consideration for China's sensitivity about such treatment.[14] Therefore, the invasion stemmed from Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge paranoia, coupled with Vietnam's motive to secure its frontier from a hostile neighbour. The Heng Samrin government - assisted by Vietnam's military and bureaucrats -functioned as Vietnam's security guarantor.

In general, the regional countries and China condemned Vietnam's intervention, but their strategies on how best to deal with the problem did not always converge. These countries shaped their individual policies and positions based on their assessments of Vietnam's motives, the history of their past interaction with Vietnam, and the way their country perceived their national and regional security from the perspective of threat perception. China, Thailand and Singapore reacted strongly to the invasion for differing reasons. Although China and Thailand believed that Vietnam's intention was to dominate Indochina and put Cambodia and Laos under Vietnam's influence, they developed their threat perception from a different angle. China was afraid of being encircled by hostile Asian neighbours who had a close association with the Soviet Union, and were willing to follow the

Soviet's strategy of isolating and containing China, especially by accepting Soviet military assistance to reinforce their military strength.[15] In the case of Vietnam, China did not want to risk a potential military threat from its Southern neighbour and a strong Soviet foothold in its backyard: Vietnam being analogous to Cuba for the US.[16] Therefore, China's determination to resist Vietnam's presence in Cambodia was framed within this strategic perspective. Juwono Sudarsono, an Indonesian political scientist, further argued that China's support for the Khmer Rouge was also a reflection of China's hostility toward Soviet involvement in matters involving the Indochina countries.[17]

Similar to China, Thailand was also very concerned about Vietnam's invasion. With the fall of Cambodia, Thailand felt more vulnerable because there was no longer a buffer country separating it and Vietnam. As stated by Khien Theeravit, "[a]n independent Kampuchea and Laos means, for Thailand, buffer states between Thailand and Vietnam and beyond. These two weak states by themselves pose no threat to Thailand. Without Vietnamese troops in their countries, there would be no border clashes with the Vietnamese."[18] What made the matter complicated was that first, the two countries considered Cambodia and Laos as their traditional sphere of influence and, secondly, Thailand and Vietnam lacked a history of co-operation (which Thailand had also supported the US during the Second Indochina war). Hence, Thailand had reason to worry about Vietnam's hostility. This concern intensified during Vietnam's military incursions into Thai territory under the pretext of ambushing the Cambodian resistance's forces hiding along the border and within the Thai interior. The earliest incursion took place in June 1980.[19] Thailand was also concerned about the possibility of Vietnam using the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) to destabilise Thailand.[20]

To counter the threat posed by Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia, Thailand allied itself with China and sought diplomatic support from the ASEAN countries through the regional association. The mutual interest between Thailand and China facilitated this co-operation. China pledged to assist Bangkok in the event of external aggression and stopped providing the CPT with material support, even instructing them to confront Vietnam.[21] For its part, Thailand let the Beijing-supported Khmer Rouge and other anti-Phnom Penh resistance forces use "Thai

territory along the common border as an active sanctuary and as a source of material resupply." [22] Moreover, "Beijing also utilized Thai territory, including the waters, to sustain the forces opposed to the Heng Samrin regime with military assistance."[23] By giving access to the Cambodian resistance forces in its interior, Thailand became a party to the conflict and, on number of occasions, Thai armed forces engaged in military clashes with Vietnam's troops.

Concerned about the security of Thailand as a 'front-line state', ASEAN provided Thailand with diplomatic support. However, at times there were disagreements among the ASEAN members about the strategy to deal with the Cambodian problem. Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, were reluctant to follow China's strategy aimed at weakening Vietnam by "perpetuating a conflict situation and preventing the Heng Samrin government from stabilising."[24] The main factor that led to the disagreements was the differing perception of threat among the ASEAN countries. Clearly, ASEAN was divided between countries who considered Vietnam as a potential threat for their national and regional securities and countries who were more sceptical about China's intentions toward their country and the region. The following discussion looks briefly at the threat perceptions of the rest of the ASEAN members: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Singapore was another member of ASEAN which had openly and consistently condemned Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. As a small island state, Singapore was very sensitive about any country breaching the principle of national sovereignty through military intervention and occupation.[25] Singapore had always considered itself vulnerable to its neighbours (Indonesia and Malaysia) who were bigger and shared a similar Malay culture. Singapore was indeed afraid of being bullied by its bigger neighbours. Therefore, Singapore considered the national integrity of a country as vital. At the same time, Singapore considered instability in its immediate environment as a threat to its national security and, indeed, a threat to its survival as a nation because instability creates unpredictability.[26] With limited national resources, Singapore depended on international trade and services and, therefore, instability and unpredictability were an anathema to Singapore's national economic development.

In the 1980s, Singapore's leaders stated that the principal external threat to the country's national security emanated from Vietnam. They believed that the Soviet Union's support for Vietnam made the presence of the US and other Western powers in the region imperative.[27] Singapore also supported Thailand's position on the importance of ASEAN's closer co-operation with China to contain Vietnam and the potential for Soviet's assertiveness in the region. Although Singapore believed that this co-operation was the best response to the immediate threat, Singapore remained cautious about China's long term interests in the region and looked upon China as "a long-standing source of external threat to Singapore's national security."[28]

Although ASEAN members expressed sympathy over Thailand's difficulties and regret on the invasion of Cambodia, two ASEAN countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) did not feel comfortable with Thailand's strategy of closer alignment between ASEAN and China. Both Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned about Thailand's growing dependence on China and at the same time, they were also suspicious about China's strategy of bleeding Vietnam into submission. They were afraid that the strategy was China's first step to put the Southeast Asian region into its sphere of interest and they believed that Vietnam was the only country in the region capable of halting China's ambition.[29] However, Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned about the potential for regional destabilisation from the prolongation of the Cambodian conflict, including the flow of Vietnamese refugees of ethnic Chinese origin into their countries. Therefore, Malaysia and Indonesia tried to find a solution to the problem and resisted a rigid anti-Vietnam posture. At times, their position, especially Indonesia's, seemed accommodative toward Vietnam's strategic interest in Indochina.

Clearly, Malaysia and Indonesia's approach to the problem reflected their perception that it was China and not Vietnam that posed a threat to their national and regional securities. China was seen as a threat because China had supported communist insurgency in their respective countries. They were also worried about the prospect of China manipulating the Malaysians and Indonesians of ethnic Chinese origin to further China's interest.[30] They questioned the allegiance of their ethnic Chinese citizens. Moreover, both Malaysia and Indonesia were

alarmed by China's determination to punish Vietnam for the invasion and especially by China's military onslaught against Vietnam in 1979.[31] In contrast, Thailand was grateful for the military attack because it meant Vietnam had to concentrate on two different fronts and had moved some of its regular troops from Thailand's border and stationed them along its border with China in the North.[32]

The concern of another ASEAN member, the Philippines, with the overall Cambodian conflict was linked with the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. Any conflict involving China and Soviet Union over Indochina would have involved the US because of the entente cordiale between the US, China and Japan.[33] The Philippines would have been brought into the conflict by the mere presence of the US bases on its soil and the two countries' security agreement. However, the Philippines' attitude toward Vietnam was relatively relaxed because it did not consider Vietnam posed a direct military threat against the Philippines.[34] The Philippines did share Indonesia and Malaysia's concern about China's potential to create instability in the Southeast Asian region based on China's close association with communist inspired insurgency in the Philippines.[35] Hence, of the five ASEAN countries, three of them (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines) were more concerned about the potential threat from China than from Vietnam.

2.2. The conflicting parties and the stakeholders from 1979 onwards

Broadly defined, the parties and stakeholders to the Cambodian conflict were those who fought for victory in the battle and the diplomatic fields. If on the battlefield, the warring factions were relatively easy to identify; on the diplomatic front the stakeholders of the conflict were more diverse and fluid. On the battlefield, the resistance groups consisted of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot; the Khmer People's National Liberation Forces (KPNLF) under Son Sann; and the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) under Prince Sihanouk. These resistance groups fought against the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with the backing of the Vietnamese occupation forces.[36] China provided Khmer Rouge forces with more military assistance compared to its assistance to FUNCINPEC. The KPNLF faction, whose military officers were members of the defeated Lon Nol regime before 1975,

received only token military assistance from some ASEAN and Western countries.[37]

The stakeholders in the Cambodian conflict as well as its settlement can be divided into two broad classifications, the inner and outer circles. *The inner circle* consisted of above three three resistance factions and the People's Republic of Kampuchea as well as countries engaged directly in the conflict, that is, Vietnam, Thailand and China. *The outer circle* involved those regional countries concerned with the prospect of conflict escalation and its potential to endanger regional stability. ASEAN also had a stake because the conflict threatened the principles of ASEAN, especially those of non-interference and the inviolability of national sovereignty.[38] Clearly, the invasion and the instalment of a puppet government in Cambodia challenged ASEAN's credibility as a regional grouping that promoted a regional code of conduct. Michael Leifer portrays ASEAN feelings by stating: "ASEAN could not ignore Vietnam having conveyed a government into Kampuchea virtually in the saddle bags of its invading army without a serious loss of international credibility."[39] Hence, ASEAN had to respond to the conflict post-invasion. The urgency of finding a solution to the Cambodian conflict increased over time because the conflict created strains in the relations of some ASEAN members. The latter aspect is further outlined during the discussion of Indonesian diplomatic initiatives to deal with the Cambodian conflict.

The outer circle included the superpowers which had strategic interests in the Southeast and East Asian regions; France, the former colonial power, which had a moral obligation to put the country back in order; Australia, and Japan. The United Nations, under the UN Charter, had the responsibility to uphold world peace, while organisations such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) could also be included in this circle. Out of these actors in the outer circle, the position of the two superpowers on the Cambodian conflict influenced the dynamics of the Cambodian conflict, for at least two reasons. First, the conflict took place in the context of the Cold War, during which the two superpowers had competed for spheres of influence in various regions in the word. Therefore, each superpower did not want to let the region fall under its opponent's influence. Secondly, the two superpowers gave their support, either directly or indirectly, to one or other of

the parties in the conflict. The continuation or scaling down of diplomatic and material support to their proxy in the Cambodian conflict influenced the attitudes of the conflicting parties, either in the battlefield or during peace discussions.

The Soviet Union backed Vietnam's supremacy in Indochina, including Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, for a number of reasons. As suggested by Vladimir Rakhmanin, both countries had developed long relations; they had mutual interests to contain China; and moreover, they shared ideological proximity.[40] To enhance their relationship, on 3 November 1978 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in which the Soviet Union gave implicit guarantees to support Vietnam against military aggression. However, the Soviet Union appeared cautious in implementing the Treaty because it did not engage militarily when China attacked Vietnam in early 1979. Arguably, China had been able to keep the Soviet Union out of military conflict by making it clear that China's objective in the border attack was limited, that is, to punish Vietnam for its hostility toward China. Hence, China successfully prevented the Soviet Union and Vietnam from invoking their Treaty.

The above episode in early 1979 showed a case when the Soviet Union maintained a cautious position within the triangular relations between itself, China and Vietnam. In fact, historically, the Soviet Union's positions had not always been in favour of Vietnam and the fluctuation in Soviet relations with China shaped that position - a factor that Vietnam was well aware of. Indeed, the Soviet's commitment to Vietnam increased in the mid-1960s during the US bombing raids over Vietnam.[41] The deterioration in Vietnam's relations with China in late 1970s provided further impetus for both the Soviet Union and Vietnam to strengthen their relationship. The Soviet Union was able to optimise the relationship for its strategic interest in the region, particularly by gaining access "to the air naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Danang and to the Tan Son Nhut air base [allowing them to establish] a permanent naval presence in the South China Sea."[42] Thus, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with economic and military assistance to sustain Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia in return for access to military facilities in Vietnam. Needless to say, the presence of Soviet military forces in Southeast Asia had the potential to aggravate peace and stability

in the region because the other superpower, the US, had military bases in the Philippines.

The strategic alignment between the Soviet Union and Vietnam which was enhanced after the invasion of Cambodia, and the fact that the Soviet Union had obtained a military foothold in Vietnam caused great concern in the US. In response to the looming threat to its interests in the region, the United States decided to align its position with China and ASEAN. At the same time, the US also strengthened its security co-operation with its allies in Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, and provided this country with military assistance. Similarly, the US also provided the Cambodian resistance forces, especially the KPNLF, with armed assistance. Hence, the US was involved in the armed conflict in Cambodia indirectly, through its military supply to some parties to the conflict who engaged in armed confrontation on the battlefield.

The alignment with China posed some dilemmas for the US because the US was forced to follow the hard-line position set by China. On the one hand, the US had no difficulty in follow the strategy because some influential sections within the US, especially the parliamentarians and military personnel, by then resented Vietnam for the trauma the Americans experienced during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, the US felt awkward upholding China's strategy of weakening Vietnam and the Heng Samrin Government by assisting the Khmer Rouge, at all cost.[43] In aligning its position closely with China and ASEAN, the US also supported the strategy of isolating Vietnam and its 'puppet government' in Cambodia internationally. However, this strategy created another dilemma for the US because due to the isolation Vietnam became more dependent on the Soviet Union's military and economic aid.[44]

Overall, the power play and manoeuvring between stakeholders in the inner and outer circles, as well as among the stakeholders in the outer circle had some impacts - good and bad - on the settlement processes of the conflict. The efforts to find peace in Cambodia were like erecting a building, at first establishing a peace map (the architect's plan), then as the dialogue progressed, the builder gradually put more bricks into the foundation, until the building's shape came into

existence. Unfortunately, in the case of the Cambodian conflict, the conflicting parties and the stakeholders often insisted that they had the best 'peace map' for the basis of the peace plan. Thus, the Indonesian peace initiative was concerned with identifying the many peace maps, consulting the parties and the stakeholders on the nature of each map, and presenting the consolidated map to the conflicting parties within the setting of informal meetings. The peace process moved back and forth from informal to formal, during which the stakeholders exchanged and negotiated positions for the sake of putting substance into the peace map, as if putting bricks in one at a time into an edifice of peace.

IV.3. The Indonesian Peace Initiatives

3.1. Indonesia as ASEAN Interlocutor

From the very outset it is important to mention that the Cambodian conflict put Indonesian and ASEAN interests in collision. To a certain extent, as outlined earlier, the differing threat perceptions among the ASEAN members also influenced how individual states reacted to the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN subscribed to the inviolability of national sovereignty and, therefore, regarded Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as having to be challenged unconditionally. Such aggression made ASEAN's ideal of having a peaceful and stable region look unattainable.[45] As a member of ASEAN, Indonesia had to support ASEAN's strategy of isolating Vietnam, at all costs, and use all diplomatic means to achieve this strategy. At the same time, Thailand provided an arms supply from China to the resistance forces in Cambodia in order to put an extra burden on Vietnam and its occupational forces. The objective of this strategy was to 'bleed Vietnam white' in order to force Vietnam to back down and meet ASEAN's demand to retreat from Cambodia. However, Indonesia did not consider that a weak Vietnam would serve Indonesia's interest for having a strong country acting as a buffer against potential threats from China.[46] Indonesia also did not consider the strategy of isolation was effective and observed that instead of backing down, Vietnam had instead hardened its stand. In 1982, for instance the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach had stated that ASEAN hostility towards Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would make the Vietnam government "resort to its right to self-

defense."[47] Indonesia considered that the other ASEAN policy of limited interaction with Vietnam, that is, by assigning certain ASEAN countries to engage Vietnam in a dialogue, would yield better results in the long run, rather than the policy of isolation. In fact, since the early 1980s ASEAN had assigned Malaysia, and later on Indonesia, as a point of contact between itself and Vietnam.

In the belief that isolation would not guarantee a reversal in Vietnam's attitude, Indonesia tried to maintain a good rapport with Vietnam, for instance by making a moderate statement during the yearly debate in the General Assembly session of the UN.[48] However, as a member of ASEAN, Indonesia had no other option other than to stand united with the ASEAN's position during the UN General Assembly which condemned Vietnam for its invasion and demanded that Vietnam pull out its military forces from Cambodia. ASEAN also used the UN to negate the existence of Vietnam's puppet government in Cambodia by blocking its credentials in the UN. Simultaneously, ASEAN used the UN to maintain international recognition of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and later on the CGDK as the legitimate representative of the Cambodians, at least in the UN. However, in the case of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), ASEAN members in the NAM (Indonesia, Malaysian and Singapore) were unable to change the NAM's policy to leave the seat for the representative of Cambodia in that organisation vacant.

To deal with the dilemma it faced from the Cambodian conflict, the Indonesian Government maintained an open-minded attitude and was willing to listen to policy options or inputs suggested by Indonesian scholars. In 1983, during a seminar organised by the Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, the Ministry requested several leading Indonesian political experts and military strategists to analyse several possible modalities to deal with the Cambodian problem. One of the ideas suggested was to ask the Ministry and the ASEAN countries to embark on a limited regional conference to complement the efforts at the UN forum. The seminar also suggested the Ministry persuade ASEAN countries to not further isolate Vietnam and gradually distance themselves from the Khmer Rouge.[49] Although it was not too clear what the impact of the seminar on Indonesian policy on Cambodia was, the

recommendation convinced Indonesia of the merit of maintaining dialogue with the Vietnamese.

However, Indonesia's efforts to lend assistance in finding a solution to the Cambodian conflict were far from smooth. Indonesia had to balance its own position with the interests of other ASEAN members, and therefore was expected to show at all times that Indonesia supported ASEAN policies on Cambodia. Initial efforts to maintain Indonesia's integrity, that is, by issuing a joint statement outlining a common understanding with Malaysia of the strategic interest of Vietnam in Indochina, were strongly criticised by other ASEAN members, particularly Thailand and Singapore. The joint statement was the result of a meeting between the former President Soeharto and the late Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn in Kuantan in March 1980 and pronounced that the solution to the Cambodian conflict should take into consideration:

> a) that Vietnam shall be free from dependence on foreign powers, either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China;
>
> b) that in the framework of finding a solution to the power struggle for influence in Kampuchea, a political solution should be employed, instead of military one, especially by recognizing the security interests of Vietnam and reducing the influence of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in the region.[50]

Thailand and Singapore's criticism of Indonesia and Malaysia for breaking ASEAN ranks was softened when in June 1980 Indonesia and Malaysia joined their compatriots to stand behind Thailand's security concerns after Vietnam's military incursion into Thailand's territory. On June 23, 1980, Vietnamese forces crossed the Thai border and engaged the Thai forces in a military clash. However, it is important to note that Indonesia kept the Kuantan principles in mind as basic principles that should govern efforts toward a 'comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian problem.'

Moreover, although Indonesia yielded to the pressure from its ASEAN colleagues, Indonesia did maintain some contact with Vietnam, especially through the Indonesian armed forces. In February 1984, General Benny Murdani, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, shocked the regional countries by his visit to Hanoi from 14 to 17 February 1984, and by his statement that Vietnam was not a

threat to the region. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was left with the task of qualifying General Murdani's statement and convincing other ASEAN members that Indonesia did not deviate from ASEAN's stand.[51] Considering the cordial relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam, ASEAN in May 1984 designated Indonesia as ASEAN's interlocutor to promote dialogue with Vietnam. Dr. Dewi Anwar suggested that ASEAN's decision was also aimed of keeping Indonesia in check[52]and reinstating confidence that ASEAN remained unified.[53] Dr. Anwar's views have some merit in respect of some difficulties that Indonesia faced from some ASEAN countries in fulfilling its responsibility as interlocutor.

3.2. Preparing the ground work for the informal diplomacy process

Upon assuming responsibility as ASEAN interlocutor, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja intensified efforts to find ways to settle the Cambodian conflict that would be acceptable to the conflicting parties and the stakeholders. He made a number of trips to Hanoi to confer about ASEAN's positions and in between consulted his ASEAN colleagues, particularly Thailand, on any developments from the discussions. Noting that some of ASEAN's and Vietnam's positions were irreconcilable, Minister Kusumaatmadja decided to consolidate all the positions into a 12-point proposal.

The proposal incorporated the various peace proposals suggested by the various parties. Indonesia regarded the proposal as an integral part for achieving peace and stability in the region and in particular for resolving the Cambodian conflict. The overall Indonesian strategy to solve the Cambodian conflict, including the informal diplomacy, revolved around this proposal. However, in the course of the process to solve the conflict, some elements of the proposal were overtaken by events, while some other elements were adjusted based on the contexts surrounding the peace process, at the regional and international levels.

On October 1985, Minister Kusumaatmadja proposed the 12-point proposal as Indonesia's framework to solve the Cambodian problem. The framework was comprehensive - albeit with some contradictions - because it addressed all issues essential for the solution of Cambodian conflict. In particular, the proposal

suggested stages on how bring peace in Cambodia and postulated ASEAN/Indonesia's ideal of the region post-Cambodian conflict.[54] The first element was a concern with strategic framework. In this case, the US had to be brought into the strategic equation to balance the role played by the Soviet Union and China. In this respect, Indonesia hoped that the US would take steps to normalise its bilateral relations, such as discussing with Vietnam the issue of American troops Missing in Action (MIA). The rationale behind the proposal was to reduce Vietnam's dependence on the Soviet Union. The second element outlined the strategic objective from the resolution of the Cambodian problem, that is, to have an independent, free, and non-aligned Cambodia. By having a non-aligned Cambodia, Vietnam in particular would not feel threatened by a neighbour who, before the invasion, had adopted a policy hostile towards Vietnam and established an alignment with China.

The third element emphasises the importance of the withdrawal of Vietnam forces from Cambodia. In this case a clear time frame for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia was seen as essential and, therefore, international pressure for such withdrawal had to be maintained. The fourth element highlights the importance of an international conference to discuss a solution to the Cambodian problem. The format being suggested was a limited conference involving ASEAN countries, Vietnam, Laos, members of the Security Council (the US, Soviet Union, PRC, the United Kingdom and France), Australia, India and Sweden. The fifth element of the proposal involved arranging direct talks between the protagonists, the CGDK and Vietnam. However, direct talks between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin led-Government was not encouraged because this would imply recognition of a 'puppet government'. The sixth proposal highlights the importance of national reconciliation, inclusively including all factions in the conflict. However, this proposal contradicted the previous proposal which, in principle, opposed direct talks between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin faction.

The seventh of the twelve elements are concerned with the stages from Vietnam's military pull out to the establishment of a national reconciliation government in Cambodia. Specifically, the seventh element highlights the aspect of withdrawing Vietnamese troops. One issue was how to pull the forces out, whether in stages or

in total. The eighth element concerned the creation of a safety zone, whether it would apply to all of Cambodia or limited to the border of Cambodia and Thailand. This issue was contentious for Thailand and Vietnam. The ninth element concerned the creation of an international force. The role of the forces would be subject to the role that the parties expected from such forces, such as to act as peace keeping forces. The tenth element was the creation of an international control commission. The eleventh was to hold an election/referendum under international supervision. The last of the twelve was concerned with the establishment of a government of national reconciliation led by Prince Sihanouk which included the Heng Samrin faction.

Preferring to have a regional approach at the first phase as a way of settling the Cambodian conflict,[55] Minister Kusumaatmadja conferred with his colleagues in the Ministry on the kind of meeting format that could bring all the conflicting parties and the regional stakeholders together. Among those consulted by Minister Kusumaatmadja was Prof. Fuad Hassan, a trained psychologist who had served the Ministry in the Research and Development Agency in the mid-1980s.[56] The colleagues supported Minister Kusumaatmadja's idea that the most feasible format was to convene an informal meeting, held on the basis of 'equal footing, without preconditions and with no political label'.[57] The informal meeting would consist of two stages: first, a meeting between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin Government, and second, a meeting between the Kampuchean factions involving ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos.

On 29 July 1987, Minister Kusumaatmadja visited Vietnam and discussed the meeting format and the 12-point proposal with Vietnam's foreign minister, Mr. Nguyen Co Thach. Minister Co Thach expressed support for the format and agreed to consider some of the elements in the 12-point proposal. This convergence of views was recorded in the 'Ho Chi Minh City Understanding' of 1987 between Indonesia and Vietnam. Vietnam's agreement to the proposed meeting format was a breakthrough in the sense that Vietnam had previously refused to participate in any meeting in which the Khmer Rouge participated and in any meeting which implicated Vietnam as a party to the conflict.[58] However, Vietnam's agreement was hardly surprising because Vietnam was worried that the

Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev might abandon Vietnam for the sake of normalising its relations with China. In fact, in 1986, the Soviet Union did attempt to resolve the Cambodian conflict directly with the Phnom Penh Government knowing that the resolution of the conflict was one of the preconditions set by China before normalisation could take place. Hence, by accepting the proposed meeting format, Vietnam hoped that it would maintain its influence in Cambodia.

Unfortunately, the agreement reached in Ho Chi Minh City was not received favourably in some ASEAN countries. It is curious that Thailand's Foreign Minister, Mr. Siddhi Savetsila, who was aware of Minister Kusumaatmadja's intention, stated that he was not fully consulted on the matter. During his press briefing in August 3, 1987, Minister Savetsila, praised Minister Kusumaatmadja for his successful visit, but made a remark that implied that ASEAN countries should not become too involved in Cambodian affairs.[59]

Baffled by this reaction, Minister Kusumaatmadja wrote to Minister Savetsila, dated 10 August 1987, stating that Vietnam's agreement to take part in the 'cocktail party'[60] was the maximum result of his visit.[61] He also mentioned in his letter that "the Vietnamese have also agreed that any subject can be raised and discussed in that informal meeting."[62] He concluded his letter by stating that "[a] consensus among us at this juncture is of crucial importance so as to enable us to consider and chart the steps that should be taken in the days ahead." He added, "for this purpose, ideally an informal meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers could be convened. If this idea of an informal meeting is agreeable, the appropriate time could be between now and the date of your departure for Beijing."[63] Indonesia's proposal to call an informal ASEAN meeting could be interpreted as an attempt not only to clarify the misunderstanding,[64] but also as an effort to find a concerted ASEAN position in anticipation of China's opposition. However, during the special ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok on 16 August 1987, both Singapore and Thailand opposed the decision to hold meetings in two stages because ASEAN acceded to Vietnam's position that the Cambodian conflict was mainly an internal conflict among Cambodians. Both countries also insisted that ASEAN use the 8-point proposal of the CGDK as a basis for the discussion during the informal meeting. However, this condition was not acceptable to Vietnam, and

Thailand was well aware of Vietnam's rejection of the CGDK proposal, which asked Vietnam to negotiate directly with CGDK.[65]

Indonesia was clearly disappointed with Thailand and Singapore's reactions, and for a while the agreed basis and format for discussion was shelved.[66] In an apparent display of displeasure, during a meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials (ASEAN SOM) in Bangkok from September 8-10, 1987, Indonesia's delegation mentioned that the ASEAN countries should always remember that the Cambodian conflict was the problem of the Cambodians and ASEAN was only there to help find a solution. Therefore, any action by ASEAN countries should always be guided by the principle of 'only to help'. The delegation invited ASEAN countries to look for ways of settling the conflict from the point of view of the victims of the conflict, that is, the Cambodians, and not from the interest of any regional country.[67]

At the same time, Vietnam also expressed its disappointment at the result of the ASEAN ministerial meeting and questioned ASEAN's appointment of Indonesia as its representative to consult Vietnam, who was acting on behalf of the Indochinese countries.[68] The question revealed that as ASEAN interlocutor, Indonesia was not given full power to speak on ASEAN's behalf. In its editorial, Merdeka - a Jakarta based newspaper, sympathetic to Moscow - expressed concern that Indonesia was being manipulated and forced to give up its independence and active foreign policy.[69] However, it could be argued that as long as the so-called 'front line-state', Thailand, considered the interlocutor function of Indonesia was not jeopardising its interests, Thailand would give Indonesia permission to take diplomatic initiatives. The kind of ambivalence in Thailand's attitudes toward Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives was observable during the overall peace efforts leading to the Paris agreement in 1991. This ambivalence is evident in the following discussion.

3.3. Paving the way for the Jakarta Informal Meetings

It is important to note that although the reaction to the 'Ho Chi Minh City understanding' was rather tepid, the 'cocktail party' proposal remained alive and

was discussed on several occasions. For instance, during an ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, 28 September 1987 – on the fringe of the General Assembly's meeting - Minister Kusumaatmadja informed his counterparts that Vietnam had expressed interest in pursuing the Ho Chi Minh City agreement, that is, organising an informal meeting among the Cambodians. Minister Kusumaatmadja also informed the meeting that Vietnam had agreed to meet Prince Sihanouk, but only in his personal capacity. However, Minister Kusumaatmadja stated that he would not follow up the request unless ASEAN gave him their fullest support. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers gave their approval, as long as Indonesia could guarantee Vietnam's participation.[70] Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the ASEAN ministers also agreed to play down the planned meeting, and requested Indonesia make the necessary arrangements with the Vietnamese government, and consult Prince Sihanouk on the matter.[71]

Prince Sihanouk was undoubtedly a lynchpin in Cambodian affairs. His consent and endorsement of any diplomatic initiative to settle the Cambodian problem was essential. Prince Sihanouk appeared supportive of the idea when Minister Kusumaatmadja discussed Vietnam's request with him in private before the rest of ASEAN Foreign Ministers joined in for a bilateral meeting with Prince Sihanouk. Interestingly, during the bilateral meeting, which was described as 'sincere and open', Prince Sihanouk maintained that ASEAN should take a realistic approach and consider Vietnam's security interests as well as the Cambodians half-hearted support of CGDK warfare, because the Cambodians were still traumatised by Pol Pot's regime. In his opinion, Vietnam would not accept any settlement which forced Vietnam to acknowledge itself as a culprit in the Cambodian conflict. The Prince also mentioned that Vietnam considered it was in a strong position because of the support from the Soviet Union and some non-aligned countries such as India.[72]

Prince Sihanouk then elaborated three possible options for peace talks: (1) dialogue between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Paris; (2) dialogue between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, immediately followed by Prince Sihanouk meeting with a high level Vietnamese leader, preferably Vietnam's President or Prime Minister (both meetings in Jakarta); and (3) dialogue within the framework of

'cocktail party' in Jakarta. He, however, was not too optimistic of the 'cocktail party' option because in his opinion the Khmer Rouge, with the backing of China, would be unwilling to participate.[73] ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their support for the Prince's plan. In the meantime Indonesia decided to follow up the planned meeting with Vietnam, despite the 'lukewarm' response from the Prince.[74]

The decision to continue pursuing the 'cocktail party' proposal stemmed from Indonesia's experience that Prince Sihanouk sometimes made conflicting statements. For instance, on 25 August 1987, Prince Sisowath, FUNCINPEC representative in CGDK's office in the UN, informed the Indonesian mission that he was asked to relay Prince Sihanouk's appreciation of Indonesia's effort in settling the Cambodian conflict. Prince Sihanouk considered the 'Ho Chi Minh City understanding' important, because the agreement recognised Vietnam as a significant factor in conflict settlement. The Prince regretted the outcome of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok and described the communiqué of the meeting as 'pure sabotage' of Indonesian efforts as the communiqué confirmed the positions of the hard-liners, that is, China, Thailand and the Khmer Rouge. Interestingly, on the following day, the same envoy again approached the Indonesian mission and conveyed a different message; Prince Sihanouk denied the legality of Vietnam's claim that the agreement in Ho Chi Minh City was between ASEAN and the Indochina states. However, Prince Sihanouk did not omit the possibility of his participation in a kind of meeting, because his envoy stated that Prince Sihanouk was agreeable to the 'cocktail party' between the Cambodian factions, as long as the Heng Samrin dropped the claim as the legitimate government in Cambodia.[75] The conflicting statements explained that the Prince's action was influenced by his attempt to act independently and, at the same time, to court China to maintain its support.

In order to have a clearer picture of Prince Sihanouk's intentions, Minister Kusumaatmadja in October 1987 sent the Director General for Political Affairs of the Ministry, Mr. Nana Sutresna to Paris, to confer with the Prince. During the discussion, the Prince annulled his earlier scenario of peace talks, that is, the two stage meetings in Jakarta and instead suggested a triangular meeting between

himself, Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. He argued the modification was prompted from his conviction that the Cambodian people would object to a notion that he met on an equal footing with Hun Sen. He mentioned that if such a meeting with Hun Sen was to take place, the appropriate venue would be France. He also mentioned that the French Government had offered assistance to solve the Cambodian conflict, but without detailing the nature of the offer. In response to the latest position of the Prince, Mr. Sutresna stated that he would bring the matter to the attention of his superior.[76] Although Indonesia was aware of Vietnam's hesitation about the idea of a direct meeting with the Prince, even in a triangular format, Indonesia did consult Vietnam on the matter during the bilateral Working Group meeting in Bali, 23 November 1987. Indonesia reasoned that the planned meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen on December 1987 in Paris could be regarded as the first stage of the 'cocktail party'. Vietnam's reaction to the suggestion was "interesting and worth considering."[77]

In his letter to Prince Sihanouk, Minister Kusumaatmadja also indicated Vietnam's preference for a "substantive negotiation for reaching a comprehensive solution to the Kampuchean problem"[78] held in Jakarta and not during Prince Sihanouk's meeting with Hun Sen in Paris. It is understandable that Vietnam would hope to gain better results from negotiation in a regional setting. There were grounds for optimism for the informal meeting in Jakarta because, in 20 December 1987, FUNCINPEC's conference in Paris declared their support for Indonesia's diplomatic efforts to find a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem. They also agreed with the principles governing the 'Ho Chi Minh City Understanding' of 29 July 1987.[79] It is also important to mention that Minister Kusumaatmadja in his visit to Bangkok in 2 February 1988 also received assurance from the Thai government of their support for the planned meeting in Jakarta. In his letter to President Soeharto, Minister Kusumaatmadja expressed his delight that Thailand had finally given its full support to Indonesia's diplomatic initiative, that is, to an informal meeting.[80]

3.4. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM)

3.4.1. The First JIM in Bogor: 26-28 July 1988

Minister Kusumaatmadja's successor, Minister Ali Alatas, renewed Indonesian efforts to facilitate the peace process upon his election as Indonesian Foreign Minister in March 1988. He even considered the Cambodian conflict as his priority.[81] During his tours to ASEAN capitals during the first months of his appointment, he invited his ASEAN counterparts to reconsider the 'cocktail party' proposal. He reiterated that ASEAN had not accomplished much from their past policies of limited engagement with Vietnam, and suggested that perhaps an informal meeting could renew interests among the conflicting parties and the stakeholders for dialogue.[82] The necessity for the new minister to gain ASEAN support was also based on the consideration of the possible negative implications of his appointment for the fate of the informal meeting, the brainchild of the former Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.[83]

The success of Minister Alatas in convincing his ASEAN's counterparts could be attributed to his persuasive skills. However, the ASEAN countries' support was also prompted by some factors, such as the two meetings in France between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk (2-4 December 1987 in Fere-en-Tardenois and 20-21 January 1988 in St.-Germain-en-Laye) which did not prove to be successful.[84] On the one hand, the non-participation of the Khmer Rouge and KPNLF in the two meetings in France was not acceptable to China. Thus, without China's blessing, any agreement reached between Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk would be difficult to implement and, therefore, would not guarantee a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem.

However, on the other hand, according to Vietnam's Ambassador in Jakarta, the deadlock, particularly during the second meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen was caused by their disagreement on the issues of the time frame for a military pull out and the establishment of an interim government. The Ambassador explained that Hun Sen had offered a military pull out within two years and that a quadripartite government should be formed after elections. In

contrast, the Prince insisted that Vietnam's military pull out should be held in 1989 and the quadripartite government would be formed before elections and at the same time the PRK government should be dismantled. The Ambassador also mentioned that the Prince, in his effort to persuade Hun Sen to accept his offer, had stated that he was prepared to leave out Khieu Samphan and Son Sann if they did not want to accept the agreement. Although this information should be considered with qualification, there are grounds for believing that the Prince might have made some offers, knowing his diplomatic canniness and constant manoeuvring.[85]

The ASEAN countries were also concerned with the potential for increased armed conflict in Cambodia after Vietnam announced its intention on 21 January 1988 to withdraw their 'army volunteers' from Cambodia by 1990.[86] Their concern with a potential civil war in Cambodia after Vietnam's statement of intent made JIM more relevant. Similarly, the failures of the two meetings in France had renewed Prince Sihanouk's interest in JIM. In fact, his son Prince Ranariddh approached the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok on 27 January 1988 to state that his father requested Indonesia to continue its diplomatic initiatives.[87]

Upon receiving these assurances of support, Minister Alatas established an organising committee and assembled a team to prepare substantive matters for JIM, scheduled for the 26-28 July 1988. Mr. Alatas mentioned that he personally requested permission from Mr. Kusumaatmadja to call the planned meeting the 'Jakarta Informal Meeting', considering the term 'cocktail party' would not be appropriate for the predominantly Muslim community in Indonesia. Mr. Kusumaatmadja did not object to the renaming providing there was no alteration to the agreed format and objectives.[88] He also invited some seasoned diplomats from the Ministry who were knowledgeable about the distinctive elements of both the Vietnamese and the Cambodians' ethnic particularities to advise him on suitable protocols.[89]

The chief diplomat taking care of the substantive aspects of the informal meeting as Director General for Political Affairs, was Mr. Louhanapessy, a French-speaking diplomat who once served as Indonesia's Ambassador in Hanoi.

Unfortunately, the Indonesian team for JIM did not seem to have definite ideas on how to proceed with the substantive discussion of JIM. During the third ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN SOM) in Bangkok, from 2-3 June 1988, the Indonesian delegation, headed by Mr. Louhanapessy, was still not prepared to provide participants to the meeting with any clearer idea on the substantive aspect of JIM.[90] Some possible explanations of this situation were: (1) the Indonesian delegation had not considered the agenda conclusive, considering some consultations were still taking place (in that period, Minister Alatas was shuttling from Jakarta to Bangkok and New York to consult with the protagonists of the Cambodian conflict); (2) the Indonesian delegation did not want to openly discuss the tentative agenda, worrying that possible leaks to the media might endanger the prospects of the meeting; and (3) the Indonesian delegation, by then, simply had no idea as to what would be the scenario of the JIM meeting.[91] What seemed most important was to have the JIM meeting taking place, as if to say 'let the protagonists get together and we will see how things develop'. In a way, this message was spelled out in the invitation letter to the conflicting parties and concerned countries. In his letter, Minister Alatas stated "I should like to propose the date of the 25th July 1988 as the start of the meeting and to keep its duration 'open-ended', to be determined in the light of developments during the meeting."[92] Thus, the letter indicated an element of speculation about the possible outcomes from the process on the part of Indonesia as the meeting convenor.

The expectation might have been prompted by a degree of uncertainty surrounding the planned meeting, such as the likely participation of Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk and whether it was appropriate for ASEAN to circulate a working paper during JIM. The following discussion looks at how undecided the parties to the conflict were about their participation in JIM and highlights some efforts made by Indonesia to convince them to participate in the informal meeting.

In his effort to convince the Cambodian factions to take part, Minister Alatas, in May 1988, asked the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok to meet in person with Khieu Samphan and Son Sann. During the meeting, the Ambassador was asked to let both Khieu Samphan and Son Sann know that their non-participation in JIM was to be used in Vietnam's propaganda campaigns. Vietnam would be able to

argue that (1) there was no need for an inclusive dialogue including the concerned countries, because a bilateral dialogue had taken place involving Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk; and (2) CGDK was not as flexible as Vietnam and PRK, who were willing to come to Jakarta to find a solution to Cambodian conflict. The Ambassador was also asked to convince both Khieu Samphan and Son Sann that the success of Vietnam's propaganda could result in a decline in international support for the ASEAN position on Cambodia during the UN General Assembly debate.[93]

For his part, Prince Sihanouk made a confusing statement when he stated that if Vietnam took part in JIM, the meeting would be bound to fail. The Prince stated further that JIM would not take place because the Khmer Rouge had declined to participate.[94] Arguably, the Prince's statement was in contrast to the conventional wisdom that Vietnam's preparedness to meet the CGDK should be welcome because Vietnam should be accountable for its actions in Cambodia. Furthermore, the participation of the Prince himself in JIM was in doubt. On 11 July 1988, the Secretary General of Thai Foreign Ministry, Mr. Kasem S. Kasemsri briefed ASEAN Ambassadors in Bangkok about Prince Sihanouk's withdrawal as President of CGDK, and stated that the Prince had decided not to attend JIM. However, the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok suggested that the Ministry should not just accept the Thai statement and asked the Ministry to confirm the matter directly with the Prince in Paris.[95] The Foreign Minister followed the suggestion and assigned Mr. Nana Sutresna (the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN) to Paris to personally delivered a letter from President Soeharto, inviting the Prince to come to Jakarta as the President's personal guest during the JIM.[96] Clearly, this personal approach at the highest level proved effective because the Prince accepted the invitation and came to Jakarta during JIM - not as a participant but as an able statesman and personal guest of President Soeharto.

The appropriateness of a working paper during JIM was not the only issue that troubled the Indonesians; they also had to deal with another pressing issue concerning which countries should attend and send participants. There was a general understanding among the ASEAN members that a working paper was not in line with the ideal of an informal meeting, that is, a free flow and undirected

discussion. However, on the issue of which countries should be invited to JIM, the ASEAN countries went through a lengthy debate. During an ASEAN Working Group meeting on the Cambodian Problem in Bangkok, from 31 May to 1 June 1988, Thailand objected to Laos's participation in JIM. Thailand, supported by Singapore, argued that: (1) Laos's participation would create an impression that JIM was a meeting between two groups of regional countries: ASEAN and Indochina; (2) the Cambodian problem had become a regional problem; and (3) Laos had nothing to do with the Cambodian problem. Although Indonesia was aware of Thailand's concern that JIM would address bilateral problem between Thailand and Laos, Indonesia also had to consider Vietnam's concern. Vietnam maintained that if Indonesia invited Thailand, Vietnam would invite Laos. Vietnam wished to have Laos, its trusted ally, there during JIM to balance the ASEAN countries. Indonesia was finally able to persuade Thailand to soften its stand and suggested that Vietnam would use the conditionality as a pretext to not attend JIM.[97]

By then, the Indonesian diplomats had no direct access to Hun Sen. Although the Indonesian Ambassador and the PRK Ambassador in Hanoi had established communication, Indonesia also had to rely on the good faith of the Vietnamese Government.[98] Thus, the success of Indonesia's effort to bring all the parties to Jakarta depended on its ability to persuade the protagonists of the usefulness of an informal meeting, and to a certain extent it had to rely on the good will of Thailand and Vietnam who had leverage over some factions.[99]

The notion of leverage was an interesting aspect of the overall peace process involving Indonesia. On the one hand, by not having leverage over the factions and concerned countries, Indonesia had the benefit of appearing as a neutral third party, who mainly acted as facilitator only able to offer facilities, expertise and presided over the meeting. On the other hand, with limited leverage, Indonesia's diplomatic efforts were subject to Thailand, Vietnam and China's co-operation. As long as these countries - *the inner circle* - considered their interests and positions were not being served by any peace discussion, they would not give their utmost support to any peace initiative by a third party. However, it is also important to mention that although Indonesia was relatively more neutral

compared to other ASEAN countries in the eyes of the protagonists and concerned countries, some members of the CGDK and ASEAN sometimes suspected Indonesia of being too close to Vietnam. This suspicion was unavoidable because, as already noted in this chapter, some Indonesians considered Vietnam as Indonesia's buffer against China's penetration in Southeast Asia. For its part, Vietnam treated Indonesia more sympathetically than the other ASEAN countries because Indonesia had no formal security and military affiliation with the West, and never engaged in hostility toward Vietnam during the Vietnam War.[100]

Preparation for JIM itself was not limited to substantive and organisational aspects. In preparing for JIM, Minister Alatas designated several seasoned diplomats to act as his liaison for each head of delegation and to accompany them during their stay in Jakarta. From a protocol point of view the approach was 'smart' as it resulted in each delegation being treated equally; from the point of view of strategy the seasoned diplomats could help the minister understand the delegation's concerns on both substantive and non-substantive matters. Between meetings and on several occasions these diplomats, the so-called 'old-timers' conferred and held private meetings with the Minister to discuss strategy and receive or transmit information.[101]

JIM took place as scheduled from 26-28 July 1988 and was held in two stages following the 'Ho Chi Minh Understanding.'[102] During the first stage (morning session) the four factions met together after Minister Alatas made his opening remarks. It was hoped that the participants would make the most of this meeting because the Cambodians were the only parties who could settle their own problem.[103] He stated that the first stage of the informal meeting was significant because it provided "representatives of all Kampuchean factions with a first opportunity to discuss, in an atmosphere of informality and unstructured, those aspects of the problem that should appropriately be taken up by the Kampuchean people themselves."[104] Not appearing to be directing the factions on what should be discussed, Minister Alatas suggested, en passant, that "[the aspects to be taken for consideration included] national reconciliation, self-determination, the provisional government to arrange for general elections and the building of a new, peaceful, independent, Non-aligned and neutral Kampuchea."[105] The intention of

the suggestion was to give the participants encouragement to discuss issues of mutual concern. The scenario was to encourage participants in the morning session to decide among themselves an agreed agenda for the afternoon session's discussion.[106] By giving the Cambodian participants the opportunity to decide on the agenda, Indonesia was hopeful that the participants would reach a consensus on a modality to end their conflict. The approach also reflected an effort to make the participants felt that JIM process was their own because they were given the responsibility to steer the course of the subsequent meeting involving the concerned countries.

The meeting among the four factions was indeed one of the breakthroughs of JIM, because after fighting for more than 10 years they had never met face to face. The informal meeting format provided them with the opportunity to sit together in one room (minus Prince Sihanouk). To maintain their privacy, no Indonesian officials (including the liaison) were present, and, therefore, no one in Indonesia could explain what was taking place during their private meeting. The conversation was held in the Cambodian language. Unfortunately, the 'conditioning' process was not too successful. During the second stage of the informal meeting, representatives of the factions and other concerned countries debated strongly on their positions. Deadlocks appeared on the issues of dismantling the two organisations that claimed sovereign's right of Cambodia (CGDK and PRK), and the proposal to establish a 'national reconciliation council' as a temporary government. In the afternoon session of JIM, the role and function of the third party was even more difficult due to the presence of the so-called concerned countries, who insisted on having their views heard and, at times, using the factions as their pawns. According to some Indonesian diplomats who attended this session, each of the participants acted unilaterally to counter others' opinion and in the same way, they could air the position of their compatriots.[107] This pattern was observable during the subsequent JIM series and in the interval meetings prior to the Paris Peace Conference of October 1991.

The second session of JIM also showed Indonesia that the concerned countries were willing to derail the meeting discussion or to subvert the role of Indonesia as a third party if their concerns were not met. For instance, Indonesia was later

informed that during JIM, Thailand lobbied the Khieu Samphan's camp to veto Indonesia's effort to release 'a joint statement' (communiqué).[108] In the end, JIM only produced a Chairman's statement which was less authoritative than a joint statement by JIM's participants would have been.

The informal setting of the meeting, which was not binding and supposedly exploratory in nature, did not induce the participants to engage in constructive discussion and instead they debated from positions, as if they were in a formal negotiation. These realities suggested that the enmity among the Cambodians after years of fighting was difficult to reconcile. However, the psychological boundary that prevented them meeting one another was no longer sustainable after JIM. The JIM forum was also marked by another breakthrough because for the first time, the three factions of CGDK were seated at the same table, face to face, with their common enemy, the Vietnamese. To intensify interactions among JIM participants, Indonesia as a host also arranged a number of social events and, according to Mr. Louhanapessy, the participants did interact during them.[109]

In his concluding statement before JIM's participants, Minister Alatas stated that he felt it was appropriate to issue a Chairman's Statement outlining what had been agreed upon.[110] He reasoned that the intention of his decision was to "show the outside world that we have started not only to discuss with one another the various aspects and dimensions of the problem, but that we also wish to move forward."[111] In the end, the first JIM reached an agreement "on the need to solve the Kampuchean problem through political means, and thereby contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia."[112] The participants also reached an understanding on the need for national reconciliation and for an act of self-determination.[113] Moreover, the participants also shared similar views on two inter-linked key issues:

> ... the withdrawal of Vietnam forces from Kampuchea, to be carried out within the context of an overall political solution and the prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure the cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces.[114]

This formulation had entangled the external and internal aspects of the Cambodian conflict, something that Vietnam had attempted to avoid. Indonesia and the ASEAN countries did not want Cambodia to fall victim to Vietnam's unilateral action of pulling out their so-called army of volunteers, which could instigate civil war. However, to accommodate Vietnam's interest, the Chairman's statement also emphasised two issues of Vietnam's concern, that is, the Pol Pot regime and external arms supplies to the Cambodian resistance forces. From a different perspective, according to Khatharya Um, these parts of the agreement were considered by many observers as a "boon for Hanoi and its Phnom Penh ally."[115] ASEAN, for the first time, committed itself "to a position that attributes equal importance to a Vietnamese withdrawal and to safeguards against a Khmer Rouge restoration."[116] In fact, it was China who always insisted that the retreat of Vietnam from Cambodia be made without putting any condition. Therefore, there was a possibility that the statement reflected a convergence in interest between Indonesia and Vietnam, for not letting a pro-China communist regime dominate the new Cambodia.

The JIM forum also highlighted the fact that Prince Sihanouk remained an influential figure. Although he had no formal position in CGDK - he resigned from the presidency of CGDK on 10 July 1988 and had delegated his position in FUNCINPEC to Prince Ranarridh - representatives of the four factions (including Hun Sen) visited him in the course of JIM meeting.[117] Interestingly, during JIM, members of Hun Sen's delegation mingled at ease with members of the other factions' delegations, particularly the FUNCINPEC and KPNLF.[118] This occurrence could be explained in two ways. Firstly, the PRK wished to act independently and not as a surrogate of Vietnam. Secondly, it was mainly a tactical move to impress other factions, especially the FUNCINPEC faction of Prince Sihanouk, and to isolate the Khmer Rouge.

The First JIM also agreed to establish a Working Group to elaborate some aspects of the problem identified by JIM. The format of the Working Group meeting was also informal and its task was "to examine specific aspects of a political solution."[119] Thus, if JIM was to provide a framework on several substantive

issues of the Cambodian conflict, the Working Group had the responsibility for putting substance into the framework.

3.4.2. The Working Group Meetings and the Second JIM in Jakarta

During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting at the UN in October 1988, Minister Alatas urged his counterparts to maintain the momentum by persuading the protagonists and Vietnam to implement some of the agreed principles reached during the first JIM. He also requested ASEAN countries to maintain unity and contribute more input in order to put substance into JIM's framework.[120] There are grounds to believe that the appeal was prompted by his concern that in the first JIM there had been no unanimity among the ASEAN countries.

It is also important to note that after the first JIM, there was an increase in international interest to help settle the Cambodian conflict. Some indications of this growing interest are as follows. First, the Indonesian diplomats in Bangkok were informed by their host that on 13 September 1988 Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed (UN Secretary General's Special Representative) had conveyed to the Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsilla, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's suggestion to involve members of the Permanent Five (P-5) in the Cambodia peace process.[121] Then Prince Sihanouk, in a meeting with ASEAN Ambassadors at the UN in New York on 19 October 1988, indicated to them his firm support of France's proposal to hold an international conference on Cambodia.[122]

In some ways, the JIM process did not benefit from the plethora of international interest. For instance, France's proposal to hold an international conference on Cambodia shifted the concentration of the participants from the planned meetings in Jakarta to the peace process that took place in France. In this case, Indonesia was not able to persuade France to wait until the informal process had run its course. Indonesia had hoped that as regional efforts, JIM and the Working Group would be able to prepare the substance, the modalities and other detailed aspects for a comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian conflict.[123] The achievements of the regional efforts, at a latter stage, could be taken up in any international conference on Cambodia. However, Indonesia was not successful in

convincing France that without this degree of preparation a formal international conference would run aground.[124] Indonesia was successful in restraining the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) from creating redundancy in peace efforts, and suggested that it concentrate instead on the international aspect of the Cambodian conflict. Thus, the NAM Committee on Cambodia was agreeable to Indonesia's suggestion to let the JIM Working Group work out the detailed aspects of a comprehensive political settlement.[125]

The First Working Group took place from 17-19 October 1988, with the objective of examining "the specific aspects of a political solution to the Kampuchean problem."[126] The Working Group failed to achieve its objective and the discussion was hampered by the non-participation of the Khmer Rouge. Although the meeting was informal and non-binding, the absence of the Khmer Rouge created a complex situation in which any agreements reached during Working Group meeting had to be discussed with the Khmer Rouge first before they were considered worthy for consideration during the formal negotiation. The Khmer Rouge failed to show up because they were displeased by the clear references to genocide directed against Pol Pot in the Chairman's statement of the first JIM.

However, the Khmer Rouge argued that the timing for the Working Group was not suitable. When consulted prior to the Working Group by Indonesian diplomats in Bangkok, Khieu Samphan mentioned that the suggested date for the meeting (17 October 1988) would constrain Democratic Cambodia's efforts to win international support during the annual voting on Cambodia's problem in the UNGA. Thailand shared the Khmer Rouge's concern on the timing of the Working Group, despite it being known that the debate on Cambodia in the UNGA would not take place until the third week of October.[127] In the end, Indonesia was not able to convince the Khmer Rouge to send some representatives, even after it hinted that the non-participation would further isolate them.[128]

The working group meeting was also conducted in an informal setting, with limited protocol intricacy, but all the participants were able to take part on an equal footing. At the meeting, chaired by Mr. Louhanapessy, participants were

asked to discuss the specific aspects of a political solution to the Kampuchean problem and also to make recommendations on the convening of another meeting. Unfortunately, as in the first JIM, the informal setting failed to stimulate constructive discussion. Minister Alatas's effort to motivate the participants by urging them to "show the outside world that they were able to solve their own problem in their own way, in accordance with their traditions and cultural values"[129] failed to find resonance. According to Mr. Louhanapessy, his efforts to reconcile the concerns of the Cambodian participants during the meting were dashed by Thailand and Singapore. He considered their action as a 'stab in the back' by the fellow ASEAN countries.[130] Interestingly, according to some diplomats who helped in the conference room, Mr. Louhanapessy was, in fact, yielding too much to participants' demands.[131]

This impression can be explained by the different expectation between those who supported the meeting (supporting unit) and those charged to chair the meeting. The diplomats who supported the meeting - who were generally very young and newly recruited - wished to see achievements, whereas Mr. Louhanapessy was more concerned with process. He preferred to involve the participants in lengthy discussion, to let their concerns be heard and better understood. Acting on behalf of a neutral third party, he also had to avoid the impression of appearing too authoritative and, therefore, was hopeful that his

ASEAN counterparts would give their fullest co-operation by ways of stimulating discussions with constructive ideas during the informal meeting. However, this did not happen. The participants remained firm to their own positions and concerns and instead of listening to other points of view, they insisted that others respect their concerns. Worrying that the meeting would result in no conclusive agreement, Minister Alatas asked Dr. Hasjim Djalal, a tough negotiator and accomplished international lawyer, to substitute for Mr. Louhanapessy at some of the sessions.[132] Minister Alatas wished to see two outcomes accomplished: an improvement in relationships among the participants and, at the same time, an indication of progress. As the helmsman in Indonesia's peace initiative, he knew that any indication of failure from the informal approach would lessen the interest of protagonists and concerned countries in taking part in the subsequent meeting

cycle. Thus, he saw a need to balance between idealism and pragmatism. More importantly, he was also aware that other interested parties, such as France and Australia, were waiting on the sidelines ready to offer their own conflict resolution mechanisms.

The First Working Group did not make substantial progress. In the end, the meeting outcome only reiterated the aspects of the Cambodian conflict identified during the first JIM. However they did agree with the necessity to reconvene an informal meeting, in order "to achieve more concrete results and to sustain the momentum of the joint efforts of all the participants."[133] The failure of the First Working Group meeting to achieve the meeting's objective was used by members of some factions as an excuse for not attending the Second Working Group and JIM. During the ASEAN SOM meeting in Bangkok, on the 20-22 December 1988, Mr. Thep Devakula, Director General of Thai Foreign Ministry, informed participants of his conversation with Khieu Samphan of the Khmer Rouge about the planned meetings in Jakarta. He mentioned that Khieu Samphan was not pleased with the result of the first JIM and he would be prepared to participate if the planned meetings had a clear agenda, and if China and the Soviet Union were present.

The reaction of individual ASEAN countries to the conditions set by the Khmer Rouge, especially on the participation of China and the Soviet Union, reflected their position on the Cambodian conflict. For instance, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam's delegations expressed no reservation about the idea. In fact, Singapore stated that Vietnam would have to accept any agreement reached between China and the Soviet Union. Malaysia responded by saying that it would be difficult to convince some participants on the merit of involving non-regional countries in JIM. However, Indonesia categorically rejected the request and argued that non-regional countries should not be allowed to decide how to end the conflict on their own terms because they were only concerned with their priorities. Indonesia asked Thailand to convince Mr. Samphan on the importance of attending the planned meetings, and to explain that non-regional countries could be involved after JIM had made some achievements.[134] In the end, ASEAN

Foreign Ministers held a position that the idea to include non-regional countries was difficult for JIM

After their internal meeting, ASEAN representatives also conferred with representatives of CGDK. During the consultations, the CGDK aired a number of concerns and put certain conditions on their participation in the planned meetings in Jakarta. For instance, Khieu Samphan considered the planned meeting would not be effective because Vietnam was not being honest. He asserted that Vietnam's recent statement of military pull out was groundless because around one million Vietnamese settlers had not yet left Cambodia's soil. In the subsequent meeting, Prince Ranariddh read a letter from his father to Mr. Samphan which said "it would be more beneficial to postpone the convocation of JIM II because of the Cambodian internal affairs and unacceptable attitude of Vietnam."[135] Interestingly, Prince Ranariddh did not completely dismiss the prospect of his father's participation in JIM because he also mentioned that Prince Sihanouk might reconsider his position if there were positive developments before the planned meetings took place. Nevertheless, Prince Ranariddh pointed out that his father appeared more interested in France's proposal for holding an international conference in Paris (some motives behind Prince Sihanouk's interest is discussed under 3.5.).

During the luncheon, and in a defence of the planned Jakarta meetings, Mr. Louhanapessy stated that a solution to the conflict should not be confined to one forum. In his opinion, if the Paris conference failed to meet its objectives, the peace efforts on Cambodia would "return to zero."[136] He suggested, therefore, that the Cambodians reconsider their reservations and proceed with the planned meetings as scheduled. In response, Khieu Samphan stated that he was willing to reconsider his position, as long as there were new elements that guaranteed progress in the peace process, and if there were adequate preparations.[137] Khieu Samphan's reaction could be interpreted in two ways. First, he wished to make a conciliatory statement, so as not to offend Indonesia. Secondly, he wished to keep the channels open, just in case the Khmer Rouge failed to achieve its interest in different forums.

As in the first JIM, the prospect of CGDK's participation in the second JIM was still clouded with uncertainty until a few days before. Indonesia made use of all available channels to persuade leaders of the CGDK to come to Jakarta. In particular, Indonesia requested Thailand to persuade the factions to come to Jakarta and also asked America to alert China to the importance of the Khmer Rouge's participation in the planned meetings. The uncertainty surrounding Prince Sihanouk's position about his participation has a lot to do with his political cunning and mercurial personality. The following illustration shows the complexity surrounding the Prince's commitment to attend the second JIM. When briefing several Ambassadors based in Paris about the result of his recent meeting with Hun Sen on 7-8 November 1988, Prince Sihanouk stated that if the Working Group meeting in Paris involving the four factions was not successful, he hoped that the Working Group JIM could make some achievements.[138] However, Indonesian diplomats in New York were informed by Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed, the special representative of the UN Secretary General, that Prince Sihanouk was rather upset about not being well informed on the preparations leading to the second JIM. Based on this input, the Indonesian representative in New York suggested the Foreign Minister approach and inform the Prince on the detailed aspects of the planned meetings.[139] In following up the suggestion, Minister Alatas wrote a letter to President Soeharto requesting the President invite Prince Sihanouk to Jakarta as his personal guest as in the first JIM. In his letter Minister Alatas considered the Prince as the only person acceptable to all of the conflicting parties.[140]

Although the participation of leaders of the CGDK was still doubtful, Minister Alatas maintained an optimistic stance and asserted that the CGDK, including Prince Sihanouk, would attend the planned meetings. His optimism was to a certain extent caused by the Prince's positive reaction to President Soeharto's invitation letter, which Minister Alatas conveyed in person to Paris on 10 January 1989. During their conversation, Minister Alatas emphasised the importance of proceeding with the planned meetings so that the peace efforts would not lose momentum. For his part, the Prince stated that he would come to JIM as a personal guest of the President and restated that the intention of his presence was to show his support of the Indonesian led initiative.[141] As in the previous JIM, the

Prince's acceptance of the invitation could be used as a means to entice the other factions to attend the informal meetings.

On 22 January 1989, one day before his departure for Beijing, Prince Sihanouk invited and briefed ASEAN ambassadors in Paris. He again reiterated that he would come to Jakarta, although he believed the planned Working Group and JIM meetings would not be successful because Vietnam and Hun Sen had rejected his five-point proposal. As a consequence, the CGDK would also reject their counter proposal. During the meeting, the Prince also expressed his regret that Mr. Sabam Siagian, editor of an Indonesian Newspaper (the Jakarta Post) had written an article suggesting the Prince should adjust himself to the reality and recognise Hun Sen's de facto control of Cambodia. Based on the article, which seemed supportive of Hun Sen and Vietnam, the Prince questioned the extent of Indonesia's neutrality as a third party in the Cambodian conflict.[142] Knowing that the Prince had a tendency to make spontaneous reference to matters that he disagreed with, Indonesia was hoping that despite his scepticism about Indonesia's objectivity, he would still come to Jakarta.

Unfortunately, the Prince finally cancelled his trip. The cancellation, announced in Beijing on 26 January 1989, was not linked to his earlier query of Indonesia's impartiality, but was prompted by Thailand's decision to invite Hun Sen to Bangkok.[143] The reversal of Thailand's policy toward Hun Sen, from non-recognition to active engagement surprised not only the Prince but also the ASEAN countries, including Indonesia. Former Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, speaking before foreign diplomats and businessman in Jakarta, on 1 February 1989, stated that Indonesia was stunned by the invitation. He also indicated that ASEAN countries had no prior knowledge of the planned visit, even though they recently had met the Thai Foreign Minister, Mr. Savetsila, in Brunei, on 21 January 1989, for a special discussion to prepare for the Second JIM.[144] Interestingly, Mr. Kusumaatmadja gave the statement not long after he had a discussion with Minister Alatas in the Minister's office. On the one hand, Mr. Kusumaatmadja's statement was not 'politically incorrect' because he no longer held an official position in the Indonesian government. However, on the other hand, his long association with Indonesia's peace initiative to resolve the

Cambodian conflict made his remark significant. His statement could be considered as an expression of Indonesian displeasure.

Indeed, Thailand's policy of rapprochement with Vietnam and Laos and a statement of intent 'to turn Indochina from a battle field into a trading market' had stimulated misgivings about Thailand's good faith among Indonesians. They were worried that the new policy might have some negative impacts on Indonesia's role as peace broker in the Cambodian conflict.[145] Indonesia's concern was well grounded considering some Cambodians had also expressed their concern that Thailand might work on its own in trying to settle the Cambodian conflict, especially by making separate agreements with China and Vietnam.[146] Moreover, Indonesia was also upset when Son Sann of the KPNLF made a statement on 28 January 1989 that questioned the relevancy of JIM and mentioned that there was no need for leaders of the three factions to come to Jakarta if Hun Sen's position was still rigid. Although Sann's son, Son Soubert, later on argued that the statement was mainly 'a tactical move,'[147] Indonesia was disturbed and considered the statement inappropriate and unnecessary.

Contrary to the CGDK, Hun Sen had indicated his preparedness to come to JIM. In his letter to Minister Alatas, Hun Sen accused the CGDK of being too rigid because during their last meeting in Paris, the CGDK had demanded that the PRK accept, in total, Prince Sihanouk's five-point proposal. In the letter, he also stated that rather than yielding to the CGDK's demand, he preferred to maintain the status quo. He further stated that JIM should not be held hostage by the non-willingness of the CGDK to come to Jakarta, and suggested, in the absence of the CGDK, the meeting could discuss the international aspects of the Cambodian problem.[148] Thus, prior to the Jakarta meeting, the parties to the Cambodian conflict had already engaged in debates over positions. In the meantime, Vietnam, the PRK's ally, had requested that the second JIM be held as scheduled. Arguably, Vietnam's interest to reconvening JIM stemmed from its desire to release the burden of sustaining its military presence in Cambodia without losing face. Vietnam's persistent questioning of Indonesia about the planned Working Group and JIM meetings, and statement suggesting Indonesia had lost interest on JIM, had irritated the Indonesian diplomats.[149] Prior to confirming the meetings,

Indonesia wished to receive assurances from each faction of their participation and co-operation during the meetings.

Meanwhile, to appease the CGDK, Prime Minister Chatichai on 30 January 1989 hosted a dinner in Bangkok for representatives of the three factions.[150] The intention of the meeting, according to Ambassador Sarasin Viraphol, the Ambassador at large for Southeast Asian Affairs of Thailand's Foreign Ministry, was also to ensure the CGDK's participation in the Working Group and JIM meetings.[151] Indeed, after his meeting with the CGDK, Prime Minister Chatichai wrote a letter to President Soeharto, dated 30 January 1989, and said "after my meeting with the three factions of the CGDK this evening, I can convince them to attend JIM II."[152] He further stated that "[the three factions] have now given their assurances of coming to Jakarta to participate in JIM II as scheduled. This step will now help make JIM II a real possibility."[153] Although some Indonesian diplomats were not happy that Thailand was taking credit for the CGDK's participation,[154] they had no other option except acknowledge the Thai government's role in the success. In his letter, President Soeharto clearly stated his appreciation to Thailand and mentioned:

> ... with the reconfirmation of the participations of the CGDK factions at the forthcoming Second Jakarta Informal Meeting as a result of Your Excellency's meeting with them, it would appear that the last hurdle in the path towards Jakarta Informal Meeting II has now been overcome. Preparations for the convening of the Jakarta Informal Meeting II, therefore, can now proceed with despatch.[155]

It is also important to mention that in an effort to avoid the planned meetings receiving further criticism from the CGDK, President Soeharto on 30 January 1989 wrote Prince Sihanouk a letter indicating that he respected his decision to cancel his trip to Jakarta. In his letter the President also mentioned that, despite the cancellation, he was prepared to welcome the Prince at any time in Jakarta. At the same time, the President expected the Prince would share his view on the relevancy of JIM, and therefore would help in encouraging the CGDK to participate in JIM.[156] President Soeharto stated in his letter that:

> ... the convening of the Second Jakarta Informal Meeting under the present circumstances constitutes a timely opportunity for our common endeavours to finding a just and comprehensive political

solution to the Kampuchean problem and therefore remains of relevance.[157]

Unfortunately, the appeal failed to stop the Prince from issuing discouraging statements about JIM, even a few days before the planned meetings, stating that JIM would be bound to fail.[158]

The second JIM took place as scheduled, from 19 to 21 February 1989, and was held subsequently after the meeting of the Second Working Group of JIM (16 to 18 January 1989). The Working Group was designed as the first stage of the meeting involving only the Cambodians. It is important to note that Minister Alatas took the unusual step of chairing the Working Group meeting. This would not be expected because the four factions as well as the concerned countries only assigned officials at the level of Director or Director General during the Working Group meeting. However, he rejected the speculation that he was not satisfied with Mr. Louhanapessy's performance during the October 1988 Working Group meeting, by explaining that his decision to chair the working group was mainly based on practicality because he would chair the subsequent leaders meeting. However, it is certain that he would not want to risk an unsuccessful Working Group because the JIM meeting was designed to follow up on undecided issues, and to endorse aspects that had been agreed upon during the Working Group.

The formats of the Working Group and JIM meetings were similar to the past practices, but during those meetings Indonesia organised more consultations among the participants or separately between the Chair and representatives of the factions. The Chair also consulted the participants from the concerned countries a number of times. The Chair intentionally limited the frequencies of plenary meetings considering that the participants in a plenary session tended to engage in non-constructive debate rather than making conciliatory statements. In particular, he noted that during the Working Group meeting, the Cambodians were mainly reiterating their already known positions and did not engage in substantive discussion.[159] Thus, the Chair considered it more appropriate if during the JIM meeting he acted as a 'middle man' who conveyed messages from one party to another. Apparently, Minister Alatas relied on his diplomatic skills[160] and also expected that he could benefit from the networking between the seasoned

Indonesian diplomats and the heads of the delegations. In the second JIM, as in the first JIM, Minister Alatas assigned some seasoned diplomats, with an in depth knowledge of ethnic particularities of the Cambodian and the concerned countries, to accompany each head of the delegation during the social events.

In contrast to previous practice, Indonesia circulated an unofficial working paper to function as a reference for the participants. The paper itself had been discussed among the ASEAN countries but to make the paper acceptable to Vietnam and PRK, Indonesia called it 'a non-paper'. The discussion of the paper was not very productive because of the difference of opinion among the participants and also because parts of the paper, which were still being discussed, were leaked to the media. The efforts of some journalists to give their own interpretation of the documents, as well as their separate interviews with some member delegations, proved counter-productive to JIM. The relaxed atmosphere during the plenary and the consultations, which Indonesia wished to maintain, was hampered by participants' harsh statements directed toward one another during the media interviews. The second JIM provided Indonesia with a lesson that when convening a meeting, even an informal one, the presence of journalists could be detrimental to the peace process.

The leakage also had some impacts on the domestic affairs of the Indonesian team. One issue was who should bear responsibility for the affair because of the difficulty of identifying the person who had leaked the content of the paper to the media, whether it was the work of a member of the Indonesian team or the organising committee. In fact, it was also possible that the media had learned about the paper from JIM's participants. In the wake of such uncertainty, the organising committee became stricter in the issuance of releases and information.[161] They were careful not to let a similar mistake reoccur. As a consequence, the media became more aggressive in searching for news and relied more on information shared by JIM's participants. Thus, the whole affair was like a 'vicious circle' with any action taken by Indonesia posing its own dilemmas.

In the end, the second JIM was unsuccessful in narrowing the gap between the protagonists. The obvious disagreements on some issues led to the Chair

postponing the closing of the meeting. During the four month postponement, the conflicting parties were to conduct their own internal discussions on the issue of the establishment of an Interim Quadripartite Authority of national reconciliation. They were to inform the Chair of the result of their consultation, and then he would decide whether or not to hold another JIM meeting.[162] The most contentious issues revolved around the following. First, the CGDK and the PRK had diametrical views on the format of the interim government. The PRK, in particular, rejected the CGDK's demand to dismantle their government. Secondly, the CGDK objected to Vietnam and the PRK's insistence on linking Vietnam's military pull out with: (a) the non-recurrence of the Pol Pot's regime, and (b) the cessation of all foreign interference as well as external arms supplies assistance. Thirdly, the participants were not able to agree on who should supervise the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, whether the UN or selected countries.

The decision to defer the closing of JIM was a shrewd diplomatic tactic. The reasons for the postponement could be explained as follows. First, the decision was a face saving formula for Indonesia as facilitator, that is, by not giving the impression of an unsuccessful meeting. Secondly, by delaying the closing of the meeting, Indonesia had sustained itself as a third party in any future meetings to resolve Cambodian conflict. Thirdly, Indonesia did not wish to damage the positive relationships among some participants that had been nurtured during informal meetings. An abrupt closing of the meeting, in a tense atmosphere, could create a negative impression in all the participants that the peace efforts were no longer on the right track. After the second JIM, Minister Alatas wrote the four Cambodian factions a letter stating that although "divergences of view still exist on many issues of vital concern,"[163] he hoped "in the months to come the talks among the four Kampuchean parties will yield success."[164] Minister Alatas's letter to Minister Co Thach of Vietnam, somewhat, conveyed a more positive tone as follows:

> It is my sincere hope, which I know is also shared by you, that now that at least the parameters for an overall political solutions to the Kampuchean question has been set through the consensus statement of the Chairman of the JIM, our efforts to find such a solution will be further facilitated.[165]

The non-conclusive results of the second JIM also stemmed from at least three factors. First, the factions expected that they would gain better results from the planned summit meeting between Deng Xiaoping of China and Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in Beijing, in May 1989. Second, the CGDK was hoping to delay substantive discussions until the planned international conference under French supervision took place. Indonesia was informed earlier by China's Permanent Representative at the UN about France's intention to organise an international conference, following the JIM pattern. Later on, France planned to expand the participants of the meeting to include the Permanent Five members of the Security Council.[166] Thirdly, the non-participation of Prince Sihanouk was another important factor that impeded the free flow of discussions among the participants. For example, participants representing the CGDK objected to the release of a 'joint statement,' on the basis that they had not received prior agreement from the Prince. In the end, Indonesia only released a 'Consensus Statement of the Chairman' at the end of second JIM.[167] Although the non-participation of the Prince was perhaps used by the CGDK as an excuse for not making any decision, their attitude could also be seen confirming the status of the Prince as the most influential figure in Cambodia who should always be reckoned with.

Another important feature of the second JIM was that a courtesy visit of all participants to President Soeharto was arranged. This event was important because Indonesia had not arranged a similar visit during the first JIM. During the courtesy visit, the President expressed his opinion that the Cambodians could settle their problems only with mutual efforts. He suggested that each of the factions should set aside their differences and contradictory positions for a while and look for common interests. He made an interesting illustration by saying that each of the factions could have their own car, but they were asked to leave their cars in the parking lot and to seat themselves together in one car and head for their intermediate objective, a national reconciliation government.[168]

3.5. Post JIM: concerted international efforts for peace in Cambodia

After the series of informal meetings in Indonesia, France had elevated the informal and exploratory nature of the informal diplomacy into formal negotiations. However, between the two international conferences on Cambodia in Paris, the first one from July to August 1989 and the last one in October 1991 that concluded the peace negotiation, peace efforts were pursued within the formal framework of negotiations and the informal setting of consultations. Since Paris 1989, participants to the peace process had multiplied and included members of the P-5, the six ASEAN countries, the Indochina countries (Vietnam and Laos), regional countries (Australia, Japan, India), Canada, representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN Secretary General, and the four Cambodian factions. Furthermore, within this period, the peace processes were also marked by concerted efforts by these countries and the UN to put substance and ideas into the peace framework.

Parts of the framework itself emanated from the elements identified during the JIM processes. JIM had identified certain elements which became an integral part of the overall resolution of the Cambodian conflict and were embodied in the peace framework of the "Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict", signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. This linkage between JIM and the Paris peace process was noted in the proceedings of the Working Group Meeting under the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) when the working group discussed and refined the peace framework. Paragraph 104 of the document reads as follows:

> Since J.I.M. I it was agreed that there were certain elements that needed to be drawn together such as ceasefire, cessation of arms supplies, withdrawal, general elections, how to prevent the recurrence of past policies and practices which was now under the rubric of human rights, repatriation of refugees, and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia.[169]

In a nutshell, JIM was successful in specifying the internal and external aspects of the conflict. M. Nagendra Prasad states that "as a result of the JIM I and II talks, the internal and external aspects of the Cambodian problem came to be distinguished from each other."[170] The concerted international efforts post-JIMs

dealt with the two issues in tandem, but in the end, all those acting as a third party noted that the single most difficult issue to resolve was the internal aspect of the conflict.

As mentioned previously, at the time of second JIM in February 1989 some of the factions already had set their eyes on Paris as their next meeting place. The following discussion looks at how the parties to the Cambodian conflict perceived the role of French Government in the peace process. Prince Sihanouk, in particular, was very enthusiastic about the planned meeting in Paris because of the participation of representatives from the major powers. He considered other forums, including JIM, not representative enough because of the non-participation of the major powers.[171] Besides, the Prince considered France his second home and, therefore, he was more comfortable with a meeting in France than in other places. Son Sann of the KPNLF had a good rapport with the Western countries and was favourable toward the planned international conference in Paris. However, the Khmer Rouge was not eager to come to Paris, because the French government was critical of their human rights violations. In Paris, the Khmer Rouge relied on China's support.

Vietnam had no strong objections to Paris as a venue for a meeting because the French government had always maintained open communication with Hanoi. However, Vietnam preferred limited scope meetings, such as JIM, because Vietnam was able to maintain its influence. Vietnam was concerned that the major powers would put pressure on Vietnam in an international conference sponsored by France. Similarly, Hun Sen was not very enthusiastic about coming to an international conference sponsored by France. In fact, Hun Sen questioned France's impartiality because during several of his meetings with Prince Sihanouk in France, he considered the French government had treated him differently compared to the Prince. Hun Sen made a number of complaints about the inequality of treatment he received when he met the Prince in France in November 1988 and questioned France's motive for such treatment. Hun Sen's displeasure was reflected in the following statements he made after returning from Paris.

> They [the Prince and France] proposed that we meet at the former Cambodian Ambassador Residence, which France illegally handed over to the Samdech [Prince Sihanouk]. We did not agree

> to this because it was a maneuver by France and Samdech Sihanouk, who wanted to push us into legitimizing the Samdech has right over this residence.[172]

By pressuring Hun Sen to meet with the Prince in the Embassy - of which the status of the legitimate trustee of the Prince was disputed by Hun Sen led-government - France ignored Hun Sen's sensitivity. Feeling insulted by the affair, Hun Sen stated that he would no longer meet the Prince in France and instead, he would meet him in Jakarta. Despite the problems arising from the meeting, Prince Sihanouk, Son Sann and Hun Sen did discuss a number of issues, and reached a consensus that after the withdrawal of Vietnam's troops had been verified, all Cambodian parties should stop receiving foreign military aid. They also agreed to ask the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the UN Secretary General to organize an International Conference on Cambodia.[173] Although the meeting appeared able to reach important agreements, in the absence of the Khmer Rouge any agreement reached was meaningless. Moreover, during the second JIM the Khmer Rouge strongly opposed any effort to link the military pull out with the cessation of military aid. Similarly, agreement about the involvement of the UN Secretary General also raised a question because Vietnam and PRK did not trust the UN, due to its non-recognition of the PRK.

In the end, at the special request of Prince Sihanouk to President Soeharto, the fourth bilateral meeting between the Prince and Hun Sen was held in Jakarta on 2 May 1989. It may be the case that the Prince's request was aimed at maintaining President Soeharto's support for the Cambodian cause, knowing that Indonesia was not very happy with the Prince's cancellation of his trip to Jakarta during the second JIM. Apparently, the Prince's letter impressed the President. In his memo to Minister Alatas, President Soeharto asked the Minister to convey to the Prince that "Indonesia accepted the request with utmost pleasure and would provide whatever assistance required for the meeting."[174] However, the process leading to that meeting was rather awkward for Indonesia as the host. An example of this was that although the Prince had asked Indonesia to host the meeting he criticized Indonesia when it sent Hun Sen an invitation letter. Clearly the Indonesians were puzzled by the criticism because they wondered how Hun Sen could come to Jakarta without an invitation. However, the affair also shows that any third party

who was willing to help solve the Cambodian conflict needed to consider the idiosyncrasies of the Prince.

All the activity and meetings described above show that by mid-1989 the parties to the Cambodian conflict all had a chance to meet informally in an informal setting, either in Indonesia or in France. The main contrast between the informal processes sponsored by Indonesia and France was in terms of participants, the facilitation function and the notion of 'equality in treatment.' The Indonesian sponsored informal process involved, inclusively, all parties to the Cambodian conflict and the regional countries who were concerned with the problems, the ASEAN countries and Laos. In the case of the informal process sponsored by France, the meetings were mainly bilateral, between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, although the third meeting on November 1988 involved Son Sann of the KPNLF. With regard to the facilitation function, Indonesian diplomats were involved in the informal process to assist the participants in their discussion. In contrast, France mainly provided facilities for the meeting to take place. Both Indonesia and France gave special attention to informality as one means to avoid complicity surrounding the non-willingness of the participants to recognise participants representing other factions. In emphasising this aspect, Indonesia considered it essential that all participants should be treated equally and Indonesia assumed that a setting would make a positive contribution to the informal diplomacy activities and the participants trusted the host for being non-discriminative by treating them equally. However, France appeared less concerned about this matter with Hun Sen claiming that he was not treated equally in Paris.

3.5.1. Paris International Conference on Cambodia

Although not too enthusiastic at first about France's proposal to hold an international conference in Paris, Indonesia finally supported the proposal after it successfully convinced the French government of the merit of chairing the meeting together. Indonesia argued that a Co-chair system would give the regional efforts adequate recognition and therefore the Paris conference could make use of some of JIM's achievements.[175] However, with regard to the function of the conference, Indonesia was not too taken with France's intention to make the

planned conference a 'multilateral negotiating forum'. Indonesia considered the idea too risky and preferred instead, a kind of 'ratification conference' for sorting out all the differences. [176] Therefore, Indonesia favoured the model of JIM meetings or working groups with limited participants. France had a different opinion and considered its approach appropriate. There was hope that during the conference the major powers could put pressure on the parties to the conflict and their supporters in order to become more accommodative. France's optimism was justifiable noting that the Permanent Five, during their meeting in New York on 8 May 1989, had declared their intent to provide assistance if requested to help settle the Cambodian conflict.[177]

The Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) was held from 30 July to 30 August 1989. The conference was not preceded by any preparatory meeting involving senior officials, but began with a short meeting among foreign ministers who adopted the rule of procedures and reviewed the meeting's agenda.[178] The foreign ministers agreed to the establishment of four committees with the following responsibilities:[179]

1) the first committee was responsible for defining the modalities of a cease fire;
2) the second committee was in charge of defining the aspect of international guarantee to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia; to ensure cessation of external arms supplies and to prevent foreign interference; and to prevent the recurrence of genocidal policies;
3) the third committee was responsible for discussing the terms and references for repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and to prepare the post-war reconstruction of Cambodia; and
4) the fourth committee, named the Ad Hoc Committee was to examine questions regarding the implementation of national reconciliation and the establishment of a quadripartite interim authority under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk.

Based on the foreign ministers' guidance, the committee conducted their individual meetings and also observed the Co-chair system. Unfortunately, the committee meetings failed to proceed as planned for at least two reasons. First, the involvement of a larger number of participants had, in fact, complicated the

discussions because of conflicting interests. For instance, on the issue of the international guarantee of Cambodia's neutrality, the US, supported by the UK, expressed reservation, worrying that this policy would have some impact on their global interests. In contrast, Indonesia and some ASEAN countries considered the issue as one important component of the ASEAN's ideal of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. Secondly, the rule of procedure of the Paris Conference on Article 16 stated that questions of substance had to be adopted unanimously. The implication of this procedure was that any participant or country could veto any decision, which was not favourable to its interests.[180] Moreover, although the Co-chair system (including in the committees) was able to give indication of efforts to balance the interests of the CGDK and the PRK, the Co-chairs were sometimes not in harmony and this affected the meeting discussions.

In the end, the Paris conference did not achieve its main objective, that is, to reach an agreement on a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict. Similar to the second JIM, the Paris conference decided to postpone the conclusion of the meeting and asked the conflicting and interested parties to continue their efforts to narrow their differences. In his report to President Soeharto, Minister Alatas identified five main points of contention as follows:[181]

1) *Interim Authority in Cambodia prior election.* CGDK maintained the importance of establishing a quadripartite interim authority, whereas Hun Sen rejected Khmer Rouge participation in the interim government, in order to prevent the recurrence of a genocide policy. Hun Sen proposed the establishment of a 'supreme council' but insisted the existing government being maintained.
2) *International Control Mechanism (ICM).* Hun Sen preferred the ICM to be instituted under the Paris conference (PICC), whereas the CGDK wanted the body under the supervision of the UN.
3) *Genocide.* Hun Sen considered the genocide issue as the key to settling the Cambodian problem. CGDK rejected the term and demanded the formulation adopted in the UN be used, that is, 'the non-return of the universally condemned policies and practices of a recent past.'

4) *Vietnam's settlers in Cambodia.* This was a new issue tabled by the CGDK. In response, Hun Sen asked the PICC to send an independent fact finding mission, but their dispatch could only take place after the genocide's issue was settled. However, CGDK demanded that the dispatch of such a mission be held after the establishment of an interim authority.
5) *Armistice.* Hun Sen maintained that the armistice should be declared prior to Vietnam's military pull out from Cambodia, whereas the CGDK demanded the opposite.

In his assessment of the failure of PICC, Minister Alatas pointed to two developments in Southeast Asia.[182] First, the success of the resistance forces to fighting the PRK who had been able to penetrate deeper, close to Phnom Penh. Clearly, the success had hardened their position in Paris and had boosted their confidence in their fighting capability. Having the upper hand in the battlefield, the resistance forces wished to gain the most during the PICC. Secondly, the moderates in the PRK had to concede more to the hardliners within the ranks and to balance, Hun Sen had to maintain a firm posture during the Paris negotiation. Hence, Hun Sen did not want to jeopardise his position in Cambodia and appear to be yielding to external pressure.

3.5.2. Post-PICC: the concerted diplomatic initiatives that led to the signing of the Peace Agreement in Paris, 23 October 1991

Following the failure of the first PICC to end the Cambodian conflict and the unilateral military pull out of Vietnam, military clashes between the CGDK and the PRK had intensified. This situation triggered alarm in Bangkok about the potential proliferation of the conflict followed by flows of refugees into Thailand.[183] In response, Prime Minister Chatichai suggested holding another informal meeting, but proposed that the venue of such meeting be Jakarta or Paris, not Bangkok. During his conversation with the Thai Foreign Minister, Siddhi Savetsila, Minister Alatas stated that Indonesia was unenthusiastic about hosting another informal meeting in Jakarta, but was prepared to offer assistance if there were grounds to believe that the parties were willing to co-operate. He reiterated that such a meeting should not just aim to reach a 'cease fire' but should be

organised under the framework of a comprehensive political solutions based on the PICC.[184] Minister Alatas did not want to rush to accede to Thailand's request if there was not enough preparation and no clear agenda.

In particular, Minister Alatas informed the Thai Foreign Minister that he was cautious about holding another JIM because at the domestic level some members of parliament and media had questioned the merit of Indonesia continuing its diplomatic initiatives to deal with the Cambodian conflict. They suggested Indonesia should limit its role only to the two JIMs.[185] Clearly, by making a reference to constraints at the domestic level, Minister Alatas implicitly wanted to make his counterpart aware that some Indonesians remained annoyed by Thailand's sudden reversal of policy toward the Hun Sen led-Government prior to the second JIM. The Indonesians did not consider it to be a matter of urgency for them to take an active role in the wake of military clashes along the Thai border and in Cambodia's interior. Hence, the message from Minister Alatas was that Indonesia was prepared to organise an informal meeting as long as the Thai Government gave it their full support.

At the same time, some countries brought a new impetus into the discussion of the Cambodian conflict. First, the Soviet Union, supported by the US, proposed the implementation of a moratorium on arms supply to the conflicting parties. Secondly, Australia proposed that the UN function as an interim government in Cambodia. The Australian proposal dealt with one of the five main points of contention during the PICC, that is, *the Interim Authority in Cambodia prior election*. To gain support for its proposal, Australia sent Mr. Michael Costello, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, on overseas tours. Responses to the proposal were varied but in general were rather sceptical. For example, France did not believe that the idea was practical, knowing the factions' insistence on maintaining their position.[186] However, hoping to find a breakthrough in the stalemate on the question of interim government, Indonesia considered the Australian proposal could be used as a basis for discussion during the informal meeting. In this connection, Minister Alatas travelled extensively to consult with leaders of the factions and some concerned countries about the prospect of holding an informal meeting, under the aegis of PICC.[187] From his

consultations, he sensed that the parties were willing to meet and prepared to make concessions, if necessary.[188] Gauging that there were adequate reasons to hold a meeting, Indonesia arranged another informal meeting in Jakarta.

The aims of the informal meeting (Informal Meeting on Cambodia – IMC) were to discuss some outstanding issues not resolved in Paris and also to ponder on the Australian proposal. The IMC took place from 26 to 28 February 1990 in Jakarta and was jointly chaired by Indonesia and France. Australia took part in the meeting as a resource delegation. The IMC was designed as an interim meeting prior to the international conference in Paris. Unfortunately, the IMC failed to move the parties to the conflict and concerned countries forward. By adopting unanimity ruling, the meeting was not successful in producing any agreement because the Khmer Rouge rejected the inclusion of the word 'genocide' in the document entitled 'possible points of common understanding' which was designed as a basis of discussion during IMC.[189] Some other issues of contention included: the question of Vietnamese withdrawal because it was held without international supervision, the establishment of a Supreme National Council and an enhanced role for the United Nations in a peace settlement. The meeting did not accept either the Australian proposal nor Prince Sihanouk's proposal which was reintroduced by the CGDK.

The failure of the IMC brought a new feature in the overall peace process, that is, an enhanced Permanent Five (P-5) role in determining the framework for a peace agreement. Ironically, this was the very notion that Minister Alatas had anticipated during the IMC. When chairing the IMC, Minister Alatas had stated that by accepting the content of the document prepared by the Co-chairs, the participants would send a signal to the world that they were determined to contribute to solving a problem in their own region. The agreement also meant that they were not simply just waiting until outside powers found, or helped to find, a solution.[190]

After the IMC, further diplomatic efforts were initiated to resolve the Cambodian conflict, both at regional and international levels. The diplomatic initiatives at the two levels reinforced one another, with each filling the gaps left at the other level.

On one level, the P-5 were determined to develop the framework for a peace agreement. They developed the framework from a number of sources, including the Australian proposal.[191] However, Indonesia and the ASEAN countries did not want the P-5 to commit a similar error to that which had happened in Afghanistan, when the Soviet Union reached a decision with the concerned countries on the peace terms for Afghanistan without consulting the conflicting parties among the Afghans. The end result of the Soviet Union's approach was civil war, which Indonesia and the ASEAN countries did not wish to happen in Cambodia. In this regard, ASEAN through Indonesia and France as the Co-chair of the PICC held a meeting to consult with the factions and the concerned countries about the content of the peace framework agreed upon by the P-5, during their Sixth Meeting in New York on 28 August 1990. The consultation meeting took place in Jakarta from 9-10 September 1990. At the end of the informal meeting, the participants representing the four Cambodian factions asserted their acceptance of the peace framework formulated by the P-5 in its entirety.[192] Moreover, the Cambodian participants also agreed in principle to form the SNC, consisting of 12 Cambodians, and to accept Prince Sihanouk as the 13th member to chair the SNC.

The Cambodians' agreement to the peace framework proposed by the P-5 and the formation of the SNC did not mean a completion of the peace process because the Cambodians then disputed what they had agreed upon. The Co-Chair of the PICC had to arrange a special informal Working Group meeting (informal expanded bureau meeting), from 9 to 10 November 1990, to refine the peace framework developed by the P-5. The other issue that required attention was a new dispute among the Cambodians about the composition of the SNC.

The composition of the SNC was one issue that the Cambodians disputed fiercely. Their deep-seated distrust, after long years of conflict, made them afraid that their faction would be disadvantaged in the event of a vote among the SNC to decide on some issues. This problem concerning the SNC was discussed mostly at the regional level. This task proved more complex because those who were acting as a third party at the regional level had to deal with a number of delicate internal Cambodian issues. From September 1990 to June 1991 a number of meetings took place in several ASEAN cities: in Bangkok (17 September 1990), in Jakarta (2-4

June 1991) and in Pattaya, Thailand (24-26 June 1991). The last two meetings were able to break the stalemate, mainly because the parties were willing to make concessions. For instance, in Pattaya, Prince Sihanouk had stated that his role as Chairman of the SNC would be impartial and neutral.[193]

However, the change in the attitudes of the Cambodians stemmed from developments that had taken place at the regional and international levels, such as rapprochement between the US and Vietnam and a shift in Chinese and US policy (they had direct contact with the Hun Sen led-government). Normalisation of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China in November 1990 gave Indonesia direct access to China, one of the main parties in the Cambodian conflict. Moreover, in September 1990, the Cambodian UN seat was left vacant because the Cambodians were by then at loggerheads on the composition of the SNC. This event was a critical juncture for the Cambodians because the international community begun to lose patience. The sign of international fatigue was observable on March 1990 when the Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan asked his cabinet to develop a plan to repatriate around 300,000 displaced Cambodians living in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. Patrick Raszelenberg and Peter Schier argued that the Thai decision was prompted by Thai impatience with the Cambodian resistance due to their lack of flexibility during the IMC.[194] Clearly, the resistance forces were disturbed by the Thai decision because it had a direct impact on their ability to recruit resistance forces from the refugees and to distribute war supplies for sustaining their war efforts.

By August 1991, the peace process had reached a stage where the international efforts under the Paris process and P-5 were complemented by the efforts among the Cambodians in the SNC. The synergy between the two processes helped further the peace process because the Cambodians were involved in the discussion of the substance of the peace framework. Their involvement in the discussion of the framework was essential for two reasons. First, the contentious issues, of armistice and human rights (especially the issue of genocide) which were unresolved in Paris, by then had been included in the framework of a comprehensive agreement. Secondly, the Cambodians had agreed earlier in Jakarta, on September 1990, to accept the peace framework as a basis for

resolving the conflict. A mere acceptance without knowing the substance and participation in the discussion would imperil the peace agreement because the Cambodians would feel that they had reached an agreement under international pressure and terms. In the end, the synergy of all efforts at resolving the Cambodian conflict culminated in the signing of Paris Peace Agreement on 23 October 1991.

IV.4. Conclusion

In retrospect, the informal diplomacy through JIM had been successful in achieving its limited and modest objectives as follows. First, for the first time ever JIM was able to bring all the parties to the Cambodian conflict and concerned countries together in one meeting. Secondly, JIM was able to identify some elements crucial to a comprehensive political solution. Thirdly, JIM was also able to maintain the momentum of the peace process at the regional level. M. Nagendra Prasad described the achievement of the JIM as follows:

> [T]here was every reason for Indonesia to be gratified because, the limited purpose for which the talks was arranged, was fully served as all the Khmer leaders took an active part in the JIM proceedings. The two rounds of Jakarta talks, though inconclusive, were significant as they offered a useful forum to promote constructive dialogue and interaction among the warring Khmer parties which had earlier outrightly refused to meet each other.[195]

However, the JIMs were not successful in inducing the factions and the concerned countries to move beyond what had been identified. They were reluctant to discuss and detail all the agreed aspects of the comprehensive political solution of the Cambodian conflict, as well as to ponder on the best way to implement the agreed elements.

The limitation of the JIMs could be discerned from two facts. First, the forum itself was informal and was not designed as a negotiating forum, although the participants behaved as if they were in formal negotiation. Secondly, the informal meetings took place not in an isolation, and, therefore, the attitude of the participants were shaped by developments in Cambodia, in the region and internationally. It was evident that the participants wished to gain the most from

external developments, such as expecting that the summit between China and the Soviet Union could have positive impacts on their respective interests.[196]

The JIM series also revealed that there were limitations in Indonesia's capacity to act as a third party in the Cambodian conflict. The limitations concerned with the question of neutrality, not having direct access to the protagonists and having a limited understanding of their characteristics (especially the Cambodians). Although Indonesia treated all the factions equally, sometimes the CGDK considered Indonesia sided more with the Vietnam and Hun Sen's position. Prince Sihanouk even portrayed JIM as Vietnam's escape route because Vietnam tended to highlight the internal aspect of the conflict rather than the cause of the conflict, that is, Vietnam's invasion. Indonesia could offer meetings' facilities, ideas and the impression of good faith, but was dependent on the willingness of the concerned countries to influence some factions to come to Jakarta.

Indonesia developed its informal diplomacy, including the JIM's strategy and tactics, based on information provided by its overseas missions, third countries, including the concerned countries, and special representatives of the UN Secretary General. All information, especially from non-Indonesians, was treated with extra care because of the potential for calculated misinformation to derail Indonesia's peace initiatives. The record shows that the activities of information gathering and rechecking were extensive prior to JIM and even Minister Alatas himself met directly with the factions' leaders to gain their first hand accounts. Although the idea of having a support system of liaison involving individuals who were familiar with the characteristics of the Cambodians and concerned countries was a worthy effort, the reality suggested that after so many years, people had changed and their behaviour was less predictable. The Cambodians or Vietnamese that the seasoned diplomats had known years before the conflict were often by the time the informal meetings took place no longer quite the same. Their basic character might be the same, but the war experiences had had some profound impact on their attitudes.

With regard to the informal format, there were two divergent points of view expressed by the Indonesians and JIM's participants. On the one hand, some Indonesians expected the informal process would help the protagonists and

concerned countries to unravel their differences, step by step in gradual manner. Consequently, Indonesia had to position itself mainly as facilitator and meetings' moderator, and try to avoid gaining the impression of steering the course of discussions. The end objective was to have the agreements reached from this process endorsed, at a later stage, by the major powers, interested countries and international organisations. Thus, the domain of this point of view was process oriented. On the other hand, some Indonesians preferred to have tangible results from the informal process and, if necessary, as facilitator Indonesia needed to influence the direction of the discussion and if necessary to pressure the participants to exchange concessions. Some participants who expected to bring home results shared this inclination. However, as a developing country, Indonesia had a limited capacity to influence events, and, even during the meetings, Indonesia was unable to convince its ASEAN friends to have a single voice. So, there was discrepancy between expectation and reality.

The informal diplomacy broke the psychological barriers of the impossibility of a face-to-face meeting between enemies. However, the long years of fighting had deepened antagonism among the participants, something that the informal meetings (working groups, JIM, social functions between meetings, and some informal meeting post-JIM and PICC) failed to curtail. The antagonism and lack of trust was observable during all those meetings, including some meetings involving major powers and interested countries.

In the end, the Cambodian conflict was resolved after the international community exerted their concerted efforts, combining the efforts of the Co-Chair of the Paris Conference, the P-5, and some ASEAN and regional countries. The changing regional and international context also influenced the attitudes of the Cambodians towards compromise as they were increasingly aware that the international community had lost patience with them.

Notes

[1] Former Australia Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans in his address on the signing of Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict in Paris, 23 October 1991, quoted an old aphorism which says "success has many fathers, failure is

an orphan" to refer to the contribution made by individuals, countries and international organisations to the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. *The Monthly Record*, October 1991, p. 631.

[2] Prince Norodom Sihanouk in his personal account argued that the coup of 18 March 1970 that ousted him from Cambodia and from the position as Head of State was masterminded by the US, because the US wanted Cambodia to side with the US. Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, *My War with the C.I.A.: Norodom Sihanouk as related to Wilfred Burchett* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973). However, according Nayan Chanda, although the US was aware of the plot to topple the Prince, there was no conclusive evidence of US involvement in the coup. Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The war after the war* (New York: Collier Books, 1988), p. 64.

[3] Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, *Red Brotherhood at War: Indochina since the Fall of Saigon* (London: Verso, 1984), p. 20.

[4] The Khmers Rouges (Cambodian Reds) according to Prince Sihanouk is "a loose description of communists and other leftists, at one time in opposition to the Royal Government, now an important component in the Cambodian National United Front and the resistance [that is, against Lon Nol's government.]. Ibid, footnote no.1, p. 28.

[5] To illustrate the massiveness of the US bombing, Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley noted that in 1973 the US dropped more than 250,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia in six months, whereas the US dropped 160,000 tons of bomb on Japan in six years of war. Evans and Rowley, op cit., p. 102.

[6] Loc cit.

[7] See Stephen J. Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 67.

[8] For a comprehensive discussion on this see Morris, ibid.

[9] *The Australian*, editorial, 12 February 2002.

[10] See Chanda, op cit., Chapter 7. An early border dispute between the two countries took place not long after the liberation of Phnom Penh, that is, in May 1975 when the Khmer Rouge attempted by force to "revive an old claim to Phu Quoc Island" in the Gulf of Thailand. Chanda, op cit., p. 13.

[11] During the border raid, the Khmer Rouge committed atrocities against the Vietnam civilians who live in the border. See Serge Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity", in Ben Kiernan (ed.), *Khmer Rouge and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 172.

[12] The figure was quoted from a result of joint research between an Indonesian university (Universitas Airlangga) and the Research Center of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. *Kampuchea Tahun 1975 – 1985* [*Cambodia between 1975-1985*] (Jakarta, BALITBANG Deplu, 1985), p. 46. In its assessment of Cambodia's political situation in the late 1977, the Indonesian Embassy in Hanoi stated that "Cambodia seemed to be wanting to maintain their distinct identity, independent from their neighbour, especially Vietnam." *Laporan Tahunan, Awal 1976 sampai Pertengahan 1978* (*Yearly report, 1976 – 1978*). KBRI Hanoi, 1978 (undated), p. 4. Unpublished. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[13] See Chanda, op cit., pp. 49-52.

[14] See Morris, op cit.

[15] Abdul Kalam, "The Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Relations: An Analysis in a Strategic Framework", *The Indonesian Quarterly,* Vol. XIV, No. 1, January 1986, p. 115.

[16] See K.N. Ramachandran, "China and Southeast Asia", in K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), *India, Indonesia and The New Cold War* (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1984), p. 116.

[17] Juwono Sudarsono, "Krisis Indocina: Dimensi Regional dan Internasional" [The Indochina Crises: regional and international dimension], *Analisa*, Tahun XVII, No. 5, Mei 1988, p. 299.

[18] Khien Theeravit, "The Conflict in Indochina – A Thai Perspective", in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), *Asia: Militarization & Regional Conflict* (London: The United Nations University, 1988), p. 131.

[19] O. Ovy Ndouk, "Penyerbuan RRC ke Vietnam" [The PRC attacked on Vietnam], in Hadi Soesatro and A.R. Sutopo (eds.), *Strategi dan Hubungan Internasional Indonesia di Kawasan Asia-Pasifik* [*Indonesian strategy and international relations in the Asia-Pacific Region*] (Jakarta: CSIS, 1981), p. 431.

[20] Theeravit, in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), loc cit.

[21] See Yong Deng, "Sino-Thai Relations: From Strategic Co-operation to Economic Diplomacy", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 4, March 1992, p. 363.

[22] Loc cit.

[23] Loc cit.

[24] Meera Shankar, "An Overview of the Seminar", in K. Subrahmanyam (ed.), op cit, p. 11.
[25] See Michael Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy; Coping with Vulnerability* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 39 & p. 86.
[26] Lau Teik Soon, "National Threat Perceptions of Singapore", in Charles E. Morrison (ed.), *Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific* (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), Chapter 9. Also Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc.), p. 48.
[27] Lau, ibid, pp. 122-3.
[28] Ibid, p. 123.
[29] See Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), p. 132.
[30] See Tilman, op cit., pp. 87-92.
[31] See Juwono Sudarsono, "The Limits of Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia", in K.S. Sandhu, et al. (eds.), *The ASEAN Reader* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), p. 389.
[32] According to Charles McGregor, the maintenance of large number of Vietnam troops in the North had burdened Vietnam economically and, likewise the maintenance of its troops in Cambodia. Charles McGregor, *The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union* - Adelphi Papers No 232 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 20-1.
[33] See Carlos F. Nivera, "National Threat Perceptions in the Philippines", in Charles E. Morrison (ed.), op cit., p. 126.
[34] Ibid, p. 127. See also Tilman, op cit., end note no. 41, p. 83.
[35] See Nivera, in Charles E. Morrison (ed.), op cit., p. 126.
[36] After April 1989, the People's Republic of Kampuchea was named the State of Cambodia (SOC).
[37] See Al Santoli, "Endless Insurgency: Cambodia", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1985, pp. 61-72.
[38] In their pursuit for regional co-operation and relationships ASEAN had developed a code of conduct as a governing principles and ASEAN hoped that the regional countries were willing to respect the code of conduct. See Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 89.
[39] Ibid, p. 93.
[40] See Vladimir Rakhmanin, "Soviet and Russian Policy towards Southeast Asia (1986-93), in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds.), *Southeast Asia in the New World Order* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 130.
[41] See Leszek Buszynski, *Gorbachev and Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 72.
[42] Kalam, "The Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Relations: An Analysis in a Strategic Framework", p. 124.
[43] Ben Kiernan exposes the awkwardness of US position from its alignment with China in, "The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace Process: Causes and Consequences", in Ben Kiernan (ed.), op cit., pp. 191-272.
[44] This aspect of the US dilemma is explored by Pamela Sodhy, "A Survey of U.S. Post-Vietnam Policy and the Kampuchean Dilemma, 1975-89: A Southeast Asian View", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol 11, No. 3, December 1989, pp. 283-312.
[45] See Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999), p.180.
[46] Based on restricted document entitled *Telaahan Strategik Nasional 1989-1999* [*National Strategic Outlook: 1989-1999*]. Unpublished. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. It is important to mention that the document was produced in April 1989, one year before Indonesia restored diplomatic relations with China. By then, China was regarded as posing a potential threat to Indonesia. For detail analysis, see Sukma, ibid.
[47] Patrick Raszelengberg and Peter Schier, *The Cambodian Conflict: Search for a Settlement 1979-1991 - An Analytical Chronology* (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, 1995), p. 55.
[48] The policy of maintaining good rapport made the Vietnamese delegate to the UN felt no hesitation to approach Indonesia and requested support for their proposed resolution (information derived from cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN dated 21 November 1985). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[49] The seminar was held on November 22, 1983 and the paper they produced entitled *Modalitas Penyelesaian Masalah Kamboja* [*Modality to resolve the Cambodian problem*]. Unpublished. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[50] Cited in Soendaroe Rachmad, "A Case Study on Cambodia: Indonesia, ASEAN's Interlocutor," *Jurnal Luar Negeri*, No. 17, March 1991, p. 93.

[51] The confusion as a result of seemingly differing positions between the Indonesian military and the Ministry is a clear indication of inter-elite competition to project each individual institution's position on how to perceive Vietnam in the context of threat perception among the Indonesian elites. A brief but comprehensive discussion on the matter is provided by Leo Suryadinata, *Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Soeharto [Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soeharto: Aspiring to International Leadership]* (Jakarta: PT Pustaka LP3ES, 1998). He argues that President Soeharto was in favour of the Ministry's position of positioning Indonesia with ASEAN's position. He further argues that in the final analysis, Indonesia benefited from the military's stand point when Indonesia assumed a role as a third party in the Cambodian conflict. Suryadinata, ibid, pp. 164-5. This thesis limits its discussion to this particular controversy among Indonesian foreign policy elites to focus discussion on the events leading to the adoption and implementation of informal diplomacy to deal with the Cambodian conflict. However, this controversy of differing positions between the military and the Ministry on this particular foreign policy issues is evidence of the nature of inter-elite competition within the Indonesian political system.

[52] Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar is an expert on ASEAN (interview, 28 November 2001).

[53] The ASEAN countries wished to restore confidence that ASEAN remained unified in the wake of Vietnam's aggression, because an apparent rift in ranks had a potential to erode ASEAN's stand in the UN. It was therefore essential for ASEAN to look internally cohesive (extract from cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN dated 24 May 1985). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[54] Summary of the 12-point proposal is taken from Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, "Prospek untuk Perdamaian di Asia Tenggara: Suatu Pandangan Indonesia" [A prospect for peace in Southeast Asia: an Indonesian view], *Jurnal Luar Negeri*, Nomor Ketiga, Maret 1986.

[55] The Indonesian Foreign Minister held a position that after reaching consensus at regional level, the consensus would then require endorsement from an international conference, in which the major powers participated.

[56] The extent of Prof. Fuad Hassan's influence in informal diplomacy's conception is not clear because during a telephone interview with the writer (21 December 2001), Prof. Hassan was not able to recall if his opinion had any impact on the informal format. However, he did emphasise that the informal approach is suitable within an Asian context and proved effective in paving the way to better understanding prior to formal negotiation. Interestingly, according to Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro, Prof. Hassan was one of Minister Kusumaatmadja's close confidants and the Minister always sought his opinion on a number of foreign policy issues (interview with Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro, 12 December 2001). Mr. Suparno, Prof. Hassan's personal secretary in the Research Agency in mid-1980s, confirms this opinion (interview, 12 December 2001).

[57] The discussion of the 'cocktail party' as a meeting format was held in private and involved small numbers of the Ministry's officials. Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad provided this information (interview, 1 November 2001). In mid-1980s, Mr. Rachmad was the Foreign Minister's private secretary. According to Mr. Juwana, in the mid-1980s, when discussing the Cambodian conflict as a case study during the diplomatic training for senior diplomat, the students recommended that the Ministry initiate a meeting with the elements of 'equal footing and with no political label'. Although he was confident that the decision-makers in the Ministry gave consideration to the recommendations, he was not too sure to what extent (interview, 19 October 2001). The writer, however, was not successful in locating the copy of the said recommendation from the library of the Education and Training Center of the Ministry. It is important to note that it has always been a practice of the Center to submit to the decision-makers in the Ministry any policy recommendations made by the students during their training.

[58] Earlier, Malaysia proposed the so-called 'proximity talks', in which a third party, that is ASEAN, would relay messages from one party to another, back and forth. The parties would sit in two separate rooms. Vietnam's rejection of the idea stemmed from a later modification of the meeting format, based on suggestion by some ASEAN countries, that is, to consider the PRK of Heng Samrin as a member of Vietnam delegation. On the notion of breakthrough, see Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "Cambodia: The Vagaries of 'Cocktail' Diplomacy", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 4, March 1988, p. 305.

[59] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok dated 4 August 1987. Archives - Puskom Deplu.

[60] Justus M. Van Der Kroef provides interpretation of 'cocktail party' as follows: "[t]he term, in this instance, refers not so much to an occasion of festive libations, but rather to an image of a mixture, contained in a single entity, of quite diverse ingredients - in short, the different Cambodian factions." Van Der Kroef, "Cambodia: The Vagaries of 'Cocktail' Diplomacy", p. 303.

[61] A letter from Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja to Siddhi Savetsila, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Royal Kingdom of Thailand, dated 10 August 1987. The intention of the letter was to put on record the results of the visit, of which on his way back from Ho Chi Minh

City, 29 July 1987, Minister Kusumaatmadja had explained, in person, the substance of the 'understandings' to Minister Savetsila. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Concerning misunderstandings, some statements in the joint understandings were indeed unclear and open to different interpretation. For instance, the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN provided his own interpretation in response to the queries from his ASEAN's counterparts in New York. For instance, he opined that the sentence of "understanding was reached" should be understood as 'positive consideration' from Minister Nguyen Co Thatch and not an agreement. Due to the many queries, he requested clarification from Jakarta on the 'nuances' behind the understanding (cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN dated 7 July 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[65] On 21 April 1986, a senior official from Thailand's Ministry for Foreign Affairs briefed ASEAN ambassadors in Bangkok on highlights of the discussions between Minister Siddhi Savetsila and Minister Co Tach in Bangkok, 21 April 1986 (Cable from Indonesian mission in Bangkok, dated 22 April 1986. Archive - Puskom Deplu). To counter the 8-point proposals, Vietnam proposed the so-called '7-act play' and invited Prince Sihanouk to meet Heng Samrin to discuss the proposal, and said that Vietnam would abide with the rulings of the two representatives of Cambodian people (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 7 November 1986). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[66] In his report to President Soeharto, Minister Kusumaatmadja stressed the difficulty he faced in persuading Vietnam to meet the CGDK. He reasoned that the two stage meetings were the only way out to the impasse (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 30 July 1987). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[67] Information derived from Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 30 July 1987. Ibid.

[68] The question was implied in a letter from Minister Nguyen Co Thach to Minister Kusumaatmadja, dated 24 August 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[69] *Merdeka*, 21 August 1987.

[70] Based on Minister Kusumaatmadja's report, of ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting, to President Soeharto dated 30 September 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Based on Minister Kusumaatmadja's report, of the bilateral meeting between Prince Sihanouk and ASEAN Foreign Ministers, to President Soeharto dated 30 September 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Excerpt from Minister Kusumaatmadja's recommendation in his letter to President Soeharto. Ibid.

[75] Cable from the Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 26 September 1986. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[76] Based on Minister Kusumaatmadja's report, of Mr. Sutresna consultation with Prince Sihanouk, to President Soeharto dated 5 October 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[77] A letter from Minister Kusumaatmadja to Prince Norodom Sihanouk dated 28 November 1987, describing the outcomes of the working group meeting between Indonesia and Vietnam. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Cable from the Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 20 December 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu. Prince Ranariddh on 27 January 1988 conveyed the message of Prince Sihanouk to Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok, requesting Indonesia to continue its effort to help find a solution to the Cambodian conflict (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 28 January 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[80] Based on Minister Kusumaatmadja's report to President Soeharto, dated 2 February 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[81] Interview with former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[82] Ibid.

[83] The writer would consider the selection of Mr. Ali Alatas as a calculated step taken by President Soeharto, knowing that Mr. Ali Alatas was known as an accomplished negotiator. The former minister, Prof. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was known as a 'scholar minister' who sometimes approached problems from an academic point of view and, at times, to those who did not know him well, his style would be regarded as 'lecturing'.

[84] Prince Sihanouk, in his briefing to ASEAN Ambassadors based in Paris, considered Hun Sen exploited the meetings for his public relations interest; such as making a statement that the

Cambodian conflict would not be solved without the participation of the Khmer Rouge (non member of Pol Pot clique) and Son Sann (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 13 December 1987). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[85] Based on a cable from the Director for Asia and Pacific Affairs to Indonesian Ambassador in Hanoi, dated 1 February 1988. The cable reports some highlights of discussion between Vietnam's Ambassador and the Director General for Political affairs in Jakarta, 29 January 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[86] Raszelengberg and Schier, op cit., p. 151. According to Muthiah Alagappa, one of the breakthroughs of the Cambodian conflict was when the Soviet Union compromised China's demand during their meeting on April 1989, that is, forced Hanoi to come to terms with China (Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security and the Cambodian Conflict", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47 No.2, October 1993, p. 201). Interestingly, China's Foreign Minister informed the Indonesian Foreign Minister during their meeting in New York, 4 October 1998, that a high-ranking Soviet Union's official admitted having difficulty in influencing Vietnam on its policy on Cambodia (cable from Indonesian mission in UN, dated 10 October 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu. According to Dr. Rizal Sukma, there are grounds to believe the information because due to their sense of pride, the Vietnamese did not want to appear under external pressure (interview, 8 October 2001).

[87] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 28 January 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[88] Interview with Mr. Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[89] Some senior Indonesian diplomats according to Mr. Triansyah Djani had a good relationship with some key players in Cambodian conflict, particularly from KPNLF and Funcipec factions. He also recalled that his late father, Mr. Anwar Djani, who served as Charge d' Affaires for the Indonesian mission in Phnom Penh between 1972-1975, mentioned that the Indonesian military had cultivated a special relationship with some military units in Cambodia which later went on to join the KPNLF. This statement should be treated with qualification, because there is no record to substantiate the information (interview 16 November 2001).

[90] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 4 June 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu. On the 6 July 1988, the Vietnamese Ambassador for Indonesia paid a visit to the Acting Director General for Political Affairs, to convey Minister Co Thach' letter to an invitation letter from Minister Alatas to attend the JIM. During the discussion, the Ambassador requested more information of the agenda and the substantive aspects of the planned JIM meeting (cable from Jakarta to Bangkok, dated 7 July 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[91] One former diplomat who did not want to be named gave the latter possibility.

[92] Invitation letter to take part in JIM from Minister Ali Alatas to Minister Nguyen Co Thach of Vietnam, dated 25 June 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[93] Cable from the Foreign Minister to Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok, dated 14 May 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[94] *Kompas*, 15 June 1988.

[95] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 12 July 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[96] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 18 July 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[97] Excerpt from the Indonesian delegation's report of the said meeting, in Bangkok, to the Foreign Minister, dated 3 June 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[98] Indonesia would always be extra observant in contacting the SOC/PRK Government, because ASEAN maintained a non-recognition policy of the PRK government. To highlight Indonesia's ignorance of Hun Sen, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in late 1987 had to ask American Embassy in Jakarta for assistance in providing them with detailed information about Hun Sen. *Briefing paper on Cambodia*, 1988 (undated). Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[99] The Permanent Secretary of Thailand Foreign Ministry, Mr. Kasemsri, during a briefing to ASEAN Ambassadors in Bangkok on 20 June 1988, stated that he would invite the CGDK's factions to his office and would remind them of their moral obligation to come to Jakarta (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 21 June 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[100] Excerpt from Minister Kusumaatmadja's letter to President Soeharto, dated 16 March 1985, explaining the results and the substance of the discussions during his visit to Hanoi between 14 to 17 March 1985. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[101] Interviews with Mr. Sunu Mahadi, 24 September 2001; Mr. Triansyah Djanie, 16 November 2001; and Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro, 12 December 2001. Also an interview with Mr. Abdurahman Gunadirdja, 14 January 2002. During JIM, both Mr. Sunu Mahadi and Mr. Triansyah Djanie served the Indonesian Committee as conference officials and Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro was responsible for information (press). Mr. Abdurahman Gunadirdja was one of the liaison officers (Mr. Gunadirdja was a Chinese speaking diplomat and was appointed as Indonesia's first

Ambassador to China after the resumption of diplomatic relation between Indonesia and China in 1990). Protocol affairs was one of the most sensitive aspects of the JIM meeting and even though the participants were aware the meeting's nature was informal but based on 'equal footing principles', they tended to compare all the time how they were being treated vis-à-vis other participants. Recollection of Dr. Boer Mauna (a French speaking diplomat), who was responsible for overseeing the meeting facilities (interview, 15 November 2001).

[102] The observance of the Ho Chi Minh agreement, that is, to hold a meeting in two stages, was a condition emphasised by the Vietnam and PRK's delegations prior to the meeting. A letter from Mr. Hun Sen to Minister Alatas clearly stated that the meeting be held "in accordance with the provision of paragraph four" [of the 'understanding' which sanctioned the two stages of meeting.] Letter dated 7 July 1988. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[103] The non-Cambodians, according to Minister Alatas, could only facilitate the peace process. Ali Alatas, *A voice for a just peace: a collection of speeches* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), p. 271.

[104] Loc cit.

[105] Loc cit.

[106] Excerpt from circular note from the Director General for Political Affairs to all Indonesian Missions Overseas, dated 6 July 1988, explaining the latest preparation prior to JIM. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[107] Personal account of Mr. John Louhanapessy, interview, 16 October 2001; and also of Mr. Juwana, interview, 19 October 2001.

[108] A member of Prince Ranariddh's delegation provided the Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok with this information on 4 August 1988 (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 5 August 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu. The informant did not provide the Ambassador with the reason behind Thailand move. The referencing of genocidal toward Pol Pot's clique in the statement might had been the reason, because China, Thailand's ally on Cambodia issue, rejected any efforts to put the Khmer Rouge on the spot. China was concerned that such recognition of Pol Pot's affair could imply acceptance of Vietnam's motivation to invade Cambodia, that is, to liberate the Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge's atrocities.

[109] Information provided by Mr. John Louhanapessy, interview, 16 October 2001. In the sidelines of the meeting, Mr. Pieter Damanik, who once served as Director General for Social Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, escorted Hun Sen to shake hands with Khieu Sampan and stated "please shake hand with your fellow brother." Personal account of Mr. Pieter Damanik, interview, 23 October 2001. This occurrence was also confirmed by Dr. Hasjim Djalal, interview, 7 December 2001. The significance of this 'incident' was symbolic that the two enemies were willing to exchange courtesy and smiles before the eyes of other participants and their respective followers.

[110] On the Statement of the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, see **Appendix No. 3.**

[111] Alatas, op cit, p. 278.

[112] Paragraph 4 (four), Statement by the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, dated 28 July 1988.

[113] Paragraph 5 (five), Statement by the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, dated 28 July 1988.

[114] Paragraph 6 (six), Statement by the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, dated 28 July 1988.

[115] Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1988: The Curved Road to Settlement", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No.1, January 1989, p. 75.

[116] Loc cit.

[117] For instance an agreement to hold a meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, in November 1988, was reached during this visit. A member of Prince Ranariddh's delegation to JIM informed Indonesian Ambassador in Bangkok on this matter (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 5 August 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[118] Personal account of Mr. John Louhanapessy, interview, 16 October 2001.

[119] Paragraph 7 (seven), Statement by the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, dated 28 July 1988.

[120] Based on Minister Alatas's report to President Soeharto dated 10 October 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[121] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 27 September 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[122] Annoyed that the Prince made no reference to the JIM's process, Indonesian Ambassador reiterated that the ASEAN's peace efforts were mainly to assist the Cambodians. However, he also

stated that it was worthy to look for peace options proposed from various international forums (cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 21 October 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[123] The ideal of JIM and Working Group were described by Minister Alatas to Vietnam Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Trang Qang Co, when they conferred in New York, 27 September 1988, to discuss France's proposal of an international conference on Cambodia (cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 28 September 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[124] According to Mr. Triansyah Djanie, the Indonesian diplomatic corps were rather upset when France informed them about its plan to organize an international conference. The Indonesians considered the action as a deliberate action of hijacking the Indonesian initiative. Based on his recollection when he accompanied members of Indonesian delegation to the UNGA meetings around October 1988 (interview, 16 November 2001).
[125] Based on Minister Alatas's report to President Soeharto dated 10 October 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[126] Quoted from invitation letter from Minister Alatas to Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Mr. Nguyen Co Thach, dated 10 August 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 25 August 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu. Minister Alatas also had a personal meeting with Mr. Khieu Samphan in New York, on 3 October 1988. In that meeting, he also persuaded Mr. Samphan to send his representatives, but the reaction was non-committal (cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 10 October 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu. During the meeting Minister Alatas also encouraged Mr. Samphan to attend the planned meeting involving the four factions in Paris, 5 November 1988.
[129] Quoted from "Report of the Working Group of The Jakarta Informal Meeting, Jakarta, 17-20 October 1988. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[130] Interview, dated 16 October 2001.
[131] Interviews with Mr. Rizali, 15 November 2001; and with Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro, 12 December 2001.
[132] Personal account of Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro, interview, 12 December 2001.
[133] Quoted from "Report of the Working Group of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, Jakarta, 17-20 October 1988." Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[134] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 23 December 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[135] Ibid. The Indonesian delegation in their report expressed regret that during the meeting, their fellow ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand, did not defend Indonesia's position, and instead kept silent. The Indonesian delegation - perhaps because of their annoyance - suspected that Thailand had masterminded the idea for postponing the planned Jakarta meetings.
[136] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 23 December 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 9 November 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[139] Cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 22 December 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[140] Based on a letter from Minister Alatas to President Soeharto, dated 5 January 1989. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[141] Based on Minister Alatas's report, of his meeting with Prince Sihanouk, to President Soeharto dated 10 January 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu. It is important to note that earlier, on 31 December 1988, Prince Sihanouk wrote his son, Prince Ranariddh, a letter essentially not favorable to the planned meetings in Jakarta. The Prince considered the meetings as an arena for propaganda, for both Vietnam and Hun Sen (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 3 January 1989). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[142] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 22 January 1988. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[143] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 26 January 1989 and also confirmed by the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok with its cable, dated 26 January 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu. In an apparent gesture of resentment to Thailand's move, some members of the CGDK approached Indonesia and inquired about the possibility of Indonesia to ask Vietnam to invite the CGDK to Hanoi (cables from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 24 and 30 January 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[144] *Suara Pembaruan*, 1 February 1989.
[145] Indonesia actually had some prior knowledge or perhaps might have speculated that Thailand would in the end reverse its policy toward Hun Sen and Vietnam. At the least, they were informed of the rift between the pragmatists from Prime Minister's Office - Prime Minister Chatichai had held his position since 4 December 1988 - and the hard-liners among the Thai Foreign Ministry on

how to settle the Cambodian conflict. This argument is sustained by a number of cables (cables from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 3 and 24 January 1989). Archive - Puskom Deplu. However, the impact of Hun Sen's visit to the cancellation of Prince Sihanouk attendance to the JIM was beyond Indonesia's expectation.

[146] Cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 25 January 1989. Archives - Puskom Deplu.

[147] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 31 January 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[148] A letter from Hun Sen, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, to Minister Alatas, dated 3 January 1989. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[149] Information provided by confidential resource person. There was ground to believe that Indonesia was also upset with the news that Vietnam was willing to compromise JIM through making separate agreement with Thailand on how to end the Cambodian conflict (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 27 September 1988). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[150] According to one senior Funcinpec's official, the dinner was mainly a social meeting with no substantive discussion. He considered the Thai Government was not treating the factions fairly, because the Thais had invited CGDK and Hun Sen on separate occasions. He regarded Indonesia's approach more acceptable because Indonesia had always invited the four factions together in one meeting. Moreover, he stated that the CGDK's acceptance to come to Jakarta was based on their respect to President Soeharto and not because of Prime Minister Chatichai's pressure (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 2 February 1989). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[151] Report on Ambassador Viraphol's briefing to ASEAN Ambassadors in Bangkok on the results of Prime Minister Chatichai meetings with Hun Sen and with the three Cambodian factions (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 1 February 1989). Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[152] Letter from Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan to President Soeharto, dated 30 January 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Information provided by a confidential resource person.

[155] Letter from President Soeharto to Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven, dated 4 February 1989. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu. On 6 February 1989, Indonesia sent each faction and concerned countries a letter to confirm that the Working Group and JIM would be held as scheduled. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[156] Letter from President Soeharto to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, dated 30 January 1989. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[157] Loc cit.

[158] *Kompas*, 16 February 1989.

[159] Interview with Mr. Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[160] According to Mr. Kusnadi, former Director for Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, one on one consultation became the dominant feature of Indonesian diplomacy in dealing with Cambodian conflict, especially in dealing with the Cambodian factions. He believed that Minister Alatas's persuasive skill had contributed significantly to the successful outcomes of Cambodian peace processes (interview, 9 October 2001).

[161] In Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto's recollection, the affair prompted the organizing committee to act extra carefully, even at one point, not releasing information unless its content had been approved by the Indonesian Foreign Minister himself. During JIM, Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto helped in the information section of the committee (interview, 3 October 2001). Such caution was understandable because the diplomats were worried of possible negative consequences from any further mistakes on their career in the Ministry.

[162] Paragraph 13, Consensus Statement of the Chairman of the Jakarta Informal Meeting, dated 21 February 1989.

[163] Letter from Minister Alatas to each faction's leaders dated 23 February 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Letter from Minister Alatas to Minister Co Thach dated 23 February 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[166] Based on a Cable from Indonesian Permanent Representative in the UN New York dated 26 January 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.

[167] On the Consensus Statement of the Chairman, see **Appendix No. 4.**

[168] *The Jakarta Post*, 20 February 1989.

[169] *Unofficial Summary Record Working Group Meeting Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC)*, Jakarta, November 9-10, 1990. (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 1990), p. 29.

[170] M. Nagendra Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), p. 137.
[171] Excerpt from Indonesian Ambassador in Pyongyang's report from his two meetings with Prince Sihanouk, 2 and 21 April 1989 (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Pyongyang, dated 23 April 1989). Archives - Puskom Deplu.
[172] Document dated 23 November 1988 entitled "Message from Hun Sen, Member of the Political Bureau of the KPRD Central Committee, on the Outcome of the Talks with Sihanouk in France." Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[173] Raszelengberg and Schier, op cit, pp. 230-1.
[174] The memo was written in Indonesian Language. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[175] Based on Minister Alatas' report of his meeting with French Foreign Minister, Mr. Roland Dumas, to President Soeharto, dated 1 June 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu. Initially, France proposed Indonesia acting as vice chairman of the conference.
[176] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 19 May 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[177] Cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 15 May 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu. From their consultations, the Permanent Five also concurred to maintain contact with ASEAN as a group.
[178] Tommy T B Koh, "The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that Failed", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1990, p. 84. In this article, Mr. Koh provided a comprehensive discussion of the successes and failures of the PICC.
[179] Loc cit.
[180] In his earlier report to President Soeharto, Minister Alatas stated that although participants to PICC had shown flexibility, in general he regretted that the Khmer Rouge with the support of China had attempted to block meeting agreements. In particular, the Minister also mentioned that Singapore was not cooperative and had made strong and negative remarks towards Vietnam and Hun Sen. The Minister considered Singapore's approach was not constructive. Based on Minister Alatas's interim report, on PICC, to President Soeharto, dated 2 August 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[181] Based on Minister Alatas's report, on the outcomes of PICC, to President Soeharto, dated 31 August 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Cable from Indonesian Embassy Bangkok, dated 15 September and 20 October 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[184] Cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 12 October 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu. At the same time, the KPNLF of CGDK also indicated their interest in participating in an informal meeting (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 23 December 1989). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 27 November 1989. Some Cambodian factions, such as KPNLF, also shared France's scepticism (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 23 December 1989). Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[187] Besides Foreign Minister Roland Dumas of France, Minister Alatas also consulted the idea of holding IMC with Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien of Vietnam, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen of China, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans of Australia, Foreign Minister Joe Clark of Canada, and Secretary of State James Baker of the US. Based on Minister Alatas's letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen, dated 28 October 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[188] Based on the briefing given by Minister Alatas to ASEAN ambassadors and France's Ambassador in Jakarta, dated 17 January 1990. Archive - Puskom Deplu. Minister Alatas, for instance, considered that Hun Sen appeared flexible and was prepared to discuss possible variations of the Australian proposal. Extract from Minister Alatas's discussion with Hun Sen in Ho Chi Minh City, dated 15 January 1990. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[189] Based on the "Unofficial Summary Record", Informal Meeting on Cambodia, Jakarta, 26-28 February 1990. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[190] Ibid, paragraph 136, p. 47.
[191] Senator Gareth Evans stated that throughout the rest of 1990, the P-5 and the Paris Conference Co-chairmen in close consultation with the UN Secretariat played a central role in refining and developing the Australian plan. See Senator The Hon Gareth Evans, "The Comprehensive Political Settlement to the Cambodian Conflict: An Exercise in Cooperating for Peace", in Hugh Smith (ed.), *International Peace Keeping Building on the Cambodian Experience* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), p. 6.
[192] See Raszelengberg and Schier, op cit., p. 393.

[193] Ibid, p. 523.
[194] Ibid, p. 308.
[195] Prasad, op cit., p. 128.
[196] This was clearly spelled out by the participants during the Second JIM.

Chapter V

Indonesian Diplomacy in Facilitating the Peace Agreement between The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

V.1. Introduction

The involvement of an ASEAN country in the settlement of another member's internal conflict is, indeed, a rare case in ASEAN's history.[1] Indonesia was given an opportunity to act as a third party in helping to resolve the separatist problem in the southernpart of the Philippines, not from an internal arrangement within ASEAN, but through its membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). From 1991, Indonesia was directly involved in the peace process, when the OIC appointed Indonesia as a member of the Ministerial Committee of Six of the OIC, which was overseeing the Moro problem. Between 1993 and 1996, Indonesia arranged a number of meetings between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that culminated in the signing of a peace agreement in Manila on 2 September 1996. Some of the meetings that Indonesia facilitated were informal while others were formal negotiations, with the boundary between the formal and informal formats overlapping at times as Indonesia used the two formats in tandem.

The intention of this chapter is to analyse the informal diplomatic approach of Indonesia, the so-called facilitation function,[2] in dealing with the separatist problem in the southernpart of the Philippines, and seeing the approach as an integral part of Indonesia's diplomatic efforts overall. This chapter will describe and analyse the aspects of what constitutes informal diplomacy in the context of the Moro problem, why informal diplomacy was required, and how Indonesia exercised informal diplomacy.

The main argument of this chapter is that Indonesia was able to play a critical role in the peace process because first, the OIC provided Indonesia with the kind of mandate to act on its behalf and secondly, both the GRP and the MNLF accepted

Indonesia's role. Initially, Indonesia designed informal diplomacy to assess the level of acceptance of the conflicting parties toward its role and to identify subjects for discussions during the subsequent meetings. As the meetings progressed, Indonesia used the informal approach to help overcome some of the obstacles that arose during the peace negotiations. The most pervasive obstacle was the low level of trust among the parties to the conflict. The diplomatic initiatives had substantial support from bureaucrats within and outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all the activities were co-ordinated by the Ministry.

The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides a background to the separatist problem in the southernpart of the Philippines and identifies the parties involved. The second section analyses the Indonesian peace initiative to understand the internal dynamics within the Indonesian team; to observe the implementation of the informal diplomacy, that is, the techniques adopted and the strategy developed, and to observe the outcomes of the peace initiative.

V.2. The background of the separatist problem in the southernpart of the Philippines

In brief, separatism in the southernpart of the Philippines stemmed from the Moro's frustration following decades of oppression under the Spaniards and the Americans, and a sense of being neglected by successive Philippines Governments. In 1968, the Moro declared their independence from the Republic of the Philippines and a year later, they established the MNLF as their military force. Libya and Saudi Arabia had brought the Moro problem to the attention of the OIC during the Third Ministerial Conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in March 1972. From 1972 onward, Libya and Saudi Arabia had always tabled the Moro problem in the OIC's agenda and at successive conferences these two countries attempted to find a settlement for the Moro problem.

The term Moro was first introduced by the Spaniards to refer to the Muslim inhabitants living around Manila Bay in the 16th Century who had fought them

during the colonisation period. Their stronghold was around the southwestern shores of the Philippines.[3] The earlier Muslim communities in Sulu and Mindanao areas were formed during the 14th Century and within the period of two centuries, they had established a sultanate system which had close ties with the sultanate of Brunei in Borneo and Ternate in Sulawesi (Celebes).[4] According to Rajaretnam, when the Spaniards arrived in the 16th Century, a distinct social and political organisation based on Islamic principles had existed in the southern Philippines.[5] The efforts by the Spanish over many years to control the whole Philippines archipelago were not completely successful because they never controlled the Luzon area in the southern Philippines.[6]

The Americans, who succeeded the Spanish, gave the southern part area of the Philippines provincial status. The Americans encouraged Filipinos from the North to emigrate to the South, which changed the demographic balance between the North and the South as well as the religious composition. Between 1914 and 1921, the American administration of the Moro Province embarked on a new policy of 'Filipinization' which gave Filipinos a greater share in the administration of the province. Those who assumed control were mostly from the North, educated in Spanish and American institutions, and the majority of them were practising Christians.[7] The two American policies of encouraging emigration and shifting administrative control to Filipinos from the North further ingrained the hostility of the Moro people towards foreigners and migrants.[8] Successive Philippines governments had to deal with hostility which, in 1968, was manifested in a demand for independence in the Mindanao and Sulu areas. Fighting was localised at first between the Christian Filipinos and Muslim Filipinos of Moro origin. Then, the central government became involved with the main objective being to fight the separatist's demands. However, their 'heavy handed' approach in dealing with the rebellion gave the OIC and some of its members a reason to support the Moro people.

Internationalisation of the conflict took place in the early 1970s. In 1971, Libya, Malaysia and Kuwait requested the United Nations to intervene. In the following year, during their meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the OIC Foreign Ministers discussed the Moro problem for the first time. Some OIC members, deliberately

or discreetly, supported the MNLF struggle. The Libyan leader, Muammar Khaddafi and the Chief Minister of Sabah, Malaysia, Tun Mustapha, gave armaments and sanctuary in Sabah. Saudi Arabia also threatened to cut its oil supply to the Philippines unless the GRP reversed its policy towards the Moro people and showed more leniency towards the MNLF.[9] The OIC pressures, coupled with a concern over oil supplies, forced the GRP to come to Tripoli in 1976 to a meeting with the MNLF.

The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 (signed by Deputy Defense Minister Carmelo Barbero on behalf of the GRP and Mr. Nur Misuari - the Chairman of the MNLF) called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities and stipulated several provisions.[10] One provision demands the GRP to give the Moro autonomy over thirteen provinces and Article 16 of the Agreement stated that "[t]he Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire agreement."[11] However, after Tripoli, the MNLF demanded the 13 provinces be accredited with the status of autonomous region, automatically without condition, whereas the GRP insisted that such a status could only be accorded after a referendum. The GRP justified their position based on Article 16 of the Agreement. Thus the agreement reached in Tripoli was far from conclusive and was open to different interpretations between the protagonists. These differing interpretations became a bone of contention between the two parties.

At the same time, a rift within the ranks of the MNLF surfaced, between those who supported and rejected the proposals for autonomy. Those who rejected the proposals formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under Hashim Salamat, and the Moro National Liberation Front Reform under Dimas Pundato. Both groups accused Misuari of betraying the Moro people through accepting autonomy and not insisting on independence. This sense of insecurity forced Mr. Misuari to seek sanctuary in Saudi Arabia.[12] Although this rift had weakened the MNLF internally, the international stature of the MNLF and of Mr. Misuari remained intact because the OIC maintained a position of recognising only the MNLF and its Chairman as the representative of the Moro people.

Internal rupture within the MNLF and extensive lobbies to Arab and Islamic countries by the Marcos led-Government gave the government until the mid-1980s with no sense of urgency to resolve the problem. New impetus for change in the GRP's policy toward the problem took place during President Corazon Aquino's administration which came to power in 1986. President Aquino made a number of bold initiatives, including her visit to the MNLF stronghold in Sulu. Her move, for a while, raised hopes for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, her decision to proceed with the referendum in November 1989 about establishing an autonomous region (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao - ARMM) - despite strong opposition from the MNLF - weakened her credibility in the eyes of the MNLF. The MNLF was also disappointed that the ARMM's proposal had split the resistance movement further, between the hard-liners who did not want to recognise the ARMM and the moderates who were willing to join the ARMM. The split within the MNLF further weakened the resistance movement, which following the Tripoli Agreement had already divided into three groups.

Internationally, President Aquino also followed President Marcos's strategy of lobbying the Arab and Islamic countries. However, she went further by approaching Indonesia and requested assistance to help resolve the Moro problem. In May 1987, President Aquino sent Ambassador Emmanuel Palaez to seek the possibility of Indonesia: (1) urging the MNLF to look for ways in settling the conflict peacefully, but under the terms and conditions of the GRP; (2) persuading the MNLF to look on the issue within the overall context of Filipino Muslims, and therefore not to further antagonise the Muslim and non-Muslim; and (3) supporting the Philippines' position in the OIC. Indonesia did contact the MNLF in Kuala Lumpur, in June 1987, but under the guidance of former President Soeharto the mission was limited to listening to the position of the MNLF.[13] Despite Indonesia's apparent hesitation to be involved deeply in the problem, Indonesia, together with Malaysia and Brunei, maintained support for the Philippines' position on Moro issues in the OIC.

Hence, during her time in office, President Aquino was unsuccessful in bringing the MNLF to the negotiation table. The ARMM was not a solution to the problem,

but instead further deepened the MNLF's distrust of the GRP. The election of Fidel V. Ramos as the new President of the Republic of the Philippines in 1992 brought new stimulus for peace initiatives. In his First State of the Nation address on 27 July 1992, President Ramos made it clear that his administration would give priority to the advancement of peace and reconciliation.[14] Ramos' intention was received favourably by Mr. Misuari who in the early 1990s was concerned about his decline in popularity among the Moro people, after his long years of self-exile in Saudi Arabia. Over those years, the splinter groups had gained more popularity among the people.[15] Clearly, mutual interests between President Ramos and Mr. Misuari for change in the status quo created a favourable condition for Indonesia to act as a third party in the peace process.

Indonesia's task was to help the conflicting parties find a solution to their problem. The task was four fold. The first was to assist the conflicting parties rebuild trust after long years of conflict and hostilities. The second was to convince the MNLF that autonomy was an end in itself and not a means to separate themselves from the Philippines. Thus, autonomy based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 was the final solution to the Moro problem.[16] The third was to assist the two parties to reconcile the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, a document that had been understood differently by each protagonist. It was important to re-frame the Agreement based on the circumstances and political realities of the early 1990s, two decades after the first conflict erupted in 1968. The last was to balance the various interests in the Moro problem: of the protagonists and of the stakeholders - the OIC and some of its members (especially Libya and Saudi Arabia).

V.3. Indonesia's peace initiatives in dealing with the Moro problem

Although the focus of this chapter is on Indonesia's peace efforts between 1993 and 1996, it is important to examine some of the events prior to 1993 which led to Indonesia instigating some meetings between the parties to the conflict. Arguably, the years between 1991 and 1993 were the formative years for Indonesian diplomatic efforts and, therefore, discussion of some important events during these periods is essential.[17]

3.1. The formative years (1991 to early 1993)

As previously mentioned, Indonesia was not actively involved in the OIC efforts to find a solution to the Moro problem until it was appointed a member of the Ministerial Committee of the Six of the OIC in 1991.[18] Prior to the appointment, Indonesia had distanced itself from the activities of the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee of the OIC (the OIC conduit for their dealing with the Philippines Government) to maintain the solidarity principles of ASEAN.[19] Moreover, Indonesia also did not want to break ASEAN's credo of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other ASEAN countries. However, by mid-1991, Indonesia had learned that the GRP had, in fact, expressed interest in having Indonesia as a member of the enlarged Quadripartite Ministerial Committee.

In his letter to Minister Alatas, dated 20 July 1991, Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus of the Philippines referred to the decision of the 19th Ministerial Meeting of the OIC in Cairo, held in August 1990, to expand the membership of the Quadripartite Committee from four to six, and to include Asian members. Secretary Manglapus stated that "the Philippines Government hopes that Indonesia will become a member of the expanded OIC-Quadripartite Committee."[20] He reasoned that:

> Indonesia's membership would assure the Philippines of an understanding friend and ally in its efforts to resolve the Muslim secessionist issue within the context of Philippines laws, and consistent with the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.[21]

Two other ASEAN members, Malaysia and Brunei also qualified for a position on an enlarged committee, but there is no record of the Philippines making a similar request to them. Within ASEAN's tradition, the Philippines would only request support from Malaysia and Brunei for Indonesia's nomination at the Istanbul meeting.[22] Secretary Manglapus also requested a separate meeting with Minister Alatas to discuss the matter during the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting/Post Ministerial Conference (AMM/PMC) held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 8 to 25 July 1991.[23]

Indonesia and Bangladesh were appointed, with acclamation, as new members of Committee of the Six during the 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul, on August 1991. Former Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali Alatas reasoned that the appointment was because the OIC finally realised that none of the members of the Quadripartite Committee, which dealt with the Moro problem, were from Asia. Thus, the selection of a Southeast Asian country was a pragmatic decision by the OIC.[24] There are reasons for believing that the decision also stemmed from the OIC's confidence in Indonesia, knowing that Indonesia was actively involved in the peace process in Cambodia and had no history of bilateral disputes with the Philippines. In contrast, Malaysia and the Philippines have a dispute over ownership of some islands in the Spratlys group in the South China Sea and they have a residual dispute over Sabah in Borneo. Brunei had no track record of contributing to the settlement of international's conflicts or disputes.

At the Istanbul meeting, the Indonesian delegation received Mr. Zacariah Candao, the Governor of the ARMM and Mr. Nur Misuari, the leader of MNLF. The GRP sent Mr. Candao to Istanbul, on a so-called 'goodwill mission,' to lobby OIC members on behalf of the Philippines. During the meeting Mr. Candao explained some of the progress that had occurred following the implementation of the autonomy agreement.[25] In contrast, Mr. Misuari expressed his deep regret at President Aquino's decision to proceed with a referendum and create the ARMM, which deviated from the Tripoli Agreement. He emphasised that the MNLF would not recognise the referendum result as well as the ARMM.[26] Mr. Misuari did indicate his willingness to meet with the GRP and, at the same, also requested that Indonesia assist with the settlement of the Moro problem based on the Tripoli Agreement.[27]

During the ministerial meeting, the Indonesian delegation was responsible for the adoption of a resolution which recognised some of the measures taken by the GRP to resolve the Moro problem. According to Mr. Sastrohandoyo, the initiative to insert a 'mild phrase' that acknowledged the recent efforts of the GRP to resolve the problem was an Indonesian one and not at the request of the GRP.[28] He explained that Indonesia's decision was based on the following reasons.[29] First, over many years the OIC had always adopted 'accusatory and condemnatory'

resolutions toward the GRP and, being a non-member of OIC, the GRP could not defend itself. Secondly, Libya and Saudi Arabia's interest in the Moro problem had been eroding because there had been no substantial progress since 1976. They wanted a solution and Minister Alatas considered this development provided Indonesia with an opportunity to lend some assistance, if requested.

Mr. Sastrohandoyo recalled that Mr. Misuari had been very upset with the recognition phrase in the adopted resolution and had requested a private meeting with Minister Alatas to complain about Indonesia's action. However, Saudi Arabia and Libya supported the resolution and, at the same time, requested that Indonesia become a member of the expanded committee, and even chair the committee.[30] Thus, during the ministerial meeting Indonesia was successful in getting the OIC to recognise some positive efforts by the Philippines in the South, without being accused by some OIC members of subsuming the interests of the MNLF. Interestingly, prior to the Istanbul meeting, Indonesia did not consider its membership in the expanded committee as a priority.[31] The possible explanations for the reversal of this position were twofold. First, Indonesia considered its membership would open an opportunity for it to assist the conflicting parties in resolving their problem. Secondly, Indonesia sensed sufficient support from the OIC's members.

To acknowledge Indonesia's positive role, Foreign Secretary Manglapus wrote a letter to Minister Alatas, dated 21 August 1991, which stated:

> The Philippines delegation, which my government sent to Istanbul and which you so kindly received, has reported that, because of the firm and well-reasoned position taken by Indonesia on the issue affecting the Philippines, the Conference passed a resolution which we consider as reflecting a new appreciation of the issue by the members of the OIC. I wish to make mention in particular of dispositive paragraph no. 2 of the resolution on the question of Muslim in the Philippines by which the ICFM, for the first time, took note of the steps being taken by my government to solve the problem in Southern Philippines. Without doubt, the inclusion of such a reference to Philippines government efforts in the resolution is a testimony to the influence and prestige which Indonesia enjoys in this important international forum.[32]

Secretary Manglapus also expressed his trust that Indonesia would maintain its support for his country's position with regard to the Moro problem and mentioned

that his country would work hard for the success of the ARMM.[33] Thus, the letter not only reflected the GRP's appreciation of Indonesia's help, but also indicated their awareness of Indonesia's influence in the OIC. This trust formed the basis for the Philippines asking Indonesia to assist them as a third party in the Moro problem. The MNLF, for its part, was aware that its main patrons, Libya and Saudi, did not object to Indonesia's efforts to insert a statement in the resolution, taking note of the Philippines' latest policy in the South. Furthermore, the two countries' support for Indonesia as a member of the expanded committee meant that they did not regard Indonesia as an ally of the Philippines. The two countries were, in fact, hopeful that Indonesia could help in settling the Moro problem.

After the Istanbul conference, the Secretary General of the OIC despatched Ambassador Ibrahim Saleh Bakr (Assistant Secretary General for Political, Legal and Muslim Minority Affairs) to the Philippines to appraise the situation in Mindanao, especially to assess the ARMM within the context of the Tripoli Agreement.[34] During his visit, from 13 to 16 November 1991, Ambassador Bakr also met with President Aquino and Secretary Manglapus to confer on the Moro problem. From the visit, both the OIC and the GRP took note of their respective positions as follows.[35]

First, the OIC still considered the ARMM not in consonance with the Tripoli Agreement because it only included four provinces and did not cover all the southern Philippines. In contrast, the GRP was adamant that the establishment of the ARMM was in line with the constitutional process of the Philippines which the Tripoli Agreement had also agreed to consider. The GRP held a referendum on 17 November 1989, based on the Republic Act number 6734.

Secondly, the GRP was prepared to engage the MNLF in a new dialogue to properly address the Muslim Mindanao problem and had agreed to the suggestion of holding a peace dialogue under the OIC's framework. However, the GRP insisted that the venue for such a meeting should be on Philippines' soil because the GRP considered the issue as its own domestic problem. Although the OIC proposed Saudi Arabia as the meeting's venue, the OIC reiterated that it would

not support any separatist movement that would risk the integrity of the Philippines.

At one level, the understandings were only reiterating their basic disagreement on the implementation aspect of the Tripoli Agreement. At another level, the GRP was willing to engage the MNLF in a peace dialogue under the OIC,[36] although the issue of the venue for the meeting remained unresolved. However, they reached an important understanding in their recognition of the Philippines' territorial integrity. All these issues were the major components that functioned as bases for Indonesia to assume its role as a third party in the conflict. More importantly, Indonesia was willing to act as a third party only within the framework of the OIC and not on a bilateral basis.

As noted earlier, regime change in the Philippines in 1992 brought new impetus to the peace initiative. In September 1992, President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 19 for the creation of a National Unification Commission (NUC), an ad hoc advisory body, with the task to "formulate and recommend, after consulting with concerned sectors of society, to the President a viable general amnesty and peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the country."[37] The NUC was given the task of conducting consultations with representatives of armed rebel groups, but not to negotiate on behalf of the government.[38]

From 3-4 October 1992, Congressmen Eduardo Ermita, a member of the NUC, and Congressmen Nur Jaafar, representing the GRP, met with Mr. Misuari, representing the MNLF, in Tripoli, Libya. The meeting was intended to explore options and to forge better understanding between the two sides.[39] The meeting ended on a positive tone and, in particular, Mr. Misuari remarked, "peace was not only possible, but achievable."[40] Both parties also agreed to pursue formal talks, and Mr. Misuari proposed that the formal talks should focus on how to reach "an agreement on the modalities for the full implementation of the December 23, 1976 Tripoli Agreement according to its letter and spirit."[41] Misuari also proposed that the formal peace talks should be held "in a neutral venue acceptable to the parties concerned under the auspices of the OIC."[42] For their part, the GRP's representatives agreed to convey Misuari's proposals to their superiors.

On 23 October 1992, the NUC issued a statement praising the result of the first exploratory talks and suggesting that the second phase of the discussion be held in the Philippines. In recognition of the OIC, particularly the efforts of its two members, Libya and Saudi Arabia to facilitate the first meeting, the NUC "welcomed OIC representatives to observe the next phase of exploratory talks that shall hopefully ensue following Mr. Misuari's homecoming."[43] Although the tone of the statement was positive, the message it contained was not too tactful because Misuari would not consider meeting on Philippines soil as a neutral venue. By offering the OIC only observer status, the NUC seemed to be wanting to play down its role, whereas the OIC and Misuari always insisted on a meeting under the framework of the OIC. Furthermore, the NUC also set a condition for the meeting to take place, that is, after Misuari had returned to the Philippines. It was then evident that the issues of meeting venue and the role of the OIC were two hurdles that required careful management before a second exploratory meeting could take place.

Mr. Misuari's rejection of a second meeting in the Philippines put pressure on the GRP and the OIC to look for an alternative venue, and not to lose the momentum for peace. In December 1992 Indonesia was approached by all the parties to the conflict, and the concerned countries (Libya and Saudi Arabia) and the OIC to facilitate the Second Exploratory Meeting. During the special ministerial meeting of the OIC in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 2 December 1992, the Head of the Libyan delegation, Ali Treiki, informed Minister Alatas about the deadlock in the planned meeting between the MNLF and the GRP because none of the proposed meeting venues were acceptable to the two parties. He asked if Indonesia could hold the meeting and indicated that the two conflicting parties seemed to favour Indonesia to other possible venues.[44] Indonesia's response to the request was non-committal and the Minister mentioned that acceptance would be subject to a request from the conflicting parties themselves, particularly the GRP. A few days latter, Mr. Misuari contacted Indonesia and expressed his support to have Indonesia as a venue for his meeting with the GRP.

On 9 December 1992, the Philippines Secretary of Defence, General (Ret.) Renato de Villa and Congressmen Eduardo Ermita contacted the Indonesian Ambassador in Manila to convey President Ramos's message as follows:[45]

1) President Ramos requested Indonesia to host an informal meeting between representatives of his government and the MNLF;
2) The meeting was to follow up the Tripoli meeting of 3-5 October 1992 and the nature of the meeting would be exploratory; and
3) Both, the GRP and the MNLF agreed to request Indonesia host the planned meeting.

During his meeting with President Ramos in Malacanang Palace, Mr. Pieter Damanik, the former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila, was informed of the Philippines' intention to ask for Indonesia's help in facilitating the peace process with the MNLF. The President also indicated that he would ask two of his senior officials to discuss whether or not Indonesia could offer its good offices on the Moro problem.[46] Mr. Damanik also mentioned that when he raised the issue with Minister Alatas, the Minister queried the position of the MNLF, knowing that the MNLF would prefer Malaysia to Indonesia.[47] In the end, President Ramos's message assured the Minister of the determination of the conflicting parties to ask for Indonesia's assistance. Hence, Minister Alatas wrote President Soeharto a letter explaining the background of the request and also sought his approval for a possible role by Indonesia in facilitating the peace process.[48] On 15 December 1992 President Soeharto, through the Minister for State Secretary, Moerdiono, extended his approval and agreement to Minister Alatas' suggestion that a meeting be held in mid-January 1993.[49]

3.2. The informal meeting in Cipanas Palace, 14-17 April 1993

3.2.1. The preparations stage

President Soeharto's approval cleared the way for Indonesia to begin preparations for the informal talks. Indonesia planned the meeting to take place in mid-January 1993. To prepare for the meeting, the Ministry set up a team involving personnel from within and outside the Ministry. The tasks of the team were to prepare

administrative and protocol aspects of the planned meeting as well as the substantive aspects of the Moro problem. Preparation for administrative and protocol aspects involved bureaucrats from the Ministry, State Secretariat, Ministry for Information, Ministry for Telecommunication, and Intelligence Agencies. In terms of substantive aspects, the Ministry gave priority to personnel from the Ministry and set a guideline that participation of non-Ministry personnel on the substantive's team would be possible when the peace process had progressed.[50] This means that the Ministry had not only anticipated a long involvement in the peace process, not limited to facilitating one meeting as requested by the GRP, but also noted that the substantive aspects involved were beyond the capacity of the Ministry's personnel alone.

Those involved in the intra-Ministry team were from the Directorate for Asia and the Pacific, because the issue concerned a fellow Asian country; the Directorate for Africa and the Middle East, because the Moro problem had been dealt with by countries in these regions since 1972; and the Directorate for International Organisation, which monitored and engaged in annual discussion on the issue in the OIC. Thus, from the very beginning, the diplomat in charge of the mission, that is, the Director General for Political Affairs, Mr. Sastrohandoyo had to co-ordinate activities involving bureaucrats from within and outside the Ministry.

This task proved somewhat difficult since each of the directorates considered themselves more appropriate than others to handle the Moro issue. During an interview, Mr. Kusnadi, former Director for Asia and the Pacific, stated that he was under the impression that his directorate would be the main player on the matter and he, therefore, had set up his own team involving some officials who were knowledgeable about the Moro issue.[51] His officials were recruited into the Ministry team because of their knowledge on the issue, but in the later stages, Mr. Sastrohandoyo worked more closely with officials from the Directorate for International Organisation who, in his opinion, were more familiar with the OIC's intricacies and had extensive experience in multilateral negotiation.[52] Thus, the three directorates were actively engaged in the early stages of the substantive preparations, but as the peace process moved on, the roles played by personnel

from the Directorate for Asia and the Pacific and the Directorate for Africa and the Middle East gradually reduced.

The possible explanation for this was the personal preferences of Mr. Sastrohandoyo, the Indonesian team's Chief negotiator. As the peace process progressed, Mr. Sastrohandoyo would need more support from diplomats who were exposed to international negotiations and could help him in facilitating discussions at the committee level. In this case, diplomats from the Directorate for International Organisations had relatively more experience in chairing international negotiations in comparison with diplomats from other directorates.[53] Moreover, their exposure to international conferences provided them with more insights about meeting dynamics and interpersonal relationships than those officials who were experts in substantive matters.

However, the substantive aspects of the Moro problem were in fact the most delicate aspects that the team in the Ministry had to oversee. Upon receiving President Soeharto's approval, Minister Alatas asked Mr. Sastrohandoyo to look closely at the substantive aspects of the Moro problem based on the Tripoli Agreement.[54] After identifying the issues involved, the team then compared and contrasted the differing positions of the conflicting parties, and tabulated what had been done by the GRP on the issues based on the Agreement. They finally categorised issues according to the levels of difficulty, that is, what issues might be reconciled or which it might be difficult to find a compromise at.[55] It turned out that in assuming its responsibility as a third party in the negotiation, the Indonesian team and its chief negotiators followed this guideline very closely. At times, they had to improvise due to the complexity of the issues involved, and sometimes they found it difficult to keep the parties committed to agreements made in previous meetings.[56]

The informal meeting did not take place as scheduled in mid-January 1993. In early January, the GRP informed the Indonesians that they could not proceed with the planned meeting because the media had learned about it. They did not consider it fruitful to meet the MNLF under the media scrutiny. However, the delay did not stop Indonesia from continuing its efforts to organise a meeting:

they provided the GRP and the MNLF with some alternative dates. The MNLF used the delay to demonstrate to OIC members that the Philippines was not serious about the peace process.[57] Whether or not the MNLF claim had influenced the OIC, the organisation did ask Indonesia to postpone the new alternative date for the meeting. They argued that the alternative dates, 14-17 April 1993, were not suitable for some officials from the OIC to participate. They preferred that Indonesia arranged the meeting after the OIC ministerial meeting, scheduled from 24 to 29 April 1993 in Karachi. In the end, Indonesia convinced the OIC of the merits of proceeding with the meeting on the grounds that: (1) the conflicting parties had agreed with the date; [58] (2) the nature of the meeting was exploratory, and, therefore, it would not require participation of a large number officials from the OIC; and (3) as a chairman of the Committee of Six, Indonesia could act on behalf of the OIC.[59] Indonesia's argument was well founded noting that in the first exploratory meeting in Tripoli in 1992, no officials from the OIC were present.

3.2.2. The Cipanas informal meeting, 14-17 April 1993

The informal meeting between the GRP and the MNLF was held from 14 to 17 April 1993 in the Cipanas Presidential Palace. Although the meeting was a continuation of the exploratory talks held a year earlier in Tripoli, the informality of the meeting had a special meaning for Indonesia. According to former Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, it was very important for Indonesia: (1) to assess, whether or not the conflicting parties really wanted to negotiate, and (2) to measure their level of acceptance of Indonesia as the third party.[60] Indonesia, as previously suggested, had anticipated a possible long-term involvement in the peace process and it was, therefore, important to clear any remaining doubts. The informal format would give Indonesia a better opportunity to explore the two issues. Mr. Alatas also argued that informal diplomacy was not replacing formal diplomacy, but was necessary given the nature of the problem.[61] Thus, the informal diplomacy was a pragmatic approach on the part of the Indonesian diplomatic community.

Indonesia organised the informal meeting somewhat differently to the experience in Libya. First, the venue for the meeting was considered important. The Cipanas

Palace was conducive for such a meeting because it is serene, and also dignified.[62] During the Tripoli meeting, the venue had been the office of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Presumably, the Philippines delegation would not feel at ease meeting with the MNLF in the office of a country which favoured the Philippines' opponents. Secondly, to make the meeting more meaningful for the conflicting parties and also to testify the seriousness of Indonesia, Minister Alatas himself opened the meeting. In contrast, officials at the level of Under-secretary had opened the meeting in Tripoli, and officials at the director level witnessed the consultation itself, whereas in Indonesia, the Director General for Political Affairs was present during the meeting. This scenario was in line with the document entitled 'Planned of activities for the meeting between the GRP and the MNLF' which was prepared by the Ministry as a guideline in carrying out its task as facilitator.[63] By opening the meeting himself and assigning a high level official to assist the dialogue, Minister Alatas was, in effect, expecting the conflicting parties to engage in meaningful discussion.

In his welcoming remarks, Minister Alatas stated that Indonesia welcomed the request to facilitate the meeting because of its natural interest in being the closest neighbour, and also its moral responsibility based on the Country's Constitution.[64] The Minister also stated that Indonesia over the past few years had been involved in various peace efforts and the practice of preventive diplomacy.[65] He further stated that Indonesia had experienced similar problems of internal dissension and conflict. Based on these experiences, he then outlined the possible steps that the conflicting parties might want to consider during their discussion. He made it clear that Indonesia did not want to intrude into the substances of the talks.[66] His message was as follows:[67]

> ... based on our experience in dealing with certain regional and international issues it would be useful for both sides to consider, at a first step, agreeing on certain measures that will create the necessary and conducive atmosphere of mutual confidence that could help ensure the success of further substantive talks. For instance you may wish to consider agreeing on a cessation of armed hostilities and other appropriate measures.

The aims of the four day meeting were twofold, first to discuss the contentious issues, and secondly to improve relations among the parties to the conflict.[68] After Minister Alatas had delivered his remarks and speeches were heard from Mr.

Ibrahim Bakr, on behalf of the Secretary General of the OIC, the Congressmen Eduardo Ermita representing the Philippines Government, and Mr. Misuari of the MNLF, the meeting was then adjourned for a welcoming dinner hosted by Minister Alatas. The dinner was very informal and was designed to give an opportunity for the hosts to meet with representatives of the conflicting parties and the OIC. The dinner also functioned as an 'ice-breaker' for the parties to the conflict. Indonesia was hoping that the peace efforts would benefit from an improved relationship.

Despite the fact that the social dinner had been pre-arranged, the program itself became more essential because of some statements made by participants on the first day were far from conciliatory. For instance, Mr. Ibrahim Bakr who read the speech of Dr. Hamid Algabid (the OIC Secretary General), on the one hand reiterated that "the problem of the Muslim of Southern Philippines could best be resolved by sincere and constructive negotiations between the parties within the framework of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Philippines."[69] On the other hand, he also stated that the OIC maintained its position on the importance of "full realization of the objective, purpose and commitment embodied in the Tripoli Agreement of 23 December 1976."[70] He had also indicated that "the [Moro] problem has been a source of anxiety and concern to the OIC Member States."[71] Thus, he was suggesting to the Philippines that although the OIC supported the integrity of the Philippines, it wished to have the problem resolved based on the Tripoli Agreement, so that the issue would no longer be of concern to the OIC's members. Mr. Misuari made a harsh statement and condemned the various administrations in the Philippines as dishonest and not willing to implement the Agreement in letter and spirit. For his part, Congressmen Ermita made a plain statement. He explained about President Ramos's policy of national reconciliation based on the principle of peaceful resolution of armed conflict. He also explained that his mandate during the informal talks was to explore possible frameworks for peace with the MNLF and not to negotiate on positions.[72]

The informal and exploratory nature of the meeting meant that there was no concrete agenda. The main objective was to let the parties themselves discuss

topics and move at a pace which they felt comfortable with.[73] However, all the participants in the undertaking were well aware that the most contentious issue was the disagreement about the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. Mr. Misuari raised this issue during his opening remarks on the first day and again reiterated the matter when he met with representatives of the GRP on the second day. Mr. Misuari maintained that the GRP did not respect the Tripoli Agreement and that the referendum was a unilateral action which was boycotted by the resistance movement. However, the tone of Mr. Misuari's statement in the second day was not as harsh as on the first day. He also made a positive gesture when he said, "I would like to assure you that if the Philippines Government in the same spirit that they came here with the honest and sincere attention, the MNLF is ready to reciprocate their intention."[74]

In the second day of the talks, Congressmen Ermita explained the Philippines Government position on the matter of the referendum was based on the constitution of his country.[75] Thus, on the issue of implementation of the Tripoli Agreement the two parties were maintaining their basic positions. However, parties to the conflict did agree to move into formal negotiation to discuss the Agreement, especially aspects of its implementation. They agreed to discuss during the formal meeting aspects of the Tripoli Agreement as follows:[76]

1) Those portions of the Agreement left for further (or later) discussion; and
2) Transitional arrangements implementing a structure and mechanism, that is, of the provisional government to supervise the autonomous region.

The meeting also agreed on three conditions for further meetings. The first condition was that a formal meeting should be held with the participation of the Secretary General of the OIC and the OIC Ministerial Committee of Six. The second condition was that the meeting should be supported by a Joint Secretariat to be appointed by both parties. And the third condition was that both parties should approve all press releases in relation to the peace talks.[77] No agreement was reached on the venue for the formal meeting between the two parties. The Philippines wanted to have such a meeting in its territory, due to the 'domestic nature' of the issue, whereas the MNLF insisted on having such meeting in an

OIC member country. On this issue of venue, it turned out that Indonesia was favoured over other alternative venues.

3.2.3. Reactions and assessments of the Cipanas informal meeting

Despite its previous opposition to media releases of its meeting with the MNLF, the GRP on 14 April 1993, released a statement about the activities taking place in Indonesia. The reason for such action was unclear because secrecy was one of the conditions that the GRP had always emphasised during their consultation with Indonesia as meeting facilitator. Arguably, the media release was prompted by the GRP's awareness that some of the local media were already aware of the meeting. Therefore, the release can be explained for the following reasons.

First, the GRP wanted to clarify media speculation that they were engaged in formal negotiation with the MNLF in Jakarta. On 14 April 1993, the Philippines Daily Inquirer wrote an article, based on information from 'unidentified sources', that the government was holding a meeting with the MNLF in Jakarta. The Daily also mentioned that its 'sources' could not verify whether the meeting was informal talks or formal negotiation.[78] Secondly, the GRP wished to pre-empt possible public and opposition outcry that the government were meeting with a separatist group outside the Philippines. Hence, rather than responding to criticism at a later stage, it would be better for the government to justify their action at an earlier stage. Indeed, in the release, President Ramos mentioned that he concurred with the idea of holding exploratory talks in Indonesia based on "the concept of a shifting venue, which stipulates that the first stage [of the meeting] shall be held in a neighbouring venue outside the country."[79] The shifting venue concept was a means for justifying the government's decision to meet with the MNLF overseas. In fact, in Cipanas, the MNLF had expressed reservations to the Philippines' proposal for holding any subsequent meetings in the Philippines.

Thirdly, the GRP wished to make the public aware that the peace dialogue with the MNLF was back on track. Knowing that the Ramos Administration placed national reconciliation as one of its priorities, an indication of progress in peace talks with the MNLF could help promote President Ramos's image and public

confidence. President Ramos made it clear that the economic development program could only take place if national security had been established.[80] Lastly, by showing its determination for the talks, the GRP also wanted to impress the rogue elements in the Moro groups that their threat to create disturbances in Mindanao, in April, had failed to derail the peace dialogue.[81]

This release made the Indonesian journalists aware of the meeting and they began searching for news from officials at the Ministry. Learning from their experiences in dealing with the media during the hosting of the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM), [82] Indonesia waited until the conflicting parties had finished their talks before arranging media interviews in the Foreign Ministry building. During the press conference, Mr. Misuari expressed his optimism and stated that peace was within reach. Congressmen Ermita also shared this optimism. For his part, Minister Alatas reiterated that Indonesia was hosting the meeting at the request of the parties to the conflict and that the meeting was being held under the OIC's framework.[83] Again, the Minister clearly wanted to emphasise that Indonesia was not interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbour, and that the involvement stemmed from the parties' acceptability of Indonesia acting as a third party in the peace process.

In reporting the outcomes of the informal meeting to President Soeharto, Minister Alatas mentioned that the conflicting parties, especially the MNLF, were still reluctant to accept his suggestion of observing a ceasefire as a confidence building measure.[84] He admitted that the positions of the two parties were difficult to reconcile and, therefore, Indonesia offered the parties its long-term commitment to facilitate the peace process. However, he considered the informal meeting a success because the parties to the conflict had agreed to launch formal peace negotiations. The projected meetings would be held on or before 30 June 1993, and the agenda for discussion would focus on modalities to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement. With such outcomes, the meeting had ended on a positive note. He concluded his letter by saying that the achievements had a positive impact on Indonesia's profile among the OIC members, on its bilateral relations with the Philippines and with the Muslim community in the Philippines.[85]

President Ramos' response to the outcomes of the Cipanas meeting was positive. He agreed that the talks in Indonesia had bolstered chances for peace and he was prepared to meet with the MNLF's leader in the Philippines to discuss a peaceful settlement of the conflict.[86] Congressmen Ermita wrote Minister Alatas a letter, thanking him on behalf of the President Ramos for Indonesia's assistance. The Congressmen also extended his thanks to President Soeharto for offering the Cipanas Palace as a venue for the meeting and said that he believed the positive outcomes of the talks were influenced by two aspects, that is, a conducive venue for dialogues and the assistance provided by the Indonesian staff.[87] In his letter, Congressmen Ermita also expressed his hope that Indonesia would continue its goodwill towards his government and the people of the Philippines.[88] The Philippines Ambassador to Jakarta, Ambassador Oscar Velenzuela, also shared a similar view on the positive impact of the meeting's venue to the talks. He stated "the venue of the talks certainly contributed to the positive and constructive outcome of the talks."[89]

Giving credit to a venue per se for the positive outcomes of the talks is not enough. A venue also implies the notion of a neutral meeting place wherein conflicting parties can meet their opponents on an equal footing. In conflict resolution, a venue is also an important component of the peace process.[90] The third party is expected to provide a conducive meeting venue that can stimulate an open and frank dialogue among the participants.[91] The arrangements also played an important role during the talks as all the participants stayed in the Palace and were encouraged to interact during the social functions, such as during the dinner hosted by Minister Alatas.[92] The social functions were a means of smoothing interaction among the parties to the conflict, whose history of interaction was marked by suspicion and mutual hatred.[93]

The informal format also had given the participants the opportunity to come to the meeting only to explore options.[94] The notion of exploring options, in this case, was very much open for interpretation. As previously stated, the Philippines wanted "to explore the viable framework for peace with the MNLF and the agenda for projected formal negotiations."[95] In contrast, the MNLF did not indicate which aspects they intended to explore. The speech by Misuari and the

subsequent statements he gave mainly elaborated his historical perspective of the conflict and his distrust of the GRP during the previous negotiations. In the context of conflict resolution enabling the parties to the conflict to express grievances and animosities is an important phase of the process. As a third party, Indonesia did not prevent Misuari from making such a statement because Indonesia regarded openness as an important ingredient for good negotiation.[96] However, as a seasoned politician and a Professor of Political Science himself, Mr. Misuari would have wanted to test how the representatives from the GRP would react to his statements and accusations. If the reaction from the Philippines representatives was also negative, he would have reason to show to the OIC representative that the Philippines was not ready for an open and honest dialogue. Apparently, the panel delegation from the Philippines was not provoked as they did not make a strong statement during the talks.

In Cipanas, the MNLF would have also wanted to assess the seriousness of the GRP for the peace dialogue. Indeed, the Philippines determination was reflected in their willingness to come to Indonesia after the MNLF had rejected the GRP's proposal to hold the talks in the Philippines. Their agreement to elevate the dialogue process into a more formal negotiation was indeed a breakthrough from the informal talks. Even Indonesia as the host had not been optimistic of achieving this. In fact, Foreign Minster Alatas had anticipated another series of informal talks before the conflicting parties could move into a formal negotiation.[97]

3.3. The formal peace talks (1993-1996): informal diplomacy at work

The series of formal meetings after Cipanas did not render the informal format obsolete. Between 1993 and 1996 the peace process took the form of formal negotiations at the level of leaders, consultations at the level of senior officials and, at some points, seminars to disseminate information to the public. According to Dr. Wirajuda, after Cipanas, formal and informal diplomacy were inseparable, as both were used in tandem.[98] In this case, Dr. Wirajuda was referring to informal diplomacy as a negotiation technique to reach an agreement on issues unresolved in a formal negotiation setting. Thus, the informal diplomacy did not substitute formal diplomacy.

As a concept, informal diplomacy during the formal talks was understood in a number of ways. Informal diplomacy was interpreted as diplomatic activities behind the scenes, to achieve certain objectives and it relied on good networking. Further, informal diplomacy was understood as a diplomatic technique to resolve conflict and also as a process to improve relationships. Informal diplomacy was also simply a negotiation technique.

Between 1993 and 1996, the Ministry was preoccupied with the peace process. During these years, the aspect of continuity of involvement and familiarity with the issues involved were the two most significant aspects of Indonesian diplomacy in helping to settle the separatist conflict. To maintain continuity in the Indonesian team, Minster Alatas kept the Ministry team intact, in particular the Chief facilitators, Mr. Sastrohandoyo[99] and Dr. Wirajuda. The Directorate responsible for the substantive and administrative aspects of the peace process was the Directorate for International Organisations under Dr. Wirajuda. Although the composition of the supporting units in this Directorate changed over the period, there was always continuity because new personnel were well briefed on the Moro problem. These individuals followed the development of the peace process closely and acted as a focal point between the Ministry and the national team as well as with the Indonesia Embassies in Manila and Jeddah. Individuals could approach experts from other Ministries to join the national team based on their expertise on some of the issues involved in the Moro problem. Assigning some individuals to monitor the issue on a day-to-day basis was an important aspect of the overall peace process because of the complex nature of the problem itself and also the three years time span of the peace talks.

In terms of familiarity with the issue, both the members of the Ministry team and those who served in the Indonesian Embassy in Manila were well acquainted with the Moro problem. For instance, the two Indonesian Ambassadors to Manila who dealt with the issue during their tenures had followed the Moro problem quite closely. Ambassador Pieter Damanik when serving in the Indonesian Intelligence Bureau, prior to his assignment to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry as Director General for Social and Cultural Affairs and then as Ambassador to Manila, was assigned to monitor the Moro problem.[100] Ambassador Abu Hartono who

succeeded Ambassador Damanik was the Deputy Chairmen of the First Commission in the Parliament overseeing Foreign Relations.[101] Ambassador Hartono served in the Commission as a representative of the Indonesian military faction. Needless to say, their previous knowledge coupled with their networking with the Philippine military officials during active duty in the Indonesian military had given them direct access to the Chief Executive and high ranking officials in the GRP. Similarly, all the Heads of Political Sections in the Embassy had also once served in the Asia and the Pacific Directorate of the Ministry.

3.3.1. The first formal peace talks in Jakarta, 25 October to 7 November 1993: setting the direction

The first formal peace talks did not take place on the schedule agreed to in Cipanas, that is, in June 1993. Again, the delay was caused by the MNLF's refusal to come to the Philippines for the formal talks and the stakeholders (the OIC, the MNLF and the GRP) had to confer again on the most acceptable venue for the meeting. The ensuing discussions illustrated the sensitivity of the meeting's venue for the conflicting parties. On 18 April 1993, Congressmen Ermita stated that the GRP agreed to the involvement of the OIC in the formal peace dialogue with the MNLF because the OIC had taken part in the Tripoli negotiation in 1976. He also stated that the OIC's involvement did not mean an internationalisation of the Moro problem. To affirm the position of the GRP that the issue was domestic, Congressmen Ermita emphasised the government's position to have the first formal meeting in its territory.[102] President Ramos affirmed this position during his speech in Maguindanao Province in 19 April 1993.[103] In response to media speculation that the venue for the first formal talks would be in Indonesia, Mr. Jesus Sison, the Secretary of Information of the GRP, on 20 May 1993, reiterated that first formal talks must be held in the Philippines. The following day Haydee Yorac, the Chairperson of NUC stated that President Ramos had agreed to let Mr. Misuari select any city in Mindanao Province for the venue.[104]

Arguably, by then the GRP had learned about Mr. Misuari's reluctance to come to the Philippines and preferred Indonesia instead as the venue of the first formal talks. Mr. Misuari was concerned about his safety if he came to the Philippines for

the meting, even in the MNLF stronghold in Mindanao.[105] On 25 May 1993, Rep. Macabangkit Lant,[106] Chairman of the Muslim Affairs in the Philippines' Parliament softened the Philippines position and proposed two options for the meeting's venue. The meeting could be held at any Philippines' Embassy in one of the ASEAN countries or, an opening ceremony could be held in the Philippines and the formal talks take place at another venue agreed to by the two parties.[107] The GRP asked Indonesia to support the latter proposal, but by mid-June the OIC had requested Indonesia to facilitate the formal talks in Indonesia.[108] By mid-June, the OIC and the GRP had agreed to postpone the talks. The OIC argued that in June 1993, the OIC would be busy preparing for the OIC Summit in Cairo. The later date of 25 October 1993 was decided after consultation with Indonesia as the host and the meeting facilitator, which meant chairing the meeting.

The preparatory meeting of the Indonesian team was concerned with substantive issues and logistics. On the substantive parts, the Ministry team discussed possible scenarios for the meeting's proceedings and their focus of interest was on how to direct the discussion based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976.[109] Knowing that the Jakarta meeting was the first large-scale formal talks between the two parties since 1976, Indonesia was concerned with creating a momentum for dialogue. They anticipated a tense atmosphere during the meeting because both parties had a history of hostility and had stereotypical opinions of each other. The Indonesians also had no knowledge of the MNLF familiarity with negotiation settings. It can be argued that the ten days allocated for the meeting was intentional, to let the parties discuss the issues exhaustively.

Minister Alatas officially opened the meeting on 25 October 1993. In his opening remarks the Minister expressed his hope that the meeting could create a momentum for peace. He also set the direction for the discussion when he pointed to the agreement reached in Cipanas in April 1993, in which the parties agreed to base their discussion on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. He also appealed to the parties to cease their armed conflicts to indicate good faith in the peace dialogue.[110] In somewhat similar tone, the OIC Secretary General, Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid, also asked the parties to the conflict to concentrate on the formulation of modalities to implement the Tripoli Agreement.[111] Mr. Misuari also shared Mr.

Al-Gabid's proposal, whereas Ambassador Manuel Yan of the Philippines emphasised the importance of observing the territorial integrity of the Philippines based on the principle of a single constitution.[112]

The first session of the talks was held on 26 October and successive discussions were held until 7 November. Mr. Sastrohandoyo chaired all the meetings. During the first session, the parties to the conflict debated the agenda for the discussion, although both parties agreed to refer to the Cipanas Agreement which stipulated the focus of their discussion. The participants wished to proceed with the talks from differing standpoints. The MNLF preferred to use the meeting opportunity for the establishment of a Mixed Committee, an organ recognised in Tripoli 1976, "to study in detail the points left for discussion [after the Tripoli Agreement being adopted]."[113] By stating that position, Mr. Misuari maintained that the Tripoli Agreement was final and the two parties were obliged to implement the agreement as it is, such as by granting the Moro people autonomy over 13 provinces with no requirement to follow the referendum process. The Philippines was adamant that their mandate was only to hold talks on how to implement the Agreement under the Philippines Constitution.[114] To break the stalemate, Mr. Sastrohandoyo suggested the establishment of a Joint Secretariat to detail and categorise the meeting's agenda.[115]

Dr. Wirajuda chaired the meeting of the Joint Secretariat. During the discussion, the Joint Secretariat agreed to propose eight agenda items based on the Tripoli Agreement for discussion at the meeting. The chosen eight items were the least difficult items to deal with and most importantly they were "strictly derived from the Tripoli Agreement."[116] The eight items were:[117]

1. National Defense (para 3, sub-para 2 in Tripoli Agreement)
2. Education (para 3, sub-para 4)
3. Administrative system (para 3, sub-para 5)
4. Economic and financial system (para 3, sub-para 6)
5. Regional security force (paragraph 3, sub-para 8)
6. Representation in National Government
7. Legislative Assembly and Executive Council (paragraph 3, sub-para 9)
8. Mines and minerals (paragraph 3, sub-para 10)

During the plenary meeting's discussion, the participants also agreed that item seven should be separated, and that one more item should be added, namely Sharia Law. Having agreed with the items, the meeting also agreed to cluster the topics and created five support committees, involving experts on the individual topics, to examine the issues in depth.[118] The other major achievements of the talks were their agreement to observe a ceasefire, to establish an 'Ad-hoc Working Group on the Setting Up of the Transitional Implementing Structure and Mechanism', and to reactivate the Mixed Committee in accordance with Article III, paragraph 11 of the Tripoli Agreement.[119] As previously indicated, the establishment of the Mixed Committee was the most delicate subject during the meeting, and even the Philippines Delegation had to contact Manila to ask for approval from President Marcos. In reality the Mixed Committee of 1993 was not similar to the Mixed Committee of Tripoli 1976 because the tasks for studying in detail all aspects agreed in Tripoli was shifted to the support committee. The Mixed Committee's function was to approve or disapprove the consensus reached at the support committee's level. The Formal Talks was the highest negotiating level to make a final agreement on what had been approved during the Mixed Committee meetings and to discuss the remaining unresolved issues. The agreements set the direction for the subsequent peace talks.

The three layers of negotiation adopted by Indonesia were both strategic and practical.[120] Clearly, the intention was to let the experts or officials from the two parties discuss the issues under the cluster exhaustively among themselves, and Indonesia chaired the discussion on behalf of the OIC. The technicality of some issues indeed required in-depth study, and they needed to consult experts from other countries on some of the issues, for example on how to set up an Islamic banking system. The essence of this approach was to give the parties to the conflict more opportunities to meet one another and, hopefully, they could better understand each other and improve their relationship. This approach also guaranteed more results, albeit slowly. As had been anticipated, in the consultation processes they were able to reach consensus faster on less contentious' issues. Psychologically, by having some consensus, the two parties could see progress from their efforts and would feel that they were on the right track.[121] Consequently, the momentum for peace was maintained. In theory, the

Mixed Committee was to seal the agreements that had been reached by the support committees and to negotiate on points of no-consensus. If the Mixed Committee still had difficulty in reaching a consensus, the issues would be left for the leaders at the Formal Talks.

The informal diplomacy, in the case of the first peace talks, was concerned more with form than with substance. In between meeting sessions and during social events, the Indonesians encouraged the participants to mingle and interact. During the coffee break or afternoon tea, Minister Alatas joined the social functions. As part of the scenario, the Indonesian Secretariat arranged that the Minister would sit with the head of the delegations to socialise and to clinch agreements, usually on issues unresolved during the plenary meetings. The Indonesian team had always updated the Minister on developments from session to session, and they also provided their assessment on issues requiring the Minister's attention. Minister Alatas would touch on those issues during his informal talks with the leaders, and he put his persuasion and negotiation skills to work. The efforts were not always accompanied with success, but it helped the parties in their process of improving relationships. In particular, it helped Minister Alatas know better the personality of Mr. Misuari, the key player from the MNLF and the Moro people.

Participants to the first formal talks returned home with a sense of satisfaction that each of them had achieved the most from the meeting. Mr. Misuari suggested that the decision to reinstate a Mixed Committee was the single most important achievement of the talks.[122] The GRP peace panel was satisfied that the MNLF had agreed to use the Organic Act, which created the four provinces Autonomous Region in Mindanao as the framework of reference during the talks.[123] The conflicting parties wished to convince their constituents that they had reached their objectives, or at least had achieved common understanding on the positions of their opponents. For its part, the OIC expressed its satisfaction that, in the aftermath of the formal talks, a "climate of mutual confidence is now prevailing between the Philippines Government and the Moro National Liberation Front."[124]

3.3.2. Peace talks in 1994: flurries of diplomatic activities

Although they returned home with positive impressions, there were still a number of issues undecided during the first formal talks, and the Indonesian Embassy in Manila was left with responsibility for providing clarification. For instance, the MNLF maintained that representatives of the Committee of Six of the OIC should be present in any meeting involving the two parties, including the support committee meetings. The GRP hesitated, at first, to have the OIC's participation in all meetings in the Philippines. The MNLF was under the impression that the function of the support committee was only to exchange views, whereas the GRP wanted to use the forum for negotiating a position. In this case, the Indonesian diplomats in Manila had to act as a 'messenger' to convey positions and, at times, to provide opinion on behalf of the OIC.

The first informal meeting after Jakarta was held after the MNLF's delegation had visited the Indonesian Embassy, on 15 November 1993, and requested the presence of OIC representatives during their meetings with the GRP. Although he had not yet received any direction or mandate from Jakarta on the matter, Ambassador Damanik relayed the message to the GRP, stressing the MNLF's preferences. After securing the Philippines' agreement, the meeting could proceed and was witnessed by the Indonesian and the Libyan Ambassadors.[125] The first informal meeting, on 17 November, and the subsequent one, on 23 November were held mainly to provide common ground on how to implement the agreement reached in Jakarta and also to discuss administrative aspects of their meetings.[126]

After their first informal meeting in Manila, the conflicting parties issued a joint press statement in which the two parties highlighted the shifting venue concept introduced by President Ramos after the informal exploratory talks in Cipanas. They emphasised that the peace talks "have now shifted to the Philippines in the form of various committee meetings supportive of the plenary sessions that are expected to resume in Indonesia in February next year."[127] This time, there was no hesitation, in particular on the part of the Philippines, to mentioning that Indonesia would be the venue for the formal peace talks in 1994. In the press release, they also denounced "all form of terrorism, banditry and lawless acts that would go

against the spirit of the Interim Ceasefire Agreement."[128] During their meeting with Indonesian Ambassador on the 15 November 1993, the MNLF complained that the GRP had intensified military operations before any meeting of the Joint Ceasefire Committee to discuss detailed guidelines and ground rules for a ceasefire. In contrast, the Philippines authorities had declared that the agreed ceasefire in Jakarta was only between the GRP and the MNLF, and not included other resistance movements and their military bands, such as the MILF and the lost command (the Abu Sayyaf).[129] Arguably, the MNLF had reason to be concerned because the Philippines army would have difficulty distinguishing the MNLF from other resistance military groups and, therefore, an indiscriminate military campaign would pose difficulties to the confidence building effort. Nevertheless, the release suggested that they had agreed to condemn terrorism and other unlawful acts, and by doing so, the MNLF had given their tacit agreement for limited military operations by the GRP to fight terrorism.[130]

Following the first informal meeting in Manila, the Indonesian Embassy hosted several consultative meetings at the level of support committees and also sent Indonesian diplomats to attend some of the support committee meetings held in various cities in the Philippines. Learning that some of the technical issues discussed during the support committee meetings were beyond their expertise, the Indonesian Ambassador asked Jakarta to intensify inter-departmental meetings and, if possible, to send experts on technical issues from Jakarta to attend the support committee meetings.[131] At the same time, the Indonesian Embassy was designated as a focal point for receiving position papers from the two parties. Thus, they would have the opportunity to study the papers earlier before they conveyed them to the respective party.

With the system of communication and contact in place, Indonesia was able to maximise its role as a third party. The Indonesian team in Jakarta studied the papers (inter-departmentally) and provided their assessment to the Indonesian Embassy in Manila. At times, a delegation from Indonesia, including some experts on technical issues went to the Philippines to join the support committee meetings. The involvement of Indonesian experts was one of the important dimensions of the overall peace process. According to Mr. Kusnadi,[132] the

Indonesian experts could provide the MNLF with a 'second opinion' on some of the papers prepared by the GRP. He explained that some of the Philippines' papers were far advanced and thus required extra attention, and the MNLF was lacking experts to respond to the ideas, concepts and proposals.[133] Ambassador Damanik also mentioned that, at times, he also had to give his counsel and opinion to the MNLF delegation.[134] Nevertheless, it took a while before Ambassador Damanik could gain trust from the MNLF because he was a Christian and, therefore, was suspected of favouring the GRP.[135] Interestingly, his personal background as a military officer from Sumatra (known for openness and being outspoken) turned out to be a major asset in chairing and participating in some of the meetings. He gave little concern about protocol matters and, therefore, could direct the discussions more easily on the substantive matters.[136]

At the Mixed Committee level, Indonesians chaired most of the meetings. In these meetings the informal approach was sometimes adopted, mainly for the following two reasons. First, to break the stalemate during the plenary meetings since the plenary setting put extra pressure on some of the participants. They had to appear firm and not give in easily to their opponents, especially when their colleagues were present. The strategy to deal with the kind of situation was by adjourning the meeting, and the Chair consulting with the leader of the two parties separately, or arranging a small informal gathering involving leaders, with limited participants. Another strategy was by assembling a caucus group, an ad hoc informal gathering, to look at the matter closely and to report to the plenary the outcomes of their consultations. Those who were involved in the caucus group usually had a similar interest on the issues and their discussions were, consequently, more focused. More often, those who were involved in the caucus group were the members of the support committee, and thus they had known each other from their previous meetings.

The second reason was to let the conflicting parties, especially the MNLF, reach out to its constituents. After long years in exile, Mr. Misuari had to regain support and sympathy from the Moro people and it was therefore understandable that, at times, he intentionally used the meeting forum to address his 'gallery'.[137] In several instances, in the middle of a meeting's proceeding Mr. Misuari would

speak, rhetorically, about other issues beyond the topic. The Chair had to adjourn the discussion to let Mr. Misuari address his people at length. The Chair also had to reach an understanding with the Philippines' panel group that letting Mr. Misuari speaking informally between formal negotiations was an important component of the peace process.[138] Sometimes, Mr. Misuari also used the speaking opportunity to inform the public on some of the issues being discussed. Hence, such activities had, in effect, familiarised the general public with the issues and built a sense of being a part of the peace process.

The Second Formal Talks scheduled for April 1994, in Indonesia, were postponed twice. The first postponement stemmed from the disagreement between the GRP and the MNLF on the security matters during the Mixed Committee meeting in the Philippines. Worrying for his safety, Mr. Misuari had demanded to be able to bring a few hundred security staff to accompany him to the Third Mixed Committee meeting in Mindanao. The GRP rejected this request because they could only accommodate, at the most, 15 personal security staff.[139] Mr. Misuari then requested Indonesia to host the Mixed Committee meeting or to provide a navy ship anchored in the Philippines as a neutral and secure venue for the meeting. Indonesia was clearly reluctant to accommodate the latter request. It would embarrass the GRP but also could trigger public outcry in the Philippines if they learnt that Indonesia was sending a military ship, even for a peaceful reason.[140] To break the impasse, the Ministry asked the Indonesian Ambassador in Riyadh to approach the Secretary General of the OIC, and also asked the Indonesian Ambassador in Manila to consult the Libyan Ambassador in Manila. Their mission was to soften Mr. Misuari's position.[141] Nevertheless, Indonesia did not pursue other diplomatic initiatives to deal with the stalemate, when Indonesia learned that the Secretary General of the OIC had decided to reschedule the planned OIC Ministerial meeting from late April to after May 1994. Hence, the earlier time pressure to hold the Second Formal Talks, including the Third Mixed Committee meeting, before the end of April was no longer a problem. The other factor affecting Indonesia's peace efforts with regard to Moro problem was a conference on East Timor in Manila.

Although Indonesia did not openly admit it, this second postponement of the talks was related to the holding of an international conference on East Timor (Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor) in Manila, from 31 May to 4 June 1994. Notwithstanding the fact that the GRP had risked its reputation as a democratic government by prohibiting several international participants, including Mr. Ramos Horta, the East Timor spokesperson, from entering Manila, it could be inferred that Indonesia was still upset that the GRP was unwilling to suspend the conference.[142] The Ramos Administration's decision to bar the international participants received strong criticism from Filipinos. They accused Indonesia of bullying its neighbour and interfering in the Philippines' domestic affairs, considering that the event organiser was a local Non Governmental Organisation.[143] Clearly, Indonesia had expected that the GRP would be more appreciative towards Indonesia's concern over the separatist problem in East Timor, especially since Indonesia was helping the Philippines deal with a similar problem of its own. Indonesia renewed its commitment to facilitating the peace process by mid-June 1994 and, in particular, asked the Indonesian Embassy in Manila to reactivate meetings at support committee and working group levels.[144]

Simultaneously, the national committee in Jakarta also renewed their internal preparations. As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian diplomats had a limited capacity to handle all the technical aspects of the Moro problem and, therefore, had established an inter-departmental team to deal with some of the technical issues. The agencies involved were the Department of Religious Affairs, the Department of Mines and Energy, and the Indonesian Military Headquarters. Each agency was assigned to study and provide counsel on the technical aspects for the establishment of an autonomous region in the southernpart of the Philippines.[145] After the First Formal Talks, the inter-departmental team conducted regular meetings and was being supervised by Dr. Wirajuda. The Ministry also maintained close contact with the Cabinet Secretariat.[146] All reports to the President concerning the facilitation process and any issues that arose were channelled through the Cabinet Secretariat for the President's immediate attention.

The Second Formal Talks were held from 1 to 5 September 1994, following the Third Mixed Committee meeting held on 31 August. Both meetings were held in Jakarta. The proceedings of the negotiations indicate that the Indonesians maintained a neutral posture when chairing all the meetings. The conference on East Timor did not see Indonesia backtracking from its position as a neutral third party. Indonesia did not appease the MNLF or disfavour the Philippines Government, and instead balanced the position of the OIC's representative which, at times, certainly tended to side with the MNLF.[147] For instance, when discussing the agenda item of 'Implementing Structure and Mechanism,' the MNLF insisted that the provisional government be established immediately, as constituted in the Tripoli Agreement, irrespective of subsequent constitutional processes in the Philippines. In contrast, the Philippines' panel argued that the establishment of the provisional government had to be facilitated by constitutional processes and the step that the GRP had taken was in conformity with the Tripoli Agreement. Ambassador Mohsin, representative of the OIC Secretary General, reiterated the position of the MNLF when he stated that the head of the government had full power to sign international agreements, while the Congress had ratification power. As a consequence, the incumbent had to honour all international agreements signed by former governments or heads of government. Thus, he considered it imperative for the Ramos Administration to fulfil the Tripoli Agreement, that is, to establish a provisional government. To break the deadlock Mr. Sastrohandoyo, who chaired the meeting, suggested that instead of alluding to history and making rhetorical statements, the meeting should consider the modalities in establishing the provisional government. The meeting finally agreed to establish a working group (Working Group on Implementing Structure and Mechanism) to discuss the matter further.[148]

As a negotiating technique, the establishment of a working group (sometimes on an ad hoc basis) was necessary especially when there was a deadlock in negotiation. Nevertheless, the technique had disadvantages as well as advantages. On the positive side, the working group could focus their discussion and energy on the substantive issue, and they could explore options more freely in the absence of their superiors. The Chair could share 'alternative views' because the forum was designed to brainstorm on the issues and was, therefore, more open to inputs.[149] Another advantage of a working group meeting was that some of the

representatives had known their counterparts from their previous engagements, such as during Mixed Committee meeting, and they had established some working relationship. Hence, the Chair could benefit from the working environment in which emotional involvement was less prominent. The disadvantages of the approach were that the official at the working level sometimes could not decide on behalf of his delegation. At times, the open-ended system of the working group had posed difficulty to the meeting proceedings. The new participants who joined the working group between discussions and had not been able to follow the previous discussions could derail the discussion, for instance by making a statement counterproductive to the meeting objective.

The roles of the Chair in the working group were also complicated by the presence of OIC's representative. According to Mr. Kusnadi, the representative from Bangladesh (a member of Committee Six of the OIC) had, on one occasion, compared the Moro's struggle for independence with his country's separation from Pakistan in 1971.[150] The comparison was counterproductive to the meeting because the aim of the peace process was autonomy in Mindanao and not separation from the Philippines. Nevertheless, the format of the working group, which was most of the time informal, less structured, and problem solving orientated, had promised more outcomes rather than a plenary meeting set up. All the consensus and points of no consensus were reported by the Chair of the working group to the plenary meeting for adoption on the consensus and further discussion on the points of no consensus. If the plenary were still unable to reach agreement, they would request the working group and the Mixed Committee to follow up the matters. This flow of discussions and negotiations, albeit slow, helped the parties to the conflict to reach consensus issue by issue. Moreover, while the participants of the working group were discussing the issues, Mr. Sastrohandoyo would approach Mr. Misuari and Ambassador Manuel Yan, the Head of Philippines panel, either separately or collectively to look for possible consensus at their level.

Arguably, the behind-the-scenes meetings involving the leaders of the parties to the conflict was designed to improve their personal relationships. Personal rapport between the two leaders was the key to a successful negotiation.[151] According to

Mr. Sastrohandoyo, Indonesia's role was "to provide a venue, create an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and compromise so that what were left unfinished in Tripoli Agreement could be completed."[152] The informal get together on the side of the formal talks was part of the overall efforts to improve the relationship and the exercises certainly helped in the creation of a constructive atmosphere.

Mr. Sastrohandoyo chaired all the sessions during the formal talks and directed the participants to concentrate on the recommendations submitted by the Mixed Committee meetings. By the end of the talks, the two panels signed an interim agreement which highlighted the 42 points of agreement between the two parties to the conflict and expounded on the implementation of the ceasefire, along with the deployment of an OIC contingent to observe the ceasefire. It turned out that the OIC again relied on Indonesia for the deployment of the OIC contingent in Mindanao. Indonesia had no difficulty in dispatching some military observers while, at the same time, an Indonesian military officer was chairing the discussions in the Working Group on the ceasefire agreement. However, Indonesia was concerned about possible misunderstanding among the Filipinos on the presence of Indonesian military personnel in the Philippines. To deal with the dilemma, the Ministry decided to make public announcement of the mission and let the Filipinos and Indonesians know that the deployment was legal and not a covert operation.[153] The announcement served this purpose.

3.3.3. Peace talks in 1995: building consensus around contentious issues

Although, when hosting the second informal talks in 1993, Indonesia had no fixed ideas on how long the peace process would last, after facilitating the peace process for two years it was confident that the peace process could be completed in 1995 and had developed a timetable accordingly.[154] Indonesia had several reasons for optimism.

Although slow, there was progress in the talks and the parties had reached agreement on a number of issues stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement. They even reached some common understandings on the sensitive issue of provisional

government during the Second Formal Peace Talks in 1994 in Jakarta. They agreed to form the provisional government in the autonomous region. The provisional government would be led by the MNLF and all components in the southernpart of the Philippines' society (Muslim, Christian and indigenous tribes) would be equally represented in the provisional government. Moreover, the President would appoint the executive body of the provisional government after he had consulted and asked agreement from the MNLF's Chairman.[155] At the same time both the MNLF and the GRP had agreed to implement a ceasefire agreement and to let the OIC monitor it.

The two parties seemed serious about ending their problem. The Ramos Administration had a stake in the success of the peace process because stability was the prerequisite condition for their economic development program. Similarly, the MNLF, especially Mr. Misuari who had lived in self-exile for almost two decades, wished to regain popular support from the Moro people, especially the younger generation who were increasingly favouring the other resistance movements, including the Abu Sayyaf. The MNLF also sensed dwindling support from the Arab countries for their armed struggles because the 1990s was marked by a number of peaceful settlement of conflicts, including the signing of the Oslo peace accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in 1993. Thus, by committing the MNLF to the peace talks, Mr. Misuari wanted to show his constituents and his international supporters that he was serious about finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Another factor that increased such optimism was that the two parties were confident that peace was within reach. During the Second Formal Peace Talks in 1994 in Jakarta, the conflicting parties had agreed that the main task of their next peace talks, scheduled for June 1995, would be to formulate the final peace agreement, symbolising an end to their conflict.

However, it turned out that Indonesia's optimism should have been lessened by some events in the Philippines, and by the impasse in the negotiations between the two conflicting parties. In April 1995, the Abu Sayyaf group had attacked the Mindanao-island town of Ipil and created havoc.[156] In their retreat after the attack,

some members of the rebel group had escaped through the MNLF's camp, which under ceasefire agreement was inviolable for the government troops.[157] In responding to the attack, the GRP had deployed troops in the area and, as a consequence, the tension between the Philippines armed forces and the MNLF had increased, and was further complicated by incidents of armed clashes between the two.

Misunderstandings and a lack of trust in the military front line had an impact on the peace process. The MNLF hardened its position on a number of critical issues because they did not want to lose popular support if it appeared to be yielding to the GRP's position. At the same time, the MNLF also wanted to pacify the hard-liners that they could secure the overall Moro's interests from the peace talks. Mr. Misuari must have noted that members of the splinter groups followed closely the peace process and its outcomes. If they were not satisfied with the outcomes, they have enough basis to take over the leadership from Mr Misuari in the struggle for the Moro cause.[158] Mr. Misuari had indicated to the GRP that if the peace talks failed, "war could be the only viable option for the MNLF"[159] and in response, the Philippines armed forces had enhanced their military preparedness in Mindanao.[160] Likewise, the GRP also did not want to jeopardise their position, for instance, by accepting the MNLF's demand to implement autonomy in 13 areas, as stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement, without constitutional process.

In brief, by the end of 1995 there was stalemate on three main issues. The first one was on how to integrate the MNLF forces into the Philippines armed forces. The second one was on how to implement the provisional government. The last one was on how best to share revenues and the incomes of the Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs). The positions of the two parties on these issues were difficult to reconcile, even during the Mixed Committee meeting and the Third Round of Formal Peace Talks, held from 27 November to 1 December 1995. Several diplomatic efforts at the highest level, between September and October 1995, led by Minister Alatas, also failed to find a breakthrough.[161] Despite the difficulties, Indonesia appeared to have tried hard to maintain the momentum for dialogue and intentionally used the informal diplomacy to accumulate more points of consensus between the two parties. The intention was

to further narrow the gap, especially on the three most contentious issues. By achieving consensus on a number of points outside the three issues, Indonesia hoped that the conflicting parties would maintain their commitment to the peace process.

It is important to mention that informal diplomacy in the form of caucus meetings was a dominant feature during the Mixed Committee meeting in Davao City, from 19 to 23 June 1995. It is clear that Indonesia had intentionally limited the plenary format. The Chairman, in his report to Minister Alatas, spelled out that the aims of the informal set up were to optimise positive result, to ensure efficiency and thorough discussions of the various issues, and to find resolution to the problems.[162] The informal caucus proved effective in accumulating consensus and identifying points of no-consensus, and most importantly at the same time the parties were willing to explore alternative ways out of their stalemate. Some consensus in the informal caucus were reached on matters related to the structure of the provisional government, and some general understanding was also reached on the modalities to integrate the MNLF into the Philippines armed forces.[163] Although the agreements on the two issues had not resolved the problem, the momentum for peace talks was maintained and the agreements reached were used as a basis for their internal discussions, and also in their discussion with their respective constituents.

The informal caucus was also used to urge the participants to look on their problems in creative ways. When chairing the caucus meeting, Dr. Wirajuda suggested the participants put aside their legal arguments and search for innovative solutions to the problems of how to establish the provisional government. He emphasised the importance of creativity and pragmatism to find new options in settling the issue.[164] In the end, the GRP came with two alternatives for resolving the problem of how to establish the provisional government. The first alternative was to finalise the negotiation process, no latter than September 1995, then to submit an enabling act to Congress on November 1995. It was expected that the referendum could be held on February 1996, by the time the ARMM ended. However, the GRP was not sure if the timetable could be carried out as planned because the Congress might not be able to finalise their

deliberation on the Act on time. For its part, the MNLF was also not too keen with the ideas of constitutional process and referendum. The second alternative was to encourage the MNLF to take part in the ARMM's election for Governor and legislative positions with the full backing of President Ramos's party thus assuring the successful result of the election. From that point, the MNLF could initiate change, to reflect the Tripoli Agreement, from within the system. The MNLF did not categorically reject this alternative and was willing to study it further. However, Mr. Misuari was concerned over the possible opposition from the hardliners who would accuse him of selling out to the GRP.

The two alternatives above were discussed separately in New York, on 24 October 1995 between Minister Alatas, the OIC Secretary General and Mr. Misuari. During the discussion, Minister Alatas sensed that Mr. Misuari appeared more flexible. In the meeting, Mr. Misuari acknowledged the necessity to find a creative formula to bridge the position of the MNLF and the Philippines Government.[165] In the previous meeting in New York, on 3 October 1995, between Mr. Misuari, the OIC Secretary General and the Foreign Ministers of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six, Mr. Misuari also had expressed awareness of some fundamental changes that had taken place in the southernpart of the Philippines. He admitted that the changes, including the new demographic composition of the population, had provided an alternative solution to the issue of provisional government that was worthy of consideration. To convince Mr. Misuari on the merit of considering the two alternatives proposed by President Ramos, Minister Alatas indicated his intention to assess the possibility to relieve the referendum requirement, at the least during the transitional period.[166]

During the Third Formal Peace Talks, held from 27 November to 1 December 1995, the mechanism for establishing the provisional government was again discussed at length. However, the MNLF did not decide on which of the two alternatives and this is probably because the MNLF was still worried about the possible backlash from the Moro people.[167] As a facilitator, Indonesia's position was consistent with the Tripoli Agreement but Indonesia had encouraged the two parties to find a middle ground concerning the provisional government. Indonesia tried to persuade the GRP not to insist on the referendum requirement and had

asked the MNLF to be more flexible on the ARMM, including giving consideration to the possibility of Mr. Misuari running for governor and other MNLF people standing for legislative positions.[168] In the end, a breakthrough was reached after high level diplomacy on Indonesia's part, utilising the available networks in the Philippines and the OIC to convince Mr. Misuari to accept the latter alternative. At the same time, Indonesia's efforts were made possible by the two parties continuous contact in the Philippines and President Ramos's courageous move to offer an alternative solution concerning which areas were covered by the autonomous region. The following discussion looks at this issue more closely.

3.3.4. Peace talks in 1996: clinching the deal through high level diplomacy

After the third formal talks, the stalemate in the discussions of some issues had put the peace process at stake. The improved relationship between the parties to the conflict which had been nurtured during three years interaction, in formal negotiations, informal consultation and social activities, were still not enough to bridge their differing positions on some critical issues. In this critical stage of the peace process, a possible solution to the impasse would be an exchange of concessions for a win-win solution or to seek an alternative solution which would be acceptable to all. At this point, it would have been difficult for Indonesia to move further from the facilitation function, other than hope that some new breakthroughs would result from continuing interaction between the parties.

The role of the Indonesian Embassy in Manila, as a continuation of Indonesia's role as facilitator, was critical because they could observe developments on a daily basis and provide suggestions on steps that could be taken by the Ministry. Close co-operation between Jakarta and the Indonesian Embassy in Manila in the last year of the peace process had intensified because of the need for internal co-ordination between the Ministry and other supporting agencies. The Ministry also needed to keep overseas posts, such as the Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh, well informed on any developments in the peace process, because these embassies were focal points between the Ministry and the OIC, and between Indonesia and the members of the Committee of Six of the OIC. The case of close co-ordination

between the Embassy in Manila and the Ministry was observable in two cases: the 'popular consultation' in Mindanao, and a special closed meeting involving the foreign ministers of the Committee of Six of the OIC.

It is important to mention that until after the third formal peace talks, the conflicting parties had agreed on almost 90% of the issues covered in the Tripoli Agreement. Admittedly, the issue left was the most sensitive one, that is, the establishment of a provisional government and the enlargement of areas for autonomy from the existing area of ARMM. Both the MNLF and the GRP, during the third formal talks, had agreed to conduct a 'popular consultation' to assess the level of acceptance among the public and local government of the provisional government and the enlargement of areas for autonomy. From his consultation with the GRP, the Indonesian Ambassador in Manila, Ambassador Abu Hartono had secured the GRP's agreement that the 'popular consultation' between Mr. Misuari and governors as well as mayors from Mindanao could be held on 29 February 1996. The GRP had also agreed that the Mixed Committee meeting to examine the outcomes of the consultation would be held in Davao City, from 2 to 4 March 1996.[169] However, Mr. Misuari expressed reservations about the timetable because the Malaysian Government could not arrange his transport from Malaysia to Jolo in Mindanao. He therefore suggested that the consultation be held on late May or early April 1996.

Clearly worried about possible negative consequences from the delay, Ambassador Hartono then suggested that the Ministry facilitate Mr. Misuari's transport from Malaysia to Mindanao. He also informed the Ministry that he had secured the GRP's agreement for the transport arrangement. He had given the Ministry two options on how to arrange the transport from Malaysia to Mindanao, either using a charter plane or a military aircraft. Concerned about possible criticism from Filipino politicians of an Indonesian military aircraft flying to Mindanao, the Ministry preferred the first option of using a charter plane.[170] Ambassador Hartono also arranged for a crowd to welcome Mr. Misuari in Mindanao, and his intention was to give the MNLF's leader a sense of being a 'real leader.'[171] Ambassador Hartono was convinced that the set up would have a

positive psychological impact on Mr. Misuari and increase his determination to accept the Philippines Government's offer to run for Governor of ARMM.[172]

The close co-operation between Manila and Jakarta was also evident during the special meeting involving foreign ministers from the Committee of Six of the OIC. The decision to hold a special meeting was caused by President Ramos's decision on May 1996 to designate the area covered by Tripoli Agreement as a special 'administrative unit' (not political unit). He called the areas a Zone of Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines (ZPDSP). The new proposal definitely provided a new impetus for the peace dialogue because it touched on the three most contentious issues: the area designated within the autonomous region, the provisional government and the referendum requirement. Seeing the prospect of breakthrough, Ambassador Hartono had sent Minister Alatas a letter suggesting the Ministry hold a 'special meeting' with the OIC and the Committee of Six of the OIC, to discuss the new proposal. In the letter, he explained that Congressman Ermita and Secretary Alexander Aguirre, Chairman GRP Panel, Ad hoc Working Group on the Setting Up of the Transitional Implementing Structure and Mechanism, had informed him about the new proposal. Based on the information, he had met separately with some leaders of the MNLF to discuss the proposal and the MNLF, in his observation, had expressed interest.[173] Although the Ambassador did not indicate in the letter whether or not the GRP had requested him to consult the MNLF, it was obvious that the GRP would have expected the Ambassador to do so due to Indonesia's role as facilitator in the peace process. However, the decision to call for a 'special meeting' of the Committee of Six, to discuss the proposal, was critical because it brought the proposal to the immediate attention of the OIC.

Arguably, Indonesia's decision to hold a meeting was based on several considerations. First, Indonesia had not been successful in convincing the MNLF to accept the Philippines's proposal, and, therefore, wished to use the OIC as a means to persuade the MNLF. Secondly, Indonesia was concerned about a possible deadlock in the peace process because none of the parties seemed willing to compromise their position or to find a middle ground on some critical issues. Although the parties to the conflict had reached consensus on almost 90% of the

problems, their inability to decide on the remaining issues left the peace process with no prospect of solution in the immediate future. Thirdly, a prolongation of the deadlock would jeopardise the peace efforts further, as President Ramos' presidency would end in 1998.[174] There was no guarantee that President Ramos's successor would also give their utmost attention to the peace process with the MNLF. Hence, finding a solution to the Moro problem during President Ramos's term was most desirable and the concession given by the Ramos Administration on some of the contentious issues required immediate attention.

On 21 May 1996, Indonesia, as the Chair of the Committee of Six of the OIC, circulated a diplomatic note to the committee's members inviting them to a 'special meeting' in Jakarta to discuss President Ramos' proposal. In the letter, Indonesia emphasised the value of holding the meeting by mentioning that the peace process, after the Mixed Committee meeting on March 1996, had reached a deadlock on some substantive issues. In Indonesia's view, the GRP's new proposal had some prospects for breaking the stalemate. Understandably, Indonesia also wanted the OIC to share this opinion. In fact, the objective of the special meeting, as spelled out by Minister Alatas was to develop a common position among the committee's members.[175] A common position in the Committee of Six of the OIC would help Indonesia in its dealing with the GRP and the MNLF.[176]

The 'special meeting' of the OIC combined the formal negotiations and the informal consultation process. During the two days' meeting, Indonesia arranged four different kinds of meetings: (1) a working session of the OIC to discuss the issue in detail; (2) a separate meeting between the OIC and the respective panels of the parties to the conflict; (3) an informal working group to look for consensus and non-consensus; and (4) a plenary meeting to set the direction for the remaining peace talks. The proceedings of the meetings show that in the working session of the OIC, Minister Alatas who chaired the meeting invited the participants to study the Philippines' paper and to identify issues which required further explanation. The OIC's positions on the paper were then raised with the Philippines panel. The Philippines' explanations were subsequently conveyed to the MNLF and, in the separate meeting with the MNLF, the OIC also listened to

the MNLF's concerns. Next, the OIC informed the Philippines panel on the result of their deliberations with the MNLF. The last meeting on the first day was held in plenary and involved the OIC and the two parties to the conflict. During the plenary meeting, the Chair had proposed the establishment of an informal working group to identify consensus and non-consensus issues. In particular, the 'special meeting' had endorsed the establishment of a transitional body, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), to oversee the transitional period before the referendum took place.

In the end, the 'special meeting' of the OIC had reached a common understanding that the Philippines' proposal was the only feasible way to break the stalemate on the peace process.[177] Undoubtedly, their agreement put the peace efforts back on the right track. At the same time, with their agreement the OIC had given Indonesia a sound basis to help resolve the remaining issues based on the Philippines proposal. The subsequent meetings at the various levels in the Philippines concentrated on the non-consensus issues and adjustments to the agreements reached during their previous peace talks with President Ramos's proposal. With this clearer direction, Indonesia was able to further the peace process more easily.

During the Mixed Committee meeting, from 20 to 23 June 1996 in Davao City, Dr. Wirajuda who chaired it reiterated the specific objective of the meeting. He stated that the meeting was to discuss the "understandings and agreements in principle"[178] on the mechanism to establish the provisional autonomous government, reached during the special meeting of the OIC. He also mentioned that the peace process had almost reached its conclusion and he, therefore, requested both the MNLF and the GRP to act with "goodwill, political vision and courage"[179] in order to finalise their discussions.

In his report to Minister Alatas, Dr. Wirajuda explained that the Philippines' proposal was helpful in settling the problem of transitional structures and mechanism, but had created new problems concerning the MNLF forces. The proposal was mainly concerned with the setting up of a transitional administration unit and less consideration had been given to the issues of how to integrate the

MNLF into the Philippines armed forces and to establish security forces in the autonomous region. Moreover, the 'administrative unit' was not a substitute for the existing administrative system and its function was limited to co-ordinating economic development programs and security maintenance. In the end, the meeting was only able to reach some common understanding on how to settle these two issues.[180] The settlement of these issues was finally reached during the series of working group meetings in the Philippines and in the fourth and final formal peace talks, held in Jakarta, from 28 to 30 August 1996.

The Ministry had, at first, planned to hold the fourth formal peace talks in early August 1996 and had already circulated invitation letters to members of the Committee of Six of the OIC. The planned meeting was postponed until late August after the Ministry had learned from its Embassy in Manila that the working groups still needed more time to finalise their discussion. In the meantime, Mr. Misuari, on 11 July 1996, had decided to run for the governor's position in the ARMM, after he had received assurances from President Ramos that the President's party would give him their full support. Also Secretary Ruben Torres (Cabinet Secretary of President Ramos Administration) and Mr. Misuari engaged in intensive discussions to reach an agreement on how to integrate the MNLF into the Philippines armed forces and how to establish security forces in the autonomous region. In preparing for the final peace talks, the Ministry held a number of mainly internal meetings to co-ordinate their strategy during the last talks.

The Fourth Round of the Peace Talks was held from 28 to 30 August 1996. In this meeting, the contentious issues had already been settled and the main task of the meeting was to put all the agreements in the peace agreement's document. The meeting was opened by Minister Alatas and presided over by Mr. Sastrohandoyo. Mr. Sastrohandoyo organised the meeting based on inputs from members of his team, that is, to proceed immediately with working group meetings. Apparently, prior to the opening of the meeting, members of the Indonesian team had lobbied participants separately and they sensed that to proceed with the working group meetings would be far more advantageous rather than a plenary set up.[181] It was suggested that the Indonesian Chair form three working groups, each to deal with

a special task. The first working group, the Working Group on the Joining of the MNLF forces with the AFP, was responsible to discuss the proposal made by Defense Secretary Renato De Villa. The second working group, Working Committee on Drafting of the Final Agreement, was given the task to finalise the Final Agreement's document. The third working group, a loose caucus, was asked to consider the ways and means for OIC's participation during the transitional periods, that is, from the signing of the peace agreement to its implementation.

Based on the recommendation, after opening the plenary session Mr. Sastrohandoyo asked the participants to break into three working group meetings to finalise the outstanding issues left. The day concluded with a plenary session to endorse the agreements submitted by the Mixed Committee meeting and the three working groups. The smooth processes during the working group meetings leading to the plenary meeting can be explained from two perspectives. First, all the concerns of the parties had been addressed thoroughly. Secondly, for the MNLF, the continuation of OIC's role during the transitional period gave them assurances that the GRP would respect the agreement. Similarly, for the GRP, by allowing the OIC's continuous involvement post-final agreement, they wanted to show good faith on issue that they always consider as internal of the Philippines. At the same time, the GRP expected the members of the OIC would contribute financially to the development of the southernpart of the Philippines.[182]

Finally, on 30 August 1996, the parties to the conflict initialled the final peace agreement in the Presidential Palace, Merdeka Palace, before President Soeharto. Representatives of ASEAN and OIC countries in Jakarta witnessed this ceremony. By witnessing the parties to the conflict initial the final peace agreement, President Soeharto gave his personal support and 'blessing' to the agreement.[183]

V.4. Conclusion

In facilitating the peace process between the GRP and the MNLF, Indonesia combined informal and formal diplomacy. In the earlier stages, Indonesia used informal diplomacy to assess the level of acceptance of the parties to the conflict for its role as a third party in facilitating the peace process. After their informal

exploratory talks in Cipanas, in April 1993, the participants were willing to elevate the peace process from informal consultations to formal negotiations. Although there was no clear explanation for this, the parties to the conflict, especially the MNLF, had observed the seriousness of the Philippines panel in reaching a solution to the problem. The setting of the meeting also had some bearing as the informal format gave the participants ample opportunity to interact and assess the sincerity of their opponents.

During the formal peace talks, informal diplomacy was used as a means to improve relationships and to discuss contentious issues in greater detail. Indonesia intentionally set up a three layers of discussions, from less formal (support committees and ad hoc working group) to a formal negotiation setting (the mixed committee and the formal talks). The intention was to exhaust discussions at the lowest level (support committee) between participants who were more concerned with the detailed aspects of the issues. Their frequent interactions had made the participants able to develop good personal rapport, and gradually trust emerged that both parties really wished to find a solution to their problem.

Informal diplomacy was also used between sessions in the formal meeting to let the delegations discuss the contentious issues informally, and sometimes in the absence of their superior. At times, the approach was effective but in some cases participants who had no clear mandate from their superior were not willing to commit themselves to an agreement. In coping with the latter problem, Indonesia persuaded the participants to identify points of consensus and non-consensus for future deliberation or to be decided by the more senior officials. Although the accumulation of the consensus approach was successful in maintaining the peace momentum, they could not resolve the most contentious issues. In a deadlock, only innovation, creativity and new impetus from their respective leaders could bring the conflicting parties into agreement. The latter shows that there was a limit to the Indonesian role and the informal format. Indonesia did not want to involve itself too deeply in the problem, worrying about possible misunderstandings by those involved in the peace process.

Notes

[1] In a rare case, an ASEAN country might ask for assistance from other ASEAN members in their dealing with the domestic problem. Such was the case of the Philippines under President Aquino who asked Indonesia for assistance in solving the Moro problem. In some other cases, the ASEAN countries might embark on bilateral co-operation to deal with insurgencies, such as border co-operation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1960s to deal with communist insurgency.

[2] According to Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Indonesia had, intentionally, avoided the term mediation because it could give an impression of recognition of the MNLF as a belligerent. Indonesia preferred the term facilitator because it was more subtle. He also stated that Indonesia, at times, acted as mediator. Interview with Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, former Director General for Political Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (1990-1993) and the Indonesian Chief Negotiator in the peace process of the MNLF (interview, 22 October 2001). The term Chief Negotiator used to designate the Indonesian who was involved in informal diplomacy process was inapt, at least for two reasons. First, the role of the Indonesians was to facilitate the overall peace process and second, the Indonesians did not negotiate because they were not parties to the conflicts.

[3] Fr. Eliseo R. Mercado, Jr. *Southern Philippines Question: The Challenge of Peace and Development* (Cotabato City: Center for Policy Studies Notre Dame University, 1991), p. 5. Also Gerard Rixhon, "Ethnicity and Development Conflicts in the Philippines", in M. Rajaretnam (ed.) *Trends in the Philippines II: Proceedings and Background Paper* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978), pp. 113-6.

[4] Cesar Adib Majul, "The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective", in Peter Growing and Robert McAmis (eds.), *The Muslim Filipinos* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), pp. 4-5.

[5] M. Rajaretnam, "Some Observations on Martial Law in the Philippines: the Dilemma of a Developing State", in M. Rajaretnam (ed.), op cit., p. 13

[6] F. Delor Angeles, "The Moro Wars", in Peter Growing and Robert McAmis (eds.), op cit. p. 31.

[7] Peter Growing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920", in Peter Growing and Robert McAmis (eds.), ibid, pp. 33-41.

[8] According to Rajaretnam, the Northerners came to the South with pre-establish stereotype of the Muslim Moro and likewise the Moro also have their own negative stereotype of the Christian North. The new influx occupied lands - in some cases with the assistance of corrupt government officials - traditionally belong to the Moro. See Rajaretnam, in M. Rajaretnam (ed.), pp. 15-6.

[9] See Ivan Molloy, "The Decline of the Moro National Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1988, pp. 61-2.

[10] On the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, see **Appendix No. 5**.

[11] Article 16 of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, dated 23 December 1976. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[12] Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab, former Head of Political Section, Indonesian Embassy in Manila, provided information concerning Mr. Misuari's plight (interview, 4 October 2001).

[13] Information derived from a briefing paper on MNLF prepared by the Directorate of Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Ministry, dated 17 May 1990. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[14] Document entitled 'The National Unification Commission and the Peace Process' dated February 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[15] Information provided by Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab, interview, 4 October 2001.

[16] This task was not easy because the Moro people had developed a sense of nationality of *Bangsamoro* (the Moro nation). They considered themselves different to the rest of the Filipinos because of their distinctive identity of observing Islam and their historical pride in not allowing themselves to be subjugated to the colonial powers. See Majul, in Peter Growing and Robert McAmis (eds.), loc cit.

[17] This study is aware that in 1974 President Soeharto and his intelligence officers tried to assist the Marcos Government in their dealings with the MLNF. However, the secrecy surrounding the mission meant this thesis has been unble to assess both the peace process and its outcomes in a comprehensive manner. There are not many reliable sources of information on the undertakings and, interestingly, the General in charge for the operation, General Yoga Sugama, made only brief reference of the mission in his biography. See Yoga Sugama, *Memori Jenderal Yoga (Seperti Diceritakan Kepada Penulis B. Wiwoho dan Banjar Chaerudin)* [*Memoirs of General Yoga: As narrated to the writers, B. Wiwoho and Banjar Chaerudin*] (Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, 1990), p.

209. Attempts to locate information relevant to the 1974's peace efforts from the archives of the Ministry had not been very successful. In fact, the yearly report of both the Indonesian Embassy in Manila and the Indonesian Consulate General in Davao City only described in passing the event and attached in their reports the press statement of the "Menado Informal Talks between President Soeharto and President Ramos on May 30, 1974" within which there was some reference to the Moro's problem. See *Laporan Tahunan 1975* [*Yearly Report 1975*]. KBRI Manila, 1975 (undated). Unpublished; and *Laporan Tahunan KJRI Tahun 1974/1975* [*Yearly Report Consulate General 1974/1975*]. KJRI Davao City, 1975 (undated), Unpublished. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[18] The Ministerial Committee of the Six was the enlargement of what was previously called the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee, established in March 1973, to deal with the Moro problem. The original members of the committee were Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia.

[19] For instance, in 1990, in assessing the domestic situation in the Philippines, particularly on the Moro problem, the Indonesian Ambassador in Manila warned Indonesia not to meddle in Moro affairs and not even to offer any assistance to help resolving the problem. The suggestion was made prior to 19th Ministerial Meeting of the OIC in Cairo, August 1990 (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 12 July 1990. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu). According to Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries regarded the Moro problem as a problem between the GRP and the OIC mainly because the GRP had raised the issue in Tripoli, on 23 December 1976 (interview, 22 October 2001).

[20] Letter from Raul S. Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to Minister Alatas, dated 20 July 1991. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[21] Loc cit.

[22] In ASEAN's practice, a nomination of one country or representative from one ASEAN's country in international position is usually discussed during ASEAN meetings. Other forums to discuss the matters include ASEAN meetings during UN General Assembly or in the various ASEAN committees overseas involving ASEAN Ambassadors, such as ASEAN Washington Committee and ASEAN Paris Committee.

[23] Diplomatic Note from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines to the Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 18 July 1991. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu. However, there was no written document in the Ministry detailing the result of the bilateral meeting between the two foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur. The possible explanations for this was, the meeting was held in private between the two ministers so no lower echelon official was present to record the discussion, or the issue itself, by then, was too sensitive to put on record.

[24] Interview with former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[25] Excerpt from Indonesian delegation' report of Minister Alatas meeting with Mr. Candao (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Ankara, dated 12 August 1991). Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[26] Excerpt from Indonesian delegation' report of Minister Alatas meeting with Mr. Misuari (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Ankara, dated 12 August 1991). Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Interview, 22 October 2001.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid. Although Indonesia during the OIC ministerial meeting had indicated its preparedness to become a new member of the expanded committee, there were several procedural matters that had to be followed by the OIC. On behalf of the OIC, the Secretary General, Dr. Hamid Algabid, wrote Indonesia a letter on 23 December 1992 and stated that after conducting several consultations, he wished to receive Indonesia's acceptance in written. Then, the OIC gave their formal confirmation during the ministerial meeting in Karachi, April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[31] Based on the Indonesian delegation's position paper for the 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, August 1991. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[32] Letter from Raul S. Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to Minister Alatas, dated 21 August 1991. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[33] Ibid.

[34] The sending of fact-finding mission was one of the recommendations in the resolution on the question of Muslim in Southern Philippines of the 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, August 1991.

[35] Based on cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 20 November 1991. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[36] Interestingly, in his letter to Minister Alatas, Secretary Manglapus suggested that the OIC had, in fact, asked the Muslim Filipino to resume dialogue with the GRP, and not the other way around.

Letter from Raul S. Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to Minister Alatas, dated 27 November 1991. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[37] Ibid, p. 1.

[38] Ibid, pp. 3-4.

[39] Joint Statement of the First Exploratory Meeting, dated 4 October 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Paragraph 9, Statement of Understanding of the First Exploratory Meeting, dated 4 October 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Statement of the NUC, dated 23 October 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[44] Indonesia was informed that the MNLF did not want to have a meeting in the Philippines and, likewise, the GRP did not want to come to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The Philippines' proposal to hold a meeting in Bangkok, Thailand or Bandar Seri Begawan was rejected by the MNLF. In the end, of the two options proposed by Mr. Misuari, that is, Indonesia or Malaysia, the GRP preferred Indonesia (based on Memorandum from the Director General for Political Affairs to Minister of Foreign Affairs, ad interim, dated 5 December 1992). Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[45] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 10 December 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[46] Mr. Pieter Damanik is former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila (interview, 23 October 2001). During the interview, Mr. Pieter Damanik, a retired General, also mentioned that he had known President Ramos and General (Ret.) Renato de Villa since they were still active military officers.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Based on Minister Alatas' letter to President Soeharto, dated 11 December 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu. Peace process was the term used by Indonesia in all the documents and correspondences during its facilitation function. The term was used to refer to the activities during the pre-negotiation stage (exploratory talks) and the negotiation stages (the formal peace talks).

[49] Based on Minister Moerdiono's letter to Minister Alatas, dated 15 December 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[50] Based on the document entitled *Rencana Kegiatan Pertemuan Antara Pemerintah Filipina – MNLF, tanggal 18-23 Januari 1993* [*Planned of activities for the meeting between the GRP and the MNLF, 18 to 23 January 1993*], outlining the terms of reference for the planned meeting. Undated. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[51] Personal account of Mr. Kusnadi, interview, 9 October 2001. Mr. Kusnadi was a Director for Asia and the Pacific, Director General for Political Affairs, from February 1991 to May 1995.

[52] Interview with Mr. Sastrohandoyo, 22 October 2001.

[53] In the previous structure of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (ended in December 2001), diplomats who were involved in various international negotiations were mostly from the Directorate for International Organisations, Directorate for International Treaty, Directorate for International Economic Relations and the Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs.

[54] Interview, 14 November 2001.

[55] Interview with Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, 22 October 2001. Also based on the document entitled *Planned of activities for the meeting between the GRP and the MNLF, 18 to 23 January 1993.*

[56] Based on the recollection of Dr. Hasan Wirajuda, one of the Indonesian chief negotiators in the peace process in the Southernpart of the Philippines (interview, 3 November 2001). He was appointed as Indonesia's Foreign Minister in 2001.

[57] The Secretary General of the MNLF, Abdul Baki Abubakar, in Riyadh stated that although the MNLF was optimistic with the dialogue proposal by the Ramos's administration, he regretted the cancellation. He mentioned that the delay clearly reflected internal problems within the Philippines system (Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, dated 7 February 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu). For its part, the GRP suspected that it was the MNLF who leaked the information to the media (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 9 January 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu). The OIC itself had been for quite sometimes questioning the hesitation of successive Philippines Governments to hold a dialogue with the MNLF. The OIC observed a shift in the Philippines Government's attitude under President Ramos because they were willing to engage the MNLF in a dialogue (statement by OIC Secretary General, Dr. Hamid Algabid, during the meeting of the Ambassadorial Level, Quadripartite Committee in Jeddah, 7 November 1992. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu). It may be the case that the Philippines decision to postpone the meeting was seen by the OIC as backtracking on its earlier commitment.

[58] When consulted about the date by the Indonesian Consul in Jeddah, Mr. Misuari stated that he agreed with the new date (14-17 April 1993), so long as the proposed dates would not pose difficulties for the OIC to participate (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh, dated 31 March 1993) Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu. Efforts to find a most suitable date for all the parties: the conflicting parties, Indonesia and OIC, proved complicated and, at times, gave Indonesia difficulties as a host.

[59] Based on cable from Jakarta to Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh, dated 8 April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[60] Interview, dated 14 November 2001.

[61] Ibid.

[62] The decision to use the Cipanas Palace was made by President Soeharto himself. The Ministry initially suggested the Bogor Palace based on practical reasons because the palace is not far from Jakarta. The Bogor Palace is also serene and in 1994 was used for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' meeting.

[63] See note 50.

[64] Welcome Statement at the Informal Meeting between the GRP and the MNLF, dated 14 April 1993. Ali Alatas, *A voice for a just peace: a collection of speeches* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001) p. 303. The constitution, in the preamble, asked Indonesia to contribute to the achievement and maintenance of a world of greater peace, justice and security.

[65] The preventive diplomacy he was referring to is the informal workshops on managing potential conflict in the South China Sea.

[66] Ibid, pp. 303-4.

[67] Ibid, p. 304.

[68] Interview with Mr. Chalief Akbar, 31 December 2001. Mr. Chalief Akbar was involved in the Indonesian team from 1993 to 1995.

[69] Statement by Dr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary General of the OIC during the Informal Exploratory Talks in Cipanas. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Taken from "Statement of Understanding" between the GRP and the MNLF, dated 16 April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[73] Interview with Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, 22 October 2001.

[74] Statement by Prof. Nur Misuari, Chairman of the MNLF during the Informal Exploratory Talks in Cipanas. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[75] Taken from "Statement of Understanding" between the GRP and the MNLF, dated 16 April 1993, op cit.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] "Government, MNLF holding talks in Indonesia", *The Philippines Daily Inquirer*, 14 April 1993. Interestingly, Kompas (an Indonesian Daily) also quoted the release, but questioned the denial of the NUC that such a meeting, indeed, took place. This uncertainty confirmed that even Kompas, the most influential national daily in Indonesia, was not given a scoop by the Indonesian authority of such a meeting in Cipanas. "Filipina dan Moro Berunding di Jakarta", *Kompas,* 15 April 1993. In comparison, during the Second Working Group Meeting of JIM (16-18 January 1989), the Jakarta Post, one of the Kompas's news groups, is the only national newspaper which was able to outline the content of the peace document discussed by the participants. It was reported that Minister Alatas was very upset with this incident (interview with Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto, 3 October 2001).

[79] Statement of President Fidel V. Ramos on the Holding of the Second Round of Exploratory Talks, between the Government and the Moro National Liberation Front, dated 14 April 1993 (Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu). *The Philippines Daily Inquirer* wrote that the talks were "criticised in some quarters as giving recognition of belligerency status of the MNLF." The Daily also suggested that the talks should be held in the Philippines because the conflict is the Philippines' internal problem. "Peace gab in Jakarta okayed", *The Philippines Daily Inquirer*, 15 April 1993.

[80] Ambassador Oscar Valenzuela, the Philippines' Ambassador to Jakarta, outlined the linkage of security and economic development program during interview with a reporter from the Jakarta Post. "GRP sees peace as most essential", *Jakarta Post*, 26 April 1993.

[81] President Ramos issued a press release on 12 April 1993 stating that the Government was aware on the plan of some armed elements in Mindanao to create disturbances on April, to discredit the ARMM elections and to attract the intention of the OIC. Statement of President Fidel V. Ramos, 12 April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.

[82] During JIM the media interviewed participants separately and the participants made statements which were counterproductive to the desire of Indonesia as a host of improving participants relationship. See discussion in Chapter 4.
[83] "Moro-Filipina Siap Berdamai", *Kompas*, 17 April 1993.
[84] Letter dated 19 April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[85] Ibid. Prior to the informal meeting, President Ramos of the Philippines wrote President Soeharto a letter and thanked him for hosting the peace talks. In the letter, President Ramos also assured President Soeharto that he would always remember Indonesia's contribution towards peace in the Philippines. Letter dated 13 April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[86] "Ramos optimistic after govt talks in Jakarta with Muslim rebels", *The Jakarta Post*, 19 April 1993.
[87] Based on letter from Congressmen Eduardo Ermita, Head, the Philippines Panel 2nd Round of Exploratory Talks with the MNLF, to Minister Alatas, dated 16 April 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[88] Ibid.
[89] "GRP sees peace as most essential", *Jakarta Post*, 26 April 1993.
[90] See Chapter II, note 135.
[91] The Ministry intentionally isolated the meeting place from the media. Not to give impression of total isolation, a special communication line was installed, prior to the meeting, to give the participants easy communication access to Jeddah and Manila.
[92] During the consecutive formal meetings, the Indonesian team always arranged a special function for Minister Alatas to joint the head of delegations, such as during afternoon tea. In some occasion the presence of Minister Alatas became an important aspect of the meeting because the Indonesian team was hopeful that the Minister could help persuade the parties to clinch the deal on some issues. Personal account of Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, interview, 22 October 2001, and also of Mr. Kusnadi, interview, 9 October 2001.
[93] Mr. Andreas Sitepu, former Head of Information Section, Indonesian Embassy in Manila, illustrated the mutual hatred among the protagonists when he said that the representatives of the conflicting parties, at first, did not even want to make eyes contact one to another (interview, 2 October 2001).
[94] Dino Djalal, "The Indonesian Experience in Facilitating a Peace Settlement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front", in Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya (eds.) *Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1999), p. 202.
[95] Paragraph 5 of the "Statement of Understanding" between the GRP and the MNLF, dated 16 April 1993.
[96] Interview with Dr. Hasan Wirajuda, 3 November 2001.
[97] Interview with Mr. Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.
[98] Interview, 3 November 2001.
[99] Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo kept chairing the formal talks, even after he was appointed as Indonesian Ambassador to Paris in 1993 and also after he was transferred to serve as Ambassador to Canberra in 1995.
[100] Interview with Mr. Pieter Damanik, 23 October 2001.
[101] Interview with Mr. Abu Hartono, 28 November 2001.
[102] Based on briefing paper of the Directorate of Asia and Pacific of the Ministry. Undated. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] According to Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab, Mr. Misuari was concerned with his safety in Mindanao because of the splinter groups, such as MILF, which considered that Misuari was selling out to the Philippines Government by accepting autonomy in 1976 (interview, 4 October 2001).
[106] Rep. Lant was representing Lakas NUCD - President Ramos' political party - from Lanao del Sur Mindanao.
[107] Based on classified document dated 6 June 1993, which detailed the peace initiative to deal with rebellions in the Philippines. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[108] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila dated 16 June 1993, and cables from Indonesian Embassy in Riyadh dated 13 and 15 June 993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[109] Interview with Mr. Chalief Akbar, member of the Indonesian Secretariat, 31 December 2001.
[110] Opening Statement as Chairman of the Peace Talks between the GRP and the MNLF, dated 25 October 1993. Alatas, op cit., pp. 305-8.

[111] Excerpt from Dr. Hamid Algabid's statement in the "Executive Summary of the Proceedings of the Formal Peace Talks", Jakarta, 25 October to 7 November 1993. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu. Mr. Kusnadi stated that in his observation, representatives of OIC tended to favour the MNLF and, at times, made a statement counter productive during the meeting (interview, 9 October 2001).
[112] Ibid.
[113] The Tripoli Agreement of 1976, paragraph 11. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.
[114] See 'Executive Summary of the Proceedings of the Formal Peace Talks', Jakarta, 25 October to 7 November 1993.
[115] According to Mr. Chalief Akbar, the suggestion to form a small group to discuss the agenda for the meeting was part of the Indonesian scenario for the meeting's proceeding. The argument for favouring a small group discussion rather than plenary meeting was that to prevent debates on non-essential issues (interview, 31 December 2001).
[116] Based on Chairman's note of Mr. Sastrohandoyo. Undated. Archive – Dit. OI Deplu.
[117] Ibid. The Indonesian team had identified the 8 agenda items during their preparatory meeting as the most logical subjects for discussion, based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. Interview with Mr. Chalief Akbar, 31 December 2001. Thus, as the Chair of the Joint Secretariat's meeting, Dr. Wirayuda's task was to guide the participants to agree with the 8 items.
[118] The Support Committee 1 (national defense and regional security forces); The Support Committee 2 (education); The Support Committee 3 (economic and financial system, mines and mineral); The Support Committee 4 (administrative system, representation in national government, legislative assembly and executive council); and The Support Committee 5 (judiciary and the introduction of Sharia Law).
[119] Based on document entitled 'GRP-MNLF Peace Talk Process and Its Main Documents.' Indonesian Embassy in Manila, October 2000, p. 3. Courtesy of Ambassador Abu Hartono.
[120] When asked about the reason of structuring the negotiations, Mr. Sastrohandoyo stated that that was the most practical approach in dealing with such a complicated conflict like in the Philippines. He indicated that clustering issues is one of the negotiation techniques that the diplomats frequently used (interview, 22 October 2001).
[121] Personal account of Dr. Hasan Wirajuda who continuously chaired the Mixed Committee. He also stated the psychological satisfaction was an important aspect in conflict resolution and he suggested that he could relate his experience in chairing the meetings with the subject of conflict resolution as well as alternative dispute resolutions (ADR) he studied during his doctoral research (interview, 3 November 2001).
[122] Document entitled 'MNLF Official Report on the Jakarta Formal Peace Talks' prepared by the MNLF. Jeddah, 5 December 1993. Archive – Dit. OI Deplu.
[123] "Jakarta Breakthrough: Rebs accept Organic Act as talks reference", *Philippines Daily Inquirer*, 4 November 1993.
[124] Press release of the OIC after the OIC Secretary General met with President Ramos in Manila on 19 December 1993. The visit was the first ever visit of the OIC Secretary General to the Philippines and the aimed of the visit was to survey the developments relating to the ongoing peace process between the protagonists. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.
[125] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 18 November 1993. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.
[126] Cables from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 18 and 24 November 1993. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu. Noting some difficulty in finding a neutral venue for the GRP-MNLF meeting in Manila, the Indonesian Ambassador had proposed the Indonesian Embassy as an alternative venue for future meetings.
[127] GRP-MNLF Joint Press Statement, 17 November 1993, Club Filipino, Manila. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Based on cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 18 November 1993, op cit.
[130] On 14 November 1993, unknown gunmen in the Sulu Island kidnapped an American linguistic researcher, Mr. Charles Walton. In response, the Philippines armed forces conducted a military operation to rescue Mr. Walton.
[131] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila, dated 24 November 1993, op cit.
[132] Interview, 9 October 2001.
[133] Ibid. Also based on information paper prepared by the Directorate of International Organisations, dated 28 April 1994. Archive - Dit OI Deplu.
[134] For instance, concerning language used at school in Mindanao, he suggested the MNLF maintain English at the provincial level, and use Arabic in the traditional boarding schools. He reasoned that by mastering English, the Moro people could compete with other Filipinos (interview, 23 October 2001).

[135] Personal account of Mr. Andreas Sitepu, interview, 2 October 2001.
[136] Ibid.
[137] According to Mr. Andreas Sitepu whenever Mr. Misuari came to Mindanao leading the MNLF delegation, there was always a throng of Moro people around the meetings place. The Moro people came to the venue to listen to Mr. Misuari's speeches (interview, 2 October 2001).
[138] Interview with Dr. Hasan Wirajuda, 3 November 2001.
[139] The earlier disputes concerning the number of personal security accompanying Mr. Misuari had taken place in January 1994. Prior to the first meeting of support committee on National Defence and Regional Security Forces in Cotabato City, the MNLF delegation informed the meeting that Mr. Misuari would come to the City with 700 security personnel. The GRP rejected the request fearing such large contingent of resistance forces in the City would create panic among the city inhabitants. Due to the disputes on the matter, the meeting was delayed and when the meeting finally took place on 11 January 1994, the two delegations only met to exchange their position papers. The second meeting of support committee on National Defence and Regional Security Forces was held in the Indonesian Embassy in Manila and was chaired by the Indonesian Ambassador. Personal Account of Mr. Rahardjo Mustadjab, who was sent to Cotabato City to attend the first meeting on 11 January 1993, interview, 30 November 2001.
[140] After the first Peace Talks in 1993, the news of possible OIC contingent, involving some Indonesian troops, sent to the southernpart of the Philippines to observe the ceasefire had invited public debates in the Philippines. Interview with Mr. Rahardjo Mustadjab, 30 November 2001.
[141] Cables from the Director General for Political Affairs, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Indonesian Ambassadors in Manila and Riyadh, dated 19 April 1994. Archive - Dit OI Deplu.
[142] See "Protesting Too Much: Ramos' democratic credentials dented", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 June 1994, p. 18. In contrast, the Malaysian Government stopped a similar conference on East Timor in Kuala Lumpur, worrying that the event would jeopardise Malaysia's bilateral relations with Indonesia.
[143] The writer was in Manila in May 1994, when the public debate about the issue was at its height. To send a gesture of regret for the conference, Indonesia decided not to participate in a May 26-28 conference in Davao City for the establishment of East Asian Growth Area (EAGA) involving the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review,* to placate the Indonesians, President Ramos on May 16 1994 sent a mission headed by former Foreign Minister, Raul Manglapus, to Jakarta. "Jakarta Withdraws", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 May 1994, p. 13. Also "Beating a Retreat: Ramos caves in to Jakarta's pressure on Timor Forum", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 June 1994, p. 17 & p. 19.
[144] Cables from the Director General for Political Affairs, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Indonesian Ambassadors in Manila and Riyadh, dated 20 June 1993. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.
[145] Based on the document entitled *Rencana Kegiatan Pertemuan Mixed Committee (MC) ke-3 dan Pembicaraan Formal Antara Pemerintah Filipina – MNLF, tanggal 31 Agustus – 5 September 1994* [Planned of activities for the third Mixed Committee meeting and the formal talks between the GRP and the MNLF, 31 August to 5 September 1994], outlining the terms of reference for the planned meeting. Undated (Archive Dit. OI Deplu). The document was the updated version of the earlier document entitled *Planned of activities for the meeting between the GRP and the MNLF, 18-23 January 1993*. Undated. Archive - Dit. ASPAS Deplu.
[146] Interview with Mr. Chalief Akbar, 31 December 2001.
[147] Based on document entitled "Executive Summary of the Proceedings of the Formal Talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six and the OIC Secretary General - Jakarta, 1-5 September 1994." Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.
[148] Ibid.
[149] The working group, ad hoc working group and caucus usually adopted an open-ended system, that is, the participants in the forum were not limited to certain individuals. At times, new participants joined the forum and the chairman could also involve some Indonesians who were knowledgeable on the matters, usually on technical issues, to the meeting to give inputs to the chair or even to the meeting.
[150] Interview, 9 October 2001.
[151] See Djalal, op cit. Also Soliman M. Santos, *Islamic Diplomacy: Consultation and Consensus.* http://www.c-r.org/acc_min/santos.htm, accessed 22 March 2001.
[152] Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, *The Role of Indonesia in the Negotiations toward Autonomy in Southern Philippines*. Undated. Mr. Sastrohandoyo prepared the paper for President Abdurrahman Wahid because the President had expressed interest in assisting the GRP in its dealings with the MILF.

[153] Indonesia learned about the ongoing debates in the Philippines on the necessity of having foreign observers in Mindanao. Based on information paper prepared by the Directorate of International Organisations of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs entitled *Pengiriman Missi Pengamat Gencatan Senjata OKI (dari Indonesia) ke Filipina Selatan dalam Rangka Proses Perundingan Damai antara GRP-MNLF* [*The deployment of ceasefire's observers from the OIC (Indonesi) to the Southernpart of the Philippines within the framework of peace negotiation process between the GRP and the MNLF*]. Undated. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu. The Ministry included several leading national news media (print and television) in the Indonesian Air force's plane during the contingent's deployment, on mid-November 1994.

[154] Based on information paper on the peace process prepared by the Directorate of International Organisations. The paper was prepared for the internal use of the Ministry and the Indonesian team, to help them consider factors that could support or impede the peace process, such as the issue of budget to fund the diplomatic activities. Undated. (Archive - Dit. OI Deplu). It is also important to note that on 4 January 1995, Dr. Wirajuda had informed Ambassador Wiryono in Paris about some developments from the various consultations at the support committees and ad hoc working group levels. He also mentioned that in May 1995, the Mixed Committee would meet to wrap up all consensus at the technical level. He then alerted the Ambassador of Indonesia's plan to hold an ad hoc meeting in January to pave the way for reaching peace agreement in mid-1995. However, he also emphasis that the peace talks could only take place if there was substantial agreements at the technical and mixed committee levels (cable from the Directorate of International Organisations, dated 4 January 1995. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu).

[155] Based on information paper entitled *Ringkasan Hasil Pembicaraan Formal Putaran Kedua antara Pemerintah Filipina dengan MNLF* [*Summary of the Second Round of Peace Talks between the Philippines Government and the MNLF*]. Undated. Archive – Dit. OI Deplu.

[156] See "Hit and Run: Rebel raids belies Manila's claims of stability", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 April 1995, p. 21 & p. 24; "Terror International: Manila claims foreign groups support extremists", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 May 1995, p. 32; and "Peace Is a Weapon: Officials talks weaken communist, but not Muslims", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 July 1995, p. 24.

[157] According to *Far Eastern Economic Review*, a former Abu Sayyaf member, Edwin Angeles, the April's raid in Ipil was a joint operation between Abu Sayyaf and a group led by MNLF commanders. "Peace Is a Weapon: Officials talks weaken communist, but not Muslims", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 July 1995, p. 24.

[158] See "Under the Gun: Spectre of Muslim rebellion again looms large", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 August 1995, p. 23 & p. 26.

[159] Ibid, p. 26.

[160] Based on classified document prepared by Indonesian contingent, who were observing the ceasefire agreement in Mindanao, dated 5 September 1995. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[161] In 6 September 1995, Minister Alatas had travelled to Manila to consult with President Ramos on the remaining issues of the peace talks. The Minister also had conferred with his counterparts, the Foreign Ministers of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six and with the Secretary General of the OIC during his visit to New York on October 1995. Based on document entitled 'GRP-MNLF Peace Talk Process and Its Main Documents,' op cit, p. 7.

[162] Ibid, p. 5

[163] Based on Dr. Wirajuda's report, on the processes and outcomes of the Mixed Committee meeting in Davao (from 19 to 23 June 1995), to Minister Alatas dated 24 June 1995. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Based on the Director General for Political Affairs' report of the tripartite meeting, dated 24 October 1995. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[166] Based on the Indonesian Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN's report of the meeting, dated 3 October 1995. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu. During the meeting, Minister Alatas was able to convince the Libyan Foreign Minister and the OIC Secretary General that the OIC should not put pressure on the GRP, and instead should listen to any proposal and also offer alternative solution.

[167] Based on document entitled "Executive Summary of the Proceedings of the Formal Talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six and the OIC Secretary General – Jakarta, from 27 November to 1 December 1995." Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[168] Based on the Indonesian position paper for the Third Round of Formal Talks. 21 November 1995. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[169] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila dated 13 February 1996. Archives - Dit. OI Deplu.

[170] Based on information paper on the issue prepared by the Directorate of International Organisations. Undated. Archives - Dit. OI Deplu. The arrangement for transportation involved the Ministry, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ambassador. The involvement of high-ranking officials in Jakarta for the arrangement of the charter plane had made the transportation possible and could be arranged in a shorter time.

[171] Interview with Mr. Abu Hartono, 28 November 2001.

[172] Ibid and also Santos, op cit, p. 9.

[173] Letter from Indonesian Ambassador in Manila to Minister Alatas, dated 13 May 1996 (Archive - Dit. OI Deplu). Also interview with Mr. Abu Hartono, 28 November 2001. Earlier in 3 May 1996, President Fidel Ramos had sent President Soeharto a letter and attached an Aide Memoire explaining the GRP's creative approach to fulfil the requirements of Article III, Paragraph 15 of the Tripoli Agreement (based on information paper on the peace process prepared by the Director for International Organizations, dated 3 June 1996. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu).

[174] Under President Aquino, the Philippines Congress adopted new constitution, in 1987, which gives a president elect an opportunity to serve as a president only in one period.

[175] Based on the "Report of the Chairman" on the Meeting of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six, 3-4 June 1996. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[176] It was evident that the OIC concerted position on the matter had somewhat affected the position of the MNLF. See Santos, loc cit.

[177] In his letter to President Ramos, dated 25 June 1996, President Soeharto had emphasised that the Philippines new proposal was instrumental to the peace process and made possible the reconvening of the Mixed Committee meeting in Davao City, on June 1996 (Archive - Dit. OI Deplu). In replying to President Soeharto's letter, President Ramos wrote a letter, dated 8 July 1996, in which he praised Indonesia for assisting the Philippines in the Moro problem. He was also thanking Indonesia for always standing beside the Philippines during the overall peace process. The content of President Ramos's letter was extracted from a copy of the translation of the letter into Indonesian language, prepared by the Ministry for President Soeharto (Archive - Dit. OI Deplu).

[178] Opening remarks of Dr. Wirajuda, Chairman of the Mixed Committee meeting, dated 21 June 1996. Archive - Dit OI Deplu.

[179] Ibid.

[180] Based on the report from Dr. Wirajuda, on the outcomes of the Mixed Committee meeting, to Minister Alatas, dated 23 June 1996. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu.

[181] Based on an internal memo dated 28 August 1996. Archive - Dit. OI Deplu. This memo suggests that the supporting roles of the members of the Indonesian team also included lobbying and suggesting proposals.

[182] This notion of hope for financial assistance from OIC countries was raised by Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab, interview, 4 October 2001.

[183] In early 1990s, Mr. Bachtul Nazar - who at one time served in Indonesian Consulate in Davoa in the southernpart of the Philippines - told the writer that there were many Moro leaders who highly respected former President Soeharto and expected him to help the cause of the Moro people. However, this information should be treated with qualification because it has yet to be verified by other Indonesians who were once posted in Davao, whether or not they share to similar impression.

Chapter VI

Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: The series of Indonesia's Informal Diplomacy (1990-1998)

VI.1. Introduction

'Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea' was the title given by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry to a series of informal meetings it sponsored to address the potential conflicts stemming from overlapping territorial and jurisdictional claims. From 1990 to 1998, the Ministry, with some financial assistance from the Canadian Government,[1] arranged annual workshops involving the six claimant states: Brunei Darussalam, People's Republic of China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. Some non-claimants (Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and Thailand) also participated in the workshops, but these countries took part individually and not as a block.

In the workshops, Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy differently to what had been used when dealing with the Cambodian and the Moro problems. In the two previous case studies, the involvement of the leaders of the protagonists in the meetings was paramount and the approach was top down, but during the series of workshops the participants were mainly bureaucrats at the mid-level, scientists and political analysts. Some claimant states did assign high-level representatives to some of the workshops, but the informality of the workshops meant that they all took part as individuals.

The intention of this chapter is to analyse the informal diplomatic approach used during the workshops. In particular, this chapter will describe and analyse the aspects of informal diplomacy in the context of the workshops, why informal diplomacy was required, and how Indonesia exercised informal diplomacy. The main argument of this chapter is that Indonesia was able to organise the informal workshop to manage the potential conflicts and play a leading role in the diplomatic initiatives because the non-claimant members of ASEAN saw the merits of the initiative. At the same time, the claimant countries and Taiwan did

not object to Indonesia's role. Informal workshops were not aimed at resolving the problem of overlapping claims of territorial jurisdictions over the islands, islets and atolls in the South China Sea. The intention was to develop co-operation and confidence building measures in order to prevent armed conflict arising from the territorial disputes.

The workshops did produce a number of recommendations and developed habits of dialogue among representatives from the littoral states. As convenor of the workshops, Indonesia expected that the participants would convey these recommendations to their leaders. However, the implementation of the recommendations required the co-operation of the claimant states and Indonesia lacked the capacity to influence them. Likewise, although the diplomatic initiatives co-ordinated by the Ministry at first received substantial support from bureaucrats within and outside the Ministry, towards the end of the workshop series the support from them gradually declined. The latter factor reduced Indonesia's determination and ability to play a leading role.[2]

The chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides a background to the South China Sea issue and highlights: the strategic importance of the South China Sea and the major stakeholders, the nature of the claims and the reinforcement of the claims, and the military build up and the potential for armed conflict. The second section analyses Indonesia's peace initiative to understand the development of the idea for the workshops and the internal dynamics within the Indonesian team. This section also examines the implementation of informal diplomacy through the workshops including the techniques adopted and the strategy developed, as well as the outcomes. The final part of this section outlines the impact of the competing interests and the differing interpretations of the workshops on this exercise of Indonesian informal diplomacy.

VI.2. The background to the South China Sea issue

2.1. The strategic importance of the South China Sea: the territorial disputes and the stakeholders

Under article 122 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) 1982, the South China Sea is designated as a 'semi-enclosed sea' because the Sea is surrounded by a number of littoral states. The littoral states bordering the South China Sea include Brunei Barussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. Taiwan is also adjacent to the South China Sea. Based on the UNCLOS, littoral states adjacent to the semi-enclosed sea are encouraged to co-operate in exercising their rights and in performing their duties.[3] The South China Sea is very strategic for the littoral states and also for maritime states who use it as a 'sea-line of communication' and a major route for trade. Although "the waters around the Spratlys are considered dangerous to shipping because they are largely uncharted, shallow and contain a profusion of moving sandbanks,"[4] control of the structures in the South China Sea will provide the occupier with immense power over the area.[5] James Gregor illustrates the strategic nature of the South China Sea as follows:

> Most shipping lanes in the South China Sea pass near the islands, atolls, and banks in the region, and occupation and control of such territory could influence the flow of traffic from the Strait of Malacca to the Taiwan Strait and from Singapore to southern China and Taiwan.[6]

In fact, during the Second World War, the Japanese used some islands in the South China Sea as a stepping-stone to attack the Philippines and to control its occupied territories in Southeast Asia.[7] After the Second World War, the two superpowers asserted the strategic importance of the area from the military perspective.[8] In the late 1970s, not long after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the Soviet Union gained access to Vietnam's naval and air base in Cam Ranh Bay on the South China Sea and then developed intelligence stations which covered the whole region.[9] At the same time, the US already had established military bases in the Philippines.

In the early 1990s, the two super powers retreated from their bases for differing reasons. The Soviet Union left because of financial difficulties, whereas the US left Clark air base and Subic Bay naval base in 1992 because the Philippines Senate had rejected a new bases treaty. Although it no longer has military bases in the South China Sea, the US maintains an interest in the area because of its global interests, either for strategic or economic reasons. The US is concerned with peace and stability in the area, and the potential for conflict threatens its access and freedom of movement.

Similarly, the economic lifeline of some countries in Southeast and East Asia depends on stability in the South China Sea. In Japan's case, for instance, 90% of its oil imports from the Middle East pass through this area and the two way trade between Japan and the ASEAN countries also flows through this Sea.[10] In the case of China, the area has become its "energy arteries – most notably the sea-lines of communications (SLOCs) from the Persian Gulf and over the petroleum reserves in the South and East China Seas."[11] Hence, interest in stability and access for sea-lines of communications is not limited to the regional countries only, but also to non-regional countries.

The South China Sea is rich with living resources and, predictably, also has immense potential for non-living resources (hydrocarbons).[12] The claimant states' interest in living resources and hydrocarbons stems from the fact that their land base resources are gradually depleting. The claimant states as well as many other countries have gained 'new hope' from the sea's potential and therefore are prepared to assert their interests by military means. Kent Calder provides an illustration on the inter-linkages between hydrocarbon potential in the South China Sea and military assertiveness as follows: "[p]otentially huge amounts of subterranean oil and gas compounded their attraction, for both China and others. A major oil strike has already been made off the nearby Filipino island of Palawan, which prompted a Chinese land grab only 170 kilo-meters away in early 1995."[13] With regard to hydrocarbon potential in the South China Sea, the claimant states have adopted a strategy of inviting foreign companies to prospect in the area they claim, and of granting concessions for explorations as well as exploitation. The strategy was a calculated one.

The involvement of foreign companies was necessary because the majority of the claimant states had not yet acquired the technological know-how to prospect and embark on offshore oil operations. The system normally used in this mode of co-operation included granting concessions or sharing in production.[14] However, the presence of a foreign company could also mean implicit recognition of territorial claims and, at the same time, maintain the interest of non-regional countries through their nationals' flag companies. Concerned about the potential for being entangled in such conflicts through private companies owned by their nationals, some governments, such as the US, have warned their nationals to consider overlapping claims before getting involved in offshore oil operations.[15]

Overall, the stakeholders in the South China Sea disputes include the five claimant states as well as several non-claimant states. The South China Sea is claimed, partly or as a whole, by five littoral states and Taiwan. Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei claim ownership of some islands, islets and atolls around the Spratlys in the South China Sea. China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim ownership of the same areas in the South China Sea - including the Paracels islands - and there is a reason to believe that China also claims the sea as its inland waters.[16] The non-claimant stakeholders include some littoral, regional states, such as Japan and Australia, and non-regional countries, like the US and Canada. The non-claimant littoral states include Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Cambodia. The following discussion highlights the nature of non-claimant interests in the South China Sea.

Indonesia's position with regard to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea is unique. Although Indonesia has no territorial claim in the South China Sea, its territorial jurisdiction around the Natuna Islands is entangled with Vietnam and China's disputes over the Spratlys. Indonesia had still not settled its continental shelves disputes with Vietnam around the Natunas and was surprised to learn that the territorial delimitation of China had incorporated Indonesia's EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) around the Natunas.[17] These circumstances put Indonesia's efforts to further exploit the hydrocarbon potential around the Natuna islands in a dilemma, particularly because China had not yet made clear whether or not its

claims included "the gas and oil fields less than 225 kilometres from the Natuna Islands."[18]

Concerning the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has received conflicting signals from China. On the one hand, Indonesia has received an assurance from China that China has no territorial disputes with Indonesia. In fact, the Deputy Foreign Minister of China, Tang Jiaxuan, gave this assurance to the Indonesian Ambassador in Beijing, Ambassador Juwana, in a private conversation on 21 June 1995. Mr. Tang informed him that China had never claimed the Natuna Islands and the Chinese Government would not acknowledge any map, that is, China's national map which included the Islands.[19] On the other hand, China expressed concern when Indonesia in September 1996 embarked on a large-scale military exercise around the Natuna Islands.[20] Such concerns over Indonesia's military exercises is not without precedent. In 1987, Vietnam had expressed concern over a planned joint military exercise between Indonesia and Malaysia in Borneo and around the Spratlys.[21] Indonesia's neutrality as an 'honest broker' in the South China Sea is often questioned due to the Natuna issue.

As an island state with limited national resources, Singapore is concerned with the potential for regional instability resulting from armed conflicts in the South China Sea. Regional stability is essential for Singapore because it relies on its strategic position as a hub for regional commerce, services and maritime sea-lanes.[22] As a trading nation, Singapore is worried that regional instability, including from territorial disputes in the South China Sea, could reduce Singapore's attractiveness for investment destination. In fact, since the early 1990s Singapore has been the driving force behind the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), a means to increase the attractiveness of the region as an investment destination. Singapore was also instrumental in the development of ASEAN and European Union economic co-operation to balance the linkage between ASEAN and the Pacific through Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Hence, regional stability is the only foundation that can sustain Singapore's overall designs of regional economic co-operation.

Thailand is also concerned that its economic interests in the South China Sea, including harvesting living resources especially fish, could be disrupted by any conflict in the area. However, Thailand is also worried that any armed conflicts would disturb its "export of agricultural and industrial products to the world market which pass through the sea lanes in the South China Sea."[23] As a landlocked country Laos wished to continue to have easy access to the sea, which was guaranteed under the UNCLOS 1982. Claimant states' assertion of sovereignty, including by military means, would restrict Laos's access to the Sea. Although there has been little discussion of Cambodia's position on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Cambodia's interest would probably be based on economic considerations. Cambodia is interested in bringing foreign investors to Cambodia to help rebuild the country after long years of civil war. All these Indochina countries and Thailand have had traditional relationships with China and Vietnam and, therefore, they would not want territorial conflicts in the South China Sea to antagonise their established relationships. These countries, especially Thailand, support a diplomatic solution to the disputes.[24]

In general, regional and non-regional countries, including major powers like the US, are interested in having safe navigation and freedom of maritime activity in the South China Sea. Although countries like Japan, Australia and the US maintain their neutral position in the territorial disputes, they are against the adoption of unilateral policy by claimant states that might restrict their maritime activity and affect sea-lanes. The US Assistant Secretary of State, Winston Lord, clearly stated that the US rejected any unilateral action that affected its freedom in the South China Sea, and which was implemented in disregard to the UNCLOS 1982.[25] The US position reaffirmed its desire to have freedom of movement in the seas, including the South China Sea, especially for US naval fleets. The US had even, on several occasions, questioned ASEAN's intent to create a nuclear weapon free zone in the ASEAN region. ASEAN's intention, according to the US, was incompatible with ASEAN's interest in maintaining US engagement in the region and supporting ASEAN's position in the South China Sea.[26]

Australia, sensing a growing Chinese presence in Southeast Asia through its foothold in the Spratlys, attempted to build a buffer and was successful in enticing

former Indonesian President Soeharto to sign a security agreement in December 1995.[27] China was obviously alarmed about the agreement and inquired of Indonesia whether the security agreement was directed against China and its interests in the region. Indonesia had to convince China that the agreement was not aimed at any particular country in the region.[28] Australia shares US concern about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Australia would not want to have any claimant states treating the South China Sea as their internal waters. Although this has yet to happen in the South China Sea, Australia's freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Straits was challenged at one time by China and this made Australia upset. The incident took place in April 2001, when China tried to exercise its sovereignty around the Taiwan Strait, and claimed the straits as its territorial waters.[29]

As noted earlier, Japan's economic interests in Southeast and East Asia, and the safety of its economic lifelines in the South China Sea depend on peace and stability in the region. Philip Bowring notes that "Japan's interest are commercial, not territorial. Japan needs to protect its trade and investments in Southeast Asia."[30] Japan observes developments in the South China Sea very cautiously, and tries to avoid antagonising China. Japan wishes to have a peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes, and Canada also shares this position. Canada's interest in the South China Sea issue also stems from its desire to promote marine conservation. As one of the largest coastal states, Canada has consistently adopted policies of "promoting conservation and sustainable use, cooperation, and the international law of the sea."[31] Canada's financial contribution for the workshop process was guided by this position. Similarly, Japan, Australia and the US had also expressed interest in supporting the workshop process.[32]

2.2. The nature of the claims and the claimants efforts to reinforce their claims

After the Second World War, the ownership of some islands, islets and atolls in the South China Sea was not clearly defined and, as a consequence, some countries asserted their claim of ownership based on historical considerations or international law. For instance, China and Taiwan declared that their ancestors

had discovered and occupied some of the islets in the South China Sea since time immemorial and named the area Nanyang or the 'Southern Region'.[33] In particular, the Chinese asserted that the Northern Song Dynasty (AD 960-1127) had included the areas as part of China's territory. To substantiate this claim, they referred to "historical records, maps, and cultural relics."[34] Vietnam also asserted sovereignty based on historical argument, but combined its argument with the principle of effective occupation (a customary international law) and claimed that it had effectively occupied the area since 1558.[35] Vietnam also argued that as a successor state of France, it was entitled to inherit part of the South China Sea's archipelago occupied by France during the inter-war period.[36]

The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei asserted their individual claims based on international law. Initially, the Philippines based its claim on its citizen's discovery (Thomas Colma) of unoccupied islands or 'terra nullius',[37] but then reinforced its claim through the notion of proximity and indispensable need, that is, its security interests.[38] The Philippines effective occupation of some of the islands it calls 'the Kalayan islands' was one way of justifying its territorial claim. Malaysia and Brunei argued that the islands they contested sat on their continental shelf. While Malaysia already occupies some of the islands, Brunei does not control any of the islands in the Spratlys. All the claimants, except Brunei, have stationed military garrisons to protect their occupied islands.

The volatility of the disputes was heightened by some claimant states' policy of 'creeping assertiveness' – that is, "a gradual policy of establishing a greater physical presence in the South China Sea, without recourse to military confrontation."[39] Although China has often been accused of being a proponent of this policy, clearly other claimants, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, have also adopted a similar strategy of gradually establishing more strongholds in the area. However, due to its determination to consolidate its hold in the Spratlys, China's actions have always created uproar in the region. In 1995, China constructed structures on Mischief Reef within the Philippines-claimed 200 miles EEZ.[40] China halted the development of the structure after the Philippines successfully galvanised international support, including ASEAN as a group, for its cause. In 1998, when some ASEAN countries were plagued with financial crises, China

was able to consolidate its position on Mischief Reef, but this time the Philippines failed to gain support from its fellow ASEAN members. Part of the reason for this was that some ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, were not prepared to antagonise China which was providing support during the financial crisis.[41]

China adopted a meticulously and well-calculated strategy of establishing a stronghold in the South China Sea. In 1974, China took over the Paracels Islands from South Vietnam without having to face strong reaction from the US, South Vietnam's ally. During that period, China and the US were in the process of rapprochement and China had anticipated that the US would not jeopardise its renewed relationship with China. At the same time, the Nixon Administration was also preoccupied with a pressing domestic issue, the Watergate scandal.[42] In 1988, China was able to establish a foothold in six islands in the Spratlys after successfully driving out the Vietnamese garrison there. Again, China had assessed correctly that its action would not attract external support for Vietnam, even from Vietnam's ally the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, the majority of the regional countries were less than sympathetic toward Vietnam because of Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia. From the mid-1980s, the relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev was less close, because Gorbachev was more concerned with the Soviet Union's domestic problems and at the same time was in the process of improving the Soviet Union's bilateral relations with China.[43] The Mischief Reef affair showed ASEAN that China was willing to postpone its action until regional circumstances suited its objectives. In the latter case, the financial crises in 1998 meant that some ASEAN countries were unwilling to antagonise China by backing the Philippines.

The situation was aggravated by some claimant states promulgating national legislation for their claims which gave them legal means to assert jurisdictional claims. The unilateral promulgation of national legislation of the claim is indeed a shrewd tactic to proclaim ownership. If other claimant states or the international community left the proclamation unchallenged, this would give an impression of recognition of the unilateral legislation. China, for instance, suggested that the lack of objection from the international community about the Chinese Government's 1947 official atlas of the South China Sea – including the

'controversial' nine interrupted lines – was implicit acknowledgement of the boundary within which China exercises its sovereignty.[44] The 'nine interrupted lines' represent a maximal claim put forward by China on the South China Sea, because the atlas places the whole sea and the islands, atolls, islets and reefs as part of China's territory.[45] In reality, the 1992 legislation had reinforced China's delimitation issued in the 1947 official atlas.

Some littoral states did challenge China's legislation. For instance, in March 1992, Malaysia sent a diplomatic note rejecting the application of the new law to any territory and maritime areas claimed by Malaysia. Malaysia also referred to the Malaysian Government Gazette of December 1979 and April 1980 which stated the delimitation of its territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelf.[46] In this case, Malaysia contested unilateral legislation by referring to its national legislation, which was then also declared unilaterally. In September 1994, Indonesia also raised its concern over the legislation, and in particular requested clarification on some inconsistency between the legislation, the many Chinese writings and various informal explanations on the claims. In its diplomatic note, Indonesia sought to clarify the basis of China's claim - with reference to the undefined lines of the 1947 - from the point of view of the Law of the Sea Convention.[47] Although in the diplomatic note Indonesia did not explicitly question the status of the Natunas, the question about the basis of the claim implicitly reflected its concern about the Natuna area. If the 'nine interrupted lines' or undefined lines were being treated as the limit of China's territorial sovereignty, China's claim would have included parts of Indonesia's 200-mile EEZ.[48]

The Philippines had even contested an article in a Chinese newspaper, the Guangming Daily, which was reporting the result of an extensive study in the South China Sea conducted by Chinese scientists over a ten year period. The article emphasised that the study provided scientific justification for China's claim. On 9 December 1994, Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo released a statement which reiterated the Philippines position in the area it called 'the Kalayan islands' and stated that "[the Philippines] cannot, as a matter of policy, recognize China's claim to all the South China Sea."[49] He further stated that "[t]he

studies made by China do not change the situation in the South China Sea, [that is, the area claimed by the Philippines]."[50] China considered the Philippines had overreacted to a newspaper article, especially by taking the issue to a higher level through the statement made by Minister Romulo.[51] Obviously, by expressing its strong reaction, the Philippines wished to de-legitimise China's efforts in building a case for its claim. In fact, China had adopted a similar strategy when the spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry, Shen Guofang, in January 1995 protested about an article in Vietnam's newspaper which publicised the results of geological research conducted by Vietnamese and Russian scientists around the Spratlys in 1993 and 1994. Mr. Shen asked Vietnam not to conduct more research in the contested areas in 1995, and asked third parties not to involve themselves in similar research with Vietnam.[52]

Undoubtedly, overlapping claims, a problem made worse by national legislation and parochial reference to the 1982 UNCLOS, were difficult to reconcile because the areas claimed involved more than one country and therefore a bilateral negotiation would not address the problem adequately. China had announced that it would not recognise the result of any bilateral negotiation between other claimant states. China was adamant that any negotiation should only be held between the claimant states and China on a bilateral basis, and mainly to discuss joint development in the areas, without contesting China's claim. China has always maintained that its sovereignty over the South China Sea to be indisputable and, therefore, considered any claims made by other states as invalid.

China's resolve about the merit of its claim, including the promulgation of national legislation, put the claimant states in a dilemma. Although aware of their relative weakness compared to China, some claimant states, such as Malaysia and the Philippines, were willing to embark on bilateral negotiation and consultation with China to address their differences. However, the Philippines also spearheaded the campaign to internationalise the disputes and tried, exhaustively, to bring its dispute with China to multilateral forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN-China Dialogue. Although China resented the Philippines' strategy, it was willing to discuss the peripheral issues of the overlapping claims in the multilateral forum, such as the security of the sea-lanes.

China was also willing to discuss the South China Sea issues in the fringe of multilateral meetings of ASEAN-China Dialogue where such a discussion would not necessitate a reflection in the formal record.[53] China was only prepared to discuss the overlapping claims disputes at multilateral forum on an informal basis.

2.3. Military build up and the potential for armed conflict in the South China Sea

As outlined earlier, the claimant states over the years increased their presence in the South China Sea by occupying more islands, stationing military garrisons, and building fortresses and even airstrips. This strategy of unilateral occupation to assert claims had led to two military skirmishes involving Vietnam and China (in 1974 and 1988). The volatility created by the military manoeuvres increased the potential for open armed conflict and posed a risk for the whole region. The regional countries who felt threatened by an increase of military presence of some claimant states, particularly China, lodged diplomatic protests and strengthened their military capability, especially their air and naval capabilities.

The following discussion illustrates the dynamics of the military build up of the claimant states and other littoral states bordering the South China Sea. According to Anthony Bergin, if China continues to develop its military capability and, in particular, its ability over the next 10 years (from 2001) to exploit advanced weapons and production technologies acquired from abroad, this would enable China to integrate naval and air capabilities against potential adversaries in the South China Sea.[54] China has also purchased Russian Su-27s which, according to Weixing Hu, could satisfy "the immediate needs to extend air coverage to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits should force be used in these areas."[55] Concerning China's navy, he added that "the goal of naval development is to have effective sea control in the areas of Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea."[56] Tim Huxley argues that the regional countries were naturally alarmed by China's military build up because of two aspects: first the modernisation involved "often overlooked but increasingly powerful and flexible nuclear and long-range missile elements" and secondly, the secrecy that clouded the details of China's defence modernisation.[57] With this threat looming, the Philippines committed

itself in 1985 to a 15-year military modernisation program, amounting to 50 billion pesos ($1.9 billion).[58] The Philippines Congress supported the military's modernisation program after they learned that "China was able to build [from late 1994 to early 1995] installations on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef with apparent impunity."[59]

Other claimant states have also embarked on military upgrading programs, especially to strengthen their navies. For instance, in April 2001 the United States agreed to sell eight conventional submarines to Taiwan. Although the purchase of submarines has much to do with Taiwan's threat perception of China, the submarines would increase Taiwan's capability to manoeuvre around the Spratlys.[60] In the late 1990s Vietnam bought two *Sango* submarines from North Korea which had a "range of 2700 nautical miles and can be armed with 4 torpedoes and up to 16 mines."[61] With relatively closer proximity to the contested islands in South China Sea, Vietnam's submarines provided a new threat dimension that China's navy had to take into consideration.[62] Malaysia was also considering purchasing submarines and developing a joint venture with the Dutch company RDM Submarines to set up a submarine service. In 2000, Malaysia obtained two *Yarrow*-class frigates from the United Kingdom (UK).

As noted above, non-claimants in the region were also concerned about the threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea as a result of the military build up by the claimant states. Some littoral states had also embarked on military modernisation programs, focusing on their naval forces. In the early 1990s Singapore developed a naval dockyard that could accommodate the US military's vessels, including aircraft carriers.[63] Singapore's strategic interest has necessitated the presence of United States' forces in the region to provide the region with security insurance. The United States' presence was also aimed at countering any potential new hegemonic power, either China or Japan, attempting to dominate the region. In particular, some ASEAN countries were concerned about China's potential to act as a new hegemonic power in the region, and they were suspicious of China's intention in the region through its growing military projection in the South China Sea.[64] Indonesia supported Singapore's strategy of maintaining the United States' presence in the region[65] and, at the same time, developing the

capacity of its own naval forces.[66] Undoubtedly, Indonesia's strategic interest in the South China Sea, especially around the Natuna Islands, was closely linked with the final solution to the South China Sea disputes.

The overlapping claims pose a risk to stability in the region because the claimant states have continuously expressed their preparedness to defend their claim, if necessary by military force. Such a statement of intent has increased concerns among the regional countries as well as non-regional countries whose strategic, political and economic interests are best served by regional stability.

VI.3. Indonesia's diplomacy to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea: the series of workshops

The magnitude of the problem and the range of interested parties involved in the conflicting territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea makes the issue very complex. Any third party seeking to manage the potential conflicts, or to resolve the disputes, should have anticipated a long-term commitment, obstacles, and no guarantee of success. The many parties involved in the undertakings, the Indonesians, the Canada International Development Agency (CIDA) as sponsor, the parties to the disputes themselves and the non-participants (that is, the media and think-tanks, like CSIS) would all have realised this situation.

This part of the chapter assesses the dynamics of the informal diplomacy of the workshop based on the objectives set by the Indonesians. The following discussion outlines the organisational aspects of the diplomatic undertakings in order to identify the weak and the strong aspects of the diplomatic process and to assess the impact of the organisational aspect on the diplomatic initiatives and their implementation.

3.1. The informal workshop: its inception as a diplomatic means

The workshop on the South China Sea was the brainchild of Dr. Hasjim Djalal (hereinafter referred to as Dr. Djalal), the then Head of Agency for Research and

Development of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.[67] He was responsible for stimulating awareness in the Ministry of the South China Sea issue and in generating interest in the issue at the national level, through his numerous publications and lectures on the subject in military staff training (LEMHANAS) and research centres, including CSIS. The workshop series was, therefore, coloured by Dr. Djalal's personality, his ideals and determination to give substance to the abstract concepts of co-operation and confidence building measures, which were the objectives of the workshops. However, apart from Dr. Djalal and his son, Dr. Dino Djalal,[68] no other officials in the Ministry were continuously involved in the undertakings and, therefore, over the period of ten years there was a gap in understanding the ideals of the workshops. Moreover, those officials did not continuously follow the substantive discussion during the long years of the workshop process. To a certain extent, this gap affected the interest and commitment of some Ministry personnel in their diplomatic efforts and the way the Ministry conducted its diplomatic initiatives.

According to Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad, in the late 1980s Dr. Djalal had discussed the idea for holding a workshop to address the South China Sea issue internally among the senior officials in the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry.[69] The idea was then reported to Minster Alatas and, after receiving the Minister's consent, Dr. Djalal travelled to the ASEAN capitals to solicit support and, at the same time, to look for funding for the project.[70] At the national level, the idea for holding a workshop was also discussed with the military establishment,[71] the concerned ministries, including the Department of Communication, the Department of Mines and Energy, the Indonesian State Oil Company, the Indonesian Science Institute (LIPI), and the Jakarta based think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The idea received favourable domestic support and after the military skirmish in the Spratlys between Vietnam and China in March 1988 Indonesian policy makers' interest in the issues increased. For instance, in 1989, the National Defense Institute, a think tank under the Ministry of Defense, urged Indonesia to take initiatives to prevent conflicts erupting from overlapping claims in the sea close to Indonesia. They suggested Indonesia hold an informal meeting, like the

Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM).[72] However, the suggestion did not outline how Indonesia should proceed with such a diplomatic initiative. To some extent, the paper vocalised Dr. Djalal's concern about the South China Sea problem which he had shared with the students during his various lectures in the Institute.[73]

In his tour of the ASEAN capitals, Dr. Djalal received a mixed reception. According to Dr. Djalal, some ASEAN countries and the national constituents in Indonesia were concerned about potential new conflicts in the region after the settlement of Cambodia's conflict. He reminded them that it had taken more than ten years to settle the Cambodian problem and it was therefore important to find ways not to let new conflicts erupt in the region. In his view, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea had the potential to embroil the region in conflict. Hence, some ASEAN countries were receptive to the idea.[74] However, Dr. Marti Natalegawa, an Indonesian diplomat who accompanied Dr. Djalal, noted that some ASEAN countries expressed scepticism, and were even cynical about the Indonesian initiative. He opined that their reaction stemmed from their suspicion of Indonesia searching for a new role in ASEAN after the Cambodian problem approached its conclusion. Furthermore, he argued that, by then, the idea of preventive diplomacy was not very popular.[75]

Having domestic support and ASEAN's consent on the proposal, Dr. Djalal proceeded with preparation for the workshop, including the development of its format. Dr. Djalal based the format on his experiences in facilitating co-operation in the Fisheries Task Force of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), involving states in Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands, and Pacific Latin America. He further developed the format, together with Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault who was willing to seek funding from CIDA.[76] Canada was included in the project not only because of its financial contribution but also because of its "political acceptability, being a non-super power but interested in the development of cooperative arrangements in the developing world, particularly in the Pacific Region."[77] Dr. Djalal summarised the involvement of Canada in the workshop process as follows:

> The project would be developed by inviting the cooperation of and resource persons from Canada Ocean Law and Policy experts, who later founded the SCS Informal Working Group at the University

of British Columbia, directed by Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault. The SCS-IWG obtained core funding for the project from Canada International Development Agency (CIDA), which has supported all the meetings. SCS-IWG would also collaborate and help in developing the agenda for the meeting, help to prepare background papers, and help to locate and arrange for participation of resource persons as well.[78]

3.2. The organisational aspect of the informal workshop: the problems of co-ordination and inconsistency of interests among the Indonesians

3.2.1. Co-ordination as a factor in informal diplomacy

The financial contribution made by Canada to the diplomatic efforts created a triangular relationship between Dr. Djalal, Prof Townsend-Gault and the Ministry, in this case the Research and Development Agency, which acted as a focal point in the diplomatic initiatives. The triangular format created problems for co-ordination, especially after Dr. Djalal no longer headed the Research and Development Agency. After the first workshop in Bali, in 1990, Dr. Djalal was appointed as Indonesian Ambassador to Bonn, but to maintain the continuity of the workshops Minister Alatas asked him to continue serving the Ministry in the informal workshop. At first, the Minister's request created dualism in the diplomatic process with the workshops being directed from Bonn and Jakarta. In addition, Minister Alatas' decision to give the Agency the custody of the project was not welcomed by some officials from the directorates who considered the issue fell under their jurisdiction.[79] To complicate the matter further, the new Head of the Agency had to seek advice about the substance of the workshops and the proceedings from Dr. Djalal.

The following discussion provides some illustration of the complications concerning co-ordination and dualism. Although Dr. Djalal was no longer officially in charge of the diplomatic initiatives, his involvement in some meetings on the law of the sea put him in contact with some representatives of the claimant states, including representatives from China. From the meetings, he sensed that China was interested in participating in the workshop and he therefore proposed that the Ministry dispatch representatives to Beijing and provide China with details of the diplomatic initiative.[80] Prof Townsend-Gault supported Dr. Djalal's

suggestion of sending a representative to China and even expressed the personal view that the presence of Dr. Djalal as Project Director in Beijing was essential.[81] In reply, Minister Alatas suggested Prof Townsend-Gault should consult with Mr. Singgih Hadipranowo, Dr. Djalal's successor, who was responsible for "the preparations for the second meeting and the administrative and substantive handling of the South China Sea project."[82] The Minister also mentioned that although he agreed on the importance of approaching China, the Ministry was still considering the merits of sending a special mission as soon as possible or only using the normal diplomatic channels.[83]

There are several reasons to explain the circumstances above. First, there was uncertainty on the part of the Canadians as to who was in charge of the project. They maintained direct contact with Dr. Djalal, under the impression that Dr. Djalal was still in charge of the project. Secondly, they wanted to bring to the immediate attention of the Minister the merits of approaching China. They noted that Dr. Djalal has sent a cable from New York on August 1990, but that no reply had been forthcoming by January 1991 when the Canadians had sent their letter. Although there was no clear explanation for the inaction, the delay most likely stemmed from the transitional period from Dr. Djalal to his successor, Mr. Hadipranowo, who needed more time to fully grasp of the project and the issues involved. In the end, the Ministry did not send a special mission but, using normal diplomatic channels, sought confirmation of China's participation in the workshop during the official visit of China's Deputy Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin to Jakarta on 19 April 1991.

The preparation for the second workshop took place in February 1991 and Mr. Hadipranowo consulted Dr. Djalal on a number of substantive issues including how to proceed with the meeting. On 30 April 1991, the Ministry circulated a note to Indonesian Embassies in Beijing, Vietnam, Laos and in the ASEAN countries, detailing the reasons for the planned workshop and asking the Embassies to inform their accredited countries about the timetable and the workshop's format. In the letter, the Ministry also explained that the initial plan to have a two-stage meeting as agreed during the first workshop in Bali (that is, a meeting involving ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Laos, followed by a meeting of all participants,

including China and Taiwan) was no longer applicable. Indonesia was concerned that China would not consider Indonesia was organising the workshop in good faith if China was excluded from the first stage of the meeting.[84]

After the second workshop in Bandung, held from the 15 to 18 July 1991, the three parties - Dr. Djalal, the Canadians and the Ministry - reached an agreement in an apparent effort to clarify their individual responsibilities and to smooth co-ordination. It was agreed that the Canadians, through the University of British Columbia (UBC), would be responsible for providing financial support to carry out studies, running the workshops, recruiting resource persons from Canada, as well as supporting the programs with documentation and library services. The Ministry (the Research Agency) would be responsible for technical, administrative, as well as political and diplomatic support. The Ministry would also be responsible for following up with the participating countries and Taiwan on the agreements reached through the workshops and, if necessary, the UBC would support any efforts to persuade the participants to commit themselves to the program. Funding for the diplomatic mission, including the financial burden for organising the workshop in Indonesia, the Ministry should look for support from the Ministry of Finance. Dr. Djalal would be responsible for preparing and studying the substantive parts of the issues, through *Yayasan Pusat Studi Kawasan Asia Tenggara* (The Centre for Southeast Asian Studies), the research centre he had established. The UBC would provide the Centre with financial support.[85]

3.2.2. Inconsistency of interests among the Indonesians and its impact on Indonesian informal diplomacy

Although the new arrangement clarified the responsibility of each of the parties in the project, the Research Agency was somewhat detached from the substantive aspects of the project. As a consequence, in the span of eleven years during the workshop process, interest among the Agency officials on the substantive aspects of the issues varied.[86] Despite informal diplomacy being the Ministry's agenda, it was natural that each Head of the Agency would wish to bring their own priority and programs into consideration during their leadership.[87] For instance, Dr. Johan

Syahperi[88] gave priority to research on international economic issues and globalization. Nevertheless, in terms of co-ordination, the Director responsible for political research in the Agency was acting as a lynchpin in the diplomatic process, with bureaucrats inside and outside the Ministry, and with the governments and authorities who sent participants to the workshops. The Director was responsible for monitoring the workshop process, and consulting with the Head of Agency on issues concerned with policies or requiring attention at the highest level.

Another implication of the Agency's detachment from the substantive issues of the workshop was the Agency's dependence on direction from Dr. Djalal, especially with regard to the steps to be taken and the strategy as well as scenarios for the various meetings held within the ambit of the workshops. For instance, Dr. Djalal prepared Mr. Hadipranowo's pointers for discussion during the latter's visit to ASEAN countries, and China and Vietnam, between March and May 1992, to follow up the agreements reached during the second workshop.[89] The technicality of the issues, especially after a number of technical working groups and expert groups were established, had also restrained the Agency from increasing its role in the diplomatic process. Therefore, the Agency functioned more as facilitator of the workshop, with the Head of the Agency chairing some of the sessions.

To optimise discussion at the workshop, the Agency organised preparatory meetings involving officials from the Ministry, other ministries, and think tank participants. In the pre-workshop meeting, the Agency, together with Dr. Djalal, discussed the meeting's agenda and, at times, requested experts from other ministries to prepare papers on specific issues, for example, assessing the potential for living and non-living resources in the South China Sea. During the meeting the Agency also requested inputs from the directorates in the Ministry who followed the issues as part of their portfolio on matters such as political and security issues in the South China Sea. The workshop's convenor needed to be aware of the issues because their political context could affect the dynamics of the informal meetings. The informal nature of the workshop did not necessarily isolate the participants from the political and security developments in the region and,

although they were taking part in the workshops in their personal capacity, they had to maintain the official lines of their government at times.

Some officials in the Agency were dissatisfied because they had only played a supporting role. Their displeasure did influence the workshop process. For example, some recommendations reached during the workshop or some pending matters for consideration in participants' respective capitals were not followed up thoroughly.[90] The informal nature of the workshop made some participants less persistent in trying to persuade their leaders to implement the recommendations. In such cases, the Ministry sent letters to remind the claimant countries about the follow up actions that they had to perform. Except for the Agency, the two other parties in the undertaking, Dr. Djalal and the Canadians had no authority to remind the participants formally. A timely and persistent follow up was an important factor of the workshop process, and any delay in the action was a risk to the achievement of the workshop's objectives.[91]

The appointment of Dr. Djalal as Ambassador at Large for the Law of the Sea and Maritime Affairs in 1994, after he had completed his assignment in Bonn, lessened co-ordination problems in the Ministry because he could continuously monitor the workshop's preparations from Jakarta. However, his appointment renewed the dualism in the process because, from his new position, he could also steer the direction of the workshop process through his close contact with Minister Alatas. The contact created resentment amongst some Agency officials.[92] Initially, this was not too problematic because at the time of Dr. Djalal's appointment, the new Head of the Agency, Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad, who was at one time Dr. Djalal's deputy in the Agency, had been involved in the early process of the workshop. Mr. Rachmad served as Head of the Agency from 1994 to 1996, during that period, the Agency played a role more as secretariat for the workshop process and positioned itself during the workshops as an Organising Committee, concerned with procedural and administrative matters.[93] However, Mr. Rachmad's successors were not impressed with a secretarial role and their reactions swung between assertiveness and passivity from lack of interest. They were not very eager, for instance, to seek funding for the annual workshop from the Ministry of

Finance, and did not consider finalising the minutes of the workshop's proceeding on time was necessary. In fact, records of the proceedings have been valuable in identifying the position of the participants and could function as a basis to set a more effective strategy for the subsequent workshops.

As to assertiveness, some officials from the Agency also wanted to set the direction of the workshop from their standpoint, with minimal consultation with Dr. Djalal and the UBC.[94] This lack of consultation or co-ordination was observable in the proceedings of some workshops and in the messages put across by the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the Head of Agency in their speeches during the workshops. The opening remarks of the Minister, which were prepared by the Agency, played an important role during the workshops because they set the tone of the discussion, and the participants usually referred to these messages during the workshops. Therefore, co-ordination and consultation among the Indonesians about the salient points or messages that they wished the Minister to emphasise in his speech were essential. Failure or lack of consultation could create awkwardness among the Indonesians or increase suspicion among the participants about Indonesia's intentions. The following discussion provides two examples of the lack of prior consultation among the Indonesians and how it impacted on the informal workshop and meeting dynamics. The first one is concerned with the notion of formalising the informal workshop and the second one with the notion of synergy between the informal and formal tracks.

Minister Alatas, when delivering an opening remark to the Fourth Workshop in 1993, expressed his belief that the informal workshop should be formalised. He stated that "[g]overnments concerned may soon deem it desirable and timely to 'upgrade' the present Workshop format and to engage in a more formal Government-to-Government dialogue."[95] The suggestion prompted debates during the workshop sessions and, in particular, China was upset.[96] China was not in favour of formalising the workshop because of the status of Taiwan, and China's policy of discussing overlapping disputes in bilateral and not multilateral negotiations. Although there was a precedent for quasi formal co-operation in the region (APEC), wherein Taiwan was an active member, it was not clear why the Minister took up the issue when the workshop was still in the formative years.

The first three workshops produced a joint statement expressing agreement to present several recommendations to their governments, including not to use force in settling disputes and to explore areas for co-operation. Optimism followed this success but subsequent events showed that the participants lacked interest to upgrade the workshop format. In fact, when travelling to the capital cities of the participants in early 1992, Mr. Hadipranowo had asked the governments and authorities' opinion whether or not the workshop should be formalised, and most of them were against the upgrading of the workshops format.[97] The reason for the Agency inserting the idea into the Minister's speech was not clear. One source suggested that the Indonesians were interested in testing the reactions of the participants toward the idea within the group and they noted that the strongest opponents of the idea were Malaysia, Vietnam and China.[98] However, the issue put Dr. Djalal in a difficult position during the meeting. He had to explain to the meeting that the format would remain informal and that formalising the workshop actually meant two things "[the] recommendations translated into actual policies of the Governments involved, or by devising projects and programs participated in and executed by Governments."[99] Minister Alatas no longer raised the matter in his remarks during the ensuing workshops and when referring to the formalising issue, his position was similar to that of Dr. Djalal.

In 1997, Minister Alatas made a remark about finding a synergy between the "so-called 'first track diplomacy' within the ARF and ASEAN-China dialogue and 'the second track diplomacy' through the workshop process."[100] He believed that the two tracks could "reinforce each other to produce the best result for the peoples of the South China Sea area."[101] During the meeting's discussion, Dr. Syahperi reminded the participants about Minister Alatas's encouragement to find synergy between the two tracks. However, Dr. Syahperi was more interested in directing the participants to discuss the implementation aspect of the project proposal and to focus on aspects that had been agreed upon. He assured the participants that the business communities would be interested in translating the framework for co-operation identified by the participants into feasible business activities.[102] The appeal was in line with his earlier speech when he stated that "[the] Agency would undertake any necessary steps, within its competence and capacity, to communicate the findings of the Workshop to the interested parties in

the region and beyond."[103] Clearly, Dr. Syahperi was more interested in finding concrete activities from the workshops' process and had hoped that focusing on agreed issues could promise tangible results.

Focusing discussions on concrete activities has positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, the workshops could concentrate their energy and resources on realising tangible projects of co-operation to dismiss the criticism that the workshops had reached a plateau and become a talk-shop.[104] On the negative side, the workshops could become more tedious and too narrow with the discussion concentrating mainly on projects rather than on ideas. More discussion on projects was welcomed by some participants who were not very keen on seeing the workshops discuss political and security issues at length, but were prepared to discuss technical issues at length. For instance, in 1997 China tried to prevent the workshops from discussing territorial and sovereignty issues,[105] or from pondering the sensitive issue of a code of conduct in the South China Sea. Prof. Xu Guangjian, Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, maintained that the workshop had no mandate to discuss a code of conduct in the South China Sea.[106] This position was also asserted in the Ninth Workshop in 1998. China wished the workshops to confine their discussions to technical aspects of co-operation in the South China Sea.

China's strategy put the Indonesians in an awkward position because the Indonesian team did not voice a coherent perspective during the workshop. Some were vocal on the project implementation issue and others took the 'balancing position' by preferring the workshop to ponder on the implementation of the projects and politico-security issues. For his part, Dr. Djalal was striving to win support from the participants to let the workshop discuss the politico-security issues, especially the code of conduct in the South China Sea. For Dr. Djalal, the concept of synergy - floated by Minister Alatas based on the draft's speech prepared by the Agency - meant that the second track was the appropriate forum to explore and discuss some sensitive issues which the formal track had been unable to do. Obviously, Dr. Djalal was eager to explore the possibility of the workshops developing a code of conduct in the South China Sea because he was not very optimistic about the implementation of the project in the immediate

future. The respective governments' support for implementing projects approved at the 1994 and 1995' workshops was not forthcoming.

Dr. Djalal's persistence on the politico-security issue, and Dr. Syahperi's repetitive call to focus on implementing the projects, were not well received by some participants, especially those who had misgivings about Indonesia's intentions. China perceived the discussion on a regional code of conduct as Indonesia's effort to restrain China from asserting its claim in the South China Sea, whereas in terms of project implementation, some participants, including Malaysia, thought that Indonesia wanted to benefit economically from the project.[107] Such misgivings about Indonesia's intention in the workshops were unavoidable and, as previously noted, were added to by the Indonesian's failure to consult among themselves prior to the workshop.[108]

3.3. The dynamics of informal workshop, and ways and means to develop co-operation and confidence-building measures

The previous discussion attempted to highlight the internal dynamics of the Indonesians and argued that the internal dynamics influenced the way the Ministry conducted its diplomatic initiatives. The following discussion addresses the dynamics of the workshops from the standpoint of the objectives of informal diplomacy, that is, to develop co-operation among the disputants and the littoral states without prejudicing the overlapping claims. The other objective of informal workshop was to develop confidence-building measures among the disputants so that they would hesitate to use military means to settle their differences. Thus, the intention was to avoid or prevent military conflicts.

As mentioned earlier, the idea to hold a workshop stemmed from concern about possible open conflicts due to overlapping claims of territorial jurisdiction. By the time Indonesia initiated the workshop, there was no other forum in the region which addressed the South China Sea issue. Due to its informality, the workshop provided a unique opportunity for representatives from all claimant states and Taiwan to meet and look for areas of possible co-operation. The objective of developing co-operation would only materialise if the participants were

committed to the endeavours and were prepared to explore the subject during their meetings.

Indonesia identified some topics of discussions during the workshops with the aim of linking the objectives of the informal diplomacy and the ideal function of the workshops (that is, as a 'policy initiating' forum). The topics, which were discussed in separate sessions, covered a range of issues: (1) resource management; (2) shipping, navigation and communication; (3) environment, ecology and scientific research, (4) political and security issues; (5) territorial and jurisdictional issues; (6) institutional mechanisms for co-operation; and (7) claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands.[109] Discussion on less controversial issues, such as navigation and environment, were more intensive because co-operation among participants was likely. In contrast the participants also addressed, although en-passant, politico-security issues and territorial claims. The discussion of controversial issues was to develop confidence-building measures among the claimant states and concerned countries. At least each of the participants would understand what the concerns of the other participants were.

Over the period of eleven years, the workshop discussions revolved around the above seven topics. In that period, the workshops had two distinctive characteristics. First, after the setting up of several technical working groups, the status of the workshop had been elevated. Workshop participants not only received the reports and assessed the recommendations made by the technical working groups, but also gave their political considerations. The workshops also provided the working groups with mandates on issues that the groups were allowed to explore. Second, with the creation of a number of working groups, from the Fourth Workshop (in 1993) onward, discussions of political and security issues were gradually set aside. Similarly, the topics of Spratly and Paracel issues and, at a later stage, confidence-building measures, were taken off the workshop agendas.

Hence, on the one hand, the workshops were characterised by some participants' efforts to politicise the technical issues of the project proposals. They prevented the implementation of projects in the South China Sea by arguing that the

sovereignty status of the territory had not yet been decided. On the other hand, some participants de-politicised the workshops by stressing that the workshops had no mandate to discuss political issues, including confidence-building measures. China, for instance, argued that the workshops themselves were already a manifestation of confidence-building measures. The following discussion further explores these matters and assesses how Indonesia dealt with the problems, as well as what strategies Indonesia used during the workshop process.

3.3.1. The informal workshop: settings and the strategy Indonesia developed

Basically, the informal workshop was a kind of multilateral or conference diplomacy. The implication of this was that the setting of the workshops, including the meeting arrangements, proceedings, and systems governing the decision making, followed the normal practice of conference diplomacy. The particular distinction of the informal workshop was that no flags were placed on the conference table because of the sensitivity concerning Taiwan's status. Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy by combining the diplomatic skills of some Indonesian diplomats, including persuasion and negotiation skills as well as their knowledge of the issues involved. Indonesia also relied on the expertise of some resource persons, mostly from Canada, who were familiar with the issues or with similar disputes in different regions in the world. To influence the dynamics of the workshops, Indonesia gave special attention to several factors such as the selection of meeting venues, the arrangement of meeting agenda, and the development of strategy during the workshops' process.

Indonesia paid particular interest to the workshop venues. During the workshops' series, meetings were held in places which had significant values, either directly or indirectly to the issues involved, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister would highlight the significance of the venues during his opening remarks. For instance, Bandung, the venue for the Second Workshop, was hailed as the city where the Asian-African Conference took place in 1955 (which declared the Ten Principles including the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes). With other venues, such as Jakarta, Batam and Balikpapan, there was an emphasis on their strategic location next to the South China Sea.

The opening remarks of the Indonesian Foreign Minister were designed to play an important role in the workshop process, and to stimulate discussion during the workshops, especially if the speech touched on sensitive issues. In most cases, the speech did set the tone of the workshops and was usually referred to by the participants during their discussions. When submitting the draft to the Minister, officials provided an accompanying letter that explained the rationale behind the messages and indicated some points that they thought should be emphasised. Although in the end it was the Minister who decided on the merit of messages, the Minister often included the messages. Another way to stimulate the discussion was by developing a strategy of structuring the discussion including assigning some participants to lead the discussions and to jointly chair the sessions of the meetings. The Canadians and other nationalities who sat as a panel of experts also contributed to the discussions by providing an alternative point of view on the subjects being discussed or by giving background information on the topic, from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Examples of these were the discussion on the joint development concept and, at a later stage of the workshop series, on the zones of co-operation models involving several countries in different regions.

The overall workshop setting was also designed to optimise the time available during the workshop. When they came to the workshops, the participants were already aware of the agenda, and had learned beforehand who would present a paper or lead the discussion. In arranging the agenda, Indonesia, if possible, tabled the sensitive issues for the later discussions in order to limit controversy and debate. It became a convention that the participants discussed the controversial issues such as territorial claims, after they had discussed the less contentious issues at length. Another approach was to invite the claimant states to outline their territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea but, based on an agreement beforehand, no discussion was allowed on the presentation.[110] For instance, during the Second Workshop in Bandung (1991), after the presentation, the Chairman, Dr. Djalal, invited views from participants on the "feasible co-operative arrangements that could be undertaken independently of the resolution of territorial disputes."[111]

During the exchange of views in Bandung (1991), participants identified a number of areas for possible co-operation. In particular, they agreed to recommend to their respective governments, and to the appropriate institutions in their respective countries, three proposals for scientific co-operation proposed by China and one proposal made by the Philippines. China suggested conducting scientific studies in the following areas: (1) a joint expedition to investigate natural phenomena in the South China Sea; (2) a joint study on the meteorological conditions in the South China Sea; and (3) a joint study on the promotion of the safety of navigation in the South China Sea. The Philippines proposed a more ambitious proposal in the form of a "joint petroleum evaluation study of an agreed area to assist in the assessment of hydrocarbon potential of that area."[112] Due to the sensitivity of the hydrocarbon issue, discussions on the Philippines' proposal (even under the Working Group of Resource Assessment) did not progress well. In contrast, China's proposals and proposals from other participants on marine scientific research suggested that the issues of scientific studies were less contentious, and therefore could generate more ideas.

Inviting participants to make recommendations was Indonesia's tactic for building a consensus for co-operation around the sensitive issues and was one of the main features of Indonesian diplomacy throughout the workshops. Indonesia hoped the participants and the respective governments would commit themselves to their own recommendations. However, the recommendations reached during the informal workshops were not always given immediate attention by the respective authorities, or some authorities simply did not want to follow up on the recommendations.

After the Bandung workshop in 1991, Indonesia was heartened by the numerous proposals of possible co-operation made by the participants, but in all cases there was a gap between proposing and implementing the proposal. China's proposal was one case. China's proposal for scientific co-operation invited curiosity. By making such a proposal, China had impressed other participants that she was taking part in the workshop in good faith. However, as evidenced in the following years, China's main intention in the workshops was seemingly to prevent co-operation in the South China Sea from materialising. In fact, China considered the

workshop process was moving very fast and in the process had tried to slow it down by way of opposing project implementations.[113] According to Dino Djalal, the designing and the completion of project proposal for co-operation in the South China Sea was "by no means an easy process: the drafting process for the proposals was marked constantly by foot-dragging, reluctance, indecision, inertia and resistance on the part of the claimants."[114]

China's tactic did limit Indonesia's ability to manoeuvre during the workshops. The consensus ruling of the workshops created difficulty for the workshops process to move forward, unless all the participants were agreeable and felt comfortable. As workshop convenor, Indonesia had to stick to group consensus and could not appear to be imposing its ideas on the participants. Indonesia had hoped that the participants would act more reasonably under 'group pressures' because it would be awkward to insist on a position when the other members of the group were prepared to make concessions. However, the group pressures did not influence some participants, for instance from China, who had to maintain their government position. To deal with the difficulty, Indonesia had also relied on the persuasion skills of the Indonesians involved in the undertakings and the approaches made by the Ministry at the governmental level.

3.3.2. Indonesia's efforts to stimulate progress in the informal workshops: the issues of participants lack of commitments and meeting procedures

In the eleven years of conducting the workshops, the various Indonesian embassies and some missions that the Ministry had sent to the participating countries were part of the overall diplomatic efforts to persuade the respective authority to support the project. An example of this occurred in January 1996, when Minister Alatas wrote letters to governments and authorities who had sent participants to the informal workshops. In the letter, he asked for support and contributions, either by providing expertise, technical assistance or financial support, to implement the projects agreed by the workshop participants. He asked his counterparts, the foreign ministers, "to take an active interest in the realization

of the agreed project proposals."[115] To give reason for his appeal, Minister Alatas highlighted the followings:

> Although the Workshop process is informal in nature and the participants, some of whom government officials, attend the meetings in their personal capacities, I am of the view that the Workshop process has been helpful in managing potential conflict in the South China Sea area and in the endeavour to convert it into potential for cooperation. Hence it deserves our support, especially since it has been widely appreciated throughout the world.[116]

To emphasise the significance of his appeal, Minister Alatas sent Dr. Djalal and the Director for Political Research of the Agency to the respective capitals to meet the foreign ministers and deliver the letter by hand. Dr. Djalal also used the opportunity of presenting the letter to explain the progress of the workshop process and to indicate on aspects which he believed the authority in each participant country might be able to contribute.[117] From their meetings with the foreign ministers, the envoys sent by Minister Alatas were able to observe and assess reactions from the foreign ministers. In their reports to Minister Alatas, they mentioned that with the exception of China and Malaysia, authorities from other countries and from Taiwan had indicated their willingness to help implement the projects.[118] Overall, the sending of special envoys was a calculated move by Indonesia to bring the matter to the highest attention in the respective capitals and to bypass the 'bureaucratic red tape'.

Success in bypassing the bureaucracy did not necessarily guarantee a positive response from the claimant states because they looked on the matter from their own interests. Not long after the visit, Indonesia received formal replies from some authorities of the claimant and littoral states. Except for Brunei and Singapore, the other authorities gave no firm commitments and only expressed 'statements of intent' for supporting project implementation. Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon of the Philippines, for instance, stated that "[w]e are now evaluating the extent and nature of Philippine contributions to them"[119] Similarly, Mr. Fredrick Chien of Taiwan stated to Minister Alatas that some authorities were discussing how they could participate and contribute to the projects and would contact Dr. Djalal as soon as they had reached a decision.[120] Singapore responded by mentioning that they would organise and finance the training of seafarers of the South China Sea states in Singapore, and also nominated the tide gauge at the

Raffles Lighthouse as a tidal monitoring station for project implementation purposes.[121] Moreover, Singapore's Foreign Minister shared Minister Alatas argument on the merit of implementing the projects and stated:

> I agree with the philosophy that we should seek ways to enhance cooperation amongst all those concerned with the South China Sea dispute, as this would lead to greater appreciation of the positions of each country on the matter.[122]

In contrast, Malaysia did not indicate in their letter whether or not they were considering the projects, only stating "Malaysian participants look forward to discussing the question of implementing the approved projects at the TWG on Marine Scientific Research scheduled to be held in Cebu, Philippines, 14-18 July, 1996."[123] In the letter, Malaysia's position was quite clear that they would not commit themselves and would rather have further discussion on the matters, that is, whether or not it was timely to implement the approved projects.

The lack of commitments by such governments made Indonesia's efforts to develop co-operation through projects implementation difficult. Similarly, in the workshops process itself, Indonesia could not adopt a different strategy other than to maintain the agreed format of consensus and the ideal of exploration of options. Indonesia could only stimulate discussion on possible co-operation in the South China Sea, but could not allow discussion on the main issue of overlapping territorial and jurisdictional claims. Indonesia did invite discussion on the Spratlys and Paracels issues during the Third Workshop in Yogyakarta (1992), and Dr. Djalal who chaired the session focused the discussion on three topics, namely: (1) clarification and possible definition of the specific area of dispute; (2) co-operative activities; and (3) dispute settlement.[124] Clearly, the intentions of the focused discussion were to set the parameters for possible future co-operation in the disputed areas and at the same time to test the preparedness of the claimant states to clarify their claims.

Not all participants were willing to engage in the focused discussion with some of the claimant states preferring to make their claim ambiguous. For example, China did not make it clear whether they claimed only the Spratly islands or the whole territorial waters of the South China Sea. As a consequence, the lack of clarity of the claims made it difficult for the workshops to suggest any area in the South

China Sea for joint development or joint co-operation. To avoid misapprehension about its attention to table the topic, Indonesia had made clear the intention of the discussion and had even prepared an annotated agenda for the participants prior to the meeting. In its explanation, Indonesia mentioned that the discussions were aimed at:[125]

1) defining the Spratly area over which the joint development could be undertaken;
2) defining the notion of 'Joint Development' in the Spratly area, whether this should include resources management and exploitation, either living or non living;
3) defining peaceful activities which would be allowed in the Spratly areas, such as freedom of navigation and communication, joint conduct of scientific research, joint action on search and rescue, and combating pollution and piracy as well as eliminating illicit drug traffic; and
4) defining the possibility of including non-claimant states in the South China Sea areas or outside it, and in what fields the non-claimants could participate.

The discussion on the topics was not very productive because some claimant states were not interested in clarifying their claim and were not prepared to talk about the issue of disputes settlement. They did exchange views on the topic of co-operative activities, but rendered no conclusive agreements on the issue. The participants only listed possible areas of co-operation, including environmental protection and marine research.[126] Although Indonesia had already anticipated this outcome, based on the preliminary visits by the Head of the Agency to the claimant states, it still proceeded with the discussions during the workshop.[127]

The decision to proceed did enable Indonesia to observe any shifts in position and to test participants' reaction towards divergence of opinions. In the end, Indonesia had to accept the reality that the issues surrounding possible co-operation in the overlapping areas were very sensitive. However, this did not stop Indonesia from looking for possible breakthroughs and had, in fact, come up with two alternative solutions. Dr. Djalal, based on his assessment of UNCLOS 1982, developed the first option of designating some areas in the South China Sea where no states could theoretically assert their claim. The second option was to propose

Indonesian territory in the South China Sea as an alternative area for project implementation.

In mid-1994, Dr. Djalal travelled around the capitals of the claimant states to discuss a proposal designating some areas in the South China Sea, based on UNCLOS 1982, for a joint development zone. He indicated in the proposal that within the designated areas there were a number of possible joint efforts that could take place, ranging from less sensitive issues, such as scientific research, search and rescue operation and marine parks to the harder subjects of prospecting and exploration of sea-bed resources.[128] Some claimant states were not interested in the proposal,[129] and China even asked Indonesia not to discuss the idea with other claimant states nor to raise it during the workshop. The proposal, known as 'the donut formula', reads as follows:

> If the 200 mile economic zone of each littoral country in the SC Sea area is measured from their baselines on the mainland or from the archipelagic baselines, then it could be visualised that a certain portion of the SC Sea (in the middle) would not fall into the economic zone of any country. If that is feasible, the 'donut' in the middle of the SC Sea could be used as the area for Joint Development Zone.[130]

The lack of commitment to the workshop process was one of the major obstacles for Indonesia in pursuing its informal diplomacy. Indonesia hoped that, at the least, commitment to the workshop process meant developing a sense of belonging or making the participants consider themselves as an important part of the whole process. To achieve this goal, Indonesia had to develop some tactics and, among others, it encouraged the participants to share the chairing of the workshops. From the Second Workshop in Bandung (1991) to the Fifth Workshop in Bukit Tinggi (1994) Indonesia shared the chairing of different sessions with a representative from one of the participating countries. Indonesia changed the tactic in 1995. From the Sixth Workshop in Balik Papan (1995) to the Ninth in Ancol (1008), the co-chairmen of the session were representatives from two participating countries.

However, Indonesia always chaired the last session in every workshop which adopted the workshop's statement. This was the most important session overall because it involved the formulation of statements that implied consensus. As a

consequence, the participants, at times, became involved in heavy debate about the formulation of some paragraphs in the statement and in this case the participants' diplomatic and legal backgrounds were their major assets. Their experience in diplomacy and familiarity with legal terms were a means to contest any draft paragraph in the workshop statement which did not suit their interest. On some substantive issues that Indonesia considered important, and which should be reflected in the final statement, the Indonesian Chair tried his best to have the meeting adopt the statement or at the least to adjust and not to delete the statement. This was not an easy task because the consensus ruling meant that all participants had to be satisfied with the paragraph's formulation.

For instance, during the Ninth Workshop in 1998, participants from China argued that the word 'develop' in paragraph 14 of the draft statement - which says 'to develop a regional code of conduct' - should not be used. Prof. Xu Guangjian, a retired Chinese diplomat with a background in law, stated that the word 'develop' implied a commitment and only a government can make a commitment.[131] He argued that the informal workshop had no authority to make a commitment and therefore the word 'develop' should be omitted from the statement. Dr. Djalal and Prof. Townsend-Gault, in their capacity as resource persons, as well as an Indonesian diplomat who served in the Legal Treaty Directorate provided their arguments on the importance of the paragraph.[132] After a lengthy discussion, the meeting reached a compromise formulation by replacing the word 'develop' with 'study and discuss'. The final formulation read as follows:

> Within the context of discussing confidence building measures, including guidelines and a code of conduct in the South China Sea, the participants agreed that *the 4th TWG-LM* [Technical Working Group on Legal Matters] *will continue to study and discuss this topic.*[133]

In such cases, the most that the Indonesian Chairman could do was to find an alternative word or phrase which suited all the participants, but which still carried an important message. Hence, the words 'study and discuss' implied that the participants remained committed to ponder on the 'code of conduct in the South China Sea' in the workshop process.

Another tactic used by Indonesia was to create two layers of meetings within the workshop process. Noting that participants to the workshop were mostly from the foreign ministry who lacked familiarity with the technical issues of the co-operation projects, Indonesia proposed the establishment of a working group meeting and an experts' group meeting to deal with the technical matters. This approach helped the process of producing recommendations as experts in such areas as environmental research appeared more concerned with issues of their expertise and not about the legal aspects of the overlapping claims. These experts' recommendations were later tabled during the workshops for participants to consider. Nevertheless, at times, some participants politicised the projects and the recommendations which, in effect, made it difficult to have the projects implemented. For instance, some participants argued that the recommendations to look for funding from non-regional countries and international organisations meant internationalisation of the South China Sea issue, and implementation of the projects was subject to the willingness of governments concerned.

The co-operation project thus reached an impasse because at issue was how to implement the project if government support was not forthcoming. Workshop participants supposedly conveyed all recommendations to their governments as policy inputs and Indonesia, from the very outset, had made clear that the workshop was not designed as a forum for academic discussion, but as a forum where participants in their private capacity could discuss policy inputs for their governments.[134] In this case, the policy inputs were the basis for co-operation.

The notion of policy inputs was shared by Minister Alatas in his opening speeches in two workshops in Bali (1990) and in Bandung (1991), but he also expected the informal process could "pave the way towards more formal, intergovernmental endeavours."[135] The Minister again raised the shift from informal to formal when he delivered his keynote addresses at the 4th, 7th and 8th workshops.[136] Although Mr. Alatas acknowledged the importance of gradualism in the workshop, he was concerned that the workshop might lose its raison d'être.[137] This concern was understandable considering that since the mid-1990s some of the participants had used the informality of the process as an excuse for not discussing some issues. For instance, as already noted, some participants maintained that the meeting

should not discuss the issue of a 'code of conduct in the South China Sea' because the topic fell under government jurisdiction. It can be implied that Mr. Alatas was concerned that mere discussion without guarantee that the governments would commit themselves to implementing the recommendations would be pointless.

In contrast, the supporters of gradualism maintained that the informal process was necessary to increase confidence among the participants and to develop the habit for dialogue. Dr. Djalal designed the workshops to move step by step and in the discussion gave priority to subjects which fulfilled several points: (a) agreement would be relatively easy to achieve; (b) as many states as possible could participate in them; (c) as many states as possible have an interest in them; and (d) co-operative relations with other governments or international/regional organisations could be worked out, particularly with necessary funding.[138] In this case, Dr. Djalal's prime concern was to create an inclusive environment through the gradual process of developing confidence and the level of comfort among the participants through discussing issues of common concern which were relatively less risky, such as environmental protection. In Dr. Djalal's view, a frank and open discussion would not take place unless the participants were feeling sufficiently at ease to express their opinion; informality would help create the atmosphere of openness.[139]

3.4. Competing interests and differing interpretations of the workshops: their impact on informal diplomacy

Indonesia's informal workshops invited curiosity not only from the states involved in the workshops, but also from non-participating countries and political analysts. The curiosity ranged from questioning the motives or suspecting Indonesian intentions, to expecting that the diplomatic initiative could contribute to a more predictable interrelationship among the claimant states. This range of reactions was not surprising because Indonesia was dealing with six claimant states and each had a different expectation of the workshop process and a different perception of Indonesia as the meeting's initiator. The Philippines and Vietnam, for instance, expected that through the workshop the South China Sea issue could be internationalised, whereas China and Malaysia did not want this to happen.

Both China and Malaysia were proposing that the solution to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea issue should be done in bilateral discussions and not multilateral discussions. Taiwan had hoped that the workshop could serve its interest of recognition, but its bid to host some of the meetings within the ambit of the workshop had always been rejected by China. Having claimed the least areas in the Spratlys, Brunei took part in the workshop to show solidarity with ASEAN and, especially, with Indonesia.[140] Hence, the accumulation of expectations and perceptions also influenced the participants' eagerness to follow up on agreements reached, or recommendations proposed during the workshops to their respective governments or authorities.

Indonesia had to deal with the problem of bridging the outputs of the informal workshops with the formal system of governance. Even if the participants were willing to follow up the outcomes of the workshops with their government, the respective governments had no obligation to implement the recommendations. The consequence of the informality of the workshop was that its resolution was not binding but Indonesia had hoped that the participating countries would show good faith and be willing to co-operate to realise the workshops' outcomes.

The following discussion considers the issue of differing expectations and also attempts to identify the numerous interpretations of the workshop itself, especially by examining some analysts' points of view. The differing interpretations reveal that the Indonesians were, at times, not sure about their approach and this was mainly caused by their desire to appear neutral throughout, to treat all the participants equally and to adhere to the principles governing the workshop, especially that of decision by consensus. Although neutrality is a matter of perception and difficult to judge, Indonesia was very cautious in upholding its image as a neutral party, having no claims in the area and, therefore, being a non-partisan in the territorial disputes.

Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives were based on its desire to have a peaceful and stable regional environment, especially for its economic development program. In exercising its diplomatic initiatives, Indonesia was very cautious about how the parties in the conflicts or disputes would perceive its neutrality in the issue

involved. In dealing with internal conflicts, the Cambodian conflict and the separatism problem in the southern-part of the Philippines, Indonesia could project an image as a neutral third party. In the South China Sea disputes, Indonesia's efforts to appear neutral and disinterested in issues involved in the disputes were handicapped by its position in the Natuna Islands.[141] Some claimant states questioned Indonesia's neutrality and Indonesia, at times, experienced difficulty in projecting an image as an 'honest broker.' Indonesia's major asset was that it claimed none of the islands in the South China Sea.

Both Malaysia and China were suspicious of Indonesia's motives for the workshops. Malaysia resented Indonesia for projecting its leadership in the region through taking a diplomatic initiative, and China was worried that Indonesia wished to internationalise the issue.[142] China was against the internationalisation of the disputes. China maintained that the South China Sea was a regional problem and non-regional countries as well as international organisations should not be involved in the issue. China was very critical of any attempt by Indonesia to involve non-regional countries or international organisations in the workshop process. China's reluctance to support the possible participation of non-regional states and regional as well as international organisations in the workshop process was reflected during the discussion of the issue during the Fifth Workshop in Bukittinggi, in 1994.[143] China's position had backtracked from the workshop's earlier consensus in 1993 to invite other regional and global organisations, as necessary, to be involved and participate in the realisation of specific projects.[144] In this case, the words 'as necessary' could constrain the possible involvement of non-regional countries as well as regional and global organisations because, during the workshop process, China maintained that their involvement was not necessary. China's position had hardened further by the Ninth Workshop in 1998, when it was even critical of the participation of a representative from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the workshop as a resource person.[145]

Indonesia was aware of China's sensitivity about the internationalisation of the South China Sea issue and also that China suspected it of having a grand design to internationalise the South China Sea issue. China's suspicions of Indonesia were

inevitable because China, apparently, resented the inclusion of the South China Sea issue in the final document of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit, in Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, under the chairmanship of Indonesia. Although China considered Indonesia accountable for the affair, Indonesia only knew about such feeling two years after the NAM Summit. On May 1994, the Deputy Head of Indonesian Mission in the UN was informed by his counterpart that during the NAM Summit, China was actually against the inclusion of a paragraph on South China Sea issue in the final document. But China had not expressed any reservations then because China's status was as an observer and it wished to uphold the renewed bilateral relationship between the two countries. In this regard, the Deputy Head of China Mission in the UN asked Indonesia's assistant to drop the reference on the issue during the NAM Ministerial Meeting in Cairo 1994.[146]

As mentioned above, Malaysia was apprehensive about Indonesia playing a leading role in regional initiatives. To impress the workshop's participants that Indonesia had ulterior motives behind its initiative, Malaysia, at times, questioned Indonesia's neutrality by referring to the Natuna issue. Indonesia was perplexed by Malaysia's attitude[147] and as a consequence Indonesia always repeated its objectives at all times during the workshops series. The suspicion also made Indonesia very cautious when running the workshop. For instance, Indonesia did not want the claimant states to think that Indonesia had a concealed agenda, such as securing its position in the Natunas or benefiting from the joint development project in the South China Sea. In principle, Malaysia had taken a similar position to China, that is, favouring bilateral rather then multilateral negotiations. Although not as vocal as China, Malaysia's response to the involvement of non-regional countries in the workshop process was cautious and it opposed internationalising the issues.[148]

Indonesia's interest in involving non-regional countries and other regional and international organisations was shared by the Philippines and Vietnam, but for differing reasons. To a certain extent, Indonesia believed that the participation of non-regional countries in the projects was essential because the realisation of the agreed projects, on bio-diversity and sea level and tide monitoring as well as co-

operation on information exchange, were subject to the availability of funds. The failure of the workshop to generate funds from the participating countries could be seen as demonstrating either a lack of interest from some participating countries to implement the agreed projects or simply that they did not yet consider the projects as a national priority. Other than Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam, no other participating countries were offering to contribute more funds. For Indonesia, the implementation of the projects was important because it indicated that the workshop had moved forward into concrete activities. This is why Indonesia was willing to search for alternative sources of funding.

Indonesia looked to non-regional countries and international organisations for funding for two reasons. First, Indonesia had anticipated difficulty in raising funds from the participating countries because the workshop decisions and suggestions were not binding, and it was up to the discretion of each individual participant to recommend to their respective authorities to consider the workshop's recommendations seriously. During the Fourth Workshop, in 1993, Indonesia appealed to the participants to display more confidence in the process so that their respective authorities would be willing to finance the projects and to consider possible funding from interested parties from outside the region.[149] The belief that the participating countries would not give immediate attention to the workshop's recommendations, or show a willingness to finance the project, was proven during the Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan, in 1995. During that workshop, except for Vietnam and the Philippines no other participants were prepared to commit their authorities to funding the bio-diversity project.[150]

Secondly, by securing funding from a third party, Indonesia had hoped that the workshops' participants would have no reason to block the project's implementation. Unfortunately, Indonesia soon learned of the difficulty in finding a third party willing to finance the overall budget of the project. For instance, during the Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan, in 1995, Dr. Hasjim Djalal informed the meeting that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was willing to finance the project as long as the respective governments approved the project. The UNDP also requested that respective government should also indicate how they would contribute to the project.[151] The condition set by UNDP posed a

difficulty for the realisation of the workshop because the participating countries failed to follow up the UNDP's requests, despite being aware of them before the workshop in Balikpapan. Ironically, Dr. Hasjim Djalal did not unilaterally approach the UNDP. He approached the UNDP with the mandate from the Fifth Workshop in Bukittinggi in 1994 to seek support and funding, especially for the bio-diversity project.[152]

The participating countries' lack of enthusiasm in following up their agreement reached in 1994 provided the Indonesians with another lesson of internal communication failure. The Research and Development Agency of the Ministry was not aware until late April 1995 that the participants had not yet followed up their agreements, such as (1) providing Dr. Djalal with names of focal points with whom the co-ordinators on fisheries (Thailand), hydrocarbon resources (Indonesia) and non-hydrocarbon non-living resources (Vietnam) should co-operate; and (2) nominating a marine science expert who could be called upon to redraft the project proposal based on inputs from potential donors. On the latter, the workshop participants had also agreed in Bukittinggi to submit names of their nominating marine science experts to Dr. Djalal no later than 31 January 1995.[153] Any delay would affect the chain of activities because, in some cases, a prompt reply to a potential donor's query should be taken up before the following workshop. Indonesia would have difficulty proposing an expert meeting to respond to queries if the participating countries had not given Indonesia the names of their contact person.

In Bukittinggi the participants had implicitly assigned Dr. Djalal and his research centre (the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies) to act as an anchor in the implementation stage of the workshop process. On the one hand, the assignment of Dr. Djalal could solve the problem surrounding the issue of establishing a kind of mechanism to supervise the project's implementation. Undoubtedly, some participants were not willing to support the creation of a new structure or mechanism because they were afraid that a structure would lead to the formalising of the workshop process, an idea that had been floated by Minister Alatas in his opening remarks in Surabaya, during the Fourth Workshop.[154] Indonesia was then narrowing the issue by emphasising that it was not the workshop process which

was being formalised, but the agreed projects. Hence, formalisation in this case was defined "by either having the Workshop's recommendations translated into actual policies of the Governments involved, or by devising projects and programs participated and executed by Governments."[155]

On the other hand, it turned out that Dr. Djalal and the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies he led had difficulty acting as an anchor when dealing with the participating countries. Dr. Djalal found himself in the awkward position of having to send a letter to the governments requesting them to follow up the agreement reached by their representatives during the informal workshop. Dr. Djalal, in his capacity as Ambassador at Large for the Law of the Sea and Maritime Affairs, faced no such dilemma when he sent letters to some non-regional countries and international organisations to request their assistance for the project. In fact, he had referred in his letter of the mandate given by the workshop to him to look for potential sources of funding.[156] However, this was not the case when dealing with the participating countries who seemingly preferred the formal channel of communication through the Foreign Ministry, and in the case of the Indonesian workshop, the Research Agency of the Ministry. To cope with this difficulty, Dr. Djalal wrote to the Head of the Agency, Mr. Rachmad, in April 1995 to request the Head urgently follow up the matter with the respective authorities of the participating countries.[157]

This indicated a communication failure among the Indonesians. Apparently, the Agency was of the opinion that Dr. Djalal would act as the focal point in the implementation stage and was fully in charge of following up all the agreements reached in Bukittinggi. However, it was unclear why they did not bother to check with Dr. Djalal on the progress of the projects after Bukittinggi. Likewise, it was also unclear why Dr. Djalal did not notify the Agency earlier if respective governments and authorities had not contacted him on time. This communication problem somewhat influenced the discussion during the Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan, in 1995, because almost all the participants were not prepared to discuss their governments' latest position on the project proposals in depth. In that meeting, they requested more time to consult with the appropriate authorities in their respective countries.

Although Indonesia was seeking assistance from international organisations and non-regional countries for funding, Indonesia was also not too naïve to realise that the involvement of these actors implied internationalisation of the workshop and the issue involved. These actors were interested in supporting the projects not mainly for altruistic reasons, but because they had interests in the region, such as for peace and stability.[158] Dr. Djalal did not object to this aspect of the internationalisation of the South China Sea issue, but maintained that that was not the intention of the workshop. However, the workshop process had helped generate international interests on the issue and increased their concern of the danger posed by the overlapping claims.[159] Thus, internationalisation was the implication or logical consequence of the workshop process.[160] In contrast, both the Philippines and Vietnam favoured internationalising the issue and wished to steer the workshop process toward that direction.

Due to the relative weakness of its military, the Philippines had relied on diplomacy to secure its claim in the South China Sea. The Indonesian workshop was one of the arenas where the Philippines was striving to win its case. The early indication of its attempt to generate international interest on the issue through the workshop process became clear when the Philippines hosted the scientific meeting on marine research in Manila, in 1993. During the Third Workshop in Yogyakarta, in 1992, the participants had agreed "to establish two working groups consisting of experts, to prepare and, after approval by governments, organise joint activities [on resource assessment and ways of development and marine scientific research]."[161] Seeing an opportunity to further highlight the South China Sea issue - after being successful in convincing the ASEAN countries to proclaim the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 1992 in Manila - the Philippines decided to host the Working Group meeting in Manila.

However, the decision was made unilaterally without consulting Indonesia, who had initiated the workshop process, or the UBC who was responsible for funnelling the funds from CIDA. The Indonesians and the Canadians learned about the Philippines' intention through the Canadian Embassy in Manila which had received a request from the Philippines Government for funding from CIDA

for the planned working group meeting in Manila in late 1992.[162] Dr. Djalal who was in Manila in mid-October 1992 had to clarify the procedure in organising any meeting within the ambit of the workshop process to the Philippines Government. He emphasised that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry should first seek agreement from the participants that the Philippines organise the meeting.[163] Dr. Djalal raised the issue of participants' consent with the Philippines because he had learned that some participating countries had indicated reservations about Manila as the venue for the meeting.

The consultation process between Indonesia and the participants took some time, and the Philippines initial plan to have the meeting in late 1992 had to be postponed until May 1993. To avoid further complication, in March 1993, the Philippines assigned a senior diplomat to Jakarta to consult with Mr. Hadipranowo, the Head of the Agency, about the substantive and technical aspects of the meeting. During their discussion, Ambassador J.A. Zaide Jr. (Acting Assistant Secretary for Asia and Pacific) mentioned that in financing the meeting, the Philippines planned to ask for third party funding, including from Japan. In response, Mr. Hadipranowo suggested the Philippines consult with other participants about the plan, because the general understanding was that the host and CIDA would be responsible for the cost of the meeting.[164] In the end, the Philippines did not pursue its plan, but they intentionally organised the technical meeting, from 30 May to 3 June 1993, in a high profile manner, to the fullest media exposure.[165] Clearly, the media coverage of the meeting was a means for the Philippines to generate international interest in the South China Sea issue.

The international interest in the South China Sea issue and the workshop process were important for the Philippines as internationalisation was a means to ensure the continuation of the interests and the workshop. The expectation was implied in Foreign Minister Romulo's opening remark to the meeting in Manila, when he mentioned "[t]the multilateral process [that is, the workshop] is very fragile, and significant unilateral actions by claimant states may terminate it before it has a chance to succeed."[166] In fact, internationalisation became a major tool for the Philippines in dealing with the potential threat from China in the South China Sea, especially during the Mischief Reef incidents. In 1995, as already noted, the

Philippines had tried to galvanise ASEAN's support and in particular through ASEAN Ambassadors in Manila who were briefed and continuously informed about developments.[167]

During the ASEAN Senior officials meeting in Singapore, in March 1995, based on the initiatives of the Philippines, ASEAN officials supported the issuing of the 'Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea.' The tone of the Statement was in favour of the Philippines, such as calling the disputants to refrain from taking actions that could destabilise the region. This statement was, obviously, directed against China. In Singapore, the Philippines had anticipated ASEAN's support from two factors. First the media campaign had successfully cornered China as the main culprit in the affair, and had raised international concern about a possible armed clash in the region as a result of China's assertive policy. Secondly, the Philippines had activated high level diplomacy in ASEAN capitals, through sending a special representative.

An example of this was the visit by a high level Philippines' diplomat to Jakarta in February 1995. On 14 February, Ambassador Lauro L. Baja, Jr. (Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs) arrived in Jakarta to consult the Ministry's Director General for Political Affairs about the incident. Indonesia was informed that the decision to send Ambassador Baja to Indonesia was because Indonesia was taking the lead in discussing the territorial disputes through the workshop.[168] During the discussion, Ambassador Izhar Ibrahim, the Director General for Political Affairs, expressed support for the Philippines' efforts to find a peaceful solution to its bilateral dispute with China. He asked the Philippines to consider their decision very carefully, based on the available options, and also to consider the likely impact of such a decision among others to the workshop process.[169] During the Second Mischief Reef incident in 1998, the Philippines failed to win support from the ASEAN countries. This time, the Philippines did not send any representative to ASEAN capitals.[170]

Vietnam also shared the Philippines' desire to maintain international interest in the region. As a victim of China's military assertiveness in the South China Sea in 1974 and in 1988, Vietnam had no other option than to raise its cause at the

international level.[171] Realising the strength of China's military power, Vietnam was not willing to engage in another military confrontation in the South China Sea and thus face the prospect of losing another stronghold in the area. Hence, Vietnam preferred to use diplomacy as a means to assert its claim and the workshop was one diplomatic forum in which it could do this. The workshops also provided Vietnam with an opportunity to internationalise its disputes over the Paracels with China and, according to Dino Djalal, Vietnam wished "to keep the issue alive in international scene."[172]

The informal workshops were successful in generating international interest in the South China Sea issue and raised international awareness of the potential for armed conflict in the Southeast Asian region due to overlapping claims. The workshops had also invited curiosity from a number of analysts who attempted to make sense of Indonesian informal diplomacy. Some analysts argued that the workshops were a kind of regime creation,[173] or an effort to develop functional co-operation.[174] Others suggested that the informal workshops were aimed at containing China or, in a rather modest interpretation, the intention of the workshops was actually to embrace China into ASEAN's way of interaction.[175] The numerous interpretations implied two things: (1) the workshops aims were rather vague and therefore subject to different interpretations, and (2) the analysts were suspicious of Indonesia and therefore they attempted to construct the motive behind the informal diplomacy.

The differing interpretations of the workshops gave Indonesia no alternative other than to argue at all times that the main objective of the workshops was not to solve the territorial disputes but to "transform potential sources of conflict into constructive forms of co-operation for mutual benefit."[176] Indonesia also emphasised that in the workshops the participants had to identify areas of possible co-operation and produce policy inputs for their respective authorities. Interactions among the participants of the workshops would, hopefully, increase confidence and create an atmosphere conducive "for peaceful cooperation and negotiation in addressing potential conflict-situations."[177] Thus, the Indonesian workshops had, in fact, a three-pronged objective: to promote co-operation, to develop confidence-building measures, and to develop networking among the

littoral states and the regional countries. The networking was the logical consequence of the participants' interactions over the eleven years of the workshops process.

VI.4. Conclusion

The triangular relationship, between the Research Agency of the Ministry, Dr. Djalal and the research centre he established (the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies) and CIDA was indeed a unique case in Indonesian diplomacy in which Canada had continuously supported Indonesian diplomatic activities, albeit indirectly through one of its universities (the UBC). In theory, the arrangement made by Indonesia of the three major players in the process was an ideal one because it combined the aspects of formal institution, expertise, and financial back up. In practice, the diplomatic initiatives encountered problems of dualism and co-ordination as well as, at times, a lack of interest in the workshop process. The latter was the result of the Agency's detachment from the substantive aspects of the workshops.

Nevertheless, the political dimension of the issue also put constraints on an open and frank discussion among the participants, especially because some of the participants were diplomats representing their country. Indonesia did tailor the workshop to meet the differing interests of the parties to the disputes in order to get the process moving and to maintain the commitment of the parties. Indonesia tried also to be more creative in designing the workshops, such as in the setting of the workshops' agenda and in conducting the meetings. At the same time, Indonesia also accommodated some of the demands made by the participants in order to assure their participation, and followed the ground rules set up by the workshop's participants, such as making decision by consensus. Although the workshops did benefit from these approaches, progress stalled if the participants disagreed with the proposals or even some of the topics for discussion, such as joint development in the South China Sea.

From their engagement in the workshop process from 1990 to 1998, the participants had got to know their counterparts in the undertakings, and were

aware of which issues were acceptable or unacceptable to various participants. This acquaintance and knowledge at interpersonal level was an asset as well as a liability. On the one hand, at the least, in the region there was a group of individuals who were attached to the workshop process and had extensive knowledge of the issues based on their participation in the workshops or the experts meetings. Some countries, such as China and Malaysia, often sent the same person every year. On the other hand, the participants became reluctant to raise issues that they knew would be vetoed by some claimant states, and records show that China tended to veto more often than other participants.

Notes

[1] According to Ian Townsend-Gault, Canada International Development Agency (CIDA) "contribution to any meeting usually accounts for less than half of the total cost; many regional authorities send (and therefore pay for) additional participants or observers." See Ian Townsend-Gault, "Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 20, No. 2, August 1998, footnote 24, pp. 189-190.

[2] After the financial crises in 1998, the Ministry gave priority to winning international confidence to improve Indonesia's domestic situation. The novel idea of managing potential conflict in the South China Sea was not too appealing to some of the Ministry officials.

[3] See Hasjim Djalal, "Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: In Search of Cooperation", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Second Quarter 1990, p. 127.

[4] See Ted L. McDorman, "The South China Sea Islands Dispute in the 1990s – A New Multilateral Process and Continuing Friction", *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1993, p. 267.

[5] Hasjim Djalal states "[s]trategically, the control over the islands would give the controlling States tremendous power over the stability of the South China Sea area, since the islands straddle the routes of international sea and air communications." Hasjim Djalal, *Indonesia and the Law of the Sea* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1995), p. 375.

[6] A. James Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute, Stanford University, 1989), p. 88.

[7] Chi-kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 11.

[8] From the point of view of military strategy, the sea-lanes in the South China Sea are of importance for surveillance, interdiction of battle ship, and for naval manoeuvring. See Asnani Usman and Rizal Sukma, *Konflik Laut Cina Selatan: Tantangan Bagi ASEAN* [*The South China Sea conflict: a challenge for ASEAN*] (Jakarta: CSIS, 1997), p. 25.

[9] See "Cam Ranh Bay Manoeuvres", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 December 2000 – 2 January 2001, p. 21.

[10] See Usman and Sukma, op cit., p. 32.

[11] Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao and Roland Dannreuther, *The Strategic Implications of China's Energy Needs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 78. Adelhpi Paper 346.

[12] On living and marine resources of the South China Sea, and the importance of maintaining their sustainability, see Aprilani Sugiarto, "The South China Sea: Its Ecological Features and Potentials for Developing Cooperation", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Second Quarter 1990, pp. 116-126. Alan Dupont quoted China's Geology and Minerals Resources Ministry's estimation that "the Spratlys area holds 17.7bn tons of oil and natural-gas reserves, considerably more than Kuwait's 13bn." Alan Dupont, *The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 31. Adeplhi Paper 319. In contrast, Ian Townsend-Gault argues that the hydrocarbons potential in that Sea has not yet substantiated with evidence of oil struck. See Townsend-Gault, "Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea", pp. 171-190.

[13] Kent E. Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific* (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 1996), p. 8. However, Alastair Iaian Johnston, quoted in Philip Andrews-Speed et al., argues that energy security is not the key factor behind China's strategic ambitions towards the South and East China Seas. He argues that what he termed as 'hyper-sovereignty values' which "dominate the thinking and behaviour of China's ruling elite" rule out compromise over key territorial and sovereignty claims. Andrews-Speed, Liao and Dannreuther, op cit., p. 81.

[14] See Roderick O'Brien, *South China Sea Oil: Two Problems of Ownership and Development*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997). O'Brien provided an early work in analysing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which was known in the mid-1970s, vis-à-vis the growing interest for offshore oil operations. He also explained some established practices in solving the disputes and production co-operation between the state and foreign oil companies.

[15] In 1992, American 'flag company' Crestone signed an agreement with China National Offshore Oil Corporation to jointly prospect and explore hydrocarbons in the South China Sea, but Vietnam claimed that the area is located in its continental shelf. The controversy following the signing of the agreement left Crestone with no other option other than to postpone the contract all together. See Daniel J. Dzurek, *Southeast Asia Offshore Oil Disputes*, Paper presented at a seminar entitled "Island and Maritime Disputes of South East Asia", the University of London, 10 May 1993. In Indonesia's case, for instance, before signing an agreement to develop gas resources in Natuna Islands in the South China Sea, Exxon (an American company) demanded assurances that the area was free from other countries' claims. See Daojiong Zha and Mark J. Valencia, "Mischief Reef: Geopolitics and Implications", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2001, p. 95 and also Gregor, op cit., p. 103.

[16] See Esmond Smith, Jr. "China's Aspiration in the Spratly Islands", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1994, p. 289 and also *The Straits Times*, 23 July 1992. China's claim of the sea as its inland waters is stipulated in Article 2 of its 'Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone' promulgated in 1992. The article stated that "[t]he waters on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial seas of the People's Republic of China constitute the internal waters of the People's Republic of China." See *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta, 28 June to 2 July 1992*, pp. 23-4. Undated. Annex Q, p. 204. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[17] See "Oil-Rich Diet: Beijing is asked to explain its maritime appetite", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 April 1995, p. 28.

[18] "Further efforts needed to strengthen future RI-China ties", *Jakarta Post*, 18 December 1999. http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?. Accessed, 2 October 2002.

[19] Based on cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, 21 June 1995. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[20] In September 1996, Indonesian armed forces engaged in high profile military exercises around the Natuna Islands involving around 20,000 armed forces with tactical support by 54 aircraft and 27 naval vessels. The military exercise was also aimed at convincing foreign investors that Indonesia would defend their investment in gas fields around the Natuna Islands. One senior Indonesian Admiral recommended in 1995 that the strategic importance of hydrocarbon exploration in Natuna for Indonesia's national development made it imperative for Indonesia to display its forces around the area. Rear Admiral Dalam Sinuraya, *Pengamanan Proyek LNG Natuna dalam Rangka Meningkatkan Ketahanan Nasional* [*Securing LNG's project for the sake of increasing national resilience*] (Jakarta: Lemhanas, 1995), p. 86. For internal use of Lemhanas.

[21] Based on a cable from the Indonesian Embassy in Hanoi, 21 December 1987. Archive - Puskom Deplu. Despite Vietnam's concern, Indonesia and Malaysia held the military exercise as planned in early 1988.

[22] Derek da Cunha has stated that "extended military conflict over the Spratlys could affect shipping traffic in the South China Sea, and which would naturally impact on Singapore, as it is heavily dependent on maritime commerce as its lifeblood." Derek da Cunha "Defence and Security: Evolving Threat Perceptions" in Derek da Cunha (ed.) *Singapore in the New Millennium* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002), pp. 136.

[23] Chulacheeb Chinwanno, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: A Thai Perspective", in Carolina G. Hernandez and Ralph Cossa (eds.), *Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Perspectives from Asia-Pacific* (Quezon City: ISDS, 1997), p. 39.

[24] Editorial, *Bangkok Post*, 12 May 1997. Also, Chulacheeb Chinwanno from Thammasat University in Bangkok argues that Thailand has friendly relations with all parties to the dispute (especially China) and with members of ASEAN. He also states that, if asked by the disputants, Thailand could act as mediator in the disputes. Chinwanno, ibid, p. 40.

[25] Statement by former Assistant Secretary Winston Lord before the US Congress, 27 June 1995. Quoted from Claude A. Buss, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: A United States Perspective", in Carolina G. Hernandez and Ralph Cossa (eds.), op cit, p. 185.

[26] Seminar's proceedings entitled *Forum Dialogue II Tentang Politik dan Keamanan Regional dalam Era Pasca Perang Dingin*, Yogyakarta, 8-10 Januari 1996 [*The second dialogue forum on the Post-Cold War political and security issues in the region, Yogyakarta, 8-10 January 1996*]. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu, p. 110.

[27] In 1999 after the turmoil following East Timor's referendum and Australia's pressure to have the UN forces in East Timor, Indonesia terminated the security agreement. The agreement was unprecedented in Indonesian history because Indonesia had been consistently adopting an independent and active foreign policy and did not want to engage in a security agreement.

[28] Interview with Mr. Kusnadi, 9 October 2001. During a foreign policy discussion held in Surabaya in 1996, a number of participants queried the nature of the agreement, and whether or not it also covered protection for the sea-lanes in the region. The questions were a reflection of uncertainty among Indonesian policy and opinion makers about the nature of the security agreement. See Seminar's proceedings entitled *Forum Dialogue III Tentang Politik dan Keamanan Regional dalam Era Pasca Perang Dingin*, Surabaya, 6-9 Oktober 1996 [*The third dialogue forum on the Post-Cold War political and security issues in the region, Surabaya, 6-9 October 1996*]. Archive – BALITBANG Deplu, pp. 33-8. According to Michael Leifer, China's rising power was a factor that prompted President Soeharto to commit Indonesia to a security agreement with Australia. Michael Leifer, "Indonesia's Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement", in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 102.

[29] On 17 April 2001, a People's Liberation Army naval patrol ship intercepted Australian warships and demanded the ships to leave the Taiwan Strait which they claimed as Chinese territorial waters. However, the Australian did not comply to the demand. "A Growing Storm for East Asia", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 May 2001, p. 17.

[30] See Philip Bowring, "In South China Sea, Worrying Noises From Beijing", *International Herald Tribune*, 21 July 1992.

[31] See *Brokering Cooperation in the South China Sea*, http://faculty.law.ubc.ca/scs. Accessed, 8 August 2002

[32] Internal memorandum of the Research Agency, January 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[33] Lim Joo-Jock, *Geo-Strategy and the South China Sea Basin* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), p. 18. See also: The Nansha Islands: A Chinese point of view, *Window*, 3 September 1993.

[34] Lee Lai To, *China and the South China Sea Dialogues* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), p. 9.

[35] *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta, 28 June to 2 July 1992*, pp. 23-4, and Annex U, p. 253.

[36] M.S. Samuels, *Contest for the South China Sea* (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), pp. 61-8. According to Samuels, in 1887 (after the Sino-French War from 1884 to 1885) France had acknowledged China's claim over the islands. p. 52.

[37] According to Martin Dixon, 'terra nullius' is the exercise of authority, which takes place in a territory, which does not belong to any other state, or based on effective occupation. Martin Dixon, *Textbook on International Law* (London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1990), pp. 79-80.

[38] See: *The Philippines and the South China Sea Islands: Overview and Documents*, Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) Papers No. 1. (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1993).

[39] Ian James Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, p. 99.

[40] Ibid, p. 97.

[41] According to Daojiong Zha and Mark Valencia, the reason for ASEAN countries' reluctance to stand behind the Philippines was because of the failure of President Estrada to maintain ASEAN's credo of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other ASEAN countries. See Doajiong Zha and Mark Valencia, "Mischief Reef: Geopolitics and Implications", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 31, No 1, 2001, p. 96. Also Ang Cheng Guan, "ASEAN, China and the South China Sea Dispute: A Rejoinder", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1999, pp. 426-7, and Suisheng Zhao, China's Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1999, p. 338.

[42] See Lo, op cit, Chapter Three.

[43] See: Ang Cheng Guan, "The South China Sea Dispute Revisited", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, pp. 203-5.
[44] "The Nansha Islands: A Chinese point of view", *Window*, 3 September 1993, p. 25.
[45] Lim, op cit, pp. 21-2.
[46] The writer was granted permission to read the Malaysian diplomatic note by the courtesy of the Directorate for International Treaty of the Ministry. Archive - Dit. PI Deplu.
[47] The writer was granted permission to read the Indonesian diplomatic note by the courtesy of the Directorate for International Treaty of the Ministry. Archive - Dit. PI Deplu.
[48] See "Oil-Rich Diet: Beijing is asked to explain its maritime appetite", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 April 1995, p. 28.
[49] News Release No. 560, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[50] Loc cit.
[51] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, dated 22 December 1994. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[52] Based on a cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, dated 24 January 1994. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[53] See: To, op cit, and Dino Djalal, *Indonesia and Preventive Diplomacy: A Study of the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea*. Doctoral thesis, University of London, undated, 2000, Chapter Six.
[54] Anthony Bergin, "East Asian Naval developments – sailing into rough seas", *Marine Policy*, Vol. 26, 2002, p. 122.
[55] Weixing Hu, "China's security agenda after the cold war", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1995, p. 126. See also Calder, op cit, p. 8.
[56] Hu, loc cit.
[57] Tim Huxley, "A Threat in the South China Sea? A Rejoinder", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 29, No. 1. March 1998, p. 115.
[58] "Ways and Means: Manila plans an expensive military upgrade", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 May 1995.
[59] Ibid.
[60] "Diving for cover costs billions", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 May 2001, p. 18.
[61] Bergin, "East Asian Naval developments – sailing into rough seas", p. 128.
[62] Loc cit.
[63] "Places not bases puts Singapore on the line", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 May 2001, p. 21.
[64] "Sea of Troubles: China's offshore oil grab chills détente with Vietnam and rings wider Asian alarms", *Time*, 27 July 1992, p. 42.
[65] Indonesia's acknowledgement of the importance of the US presence in the region transpired, among others, during a foreign policy dialogue sponsored by the Ministry, involving military establishment, think tanks, academicians and journalists. Seminar's proceedings entitled *The second dialogue forum on the Post-Cold War political and security issues in the region, Yogyakarta, 8-10 January 1996,* p. 39.
[66] Bergin, "East Asian Naval developments – sailing into rough seas", p. 128.
[67] Dr. Hasjim Djalal served as Director General or Head for Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry from 1985 to 1990. Prior to his appointment as Director General in the Ministry, he served as Indonesian Ambassador in Ottawa, Canada (1982-1985).
[68] At the time of the writing of this thesis, Dr. Dino Djalal served in the Ministry as Director for North American Affairs. He received his Doctorate from the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, UK, in 2000 (see note 53 above). Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault, a Canadian academician from the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, was also involved in the whole workshop series.
[69] Interview, 1 November 2001.
[70] See Dino Djalal, op cit, pp. 36-47.
[71] Recollection of Admiral (ret.) Sunardi, interview, 31 November 2001.
[72] The National Defense Institute (*Lembaga Ketahan Nasional - Lemhanas*), *Transformasi Potensi Konflik menjadi Portensi Kerjasama di Laut Cina Selatan* [*Transforming the potential conflicts in the South China Sea into potential co-operation*]. Undated, Lemhanas, 1989.
[73] See Dino Djalal, op cit., footnote 15, p. 36. Lemhanas provides training on selected basis for high-ranking military officials (minimum Colonel), senior governmental officials, and public figures that have the potential to become national leaders.
[74] Interview with Dr. Hasjim Djalal, 5 November 2001.

[75] Interview with Dr. Marti Natalegawa, 5 December 2001. At the time of the writing of this thesis, Dr. Marti Natalegawa served in the Ministry as Director for International Organization.
[76] Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: Informal Diplomacy for Conflict Prevention" in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, *Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, DC.: USIP Press, 1999), pp. 115-6.
[77] Briefing paper prepared by Dr. Hasjim Djalal during his ASEAN tour in 1989, Appendix 2 from Annex B of the *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bali 22-24 January 1990.* Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[78] Hasjim Djalal, *Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Lessons Learned.* Manuscript prepared in the East West Centre, Honolulu, not yet published, 31 October 2001. Courtesy of Dr. Hasjim Djalal.
[79] Information provided by Mr. Sunu Mahadi, Deputy Director, Asia and Pacific Directorate (interview, 26 September 2001) and Dr. Soejatmiko, Deputy Director, Political Analyses Directorate of ASEAN National Secretariat of the Ministry (interview, 22 November 2001).
[80] Cable from Dr. Djalal in New York, dated 28 August 1990. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[81] Letter from Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault to Minister Alatas, dated 7 January 1991. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[82] Letter from Minister Alatas to Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault, dated 9 February 1991. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[83] Ibid. It was not clear whether the normal diplomatic channel between Indonesia and China has fully functioning because the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing was just recently opened, after the restoration of diplomatic relations in August 1990.
[84] Cable from the Ministry dated 30 April 1991. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[85] Excerpt from a document entitled "Follow Up Activities Regarding the South China Sea Studies" dated 28 October 1991. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. The Canadians in this case paid the travel and accommodation costs of some participants to the workshops (except Brunei, Singapore and Taiwan) and Indonesia covered the local cost of the activity. See also Ian Townsend-Gault, "Confidence and Cooperation in the South China Sea: The Indonesia-Canada Initiative", in Jusuf Wanadi (ed.), *Regional Security Arrangements: Indonesian and Canadian Views* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1996), p. 72.
[86] The academic background of the Head of Agency also influenced their interest in the informal workshop. Two of the Heads of Agency between 1997 and 2000 were economists. Dr. Johan S. Syahperi, between 1997 to 1998, and Mr. Adian Silalahi, between 1999 to 2000.
[87] According to Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto, some leaders in the Ministry wished to establish their own landmarks during their leadership time and, therefore, sometimes there were discontinuities of programs (interview, 3 October 2001).
[88] Dr. Johan S. Syahperi who led the Agency between 1997 and 1999) has a background in international economic law.
[89] Cable from the Indonesian Mission in New York dated 13 March 1992, forwarding Dr. Djalal's pointers that he prepared in Kingston, Jamaica. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[90] Confidential interviewees.
[91] More discussion on this matter is provided in this Chapter under the sub heading: *Competing interests and their impact on the informal diplomacy.*
[92] Confidential interviewees.
[93] During the Seventh Workshop in Batam, in 1996, the workshop statement clearly indicated this reality because it stated that the workshop was organised by the research centre of Dr. Hasjim Djalal and the Agency was merely assisting the workshop. See the workshop statement, Annex E, paragraph 3, p. 65. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Batam, 13-17 December 1996. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[94]The relationship between UBC and the Ministry was not always smooth because at one time the Ministry had considered terminating their co-operation. Apparently, there was a different point of view between the aspect of approach and efficiency. In designing the program, the Ministry was aiming at enhancing personal relationships among the participants, whereas the UBC was concerned about financial implication from a longer meeting. Information derived from internal memorandum in the Agency, dated 15 August 1995. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[95] Opening remark by Minister Alatas on the Fourth Workshop in Surabaya, 23 August 1993, Annex E, p. 72. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Surabaya 23-25 August 1993.* Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[96] See "Divide and Rule: Beijing scores points on South China Sea", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 August 1994, p. 18.

[97] Memo from Mr. Hadipranowo to Minister Alatas, dated 28 March 1992, and letter from Mr. Hadipranowo to Prof. Townsend-Gault, dated 10 April 1992 (Archive - BALITBANG Deplu). Interestingly, during his visit to some claimant states, the authorities also asked Mr. Hadipranowo to seek clarification from China about the new national legislation of 25 February 1992 (based on Mr. Hadipranowo's cable to Indonesian Embassies in Manila and Kuala Lumpur, 9 April 1992). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[98] Based on a memo from Mr. Hadipranowo to Minister Alatas, dated 25 August 1993. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[99] See proceedings of discussion, p. 4. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Surabaya, 23-25 August 1993. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[100] Opening remark by Minister Alatas on the Eight Workshop in Pacet, 3 December 1997, Annex D, p. 51. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Pacet, 2-6 December 1997.* Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[101] Loc cit.

[102] See proceedings of discussion, p. 6 & p. 26. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Pacet 2-6 December 1997.*

[103] Remarks by Dr. Syahperi on the Eight Workshop in Pacet, 3 December 1997, Annex C, p. 46. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Pacet 2-6 December 1997.* He repeated his idea in the Ninth Workshop, in 1998, when he called on the participants to support the implementation stage of the approved projects and concentrate on follow up activities as well as recommendations made during the workshops process. See proceedings of discussion, pp. 5-7. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Ancol 1-3 December 1998.* Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[104] Minister Alatas referred to this critic, en-passant, in his speech during the Sixth Workshop in 1995. See opening remark by Minister Alatas on the Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan, 10 October 1995. Annex E, p. 56. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Balikpapan, 9-13, October 1995.* Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[105] See proceedings of discussion, pp. 14-5 and pp. 25-6. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Pacet 2-6 December 1997.*

[106] See proceedings of discussion, pp. 14-5. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Pacet 2-6 December 1997.*

[107] Interview with Dr. Hasjim Djalal, 5 November 2001.

[108] The lack of consultation among the Indonesians was very apparent during the Ninth Workshop (1998) because in the final session to formulate the workshop's statement, a representative from Indonesia proposed formulation, which was in line with China's position. In contrast, Dr. Djalal was not satisfied with the proposed formulation concerning the code of conduct in the South China Sea. The writer was present in this workshop.

[109] See proceedings of discussion, paragraph 6, p. 4. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Bandung, 15-18 July 1991. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[110] When joining the workshop for the first time in 1991, China prior to the meting requested Indonesia as a host to act wisely when China was presenting its paper. China also emphasised that during the discussion of Spratlys and Paracels issues, Indonesia should avoid debates on the issues (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, 28 June 1991). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[111] *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bali 15-18 July 1991*, p. 30. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[112] Ibid, p. 31.

[113] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing dated 13 January 1994. In this regard, China requested that the workshops be held every two years and not annually. A similar impression was also reported in Dr. Djalal's memo to Minister Alatas, dated 21 May 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[114] Dino Djalal, op cit, p. 71.

[115] Letter from Minister Alatas dated 12 January 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[116] Loc cit.

[117] Based on cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan reporting the result of Dr. Djalal's meeting with Foreign Minister Mohamed Bolkiah of Brunei, dated 25 January 1996. Also a cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila reporting the result of Dr. Djalal's meeting with Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon Jr of the Philippines. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[118] Memo from Dr. Djalal to Minister Alatas, dated 9 February 1996 (Archive - BALITBANG Deplu). Interestingly, in the memo Dr. Djalal also mentioned that the respective authorities in Indonesia had not given their commitment to the projects. The reasons for this could be the failure

of the Agency to follow up the projects' implementation with the relevant ministries in Indonesia, or that the issue had not been adequately raised at the highest level. On April 1996, Minister Alatas sent letters to several ministers in Indonesia and asked them to give attention and to take part in the implementation of the agreed projects (based on Minister Alatas's letter, dated 12 April 1996). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[119] Letter from Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon of the Philippines to Minister Alatas, 25 January 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[120] Letter from Mr. Fredrick Chien of Taiwan to Minister Alatas, dated 14 February 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[121] Based on letter from Anil Kumal, First Secretary (Political), Singapore Embassy in Jakarta to Dr. Djalal, dated 8 February 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[122] Letter from Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar of Singapore to Minister Alatas, dated 10 July 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[123] Letter from Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi of Malaysia to Minister Alatas, dated 7 June 1996. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[124] *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta 28 June to 2 July 1992,* pp. 23-4. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[125] Ibid, Annex B.

[126] Ibid, pp. 24.

[127] Based on the Head of Agency report to Minister Alatas, dated 28 March 1992, of his tour to the claimant countries. During the visit he consulted the respective authorities about the meeting agenda and sought their opinion on some of the issues. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[128] Paragraph 6 of a restricted document dated 11 February 1994, entitled "Some possible principles for a theory of 'donut' in the South China Sea". The writer was given permission to read the document at the courtesy of BALITBANG Deplu.

[129] See "Divide and Rule: Beijing scores points on South China Sea", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 August 1994, p. 18.

[130] Paragraph 6 of document "Some possible principles for a theory of 'donut' in the South China Sea", op cit. When questioned about the theory during foreign policy discussion in 1996, Dr. Djalal explained that the theory was not new and has been implemented in Oskhost and Bearing Seas. He also explained that the majority of Chinese scientists were familiar with the theory. See seminar's proceedings entitled *The second dialogue forum on the Post-Cold War political and security issues in the region, Yogyakarta, 8-10 January 1996*, p. 31.

[131] See proceedings of discussion, p. 27. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Jakarta, 1-3 December 1998. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[132] The writer was present during the debate.

[133] Ibid, see workshop statement, Annex E, paragraph 14, p. 56. Italic to emphasis was added.

[134] Opening remarks by Dr. Djalal on the first workshop in Bali, 22 January 1990. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bali 22-24 January 1990.* Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[135] Address by Minister Alatas during the Second Workshop in Bandung, 15 July 1991, Annex E of the *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bali 15-18 July 1991* and also Annex C from Bali's report. Ibid.

[136] In particular, and as already noted, his remarks during the 4th workshop raised controversy during the meeting.

[137] Interview with Mr. Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.

[138] Based Dr. Djalal's pointers he prepared in Kingston, Jamaica, op cit.

[139] Interview with Dr. Hasjim Djalal, 1 November 2001.

[140] According to Mr. Kusnadi, former Indonesian Ambassador to Brunei Darussalam, some Bruneian officials had expressed their conviction that Indonesia would not stand idle if a foreign country attacked Brunei militarily. The revelation was made during former President Soeharto's era, during which the Sultan of Brunei had a very close personal relationship with Mr. Soeharto (interview, 9 October 2001).

[141] See Leifer, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), op cit., p. 95.

[142] Interestingly, in assessing the renewed bilateral relationships between Indonesia and China after two years, Indonesian diplomats in Beijing believed that China took part in the workshops because they trusted Indonesia. The trust stemmed from Indonesia's contribution toward peace in the region by helping to solve the Cambodian conflict (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, 16 March 1992). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. Considering that the two countries had just renewed their diplomatic relationship, it may be the case that China only wished to impress Indonesia.

[143] See proceedings of discussion, pp. 17-20. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Bukittinggi, 26-28 October 1994. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[144] See Workshop Statement of the Fourth Workshop, Surabaya, 23-25 August 1993, paragraph 18, p. 78. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Surabaya, 23-25 August 1993. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[145] See proceedings of discussion, pp. 10-12. *Report of the Ninth Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Jakarta,* 1-3 December 1998. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[146] Cable from Indonesian Mission in the UN, dated 19 May 1994. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. Actually, Indonesia had learned about China's displeasure about the reference of South China Sea issue in the NAM forum from Indonesian Ambassador in Beijing, who was given a clue about the matter by his counterpart, the Egyptian Ambassador in Beijing (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Beijing, dated 6 May 1994). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[147] This feeling emerged in Mr. Hadipranowo's memo to Minister Alatas, dated 25 August 1993, informing the Minister on the result of the Fourth Workshop in Surabaya, 23-25 August 1993. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. Indonesia's confusion about Malaysia's attitude in the workshop and the South China Sea issue in general transpired in several foreign policy discussions organised by the Research and Development Agency, that is, in August 1994, in January 1996 and in June 1997.
[148] See Dino Djalal, op cit., p. 193
[149] See proceedings of discussion, p. 10. *Report of the Fourth Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Surabaya, 23-25 August 1993. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[150] See proceedings of discussion, pp. 8-10. *Report of the Six Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Balikpapan, 9-13 October 1995. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[151] Ibid, p. 8.
[152] See proceedings of discussion, pp. 11-2 and Workshop Statement of the Fifth Workshop, Bukittinggi, 26-28 October 1994, paragraph 5.b, pp. 53-4. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Bukittinggi, 26-28 October 1994. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[153] See Workshop Statement of the Fifth Workshop, Bukittinggi, 26-28 October 1994, paragraph 5.c and d, p. 54. Ibid.
[154] See Opening remarks of Minister Alatas during the Fourth Workshop, Annex E, p. 72. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Surabaya, 23-25 August 1993. Undated. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[155] Clarification made by Dr. Djalal during the Fourth Workshop in Surabaya. Ibid, p. 4.
[156] Based on Dr. Djalal letter to Ambassador of Japan to Indonesia, dated 8 November 1994. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[157] Based on Dr. Djalal's letter to Mr. Rachmad, Head of the Agency, dated 28 April 1995. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[158] Both the US and Australia mentioned the importance of regional stability in the 'Aide Memoire' they sent to Dr. Djalal, in response to his inquiry of possible support for the workshop's projects. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[159] Minister Alatas mentioned the success of the workshop to generate international interests on the issue in a number of occasions, including in his opening remark in the workshops, such as during the Sixth and the Ninth Workshops.
[160] Interview, 1 November 2001.
[161] See Workshop Statement of the Third Workshop, Yogyakarta, 28 June - 2 July 1992, op cit., paragraph 11, p. 84.
[162] Based on Prof. Gault's letter to Mr. Hadipranowo, dated 7 October 1992. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. One of the Philippines delegates to the Seapol Conference in Bangkok informed Indonesia that the decision to hold a meeting in Manila came from Foreign Minister Romulo, without consulting his staff and considering the possible implications of the decision (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, dated 12 December 1992). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu. Meanwhile, Vietnam's official also informed the Indonesian Ambassador in Hanoi that Foreign Minister Romulo had mentioned to his counterpart about the planned workshop when he visited Hanoi from 10-14 November 1992 (cable from Indonesian Embassy in Hanoi, dated 8 December 1992). Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.

[163] Based on Dr. Djalal's letter to Prof. Gault, dated 29 October 1992. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[164] Based on Mr. Hadipranowo's memo to Minister Alatas, dated 11 March 1993.
[165] See Dino Djalal, op cit, pp. 90-1. Also "Scientific Meeting Being Held to Reduce Spratlys Tension", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 May 1993, p. 30.
[166] Quoted in *The Philippines and the South China Sea Islands: Overview and Documents*, p. 24.
[167] Cable from Indonesian Embassy in Manila dated 10 February 1995. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Based on Ambassador Ibrahim memo to Minister Alatas, dated 15 February 1995, reporting the result of the meeting. Archive - BALITBANG Deplu.
[170] The Philippines also did not send any representative to attend the Tenth Workshop in 1999. The organising committee was informed that the Philippines' delegation, which was to travel to Jakarta, had to cancel their trip because of technical difficulties. However, in the corridor, there was a speculation that the non-arrival was caused by the Philippines displeasure of China's assertiveness and the lack of support from ASEAN countries.
[171] See Dupont, op cit., p. 33.
[172] See Dino Djalal, op cit., p. 223.
[173] See Tom Naess, "Environmental cooperation around the South China Sea: the experience of the South China Sea Workshops and the United Nations Environment Programme's Strategic Action Programme", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2001, pp. 553-573. Also Francisco A. Magno, "Environmental Security in the South China Sea", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 97-112.
[174] See Townsend-Gault, op cit., p. 183. Also Kuan-Hsiung Wang, "Bridge over troubled waters: fisheries cooperation as a resolution to the South China Sea conflicts", *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2001, pp. 531-551.
[175] See Liselotte Odgaard, "Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea", *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* Vol. 23, No. 2, August 2001, pp. 292-306.
[176] Opening remarks of Minister Alatas during the Second Workshop, Annex E, p. 64. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Bandung, 15-18 July 1991, op cit.
[177] Opening remarks of Minister Alatas during the First Workshop, Annex C, p. 69. *Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea,* Bali, 22-24 January 1990, op cit.

Chapter VII

Indonesian Diplomacy in Dealing with Regional Conflicts and Disputes (1985-1998): Evaluation of Informal Diplomacy

VII.1. Introduction

This chapter evaluates the implementation of informal diplomacy by comparing the way Indonesia exercised informal diplomacy in the three case studies. The chapter's discussion is organised into three main themes based on the common threads of the Indonesian informal diplomacy discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The first discussion focuses on the organisational aspects of co-ordination, building the team and bureaucratic politics. This section also addresses the aspects of the originator of the informal diplomacy approach adopted by the Indonesian camp.

The second discussion examines the processes that took place during the meetings because the processes provided this thesis with insights into the meetings' dynamics. Attention is given to the strategies and tactics developed by the Indonesians in dealing with the meetings' dynamics, particularly those which went against informal diplomacy's objectives of, for instance, exploring options. The analysis of the process during the meetings will also look at the interplay between the core participants, that is, representatives from the parties involved in conflicts and disputes, and the facilitators: the Indonesians and others, such as the Canadians in the South China Sea workshops and the French in Cambodia. The role of the media who were not taking part in the meetings but were able to influence the meetings' dynamics will also be observed.

The third discussion looks at the objectives of Indonesian informal diplomacy in conjunction with Indonesia's strategic interests in the region. This chapter will assess what was achieved through informal diplomacy in the three case studies, based on the characteristics of Indonesia's informal diplomacy, and in the light of conceptions derived from Track Two diplomacy and the problem solving workshop. It will be argued that the achievement of informal diplomacy's

objectives was influenced by several factors: first, the participants' motives, whether or not they were willing to seek a solution to their problems; second, the nature and the context of the problems, and to a certain extent of non core participants' involvement in the problems; third, the way Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy; and fourth, the interrelationship between the timing of Indonesia's involvement as a third party and the participants' interests in seeking a solution to their problems.

VII.2. Assessment of the Indonesian organisational aspect: the domestic context of the third party

The organisational aspect of the third party played an important role in the informal diplomacy process. Good co-ordination and teamwork among the Indonesians involved in the informal diplomacy and their clear understandings about the mission, as well as the underlying principles governing the informal approach were factors which contributed positively to the process. The domestic context was also affected by the level of support the Ministry received from other ministries, and from the military establishment, in pursuing and co-ordinating the peace initiatives.

2.1 The originators of informal diplomacy's conception in the Ministry

In the three case studies, the proponents of informal diplomacy in the Ministry were diplomats with extensive experience in negotiations, some of them with a background in international law. They were knowledgeable about the issues involved in the conflicts and disputes, interested in finding a breakthrough in the stalemate, such as in Cambodia and the Philippines, and in defusing potential conflicts in the South China Sea. Those diplomats considered a new impetus to influence the relationship among the protagonists was essential because of the lack of trust and confidence among them. Hence, the informal formats proposed were based on an assessment of the nature of the conflicts and the disputes, as well as the level of relationship among the disputants and the conflicting parties. The informal diplomacy approach was also developed based on their experiences in negotiations and on theoretical knowledge obtained from academic institutions.

In Cambodia's case, the former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, developed the informal format based on his assessment of factors that prevented the Cambodian factions from meeting face to face. In particular, the competing factions - with the full backing of the regional countries who were involved in Cambodia's imbroglio - did not want to recognise, let alone accept, the legitimacy of their opponents. Moreover, the long years of conflict and antagonism created a psychological barrier to the competing factions sitting down together and engaging in frank discussions. Therefore, an informal format - held on a basis of equal footing, without preconditions and with no political label - was the only option that could bring the conflicting parties together in one meeting.

To accommodate Vietnam's interests the informal meeting was held in two stages to reflect the internal and external dimensions of the Cambodian conflict. In this way, Indonesia accommodated Vietnam's concern at being identified as the main culprit in the conflict. This concern is understandable considering that the coalition forces (the CGDK), and some ASEAN countries had long insisted on a direct meeting with Vietnam because they did not recognise Vietnam's 'puppet government' in Phnom Penh. The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) were developed on the basis of equality, and on the premise of accommodating the concerns of the many parties to the conflicts.

The successor to Minister Kusumaatmadja, Minister Alatas, had no difficulty in continuing the peace initiative developed by his predecessor. Minister Alatas had followed the developments from his previous position as Indonesian Ambassador to the UN where part of his responsibility was to promote the proposal during his interaction in New York with the various parties to the Cambodian conflict. The transitional period from Minister Kusumaatmadja to Minister Alatas did not jeopardise Indonesia's peace initiative. On the contrary, the new minister gave 'new blood' to the initiative.

The informal meeting on Cambodia followed the original design put forward by former Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja. No modification to the proposal - except for a change in nomenclature from 'cocktail party' into 'Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM)' - meant that Minister Alatas agreed with the principle governing

the informal diplomacy. The informal diplomacy through the first JIM gave the various parties in the Cambodian conflict an opportunity to meet face to face for the first time, and by doing so, the meeting broke the psychological barrier that in the past had prevented a fully inclusive meeting.

In the Philippines case, the informal exploratory talks held in Cipanas in 1993 were a continuation of the first exploratory talks sponsored by Libya in Tripoli in 1992. The difference between the exploratory talks sponsored by Libya and those sponsored by Indonesia was in the way Indonesia arranged the setting for the meetings (this will be elaborated on when discussing the process of informal diplomacy) and on the kind of facilitation function that Indonesia upheld during the informal diplomacy process. The exploratory talks under the aegis of Indonesia met the principle governing Track Two diplomacy, that is, to facilitate the conflicting parties in the process of addressing their problem, improving their relationship and solving their problems amicably.

Informal diplomacy remained essential, even when the process had been elevated to formal negotiations. Informal diplomacy was being used more as a diplomatic tool to create a conducive environment for negotiation and to increase the level of comfort among the participants for open communication. To reinforce this, as suggested by Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia intentionally followed a gradual approach in order to develop a habit of communication among the disputants.[1] Gradualism in this case referred to an approach of discussing less contentious issues in the earlier phase, to discussing more sensitive issues later on. Years of hostility prevented the Moro and the Government of the Republic the Philippines (GRP) from meeting face to face and discussing their problem openly. Arguably, maintaining a habit of communication and momentum for dialogue between the parties was one of the characteristics of Indonesian informal diplomacy in dealing with regional conflicts and disputes. At the same time, another intention of this gradual process was to increase the level of comfort among the participants enabling them to sit together and discuss their problems openly.

This gradual approach for the sake of maintaining communication and increasing the level of comfort among the participants raises the question as to whether or

not Indonesia adopted control communication techniques of problem solving in the informal diplomacy.[2] Although this matter will be discussed in following sections, it is worth noting here that in the case of the Moro issue, the main feature of Indonesia's facilitation function was to let the parties engage in consultation and discussion rather than in political bargaining. Indonesia clearly did not adopt the control communication technique fully because in some sessions the discussion was based on proposals tabled by either of the parties. What the Indonesian facilitators cautiously 'controlled' during the process was the momentum of discussion which included shelving discussion on sensitive issues until a later stage so that the process of improving the relationship among the participants would not be disturbed.

The proponent of the South China Sea workshop in the Ministry was Dr. Hasjim Djalal, trained in international law and with extensive experiences in UNCLOS (UN Convention of the Law of the Sea) negotiation as well as in the development of a regime to manage fisheries in the Pacific under the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Dr. Djalal envisaged that the informal workshop could help the disputants shelve their territorial claims and embark on co-operative efforts. He also believed that a regular informal consultation could induce better understanding of the differing claims, such as the area and the basis of the claim, and the concerns of the claimant and non-claimants.[3] Clearly the intention of the informal workshop was to reduce regional tension through confidence building measures.

2.2. The building of the team and teamwork

Who initiated and led the peace initiatives and at what level the initiatives were formulated influenced the dynamic within the Indonesian team. These factors also had an impact on the aspects of team building, involving personnel from inside and outside the Ministry, and of the administrative support to each of the peace initiatives. The direct involvement of the Indonesian Foreign Minister in the informal diplomacy process reduced intra-ministry competition and guaranteed smoother teamwork. At the same time, President Soeharto's interest in the peace initiatives assured the Ministry that the informal diplomacy process would receive

equal support from other ministries and bureaucracies in Indonesia. Moreover, at times, the President himself was involved during the process and this, gave more weight to the Ministry's profile and to the diplomats who were responsible for informal diplomacy.

As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, the informal diplomacy process to solve the Cambodian and Moro problems was developed at the highest level. Both Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas were involved directly in the shaping of the informal diplomacy and in directing the process. President Soeharto also gave his fullest support to both peace initiatives. In contrast, the idea of an informal workshop to manage potential conflict in the South China Sea was shaped by bureaucrats at the Director General level. After receiving consent from Foreign Minister Alatas, Dr. Djalal promoted the proposal domestically and regionally. Although the level of President Soeharto's support for the informal workshop on the South China Sea was unclear, some Indonesian scholars like Rizal Sukma and Ben Drajat believed that the informal workshop was an indication of assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy under Soeharto since the late-1980s.[4] However, 'a tacit support' from the President presented the Ministry with some difficulties in organising the informal workshops, such as obtaining a yearly budget from the Ministry of Finance to underwrite the expenses for the workshop which were not covered by the Canadians.

In both the Cambodia and Moro cases, Minister Alatas had no difficulty in pooling the cream of the Ministry's human resources. In dealing with the Cambodian problem, Minister Alatas recruited senior diplomats who, as a result of their earlier postings in Indochina and in the ASEAN countries, were familiar with the cultural particularities of the Cambodians, the Vietnamese and the concerned countries. Their knowledge of the local languages - some of them spoke French and one diplomat spoke Chinese (Mandarin) - as well as their acquaintance with some members of the representatives of the factions were an asset to the Indonesian team. Minister Alatas assigned these diplomats as his liaison with the participants of the JIM. They functioned in the team as the Minister's confidants to listen to any concerns of the participants, on either substantive or non-substantive matters and, if necessary, to convey any message

from the Minister to the participants. Overall, the main responsibility of the liaisons was to make the participants feel comfortable during the informal meetings.

Minister Alatas was in charge of the substantive aspects of the problem, assisted by diplomats responsible for regional issues under the Directorate General for Political Affairs. The direct involvement of Minister Alatas in the substantive aspect centralised the decision-making. On the one hand, this gave the Minister a firm grip over the process and an opportunity to follow developments closely. The complexity surrounding the Cambodian conflict made it imperative for Minister Alatas to be aware of any developments, such as whether or not there was any shift in participants' positions during the informal meeting. On the other hand, this centralisation meant that some team members were unwilling to risk making decisions on substantive matters without Minister Alatas's approval. For instance, they were reluctant to provide information to the media without the Minister's consent. The problem with this dependency was that the media were searching for information from the participants and, as a result, occasionally the media highlighted contradicting viewpoints. The antagonism created by this was not in line with Indonesia's interests in improving relationships among the parties.

Indonesia's efforts to deal with the Moro problem received a high level of attention from its inception. Minister Alatas was personally involved in the formative year of the peace process after Indonesia was asked to become a member of Committee of the Six of the OIC tasked with helping resolve the Moro problem. After receiving the mandate from the OIC, Minister Alatas gave the Director General for Political Affairs, Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, full responsibility for setting up and recruiting the members of the Indonesian team. In selecting members of the team, Mr. Sastrohandoyo recruited diplomats who were familiar with the issues from the regional and international organisation directorates of the Ministry. These diplomats represented the Asia and Pacific Directorate who dealt with the Philippines issue, the Africa and Middle East Directorate who dealt with the Moro problem due to the involvement of Libya and other Middle Eastern countries, and the International Organisation Directorate who followed the discussion of the problem in the OIC.

The selection of members of the team was based on their knowledge of the issue as well as their understanding of the standpoint and interests of the parties involved in the conflict. Hence they were able to provide Mr. Sastrohandoyo with a comprehensive understanding of the problem. As the informal diplomacy process moved on, Mr. Sastrohandoyo scaled down the members of the team. He gave diplomats from the International Organisation Directorate, under the supervision of Dr. Wirajuda, more responsibility in the daily operation of the Ministry's secretariat to deal with Moro problem because they were more familiar with the intricacies of the OIC. Clearly the intention was to streamline the team and increase efficiency. Moreover, the diplomats from the International Organisation Directorate had been exposed to multilateral international negotiation settings and knew how to deal with participants from the OIC countries. However, Mr. Sastrohandoyo maintained the involvement of diplomats from other Directorates who were skilful in negotiation and were known for their patience.[5]

Although Mr. Sastrohandoyo acted as an anchor in the peace process, Minister Alatas remained fully appraised of the process and, at times, acted as a trouble-shooter. Mr. Sastrohandoyo always briefed Minister Alatas about developments during the meeting so that the Minister was well advised on matters that required his early attention or involvement. For instance, he took part in some chief delegations' meeting to break some stalemates. The nature of the Moro conflict, the deep-seated frustration among the Moro and the idiosyncrasy of Mr. Misuari, the MNLF leader, made it necessary for the Indonesians to approach the MNLF with extra caution. Minister Alatas' continuous contact with the participants, especially with Mr. Misuari, was a means to develop personal rapport and to win trust and confidence. Hence, Minister Alatas was, at times, involved in the facilitation activities, but most of the time he provided his support based on his capacity as Foreign Minister through his close contact with the Philippines leaders at the highest level.

The Indonesian team in Jakarta co-ordinated their work closely with the Indonesian diplomats in Manila who were also knowledgeable on the Moro issue from their previous portfolio in the Ministry prior to their assignment. At the same

time, the two Indonesian Ambassadors in Manila (retired military generals) enjoyed a personal rapport with President Ramos and the Philippines military establishment throughout. This contact gave them relatively easy access to the Philippines leaders and helped Indonesia bypass the bureaucratic lines on issues that required the Philippines leaders' immediate attention. Thus, in dealing with the Moro issue Indonesia had the benefit of a solid team who were familiar with the issue. Further, the Chief negotiator, Mr. Sastrohandoyo, gained the most from the strength of his team members he had appointed. Furthermore, Mr. Sastrohandoyo and his team were able to concentrate on the day to day operation of the conflict resolution process and as a consequence, they had the privilege of overseeing the internal dynamic within the Ministry on the Moro issue. Such a privilege, however, did not transpire within the Indonesian team which was responsible for the South China Sea informal workshop.

Indonesia's informal workshop to deal with South China Sea disputes was masterminded and organised by officials at the Director General level. The diplomatic initiative based on policy initiation by bureaucrats at first echelon level was prone to inter-elite rivalry, especially when high-level officials from other Directorate Generals considered the issue fell under their jurisdiction. The implication of this was that the support for Dr. Djalal and the Research Agency of the Ministry from other directorates was not optimal. Although the informal diplomacy initiative received the full blessing of Foreign Minister Alatas and the Minister had given Dr. Djalal as well as the Head of Research Agency of the Ministry authority in shaping and directing the peace process, they largely worked on their own. Ideally, the Directorate General for Political Affairs and the ASEAN National Secretariat of the Ministry who dealt with some of the South China Sea issues in their portfolio should have had more involvement in the shaping and directing of the informal workshops.[6] Closer co-operation between the Research Agency and the operational unit in the Ministry would have increased the synergy between the informal workshop and the policy discussion in formal fora, such as in ASEAN.

Arguably, the less than forthcoming support from other directorates within the Ministry was, partly caused by the active involvement of non-Indonesians, as a

third pillar in the informal workshop process. Through their financial contributions in the workshop process and close working relationship with Dr. Djalal, the Canadians had more leverage in the informal workshops than the Ministry's bureaucrats outside the Research Agency. Moreover, on issues of substance, Dr. Djalal consulted the Canadians more than the Ministry's officials. Needless to say, the active role of the Canadians in the informal workshop created resentment among some Ministry officials and led to their lack of interest in contributing substantive ideas to workshop discussions.[7]

Another factor that further distanced some Ministry diplomats from the informal workshop concerned the recruitment of resource persons during the process. As noted in Chapter 6, part of the Canadian responsibility was to recruit resource persons for the workshops. The Canadians recruited resource persons based on their expertise, and in line with the topic of the workshop discussion. For instance in discussing proposals for environment protection in the South China Sea, the resource person who was invited came from the United Nations Environment Protection Agency (UNEP). Indeed, the nature of some discussions during the workshop did not necessitate the involvement of diplomats from the Ministry. However, on issues where the Ministry had a numbers of experts, such as on the law of the sea, the Ministry's personnel were seldom recruited as resource persons. On the one hand the limited involvement of Indonesian diplomats as resource persons in the informal workshops actually benefited Indonesia because it balanced the impression of Indonesia wanting to dominate the informal workshop process (see more discussion under 3.1.3. The South China Sea disputes). On the other hand, the non-involvement of Ministry diplomats as resource persons further distanced them from the workshop process. Hence, the inter-elite rivalry in the Ministry, coupled with Dr. Djalal's close working relationship with the Canadians accounted for the Agency's difficulty in assembling an inter-directorates team to run the informal workshop.

The Indonesian team dealing with the South China Sea issue consisted mainly of officials from the Research Agency of the Ministry. Personnel from other directorates usually took part only during the workshop and the preparatory meetings prior to the workshop. At times, representatives sent by some

directorates to the preparatory meetings differed from those who took part in the actual workshops. This discontinuity affected their involvement in the workshop because they were not fully briefed on the context of some workshop issues discussed during the preparatory meetings. In theory, those who were involved in the actual workshops should have been aware of the results of the preparatory meetings. This was not always the case because, at times, their preoccupation with their main portfolios gave them little time to ponder on the workshop substance.[8]

2.3. Co-ordination as a factor in the informal diplomacy

Internal and external co-ordination influenced the outcomes of Indonesia's informal diplomacy. In the domestic context, internal co-ordination involved the team inside the Ministry, and between the Ministry and other ministries. External co-ordination implied a working relationship between Indonesians and non-Indonesians who were involved at a certain stage or in the overall process. For instance, in the case of Cambodia, the Indonesian diplomats needed to co-ordinate their work with diplomats from ASEAN countries, France and Australia. In the Philippines case, Indonesia worked closely with the OIC and in the South China Sea workshop, Indonesia's counterpart was Canada.

In the domestic context, to a certain extent, the Ministry could benefit in co-ordination efforts when the President himself showed an interest in the process. In particular, former President Soeharto was interested in having Indonesia assist the Cambodians and the GRP in resolving their problems. As a result, the Foreign Ministry had no difficulty obtaining financial and administrative support from other ministries, especially once the other ministries learned about the President's support for the informal diplomacy initiative.[9] What was important in this case, was keeping the President aware of developments at all times and, therefore, the Ministry had to keep their communication channel with the President open by maintaining good rapport with the State Secretariat.

The Ministry' secretariat under the Director General of Political Affairs handled internal co-ordination in the cases of Cambodia and the Philippines. The Ministry secretariat's responsibility was to follow up the substantive and administrative

aspects of the peace process on a daily basis. They served this function at the point of contact, inside the Ministry and between the Ministry and other ministries. The secretariat also arranged preparatory and follow up meetings involving members of the Indonesian team. The follow up meetings usually took place after the actual events, such as after JIM for example. The composition of the secretariat remained intact and even if some members took up new positions, their successors were well exposed to the substantive and non-substantive aspects of the peace process.[10] Clearly, the series of internal meetings coupled with a solid secretariat mechanism guaranteed continuity and kept the team's members abreast of every development and the issues involved.

The strength of the internal co-ordination mechanism for Cambodia and the Philippines was not evident when Indonesia launched the series of informal workshops to deal with the South China Sea disputes. The difference was the question of who was responsible for supervising the informal diplomacy process on a daily basis, and for acting as a point of convergence at the national level. In theory, the Research Agency played a secretarial role and was responsible for providing diplomatic support. In reality, the secretarial function of the Research Agency was constrained by their detachment from the substantive aspects of the informal workshops. After the first workshop in 1990, the two main players at national level, the Research Agency of the Ministry and Dr. Djalal, reached an agreement that the substantive aspect of the informal workshop would be dealt by Dr. Djalal and his research centre (the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies). Consequently, the Research Agency's role was mainly administrative, and before arranging internal meetings prior to or after the workshops - involving members of the Indonesian team from inside and outside the Ministry - it had first to co-ordinate the substance of the discussion with Dr. Djalal. The scope of the secretarial function of the Research Agency was more limited compared to that of the secretariat which dealt with the Cambodia and the Moro issues.

In some cases, Foreign Minister Alatas intentionally did not inform the secretariat on some substantive issues on Cambodia.[11] His decision, however, did not create displeasure among the secretariat members because the peace process was under Minister Alatas's authority. In the case of the informal workshops, the Research

Agency's lack of grasp on the substantive aspects of the informal diplomacy initiative limited their ability to optimise their secretarial function. For instance, the Agency was unable to take a proactive role in co-ordinating their position and responsibilities among the Indonesians who took part in the informal workshop. As a consequence, some Indonesian participants faced the dilemma of a lack of clarity about their role in the informal workshop and they lacked an awareness of the direction of the informal diplomacy process itself. The situation was rather awkward considering that it was the Agency which had been given the custody of the peace process by Minister Alatas and, therefore, had to report to him the progress of the process, both on substantive and non-substantive issues. As mentioned in Chapter 6, this dilemma was worsened by the efforts of the workshop's participants, at certain stages, to further limit the involvement of government in the process.

During the Fifth Workshop in Bukittinggi, in 1994, the participants agreed to appoint Dr. Djalal and his research centre as their contact on issues relating to hydrocarbon resources and non-hydrocarbon non-living resources projects. This, in essence, gave Dr. Djalal and his research centre a secretarial function to co-ordinate activities relevant with the projects. This arrangement proved ineffective because the participants failed to contact him. For his part Dr. Djalal, a retired Ambassador, was reluctant to contact authorities of the participating countries to follow up the matters. In the end, the Agency took over the function and the contacting of the authorities of the participants. Interestingly, some participants during the Fifth Workshop argued that the appointment of Dr. Djalal as point of contact was to ensure that the project proposals would be followed up. It could be argued, however, that the main motive was actually to delay the process by distancing the Research Agency from the responsibility of following up the project proposals through formal channels.

External co-ordination was another aspect of the informal diplomacy process in the three cases. The task of co-ordinating positions with non-Indonesians was not easy because they brought their own interests and agenda. The least the Indonesians could do was to maintain dialogue with the parties involved to limit misunderstandings during the process. This approach was not always effective,

especially if the parties had their own agenda. To illustrate, during the 1989 meeting in Paris, France submitted a proposal without the consent of Indonesia as one of the Co-chairs. The most Indonesia could do was to clarify that the proposal was made by France and that Indonesia not been consulted in its preparation.[12]

In the Cambodian case, Indonesia had no capacity to co-ordinate an ASEAN position in dealing with the conflict, even though Indonesia was, supposedly, acting as ASEAN interlocutor with Vietnam. What really mattered was that ASEAN countries gave Indonesia a partial mandate to communicate with Vietnam, but not a mandate to make any decision on behalf of ASEAN. This ambiguity in mandate limited Indonesia's ability to set the direction of the JIMs and during the actual informal meetings, ASEAN did not speak with one voice because each member country was promoting its own position and agenda.

When the French Government entered in the scene and Indonesia had to work as Co-chair with them, co-ordination efforts between the two governments centred on open communication. The two countries always advised each other on the planned programs and the substance of the issues. This task experienced some difficulties in the beginning because during the first Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC) in 1989, the Co-chairs were not always successful in synchronising their positions.[13] Similarly, the ASEAN countries also took part in the Paris talks on their own, and the only co-ordination activity that Indonesia could arrange by then was a caucus meeting among the ASEAN countries to listen to each ASEAN countries' position and to share information. However, Indonesia's efforts to promote openness among the ASEAN members remained unsuccessful because some of them were reluctant to disclose their position during the caucus meetings.

After the Paris meeting, co-ordination between Indonesia and France was more effective, especially after Indonesia gained the trust of the French Government that the following meetings after Paris were under the framework of PICC. Indonesia always involved the French in the post-Paris meetings in Jakarta and, likewise, France also kept Indonesia abreast about discussions among the Permanent Five. Thus, each Co-chair did not leave their counterpart out of the

loop on the development of the discussion after Paris and the two tracks of discussions, in the UN and in Southeast Asia, cross-fertilised each other.

The co-ordination function between Indonesia and Australia was relatively easier. Australia entered the picture after offering a new proposal to break the stalemate in the discussions on the merit of diluting the Hun Sen led-Government, and the kind of role for the UN before the election. Australia proposed that the UN function as an interim government in Cambodia. The Australians consulted Indonesia and France about the idea, and then the Australians consulted the Cambodian factions, the Vietnamese and the PRK of Hun Sen. At the same time, Minister Alatas conducted a regional tour to seek responses from the factions, the Vietnamese, the PRK and the concerned countries about the Australian proposal. After gaining some knowledge about the respective parties' positions, Indonesia arranged an Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC) in Jakarta in February 1990, and Indonesia invited the Australians to act as resource persons during the meeting. Later still, the Permanent Five refined the Australian proposal for UN involvement in Cambodia.

The OIC mandate regarding the Moro issue presented Indonesia with a unique opportunity to assist the conflicting parties in resolving their problem. Basically, the mandate provided Indonesia with more leverage to facilitate the informal diplomacy. This leverage was more observable on non-substantive issues with, for instance, Indonesia having no difficulty in proceeding with the talks even though the schedule for the meeting that Indonesia set, did not suit some members of the Committee of the Six, or even the OIC secretariat. Indonesia was able to set the tone and the direction of the informal diplomacy process more easily. In terms of substantive issues, Indonesia's ability to co-ordinate a common position with the OIC and members of Committee of the Six was subject to the interest of the OIC and Committee of the Six members.

Toward the end of the process, Indonesia had co-ordinated a common position among the OIC and Committee of the Six's members that helped persuade the MNLF to accept the final solution of the Moro's problem. This event took place in late August 1996, when the conflicting parties were still undecided about the

few remaining obstacles for an agreed solution, including the integration of the MNLF forces into the Philippines Armed Forces. Indonesia was able to co-ordinate common positions among members of the Committee of Six and the OIC Secretariat, after convincing them that the GRP had given Mr. Misuari more concessions. The critical concessions in this case included President Ramos' support for Mr. Misuari's bid as Governor of the ARMM, and the President's agreement to absorb some MNLF members in the Philippines Armed Forces. In the end, the positions of all parties in the peace process had converged or reached a consensus, based on pragmatism that a conclusion of the Moro's conflict was within reach.

In the case of the informal workshops, the Indonesians needed to co-ordinate with the Canadians. Mostly, Dr. Djalal supervised co-ordination on the substantive aspects of the informal workshops between Indonesia and the Canadians, whereas the Research Agency dealt with the Canadians prior to and during the informal workshops. The Agency co-ordinated with the Canadians on the administrative aspects, but not so much on the substantive aspects of the informal workshops.

The secretarial role of the Agency was confined to non-substantive aspects of the workshops which prevented the Agency from co-ordinating substantive aspects, either with Dr. Djalal or with the Canadians. However, the Agency was responsible for preparing the opening remarks of the Foreign Minister in every workshop. This arrangement was not without flaws. At times the lack of co-ordination among the Indonesian team on the content of the speech, and on the message that they wished the Foreign Minister to put across, created confusion among the Indonesian team.

VII.3. Assessment of process during informal diplomacy

Process in informal diplomacy refers to the interactions between the Indonesians as the facilitators and the participants, and between the participants themselves. A solid team and sound teamwork among the Indonesians, and between the Indonesians and their counterparts, did not guarantee successful outcomes.

However, a solid team, combined with a well developed strategy and tactics during the peace process did increase the effectiveness of informal diplomacy.

The following discussion evaluates the informal diplomacy process by looking at the activities that took place during and between the meetings, involving Indonesia as facilitator, the core participants and individuals who acted as resource persons, such as the Canadians in the South China Sea workshops. The role of non-participants, that is, the media and the think tanks will also be evaluated. The overall intention is to gain a bigger picture of the process by looking at the interplay between the core participants and non-participants, as well as at the interrelationship between the actual meeting facilitated by Indonesia and the wider contexts of regional and international environments.

3.1 The dynamics of informal meetings

The notion of dynamics implies a lively interaction involving the participants in the informal diplomacy process. The lively interaction during the various meetings was of two types: positive and negative. Positive interaction meant that the participants were willing to share ideas and exchange points of view for the sake of gaining mutual understanding and resolving conflict. In contrast, participants engaged in negative interaction if they were not willing to move from their 'square,' and maintained defensive attitudes. The third party's responsibility during the meeting was to stimulate positive interaction and to facilitate or encourage a smooth transition from negative to positive interactions.

In situations, involving deep-rooted conflicts and disputes, negative interactions are unavoidable. Any kind of meeting, either formal or informal, results in participants expressing their feelings of anger, frustration and dissatisfaction directly in front of their opponents. As noted in Chapter 2, Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks argue that an outpouring of emotions during the first stage of most workshops is normal and the third party should not stop the process.[14] Likewise, the proponents of psychoanalytical techniques in problem solving workshops consider expressing a feeling openly as the strength of the informal approach and a way of reducing stereotypes.[15] Informal meetings are seen as a

more suitable forum for the negative interactions because the participants take part in the meeting in their private capacity, thus distanced from their primordial elements of identity group or affiliation, and they are treated equally. Moreover, in theory, an informal setting could filter dissatisfaction from aggressive exchanges of views because a stress free environment would help the participants feel comfortable. Therefore, the facilitator should select a venue and arrange a meeting setting where the participants feel comfortable during and between the meetings.[16]

An informal meeting would not jeopardise the official lines of the factions or countries, especially if the participants are aware that the objective of the endeavour is to explore options. However, during the Indonesian led informal meetings, some participants had difficulty in accepting strong statements from their opponents. Some participants also had difficulty in dissociating themselves from the official lines of their governments and the interests of their supporters. This problem was heightened by the reports made by media on the meetings because of the high profile nature of the issues. The following discussion looks closely at these issues and, in particular, at the issues of participants' sensitivity and inflexibility in their position. The discussion also highlights some strategies developed by Indonesia to deal with the problem.

3.1.1. The Cambodian conflict

Sensitivity toward other participants' comments was observable in the JIM process. The Khmer Rouge faction did not accept any mention of 'the genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime' in the meeting discussion of the first JIM and in the Chairman's Statement. As a facilitator in the JIM meeting, Indonesia tried to balance the Chairman's Statement of the first JIM by also stressing the aspect of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Still, the Indonesian efforts did not satisfy the Khmer Rouge and they expressed their dissatisfaction by boycotting the First Working Group meeting of JIM in Jakarta, from 17 to 19 October 1988.

The JIM process provided Indonesia with a lesson that the deep-seated animosity among the Cambodian factions would be difficult to reconcile. Indonesia also

learned that the plenary format of the first JIM was prone to confrontational interactions. The unstructured discussion in the morning meeting of the first JIM, which was designed to give the factions more freedom to look at their problems and explore possible solutions, failed to meet these objectives. Initially, Indonesia had hoped that the factions could come up with some topics for discussion in the afternoon session. By encouraging the Cambodian participants to assume responsibility for deciding the agenda, Indonesia had hoped that the factions would feel that the JIM process was their own. As argued by John Burton, "problem solving means leaving decision making in the hands of the parties until an agreement is reached which satisfies the needs of all concerned."[17] Knowing the level of distrust among the Cambodian factions, the least that Indonesia expected from the Cambodians in the morning session was to have them generate a list of issues to be discussed in the afternoon session involving non-Cambodians.

However, the Cambodians who participated in the morning session did not produce any topics for discussion and, therefore, Minister Alatas, who chaired the afternoon session, had to set a discussion agenda. The afternoon session was also clouded by the reality that participants from the ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Laos, were more concerned with their own interests than with finding a solution to the Cambodian problem. Hence, a deep-seated animosity coupled with the participants' competing interest constrained progress during the first JIM.

The first JIM was a learning exercise for Indonesia. The least that Indonesia had hoped to achieve through the informal meetings and the social functions organised on the fringe of the meetings was an improvement in relationships among the Cambodians. However, this did not happen. There was some mingling and interaction during the meeting and the social functions (members of Hun Sen delegation mingled with delegations from FUNCINPEC and KPNLF), but this did not make them more conciliatory when discussing the substantive issues of their conflict.

Having no leverage over the participants and the concerned countries, the success of the Indonesia led JIM depended on whether the participants were seriously

looking for a solution to the Cambodian problem. Indonesia could not even develop a common position with the ASEAN members because each of the members had their own agenda. Therefore, it was simply impossible to dislodge the participants from their official positions. To deal with this problem and also to avoid negative interactions, Indonesia modified the format of the second JIM by limiting the plenary meetings and, instead, encouraging more informal consultations among the factions and the concerned countries. The aim of the strategy of limiting plenary meetings was to give the participants sufficient time to study and respond to a discussion document prepared by Indonesia. Minister Alatas who chaired the meeting moved from participant group to participant group to learn about their latest position on the document and identify areas of possible consensus.

This strategy also failed to bridge the gaps among the differing positions because the participants were unwilling to compromise their own interest. The participants were trapped in the realist paradigm of a zero sum game and did not want to seek a co-operative solution of win-win. Indonesia had hoped that the second JIM would be more progressive than the first one, especially as the document discussed by the participants during the second JIM had been discussed earlier by participants - composing representatives at senior level - during the working group meeting prior to the Second JIM. The main task of the participants to the Second JIM was to discuss issues left undecided during the working group meeting.

Other factors that impeded some participants from making any shift in their positions were, first, their expectation that they would gain the most from a peace process under the aegis of the French Government. By the time of the second JIM, some of the Cambodians had already requested the French Government to take a role as a third party. Hence, the second JIM had to face the issue of lessened interest from some participants who did not wish to yield their positions because they hoped to have a more favourable outcome from the Paris peace process. The second factor that influenced the JIM process was the media.

The mere presence of the media put the JIM process in limbo. The high profile nature of the Cambodian conflict and the fact that JIM was the first ever meeting

among the Cambodians and the regional countries brought a throng of journalists to Jakarta. Indonesia had no authority to seclude the participants from the media because the two had mutual interests. The journalists were searching for news and the participants benefited from the media interest for news by sharing their interests and positions. The factions and the concerned countries also used the media as a means to send signals to other parties, even before the second JIM took place. For instance, Vietnam Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach declared that if the second JIM failed to reach an agreement, Vietnam would not abide by the timetable for its military pull out from Cambodia.[18] Another example was Prince Ranariddh's statement before the journalists during the JIM that the dilution of power of both the CGDK and the PRK was a prerequisite for a free election.[19] This position was contrary to the interests of the PRK and Vietnam who were against the idea of diluting the power of the PRK.

When the Cambodian peace process was elevated into formal negotiation under the Co-chairman, Indonesia and France, the difficulty of reconciling this differing position remained. The level of animosity among the Cambodians was very high and they were not willing to compromise their interests and position. Likewise, the concerned countries also impeded the meeting by raising issues of their own concern and by making statement critical to particular participants. For instance, Singapore always expressed strong and negative statements toward Vietnam and Hun Sen.[20] Arguably the intention was to draw a clear line that Singapore strongly opposed any military intervention by a stronger country on a weaker country. In a way, the assertion was a reflection of Singapore's vulnerability as a small island country, bordering a bigger country, such as Indonesia, which in the past had adopted a hostile policy toward its smaller neighbour.

The Paris peace process did not start from scratch because some of the peace elements that had been identified earlier in the JIM process and reflected in the Consensus Statement of the second JIM were used as the basis for the Paris discussion. After the JIM process, the peace process shifted from formal negotiation in Paris to informal consultation in Jakarta as well as a number of related meetings in some Asian cities. Clearly, the informal consultation was the strategy for building consensus gradually. The format was preferable and less

risky for both the third party and the participants because the expectation was that those involved were more concerned with process rather than the end result. In contrast, a formal negotiation, at times, had to face time constraints, more pressure and high expectations. A failure of a formal negotiation has a potential to backtrack the overall process because the participants might harden their position, and even not willing to meet again, face to face. After the two Chairs were convinced that a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem was achievable, they organised a formal Paris Peace Conference in October 1991 to finally seal the peace process.

Overall, Indonesia's expectation of having the Cambodians reach a resolution by themselves was difficult to realise. The solution to the Cambodian conflict was reached first among the concerned countries, then endorsed by the Permanent Five and later on the Cambodians accepted the agreement. Other factors that made the resolution of the Cambodian conflict possible included the improvement of bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union, Vietnam's efforts to break the isolation, and the betterment of relations between Thailand under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and Vietnam, as well as with the PRK. The improvement of the external environment left the Cambodians with no other option than to accept the peace framework because, in particular, their external patrons had accepted the content of the agreement in total. The peace framework also dealt with the internal aspects of the Cambodian problem. However, this reality suggests that, in the end, the Cambodians had to face realism that they were lacking incentive to prolong their conflicts, especially with the dwindling supports from their respective patrons. When the external parties left the battlefield, the Cambodians were left with the only alternative, that is, to co-operate among themselves to rebuild their country. At the least, the JIM forum provided the Cambodians with a first ever opportunity to communicate among themselves, during which they had a chance to judge from the meetings whether or not they would be able, in the end, to work together as fellow countrymen.

3.1.2. The Moro problem

In contrast to the factions in the Cambodian conflict, the parties in the Moro problem did not take negative statements and criticism from their opponents as an offence and a stumbling block to the informal diplomacy process. This self-restraint was observable especially among the representatives from the GRP, and, the conciliatory attitude made Indonesia's role as a facilitator less troublesome. Clearly, the representatives from the GRP and the MNLF came to the Cipanas informal exploratory talks for the sake of exploring options and assessing whether or not their opponents were serious about finding a solution to the Moro problem. The interests of all parties to explore options, during the informal talks and the subsequent peace talks, gave Indonesia more flexibility in facilitating the informal diplomacy process. Hence, the process moved on with the participants' willingness to look for innovative ways in resolving the problem.

However, the positive attitudes described above did not necessarily mean that the participants trusted each other. After more than two decades of arms conflicts, the level of trust among the parties was very low. The MNLF considered the various GRP deceitful because they did not want to implement the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. This lack of trust was a problem that Indonesia encountered as facilitator during the informal diplomacy process. As the third party facilitating the process, Indonesia did not have a remedy to deal with this problem. They tried hard to encourage more communication and interactions among the protagonists, during and in the fringe of the meetings through social functions and group activities. During the informal diplomacy process social activities became part and parcel of the process, and the activities were designed as a means to develop confidence among the participants. Indonesia facilitated the participants, as a group, to visit some scenic places in Indonesia or arrange opportunities for shopping together in local shopping mall.

Other critical problems that the Indonesians encountered were the lack of experience of formal negotiation among some MNLF representatives and their distrust of GRP. Dealing with this problem required patience not only from the Indonesians, but also from the GRP's representatives. Indonesia's main tasks were

to develop an environment conducive to discussions among the participants, and to implement a strategy for developing consensus on the lesser and gradually on the more contentious issues. In pursuing this strategy, Indonesia developed a tactic of limiting plenary meetings and encouraging more informal consultations to reach consensus. Hence, the formal plenary meetings were held after Indonesia was confident that the participants had reached a consensus on some issues, a tactic Indonesia also adopted during the second JIM. However, the consultation process during the JIM proved more difficult because more than two actors were involved in the process, with the four Cambodian parties and the eight concerned countries. In the case of Moro, there were usually only two parties: the representatives from the GRP and the MNLF. The representative from the OIC in general followed the leadership of Indonesia.[21] Clearly, the number of parties is a factor that influenced the efficacy of the Indonesian informal diplomacy.

To tackle the issue of inexperience among the MNLF on the negotiation format and their lack of experts who could comprehend the substantive as well as technical aspects of the issues being discussed, Indonesia provided some experts to assist the MNLF indirectly. For instance, an expert from the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs gave their account of the GRP's proposal of Sharia Law, and an expert from the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mining looked at the issue of resource sharing based on the GRP's proposal. At times, the Indonesian experts gave their assessment of the GRP's proposal to the Indonesian diplomats. Then during the interaction with the MNLF, the Indonesians used this input as a means to convince the MNLF, particularly in stressing the merits of various proposals of the GRP. However, this did not preclude the MNLF from asking for inputs from the OIC Secretariat. Hence, the Indonesian experts were acting more as a second or alternative opinion for the MNLF.

The informal diplomacy process was also characterised by Indonesia's efforts to win the support of Mr. Misuari. Arguably, Mr. Misuari was the personification of the MNLF. He had pioneered the MNLF, lobbied for Moro's cause in the OIC, and was very instrumental in the informal diplomacy process as Chief Negotiator. As mentioned earlier, during the informal diplomacy process in Jakarta, Indonesia always arranged a private meeting between Minister Alatas and the leaders of the

conflicting parties. Such a meeting not only helped the Minister to become aware of and understand at first hand information on the process, but it also helped him understand the personality of Mr. Misuari better. A better understanding of Mr. Misuari's personality influenced the way Indonesia conducted the informal diplomacy process. For instance he was not prevented from making a statement, in the middle of the meeting, that was outside the scope of the topic under discussion. Indonesia was aware that Mr. Misuari wished to address 'his gallery', that is, his sympathisers who always gathered when the meetings were held in the Philippines.[22] Although this distracted the concentration of the meeting's participants, Indonesia did not stop Mr. Misuari from speaking to his 'gallery'.

In comparison with the Cambodian conflict, an approach at the personal level in the Moro case was relatively easier. At the governmental level, the two Indonesian Ambassadors in Manila were old acquaintances of President Ramos. Further, their military background helped them gain access to the Philippines military establishment. Moreover, the relations between officials from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also in a good accord. Thus, the Indonesians who facilitated the informal diplomacy process were able to concentrate more on persuading Mr. Misuari who stated that he felt he was the target of OIC persuasive diplomacy.[23] Mr. Misuari's statement should be understood in the context of, first, Indonesia representing the OIC as Chairman of the Committee of Six, and second, when making this statement, Mr. Misuari had been approached by other members of the OIC Committee of Six after Indonesia had called for a special meeting. In that meeting of June 1996, Minister Alatas briefed the OIC Ministerial Committee of Six about the latest development of the informal diplomacy process and explained about the concessions that the GRP had offered. Thus, Indonesia did ask the committee members to help in persuading Mr. Misuari to accept the concession.

A similar personal approach was difficult to achieve in the Cambodia case. Indonesia faced the problems of the many parties in the Cambodian conflict, and not having direct access to some of the key players in the conflict. For instance, Indonesia had to rely on Thailand in dealing with the Khmer Rouge and its contact with the PRK was through Vietnam. By then, Indonesia also had not yet

normalised its diplomatic relations with China, although the two countries' diplomats maintained contacts in the UN forum. Consequently, this handicap of direct access prevented Indonesia from pursuing the informal diplomacy to the utmost.

Overall, the role of non-participants in the Moro informal diplomacy process, particularly the Philippines journalists, was relatively balanced. At first, the Philippines' media was very critical about the planned meeting between their government and the MNLF about internal issue was being hold overseas. In order to clarify speculation in the media about the nature of the meeting in Indonesia, the GRP released a statement explaining the rationale for the meeting and asserted that the following meeting would be held in the Philippines. The media interest on the informal meeting, held on April 1993, did not disturb the process because the press were not admitted to the meeting's venue. Press briefings and interviews were held after the conflicting parties had completed their deliberations in Cipanas. The isolation from the media gave the participants in the informal talks an opportunity to concentrate on their deliberations.

The subsequent formal talks, between 1993 to 1996, were held under the close coverage of the Philippines media. At times, both the GRP and the MNLF used the media to assert their positions and justify their actions. The Ramos Administration wished to convince the public that the government national reconciliation program was on the right track. In the case of Mr. Misuari, obviously, he benefited from the media coverage. He had become less popular among the Moro in Mindanao due to his long period of self-exile in Saudi Arabia. The media coverage reasserted his position as a central figure in the MNLF, and his prominent position among other known separatist groups, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf.

The fact that it was only the MNLF which was recognised by the OIC as the representative of the Moro people gave no basis to include the splinters groups, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf, into the informal diplomacy process. Thus, they were not bound by the agreement reached at the end of the process which meant that

Indonesia's intention to assist the Filipinos in finding a comprehensive solution to the Moro problems was not fully attained.

In the end, Indonesia's effort to facilitate the resolution of the separatism conflict in Mindanao was enhanced by three factors to emerge inside and outside the Philippines. First, President Ramos committed his administration in a campaign to end the domestic insurgencies, including the Moro problem, so that he could concentrate on an economic development program. Secondly, Mr. Misuari realised that his popularity in Mindanao had declined due to his long period of self-exile in Saudi Arabia. In his absence, the other rebellious group, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf, had gained more popularity among the Moro people. Thirdly, the interests of both Libya and Saudi Arabia on the Moro problem had also declined. In particular, Libya wanted to improve its image from a country that sponsored armed rebellion to a country which supporting peaceful settlement of conflict.

3.1.3. The South China Sea disputes

The South China Sea informal workshops (1990-1998) presented Indonesia with a unique experience in terms of interpersonal relationships among the participants and with regard to their position toward the official line of their government. The informal workshops provided participants with an opportunity to meet in their individual capacity and develop personal relationships. This relationship helped them to better understand the concerns of their counterparts on issues sensitive to their country, but this did not limit the efforts of some participants and Indonesia to raise those issues during the informal workshop. Most of the time, participants from China vetoed discussion on issues sensitive for their government, such as on a regional code of conduct and the involvement of non-regional countries and international organisations in the workshop process.

The difficulty some participants had in distancing themselves from the official line of their governments during the workshop limited Indonesia's ability to explore options during the process and encourage the participants to look outside of their 'square'. Indonesia's efforts to innovate, such as by proposing a 'doughnut formula' as areas for possible co-operation, were rejected by some

claimant states. Therefore, the workshops between 1997 and 1998 were marked by a lack of new ideas and the participants tended to concentrate their discussions more on the technical aspects of the co-operation. This tendency turned the informal workshops into more routine meetings with the function of endorsing or revising the various proposals made by the informal meetings at the working groups and experts level. Despite the difficulty, the informal workshop was marked by an increase of personal understanding and bonds among the participants. They did not take strong language and statements from other participants personally. Their interaction in the workshop and during the social functions and activities organised by Indonesia between the workshop' sessions gave the participants opportunity to develop a personal rapport.

Indonesia's role during the South China Sea workshops was not confined to the three roles suggested by Herbert Kelman, that is, providing theoretical inputs, content observations and process observations.[24] Indonesia had engaged in the substantive discussion of the issues during the process, through the role of Dr. Djalal as resource person, and through the Indonesians who took part as participants during the meeting process. At times, Dr. Djalal was involved in intellectual debate with participants from China, to defend the merit of discussing particular topic during the workshop, such as the regional code of conduct.[25] Dr. Jiwandono of CSIS stated that even during the First Workshop in 1990, the Indonesians who took part in the workshops as participants or resource persons engaged in substantive discussion. In his opinion not all participants from the ASEAN countries were happy about this 'know better attitude', and he was under the impression that the Indonesians dominated the First Workshop.[26] The question is whether his observation confirms Herbert Kelman' argument that the third party in a conflict resolution should not take part in the substantive discussion nor give advice or offer its own proposals?[27]

There is no affirmative answer to this matter because the informal workshop was a rather unique diplomatic effort involving not only participants with territorial disputes, but also those who have no territorial claims whatsoever. Arguably, those who have no direct stake on the issue would be less reserved in presenting their opinion, including the Indonesians who took part in the informal forum as

participants or resource persons. Another explanation for active third party involvement in the process was that they had a stake in a successful or tangible outcome of the process and, therefore, were willing to transgress the ideal boundary of informal diplomacy set by some scholars. In fact, the Indonesian diplomats who were in charge in the process had to report to their superiors about the outcomes of the process, and their concerns were ultimately about achieving tangible results. However, the implication of much involvement in the process was resentment from some participants to the role of the third party.

Another question arises whether the Indonesians engagement in the substantive discussion mean that as facilitator in the problem solving exercise Indonesia wished to steer the discussion. Although none of the interviewees were willing to support such a scenario, at a certain stage during the workshop process, the Indonesians must have become nervous at the slow pace of the workshops' achievements. Minister Alatas' suggestion to formalise some of the agreements reached during the workshops could be seen as a hint that he was not very pleased with the slow progress of the informal workshop. The Minister's assertion put extra pressure on the Indonesian team and they wished to gain concrete results.

Another way to explain the active involvement of the Indonesian team in the workshop discussion could also be that on the one hand, the Indonesians wished to stimulate the substantive discussions during the workshop in the expectation that this would induce other participants, especially the claimant states, to be more forthcoming. Therefore, their active involvement was a calculated tactic on the part of Indonesia as facilitator of the informal workshops. On the other hand, some members of the Indonesian team lacked understanding or direction on the kind of role that they had to perform during the informal workshops. This was mostly caused by a lack of clarity of the assignment they received before the informal workshop. Consequently, they actively engaged in the discussion based on their 'gut feeling' and background knowledge on the topics under discussion. Arguably the second explanation is more desirable because, as admitted by Dr. Djalal, some participants from the claimant states, at times, suspected Indonesia of having an undisclosed agenda, such as to benefit economically from the co-operation projects.[28] Such suspicion was unavoidable knowing that some

members of the Indonesian team included officials from the military, mostly the navy, and from technical ministries such as the Ministry of Mining and Energy. Other participants could interpret any comments made by Indonesian participants from these branches of government during the substantive discussion as an implicit interest.

The lack of clarity of their role among the Indonesians during the workshop was further impaired by insufficient co-ordination among members of the Indonesian team between the sessions of the workshop. Although the Indonesian team engaged in preparatory meetings prior to the workshop, internal co-ordination in the intervals between the workshop sessions was limited. Seemingly, as long as those who acted as facilitators, participants or observers understood their role and function, they were left to perform it. Some co-ordination activities were held by each group, but the groups did not meet as a whole team. Dr. Djalal co-ordinated the substance with resource persons from Canada, while the Indonesian team from the Research Agency conducted a separate meeting. Meanwhile, those involved as participants as well as observers seldom sat together to discuss the process or the dynamics of the earlier sessions.[29] This reality could also stem from the fact that a number of Indonesians had long involvement in the yearly workshops and, therefore, to some members of the team, at least, the informal diplomacy had become a routine exercise. They simply did not find internal co-ordination during the workshop urgent because they assumed that the rest of the team members were also aware of their role and function. Hence, the active participation of the Indonesians during the substantive discussions was the result of internal pressure and different understanding among members of the team of their role in the informal process.

This finding raises a question as to the extent of Indonesia's involvement during the substantive discussions on Cambodia and the Moro problems. The discussion in Chapter 4 suggested that during the Cambodia peace process the Indonesians, at first, tried to avoid involvement in the substantive discussion by letting the Cambodians hold their internal discussions. However, the paucity of results from this session put pressure on Minister Alatas, in his capacity as a chairman of the JIM, to direct the discussion in the afternoon session. Indonesia even prepared a

document for the second JIM and Minister Alatas consulted the content of the document with the head of each delegation. Therefore, Indonesia was also involved in the substantive discussion during the informal meetings of the Cambodians, and was even more active in terms of providing the participants with a consolidated text as a basis for their discussion.

In the Moro case, Indonesia distanced itself from the substantive discussion during the informal exploratory talks and took a facilitative role. When the informal talks moved into formal talks, Indonesia set the direction of the substantive discussion by identifying the issues or topics of discussion based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. However, in the overall informal diplomacy process, the Indonesian team also tried to limit their involvement in the substantive discussion. In the process, they mostly facilitated the discussion among the participants, by chairing the various meetings. They did give alternative opinions based on the request, mostly of the MNLF, and mainly on issues where the MNLF lacked expertise. Thus, the involvement of the Indonesians in the substantive discussion in dealing with the Moro case was more moderate compared to the other two cases, Cambodian and the South China Sea.

The above evaluations reveal that the involvement of Indonesia in the substantive discussions during the informal diplomacy process in certain circumstances was unavoidable. However, what made a difference in these cases was the level of understanding among the Indonesians on the extent of their role in the informal diplomacy process. Furthermore, their understanding was influenced by the considerable extent of co-ordination within the team. Clearly, members of Indonesian teams dealing with the Cambodian and Moro problems were engaged in intensive co-ordination in comparison with the Indonesian team for the South China Sea informal workshop.

3.2. The meeting setting and its impact on the informal diplomacy process

Track Two scholars have long drawn attention to the setting as one of the most important aspects in the problem solving exercise.[30] The impact of the meeting setting on the informal diplomacy conducted by Indonesia and meeting dynamics

is difficult to evaluate. At question is how influential the setting was to the meetings' dynamic and the outcomes of the meetings themselves. During the informal diplomacy process, Indonesia tried to create a setting which was supportive to the dynamics during the actual meeting and between the sessions. The setting in this case involved the selection of the meeting's venue and the seating arrangement during the meeting itself. Indonesia also gave extra attention to other factors that could influence the settings and meeting dynamics, such as the arrangement of participants' accommodation and the organisation of social activities in between the meetings, to effect improvement in interpersonal relationships among the participants. The following discussion evaluates these efforts in the three case studies.

The first JIM on the Cambodian issue and the informal exploratory talks of the Moro were held in the Presidential Palace. The venues were selected at the discretion of President Soeharto, reflecting his personal interest in the informal diplomacy process. By selecting the palaces as the venue, Indonesia clearly wished to demonstrate to the participants that it took its role as facilitator seriously and wished to treat the participants with the utmost respect. Moreover, the palace has an aura of dignity and Indonesia wished to share this with the participants. Seemingly the element of symbolism was an important factor for Indonesia in performing the role as facilitator and, arguably, Asian culture takes symbolism very seriously. For instance, Hun Sen was upset that as Prime Minister he was not being treated equally by the French Government because the host did not reserve him a room in the same hotel where Prince Sihanouk was staying. Also in the case of Cambodia, in Jakarta in 1989, Prince Sihanouk had insisted Hun Sen visit him in the hotel he stayed for their bilateral talks. Hence, the mere visit of Hun Sen to his hotel symbolised obedience. In the case of the Moro, arguably an opportunity for the MNLF to share a stay in a palace with representatives from the GRP gave them a sense of equal status. Likewise, for the GRP's representatives, the palace would be less intimidating for a meeting than the office of Libya's Foreign Ministry in Tripoli where they held their first informal exploratory talks with the MNLF in1992.

The selection of a palace also stemmed from practical reasons. It was easier for Indonesia to provide the participants with security and to isolate them, for instance, from media interference. Both palaces were located on the outskirts of Jakarta. However, Indonesia did face some difficulties in meeting the demand of the Cambodian participants during the first JIM in Bogor, as each group insisted on having sleeping quarters at the same level; no one wanted to be placed in the room at a lower level than other participants.[31] Similarly, the parties were highly sensitive over the meeting setting and, at one point, their officials even measured the size of the table in the meeting room that Indonesia provided for their head of delegation.[32] Indonesia also faced difficulty in providing the media with a holding room and telecommunication facilities in Bogor Palace. Clearly, some of the technical problems of the antique Bogor Palace caused difficulties for Indonesia in fulfilling the various demands of the participants. Indonesia was able to meet the participants' demands, but the complexity surrounding the process could have influenced the positive atmosphere of friendship that Indonesia had wished to nurture. The limitations of the palace venue were the reason why the second JIM was held in a modern hotel in Jakarta.

The informal exploratory talks involving the Filipinos held in the Cipanas Palace did not face the same sort of technical problems. Despite the antiquity of Cipanas Palace, the Indonesian team had earlier requested the Ministry of Communication's assistance to upgrade the telephone facility and guarantee easy access to Manila and Riyadh. With the communication system in place, the participants faced no difficulty in consulting with their superiors or advisers in the two cities. This easy access to communication proved valuable for the informal talks and the subsequent meetings in Jakarta, and Indonesia took special care of this matter. Therefore, in Cipanas, Indonesia was relatively less troubled by the participants' demands. Their numbers were also smaller. Indonesia had to deal mainly with Mr. Misuari and his entourage. The participants from the GRP were easier to deal with because understandably they were in need of Indonesia's assistance.

In the subsequent meetings after Cipanas, Indonesia had to deal with the increasing number of representatives from the MNLF. Indonesia had to

accommodate their large numbers - even at its own expense - for the sake of providing Mr. Misuari and the MNLF with peace of mind. Indonesia tried to empathise with Mr. Misuari's interest in bringing the various interest groups of the MNLF to Jakarta so that he could convince them that he was discussing the interests of all the Moro elements. At the same time, the informal diplomacy process itself benefited from the involvement of the various sections and interest groups in the MNLF. The dissemination of the meetings results was enhanced because more Moro people were exposed to the process. Therefore, Indonesia would not have been reluctant to accommodate the large number of MNLF representative during the peace process in Indonesia.

In the case of South China Sea workshop, the activities were held in different cities in Indonesia. The selection of the city and venue was based on the consideration of symbolism and practicality. A city with a symbolic meaning was selected in order to relate the participants with what had been achieved in the city in the past; for instance Bandung because of the Afro-Asian Conference, and the ancient city of Jogyakarta because of the peace tradition among the Javanese society. Some cities were selected because of their proximity to the South China Sea, and in the past those cities functioned as a hub that connected the Asian people from different race groups for trades and communications. The significance of every city was explicitly stated by Minister Alatas in his opening remarks in every workshop. Hence, the aspect of symbolism remains essential for the venues of the informal workshops. However, there is no clear explanation whether or not such symbolism had any influence on the participants.

Indonesia also gave careful attention to the seating arrangements during the informal meetings. Although the informal setting supposedly gave the facilitator less headache over the protocols, in reality during the Indonesian informal diplomacy some participants remained critical about protocol matters. As mentioned earlier, some Cambodian participants were very sensitive to the treatment their leaders received from the host. To avoid apprehension during JIM, the participants were seated based on alphabetical order and this arrangement was also introduced during the informal workshop. However, in the case of the South China Sea informal workshop, no flags or country designation were placed on the

table. Each participant received a map of the seating arrangement, so they would know where to sit. In the case of JIM, the Cambodian participants sat with the only identification: a plate which said 'Cambodia'. Therefore, arguably the intention of Indonesia was twofold: first to avoid disputes on who was the legitimate representative of the Cambodians, and second to emphasise togetherness, that all the participants were Cambodian by origin.

Indonesia was also concerned about the shape of the table for the informal meetings. The shapes of the table for the informal meetings were either round or oval. However, in the case of the informal workshop, this was not always the case because some venues had difficulty in accommodating a round or oval shaped table. A square table was all Indonesia could arrange in some of the workshops. In general, participants to the informal workshop seldom complained about the seating arrangements. What really mattered for China was to prevent Taiwan using the workshop forum to assert its claim as a sovereign entity.

China was very critical if the notion of the Republic of China was mentioned during the meeting or in workshop documents. On some occasions, Taiwan did circulate a document bearing the name Republic of China which dragged some meeting sessions into a long debate between participants from China and Taiwan on the legality of the name. According to Dino Djalal, at times China used this issue to delay discussion on substantive issues.[33] Clearly, Indonesia took care of the Taiwan issue very carefully because Indonesia did not want to embarrass China and did not want the peace process troubled with China's domestic interest. For its part, Taiwan did benefit from its participation in the informal workshop. The forum provided Taiwan with an opportunity to follow discussions not only on technical issues but, at times, also on political and security issues.

Indonesia gave special attention to social activities involving the participants during the informal meetings. Indonesia organised social events between meeting's sessions and at the end or the final day of the meetings. The aims of the activities were to relieve their tensions and stress during their interactions in the meeting, as well as to socialise the participants one with another. The varieties of activities included attending traditional dances performance (in the case of JIM),

taking turn in presenting national songs (in the informal workshop on the South China Sea) and visiting scenic places. During the Moro meetings, Indonesia organised a number of group field trip to various tourism sites or simply to visit local markets together. The social activities were aimed at increasing interpersonal relationships among the participants, better understanding and also to relieve some tensions during the meetings.

Arguably, such social activities did influence participants' relationships in the three case studies, although their impact in each case was different. At the least, the MNLF admitted that they had learned more about their opponent during the various social activities organised by Indonesia.[34] Similarly, some Cambodians who took part in JIM stated to the Indonesian Ambassador in Phnom Penh that they were touched by the message delivered by President Soeharto during their courtesy visit.[35] In that meeting the President appealed to the Cambodians to fulfil their common goal together, of holding an election, and to leave their antagonism behind. During the second JIM, one of the social activities that Indonesia organised was a courtesy visit to President Soeharto's house.

VII.4. Assessment of the objectives of informal diplomacy and the outcomes

The efficacy of informal diplomacy in dealing with regional conflicts and disputes is subject to various interrelated factors, such as whether or not the conflicting parties were interested in the informal diplomacy process, and whether or not the participants in the process shared similar objectives of resolving their problem. As noted earlier, developments at the domestic, regional and also international environments also had some influence in the process.

Indeed, Indonesian informal diplomacy was only one of many peace efforts involving different actors and countries, and took place in other forums. The informal diplomacy contributed to the peace efforts in different forums and, at the same time, it was influenced by the interrelationships between the core participants in the informal meetings and those outside the meeting forums or the non-participants. For instance, the Khmer Rouge dependence on China set the limits on the JIMs because China did not take part in the meetings. Indonesian

informal diplomacy also influenced the peace efforts in other forums, such as the inter-linkages between the JIMs process and the UN discussion on Cambodia. Similarly, the informal workshop on the South China Sea actually provided the regional countries with some proposals of possible regional co-operation in the South China Sea.

The following discussion evaluates the objectives of the Indonesian informal diplomacy and whether it has furthered Indonesia's strategic interests in the region. The participants' interest in the process also influenced the attainments of the objectives. However, their interest in taking part in the informal diplomacy process can be difficult to discern. Their interests and objectives can really only be ascertained from the various statements the participants made inside and outside the meetings, and through observing their behaviour during the process. In determining whether the participants were interested in the informal diplomacy, the thesis has to rely on the impressions the Indonesians had about the many participants. Similarly, the objectives or the motives of the third party in sponsoring the informal diplomacy process are also difficult to identify at times. The techniques to identify Indonesia's objectives and motives as a third party in resolving the conflicts are similar to the ones used in assessing the participants' objectives, that is, through observing the various statements made by Indonesians, and through the interviews with some Indonesians involved in the undertakings.

4.1. Shared objectives: between ideals and reality

Shared objectives is an ideal in informal diplomacy. If all parties in the conflicts and disputes shared the desire to resolve their problems, then the role of the third party is relatively easy. What the third party needs to do is assist those in conflicts to find the most acceptable solution to their problems and ensure that all participants are satisfied with the outcomes of the peace efforts. As noted in Chapter 3, Indonesian informal diplomacy was also inspired with the ideal of 'just peace', that is, to resolve the problems of conflicts and disputes comprehensively to the satisfaction of all the participants and the parties concerned.

As also noted in Chapter 3, this ideal of a lasting peace; stemming from the balance between freedom and responsibility; [36] was also shared by many officials of the Ministry. They believed that conflict resolution would last longer if the parties to the conflicts or disputes were satisfied with the outcomes of the informal diplomacy process. For instance, Mr. Yusbar Djamil mentioned that Indonesia's peace initiatives to deal with the three regional issues were based on the interest of finding a comprehensive solution to the problem.[37] A comprehensive solution in this case meant that Indonesia looked at issues involved in the conflicts and the disputes comprehensively, and not mainly on issues related to the conflict. Arguably, informal diplomacy was Indonesia's main tool to address issues which were not immediately obvious. The informality of the forum (it is not official) which is exploratory in nature, with outcomes which are non-binding, is suitable for efforts to explore problems, positions, and options exhaustively. However, the effectiveness of an informal forum and the role of the third party can only be enhanced if the participants also shared similar objectives of resolving their problems.

The third party's role is far more difficult where the participants do not share similar objectives of conflict resolution and come to the forum with a differing interpretation of the Indonesian peace initiative, or seek to achieve particular interests. For example, some participants came to meetings mainly to block the discussion because of their national interest, such as the case of China and Malaysia's participation in the South China Sea workshop.[38] Therefore, the main challenge for any third party in the informal diplomacy process is how to encourage the participants to share the objective of resolving their conflict and disputes. It is important for the third party to make participants understand that the foundation of informal diplomacy is process, and in some cases it takes time for the process to achieve the objective of solving the conflict. Likewise, the third party needs to enlighten the participants that the process itself does not guarantee a solution to the problems, but could help parties become more aware of and understand the positions, concerns and interests of other parties.

Both attitudes among the participants toward the informal diplomacy, either of having or lacking interest, were observable during the informal diplomacy process

sponsored by Indonesia. Cases where the participants showed a lack of understanding of the objectives of the informal diplomacy were observable during JIM and the informal workshop on the South China Sea. In fact, in the case of JIM, the forum itself was marred by participants' insistence on maintaining their parochial interests. This stance was a clear reflection of their objectives and motives in participating in the informal forum. For instance, during JIM, participants representing the CGDK wished to put Vietnam on the spot as the main culprit for Cambodia's fiasco. Singapore and Thailand also shared this intention. In contrast, Vietnam and Hun Sen wanted to put all the blame for the Cambodian debacle on the Khmer Rouge, implicating that the Khmer Rouge policy of genocide was the main factor of the Cambodian conflict. Thus, Vietnam invaded Cambodia not as an oppressor but as a liberator.

Vietnam's objective in participating in the JIM was to break the international isolation imposed by some countries and international organisations. At the same time, Vietnam was also interested in relieving itself of the economic burden of its occupation in Cambodia. Hence, Vietnam had a stake in a successful outcome from the JIM and, therefore, played a constructive role during the informal diplomacy process. However, Vietnam's desire not to be blamed as the instigator of the conflict made this country very averse to any discussions on the topic of military pullout. Vietnam's tactic to avoid discussion was to link the issue of a military pullout with the discontinuation of all military assistance to all the Cambodian factions and to declare the non-recurrence of the genocide policy of the Khmer Rouge.

Similarly, the Cambodian participants did not share the objectives of resolving their conflicts in a most acceptable way, where all parties involved in the informal diplomacy were satisfied with the outcomes. Clearly, they came to Jakarta to gain the most vis-à-vis the other parties and, as a consequence, they were unwilling to listen to other parties' points of view. The informality of the forum was not able to move the participants forward to look at issues beyond their parochial interests. As explained in Chapter 4, Indonesia designed the first stage of the First JIM as an avenue for the Cambodian participants to discuss among themselves issues that

required attention during the second stage of the JIM, involving participants from concerned countries. Minister Alatas spelled out this objective as follows:

> Herein lies the significance of this stage of our Meeting [the first stage or morning session], for it is our considered view that it will provide all of you representatives of all Kampuchean factions with a first and unique opportunity to discuss, in an atmosphere of informality, those aspects of the problem that should appropriately be taken up by the Kampuchean people themselves, e.g. such aspects as national reconciliation, self-determination, the formation of a provisional government to arrange for general elections and the building of a new, peaceful, independent, Non-aligned and neutral Kampuchea.[39]

By giving the Cambodian participants the opportunity to set the direction of the afternoon discussion, Indonesia had hoped that they would have considered the JIM as their own. With a sense of belonging, Indonesia expected that Cambodians would have respected any outcomes of the JIM process, thus guaranteeing the sustenance of the outcomes of the informal diplomacy process. However, the Cambodian participants did not seize the opportunity and, in the end, Indonesia had to set the agenda for the afternoon discussion. By setting a meeting agenda, Indonesia deviated from the principles governing the conflict resolution exercise, especially of the Track Two diplomacy. John Burton, for instance, maintained that in an informal forum for conflict resolution "there should be no fixed agenda of either specific items or timing".[40] The difficulty of observing this principle in the actual exercise of conflict resolution, such as in Cambodia, is that the core participants were not willing to engage themselves in a kind of exploratory discussion. Hence, as a third party, Indonesia felt obliged to stimulate the discussion during JIM by setting the agenda and items for discussions, otherwise the momentum of the first ever meeting among the parties in the Cambodian conflict would be meaningless.

Similarly, by letting the Cambodian participants discuss some issues of their conflict among themselves, without the presence of the third party, Indonesia also did not observe the requirements of controlled communication, another cardinal principle of the Track Two diplomacy.[41] For scholars of Track Two diplomacy and problem solving workshops, controlled communication is the main characteristic of their conflict resolution approach because the participants were

expected to move from one discussion to another after completing their analysis of their problem in the earlier discussion. In this case the third party should ensure that the participants observed this procedure and prevented the participants from suggesting any proposal before the analysis of the situation was complete.[42]

Given the discrepancies between the ideal of conflict resolution as outlined by some scholars and the implementation of informal diplomacy by Indonesia, the question arises of why the Indonesians did not observe the principles behind conflict resolution, particularly of the problem solving workshop? Furthermore, is there any similarity between what Indonesia called a 'just peace' or a comprehensive resolution and conflict resolution? On the second question, arguably in principle what Indonesia called 'just peace' and 'comprehensive resolution' share the central tenet of conflict resolution through a problem solving workshop. According to Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks a successful workshop is when the parties emerge from the meeting with "*an outcome that satisfies their underlying interests and their goals.*"[43] The so-called comprehensive resolution is also based on the interest of addressing all aspects of the conflict so that the parties are satisfied with the outcomes and their sense of justice is served.

Although sharing the basic tenet with some variants of conflict resolution techniques, in pursuing its informal diplomacy, Indonesia did not follow the ideal forms of the problem solving approach as suggested by the Track Two diplomacy scholars. This action stemmed from the fact that JIM was Indonesia's first ever exercise of informal diplomacy in dealing with regional conflict, and therefore, it was open for experimentation. Arguably, Indonesia had learned some lessons from the difficulty it encountered in the first JIM and in the subsequent informal diplomacy meetings; Indonesia no longer left the parties in a meeting setting on their own, without the presence of Indonesia as the third party. Similarly, in both the Cambodia and Moro cases Indonesia also reduced the frequency of plenary meetings when it found that the participants tended to engage in confrontational interactions during the plenary setting. To deal with the problem, Indonesia intensified informal caucus meetings wherein the third party and the parties in the conflicts met in private to discuss the contentious issues.

The caucus meeting is a informal meeting with a limited number of participants. Some scholars of problem solving techniques consider a caucus meeting not suitable for conflict resolution because the exercise is depicted as non-analytical and concerned with bargaining an outcome. Scholars are concerned that in a caucus meeting the interactions among the parties are influenced more with power politics and, therefore, the weaker party would not find the outcomes acceptable. However, during the Indonesian caucus meetings all the participants were involved and the interactions were not guided by power politics but more by exploring the underlying reasons behind some participants' positions on some issues of their conflict. For instance, representatives from the MNLF did not feel comfortable discussing the issue of their irregular forces' integration into the Philippines Army openly in the plenary settings. Thus, a caucus meeting during the informal diplomacy process to deal with Moro problem provided the parties with the opportunity to discuss all their concerns on some sensitive issues exhaustively.

At the same time a caucus meeting helped the participants know each other better, and from the interactions they gradually developed a personal rapport. Arguably, personal rapport among the participants was one of the main objectives of the Indonesian informal diplomacy because with good rapport the participants could understand more of the perspectives of their opponents and, at the same time, see them as fellow humans and not simply as an enemy sitting on the other side of the table. Clearly good personal rapport among the participants and between the Indonesians and the participants was an important feature in Indonesian informal diplomacy. To reinforce this objective, Indonesia kept intact the composition of the teams who were assigned to deal with the informal diplomacy, and in particular maintaining the head of the team at all time. In the case of Moro the Foreign Minister assigned Mr. Sastrohandoyo as head of the team continuously, even after he was appointed as ambassador in France, and in the case of the South China Sea informal workshop, the Foreign Minister trusted Dr. Djalal.

However, good personal rapport, especially among the participants, also has a negative side. Good relations at the interpersonal level among the participants carries the risk of frustrating the informal diplomacy process because the

participants' integrity could be questioned by colleagues back home who were not involved in the informal diplomacy process. In order to deal with the problem emanating from the perception of 'selling out' to the enemy, Indonesia encouraged the participants to maintain close contact with their colleagues back home by installing communication facilities in the meeting venue. In the case of the Moro, another option chosen by Indonesia was to let the MNLF bring into the informal diplomacy process more participants who were representing the different interests among the Moro. Their exposure to the discussion helped the Moro people's acceptance of the meetings outcomes. However, this option of bringing more participants was costly for Indonesia, financially.

The role of the third party in conflict resolution is less complicated where participants share the objectives of the informal diplomacy. In the Moro case, the participants did share similar objectives when they came to Jakarta to participate in the informal exploratory talks. All the participants came to the forum to explore options and to look at their problems afresh. In particular, they were willing to re-look at the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and to find ways and means to improve the Agreement. Indeed, the parties had different understandings and interpretations of the Agreement because, after almost two decades, the Agreement had been taken over by events and developments in the Philippines. As facilitator, Indonesia assisted the participants in their discussion on the issues involved by identifying the points of contention in the Agreement and let the parties discuss each point, step by step.

In the case of the workshop on the South China Sea, Indonesia had difficulty in convincing the participants of the merits of informal diplomacy's objectives. Indonesia had hoped that the informal diplomacy would build confidence among the participants and, at the same time, contribute to the development of alternative policies to deal with the issues relating with the territorial disputes. Although in the informal diplomacy process, the participants were able to develop a cordial working relationship among themselves, the better understanding did not occur at the governmental level. There was a gap between the improvement of relationships at an interpersonal level, better understanding of the participants' position and concerns during the workshop and the attitude of their authority in

the region. This occurred, despite the fact that the majority of the participants to the informal workshop dealt with the South China Sea issues in their daily responsibility or portfolio in their government. Hence, this reality can be explained in two ways: first, the participants failed to influence the policy of their respective authorities and, second, they came to the informal workshop simply to secure the official lines or the interests of their government.

In the workshop, the participants were also reluctant to discuss the so-called policy inputs issues. They did discuss some topics that were aimed at exploring policy options for their respective governments, but in the process some participants vetoed the discussion giving the reason that the workshops had no mandate to discuss such issues. Hence the ideal nature of informal diplomacy to explore issues comprehensively was handicapped by some participants' determination to prevent such discussions taking place. In this case, clearly some participants to the informal workshop were taking part in the informal diplomacy process for the sake of securing their government's interest.

The difficulty in encouraging participants to share the objectives of the informal diplomacy was one of many problems Indonesia experienced during the informal diplomacy. At times, the participants also questioned Indonesia's motives in sponsoring the informal diplomacy and, as discussed in Chapter 6, such scepticism was observable in the South China Sea workshop. Some participants to the JIMs also questioned Indonesia's motives. They did not believe that Indonesia was sponsoring the informal diplomacy initiatives mainly for altruism. The following discussion evaluates the issue of motive in the context of informal diplomacy.

4.2. Third party motives in facilitating informal diplomacy

The motives of any third party willing to facilitate resolution of a conflict or dispute is always questioned, not only by those directly involved in the endeavour (the core participants), but also by the non participants, such as the media and independent analysts. Usually they are suspicious that the third party might have undeclared motives behind the peace initiatives. For instance, Indonesia was often

alleged to have ulterior motives in playing a leadership role - at times pejoratively called the 'big brother role' - in ASEAN and the region. Any indication of Indonesia increasing its diplomatic profile in the region was at times received as a conflicting signal by the neighbouring countries. However, in the end, some regional countries including Singapore were able to appreciate Indonesia's diplomatic initiatives because their strategic interests were also linked to the resolution of the problems.

Indonesia's interest in regional stability when translated into diplomatic initiatives was not always easily expressed. For instance, Indonesia would be hesitant to mention that the South China dispute jeopardised its territorial integrity around the Natuna islands. Any new configuration of boundary delimitation as a result of the dispute would have a direct impact on Indonesia's territorial boundary. Hence, Indonesia only stated the motives of the informal diplomacy in general terms, such as to bring peace and stability, and avoided any impression of self-benefit from the diplomatic efforts. Nevertheless, Indonesia benefited from any solution to the problems, from the perspective of security and in terms of an increase of diplomatic profiles, regionally and internationally, as did the regional countries and ASEAN.

In some instances there were discrepancies between the statements made by some Indonesians when organising the informal diplomacy to deal with the regional conflicts and disputes. In the case of Cambodia, the stated interest of the Ministry's officials to help solve the Cambodian problem was at times contradicted by the position of officials from the Defence Ministry, implying an unstated interest in strengthening the capacity of Vietnam to act as a buffer against potential threat from China. This lack of internal cohesion was inevitable because foreign policy making in Indonesia involved a number of actors, including the military, each with their own vision on how best to deal with particular problems. However, the military no longer contradicted the motive after it received a signal of the President's interest in having Indonesia help resolve the Cambodian problem.[44] In the late 1980s President Soeharto's attitude toward China was more progressive compared to the hard-line views of in the military.

The misrepresentation of motives had to a certain extent constrained Indonesia's efforts in dealing with the Cambodian problem because some participants were sceptical about Indonesia's impartiality. Despite Indonesia stating that the intention of the JIM was to allow the Cambodian factions and the regional countries to deal with the Cambodian problems, the non-participation of China in the JIMs limited Indonesia's ability to optimise the forum. Some participants also suggested that the prior agreement between Indonesia and Vietnam about the format of the JIM reflected Indonesia's favouring of Vietnam's interest. Indonesia decided to make all the participants feel that there was no discrimination during the South China Sea informal workshop. For instance, Indonesia did not follow the recommendation of the first workshop in 1990 to include China at a later stage after Vietnam had been included. China and Vietnam as well as Taiwan were admitted in the process at the same time, during the Second Workshop in 1991. Indonesia also decided not to organise a separate meeting to include all members of ASEAN during the second Workshop which was recommended during the first Workshop. Thus, all participants took part in all sessions during the second Workshop in 1991.

In the Moro case, misunderstanding about Indonesia's motives did not carry such concerns. At one point of the informal diplomacy process, the Philippines public was critical of Indonesia seemingly using its facilitation role to pressure the GRP on issues relating to the East Timor. In 1994, Indonesia delayed the planned meeting between the Moro and the GRP when it learned about an international conference on East Timor in Manila. In fact, the diplomatic pressure that Indonesia put on the Philippines included the delaying of a business visit to the Philippines by some Indonesian businessmen in the context of regional co-operation.[45] Some Philippines' media accused Indonesia of bullying its neighbour and interfering in the domestic affairs of the Philippines. Nevertheless, this affair did not affect Indonesia's conflict resolution efforts overall.

The Indonesian motive behind the South China Sea informal workshops was quite obvious, to prevent the disputes becoming armed conflicts. However, some participants suspected Indonesia of wanting to internationalise the issue and to gain economic benefit from the co-operation (see discussion in Chapter 6). The

main proponent of the informal workshop, Dr. Djalal, admitted to such suspicions, but argued that internationalisation of the issue was not Indonesia's motive, and was a logical consequence of the informal workshop process.[46] Hence, although there was no conclusive evidence whether internationalisation was Indonesia's main motive, Indonesia did benefit diplomatically from international interest in the issue and the informal workshop process. For instance, despite the East Timor debacle in late 1990s - especially following the mayhem after the UN supervised referendum in August 1999 - Indonesia was still noted as a country which was actively contributing to regional peace, including its role in sponsoring the South China Sea informal workshop.[47]

4.3. The outcomes of the informal diplomacy

The following discussion evaluates the outcomes of the Indonesian informal diplomacy by looking at the objectives and motives of the Indonesian peace initiatives through informal diplomacy.

In pursuing informal diplomacy, Indonesia wished to have 'a just or comprehensive peace', where all the parties in the conflicts and disputes were satisfied with the outcomes of the informal diplomacy process. Indonesia believed that satisfaction among the parties would guarantee a durable peace and the parties' observance of the peace agreement reached from the informal diplomacy process. However, on the one hand, this expectation was not sustained by the fact that the Khmer Rouge boycotted the UN supervised election, one of the main elements of the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991. Similarly, the MNLF in 2001 abrogated the Peace Agreement of 1996, accusing the GRP of not adhering to the Agreement. Do these realities mean that the informal diplomacy process failed? On the other hand, the failure to observe these details of the two Agreements also could not omit the fact that the informal diplomacy process had contributed to the signing of those Agreements. In the case of the informal workshop process in the South China Sea disputes, the workshops also produced a number of project proposals and discussed some possible policy options for the regional countries. However, some regional countries were reluctant to implement the proposals and consider policy options.

In the end, the only viable means to assess the outcomes of the informal diplomacy process is by looking at the Indonesian objectives and motives in pursuing its diplomatic initiative. This reasoning also took into consideration that the process did contribute to the signing of the peace agreement, such as the cases of Cambodian and Moro conflicts. The difficulty in this approach is that, at times, Indonesia did not make clear its objectives and motives from the informal diplomacy process. However, four of the objectives the Indonesians always mentioned during the process included: a) to explore options for the solution of the conflicts and disputes, b) to improve the relationship among the participants, c) to develop confidence among the participants, and d) to let the regional countries deal with their own problem.[48]

In term of exploring options, clearly Indonesia used informal diplomacy as a means to achieve this objective. Exploring options in this case involved efforts to search for alternative resolution to the conflicts and innovation in developing policy options. In the informal diplomacy process, Indonesia encouraged the participants to re-look at their problems, let them define and share their own perspectives on the problem within the informal forum, helped to map the issues involved and facilitated the discussion to move gradually from the less to more contentious issues. Thus, as a third party, Indonesia at times played a more active role in the informal diplomacy process and did not simply rely on participants' initiatives. It was almost impossible to expect the participants, such as the Cambodian participants in JIM, to come up with alternative ideas for resolving their conflict because they all had their own preconceptions on how to end their conflict. However, their approach was zero-sum and they were not willing to look for alternative solutions that would benefit all the parties involved. Indonesia had to map the issues and alternative solutions to the conflict and, later, approach the participants separately to consult its content.

In the case of Moro's problem, the process of exploring options was helped by the participants' interest in finding solutions to their problem. The early efforts of re-framing the problem reached a conclusion that the basis of the discussion was the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 of which the parties interpreted the Agreement differently. Indonesia helped map the issues involved in the problems, with

reference to the content of the Tripoli Agreement and to the developments between 1976 to early 1990s, which were taking place in the Philippines and within the Moro as earlier discussed in Chapter 5. In the informal diplomacy process, the GRP was willing to make some innovation regarding the transitional structure and mechanism (see Chapter 5) which enabled the conclusion of the process in 1996.

The informal South China Sea workshop was the best example of the informal diplomacy ideal of exploring options in the Indonesian informal diplomacy overall. As an informal meeting convenor, Indonesia encouraged the participants to explore options of possible co-operation to avoid conflict from territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Arguably, in the process Indonesia helped to map the issues involved in the disputes and began the discussions on issues less contentious where co-operation involving regional countries was more possible. Participants who contested some or all areas in the South China Sea were given the opportunity - during several sessions in the early years of the informal workshop - to define their perspectives on the disputes. At the same time, the informal workshop provided participants from non-claimant states with an opportunity to share their concerns about possible regional instability emanating from armed conflict between the disputants. Exploring options, in this case, involved efforts to explore possible co-operation and alternative policy options that the regional countries might take during the formal interaction.

In terms of improving relationships and developing confidence among the participants, the informal diplomacy process did gain this objective in two of the three cases. Improvements in relations and confidence occurred among the participants in the forum dealing with Moro and the South China Sea's problems. In the Moro's case, the improvement of relationships was characterised, at the least, by the willingness of the participants, albeit gradually, to face each other during the meetings and, in some instances, to communicate during the meetings in their own dialect (*Tagalog*). In the South China Sea workshop, the participants mingled freely and were not offended when other participants made strong remarks and, at times, personal comments during the meeting sessions. However, the degree of improvement in relationships and confidence in the Cambodian case

was difficult to judge. The most that Indonesia can claim was that the JIM provided the Cambodian participants with, for the first time, inclusive meetings among the Cambodian factions. The extent that the meeting had been able to reduce the stereotypical behaviour among the Cambodians was difficult to assess because even after the meeting had moved into Paris peace process, some Cambodian participants were still reluctant to speak one to another, especially participants representing the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen's led-Government. Nevertheless, during the JIM some participants representing Hun Sen's led-Government did mingle with participants from the Sihanouk and Son Sann camps.

Although Indonesia attempted to limit the involvement of non-regional countries in the informal diplomacy process, the involvement of the non-regional countries was inevitable in the process. In dealing with the Cambodian problem, Indonesia initially wished to have the regional countries dealing with their own problems first, and later to have the non-regional countries endorse the result. The expectation was not achieved because some participants were not able to make any decision without the approval of their patron, for example, China in the case of the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk. Moreover, some Cambodian participants wanted the direct involvement of non-regional countries, such as the Soviet Union, China and France in the process. After the Paris meeting in 1988, the involvement of the non-regional countries in the process had increased. However, learning from the failure of the Paris meeting in 1989, Indonesia was able to persuade its partner (Co-chair), France, not to rush into an international conference on Cambodia unless the parties had reached some agreement on the most contentious issues. To facilitate this gradual process of reaching agreements, Indonesia organised a number of informal consultations and meetings involving Cambodians and non-Cambodians.

In the informal diplomacy process dealing with the Moro problem, Indonesia had to accept the participation of members of the OIC (Committee of Six) and the OIC Secretariat in the process. However, Indonesia maintained control of the process and, therefore, the participation of non-regional countries and the OIC did not really affect the process. In dealing with the South China Sea disputes, Indonesia was not able to implement the objective of limiting the participation of non-

regional countries on issues of regional characters for two reasons. First, Indonesia needed the financial assistance of Canada in the process. Canada was selected because of its remoteness from the areas under the disputes and because the country had a record of promoting peace efforts in many regions. Countries who sent their representatives to the informal workshop did not feel threatened by Canada, a middle power country remote from the region.

Second, as the discussion in the informal workshop expanded, the participation of non-regional countries and international organisations was also inevitable. Indonesia wished to tap their financial resources for implementing some of the project proposals and to avoid overlapping between the projects under the informal workshop and projects under some international organisations, such as UNEP. Other than breaching the ideal of having the regional countries dealing with the regional countries at first, Indonesia's efforts to involve the non-regional countries and international organisations were perceived by some countries as an implied effort to internationalise the issue. Hence, some participating countries questioned Indonesia's motive, that is, whether Indonesia was acting for the region or mainly to secure its own national interest of regional peace and stability by way of internationalising the issue, and thus, keeping the parties in check under international surveillance. Indeed, the South China Sea informal workshop was successful in maintaining international interest on the issue, especially on the concern of negative consequences of any armed conflicts due to territorial disputes.

Overall, the successful achievements of each one of the four objectives of informal diplomacy, from the three case studies were varied. The outcomes were influenced by (1) the participants' motives, whether or not they were willing to seek a solution to their problems; (2) the nature and the context of the problems, especially the extent of non core-participants' involvement in the problems; and (3) the way Indonesia pursued the informal diplomacy. Furthermore, (4) the interrelationship between the timing of involvement as a third party and also participants' interests in seeking a solution to the problem were also factors that influenced the successful outcomes of the informal diplomacy. Discussion in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 revealed that the timing of Indonesia's involvement in the

three cases studies differed. In Cambodia, although Indonesia had propagated the idea of informal meeting among the core-parties in the conflict since 1985, the actual meeting did not take place until 1988. By then, the regional contexts were characterised by the rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union, and Vietnam was having difficulty in maintaining its presence in Cambodia. Although the timing was supportive of Indonesia's efforts, some Cambodian participants were not prepared to improve their relationship. Clearly, their long years of armed conflict and deep-seated animosities set a limit for possible improvement of their relationship from the JIM process.

In the Moro case, the timing of Indonesia's involvement was suitable. On the one hand, the Ramos Government wished to end all the internal problems of rebellion and separatism so that the Government would be able to concentrate on economic development. On the other hand, the MNLF was also interested in finding a solution to their problems because of the declining support from Libya and Saudi Arabia, and also due to Mr. Misuari's intention to regain the support of the Moro people. What prevented the two parties having a bilateral meeting of their own was their lack of trust. Thus, the involvement of a reliable third party was necessary.

Indonesia designed the South China Sea informal workshop conception and the concept was then offered to the regional countries. The participants came to the informal workshop with differing expectations and motives. The fact that the issue was not looming high in the regional security agenda in early 1990s made some participants feel that they had less stake on the issue and on the process. In fact, before 1990 the armed clash over the territorial disputes involved only China and Vietnam, and thus other countries felt less threatened by China, the major power in the region. The regional countries' interest of the informal workshop had increased over the years, especially after they noted China's persistence in asserting its claim. However, what transpired in the process after its fourth year was Indonesia's effort in maintaining the momentum of informal dialogues to prevent conflicts and participants from China's efforts to 'tame' the process, that is, for not letting the informal workshop discuss the security-politico issues.

In terms of motive, Indonesia wished to have peace and stability in the region, and translated the motive into a role as third party, but with various names. In the Cambodian conflict, Indonesia called itself 'honest broker' and later was addressed as a Co-chair in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia. In the Moro case, Indonesia named itself 'facilitator', whereas in the informal South China Sea workshop, Indonesia was known as 'workshop convenor'. Although, in theory each designation carried different responsibilities and functions, in the process Indonesia did not see the nomenclature set a limit to its role. Based on the priority of achieving peace and stability in the region, Indonesia used the opportunity to assist the parties in the disputes and conflicts by all means and, at times, as discussed in earlier discussion went outside the ideal role of third party in conflict resolution theory.

VII.5. Summary and Conclusion

The assessment of Indonesian informal diplomacy based on its organisational aspect, its process and its objectives shows that these three aspects were interrelated and that they all influenced the achievement of the informal diplomacy objectives.

The organisational aspect was important overall because good co-ordination and teamwork among the Indonesians involved in the informal diplomacy and their clear understandings about the mission had some impacts on the informal diplomacy process. A clear understanding about informal diplomacy principles also influenced the way the team members conducted their role during the process. The organisational aspect also involved co-ordination with other ministries and the military establishment. Good co-ordination coupled with a clear signal from the President of his interest in the informal diplomacy helped the Ministry in its co-ordination of the diplomatic initiatives.

The assessment of the process shows that the dynamics during the informal diplomacy were shaped not only by the process during the informal meetings, but also by the interaction within the wider contexts of regional and international environments. However, the ability of the Indonesian teams to develop a well

designed strategy and tactics during the peace process did increase the effectiveness of the informal diplomacy process.

The assessment of the objectives shows that the efficacy of informal diplomacy in dealing with regional conflicts and disputes is subject to various interrelated factors. The differing understanding of informal diplomacy objectives between Indonesia as facilitators and those of the participants were detrimental to the process. At the same time, the participants' interest and their motivation in taking part in the process influenced the overall process in some cases positively and other cases negatively.

In conclusion, the Indonesian diplomats developed informal diplomacy as a concept and approach to deal with conflicts and disputes in the region. They developed the approach, and implemented it as a diplomatic technique, based on their experiences as negotiators and with reference to their academic background. When performing their role as a third party in informal diplomacy, the Indonesians often adapted the approaches and techniques developed by the Track Two practitioners and scholars. At times, the circumstances necessitated this, but in a number of instances adaptation was a response to pressures from colleagues and superiors who wished to see tangible results from the informal diplomacy process.

Finally, from the discussion it is not conclusive whether the informal diplomacy was intentionally developed to increase the Ministry's profile domestically vis-à-vis the other ministries and military establishment. What is clear is that the outcomes of the Ministry's diplomatic initiatives were influenced by the support the Ministry gained from other ministries and from the military establishment. Such support was enhanced after the other ministries learned of President Soeharto's interest in the approach. However, support from the Ministry's bureaucracy on the informal diplomacy initiative was less forthcoming if there were conflicting interests. This reality was observable during the informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes.

Notes

[1] Interview with Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, 3 November 2001.
[2] See Chapter 2, notes 141&142.
[3] Interview with Dr. Hasjim Djalal, 23 November 2001.
[4] See Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 1999); and interview with Dr. Ben Perkasa Drajat, 24 October 2001.
[5] Mr. Kusnadi from the Asia and Pacific Directorate possessed these qualifications and he was continuously involved in the process. Interview with Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab, 4 October 2001.
[6] Based on inputs from confidential interviewees.
[7] Confidential interviewees.
[8] This observation is based on the writer's involvement in the 9th workshop in 1998.
[9] Interview with Mr. Ali Alatas, 14 November 2001.
[10] Interview with Mr. Chalief Akbar, 31 December 2001. Mr. Chalief Akbar also explained that his overseas posting was, at one time, delayed due to his responsibility in the secretariat for the Moro peace process.
[11] Interview with Mr. Kusnadi, 9 October 2001. It is not clear why the Minister did not share some information to his subordinates. A logical explanation for this is that the information might be very sensitive or he was waiting for the appropriate time to share the information.
[12] Personal account of Mr. John Louhanapessy, interview, 16 October 2001.
[13] See Tommy T. B. Koh, "The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that failed", *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 6, No 1, January 1990.
[14] See Chapter 2, note 67.
[15] See Chapter 2, notes 65 & 66.
[16] See Chapter 2, note 135.
[17] See Chapter 2, note 140.
[18] "Para Pemimpin Koalisi Pesismis JIM II Menyelesaikan Masalah [The coalition leaders are pessimistic that the 2nd JIM could resolve the problem] ," *Kompas*, 16 February 1989.
[19] "Ranariddh: CGDK Tidak Inginkan Penyelesaian Sebagian [Ranariddh: CGDK does not want a partial resolution]," *Antara*, 21 February 1989,
[20] Based on cable from Indonesian Embassy in Paris, dated 1 August 1989. Archive - Puskom Deplu.
[21] Personal account of Mr. Pieter Damanik, interview, 23 October 2001.
[22] Interview with Dr. Hassan Wirajuda, 3 November 2001.
[23] See Soliman Santos Jr., *Islamic Diplomacy: Consultation and Consensus*, http://www.org/acc_min/ santos.htm. Accessed on 22 March 2001, p. 6.
[24] On Herbert Kelman, see Chapter 2, note 99.
[25] Based on the writer observation of the 9th workshop (1998). Also pointed out by Dr. Soejatmiko during interview, 22 November 2001.
[26] Interview, 22 November 2001. Dr. Soejati Jiwandono took part in the First Workshop in Bali (1990) as a participant from Indonesia.
[27] See Chapter 2, note 100.
[28] Interview, 5 November 2001.
[29] Based on personal observation and confidential interviewees.
[30] See Chapter 2, notes 135 & 136.
[31] Interview with Dr. Boer Mauna, 15 November 2001.
[32] Interview with Dr. Marty Natalegawa, 5 December 2001
[33] See Dino Djalal, *Indonesia and Preventive Diplomacy: A Study of the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea*, Ph.D. thesis, (London: University of London, 2000).
[34] See Santos, op cit.
[35] Interview with Mr. Taufik Soedarpo, 13 January 2002. Mr. Taufik Soedarpo was appointed as Indonesian Ambassador to Phnom Penh not long after the signing of Paris Peace Agreement.
[36] See Ali Alatas, *A Voice for a Just Peace: A Collection of Speeches by Ali Alatas* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), p. xxvii.
[37] Interview, 10 January 2002. At the time of interview Mr. Yusbar Djamil's position was Director for Asia and Pacific of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. He was involved in the Indonesian diplomatic initiatives to deal with the Cambodian and the Philippines problems.
[38] See the discussion on the informal workshop of the South China Sea in Chapter 6.
[39] Alatas, op cit, p. 271.

[40] See Chapter 2, note 139.
[41] See Chapter 2, notes 14 & 142.
[42] See Chapter 2, note 142.
[43] See Chapter 2, note 93. Italics in original.
[44] Interview with Mr. John Louhanapessy, 16 October 2001.
[45] In early 1990s, some ASEAN countries engaged in sub-regional economic co-operation, including the one involving four ASEAN countries, the so-called BIMP-EAGA (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area).
[46] Interview, 23 November 2001.
[47] See for instance the United States Department Website http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm, accessed on 16 August 2001. However, contrary to Indonesia's preferences the US designated the effort as mediation and stated that "The United States has welcomed Indonesia's contributions to regional security, especially its leading role in helping restore democracy in Cambodia and in mediating among the many territorial claimants in the South China Sea".
[48] The list does not suggest the order of priority.

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

The main purpose of this thesis has been to assess Indonesia's use of informal diplomacy as it sought to further its interests in the peace and stability of its immediate region, Southeast Asia. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 presenting the case studies and the summary analysis in Chapter 7 set out how Indonesia pursed informal diplomacy in dealing with three regional problems: the Cambodian conflict, the separatism problem in the Philippines (the Moro problem), and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The case studies also showed that informal diplomacy was adopted because the nature of the conflicts and the disputes suggested a different approach from traditional diplomacy.

Informal diplomacy as outlined in Chapter 2 is derived largely from Track Two diplomacy. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 3, informal diplomacy was introduced as a result of internal dynamics at the institutional level of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (the Ministry). The adoption of informal diplomacy was also a manifestation of bureaucratic politics within the Indonesian political system. The Ministry had to compete with other bureaucracies and the military establishment for the President's favour, and informal diplomacy was the Ministry's preferred means of gaining its President's support. In their efforts to gain the confidence of the President, the professional diplomats from the Ministry searched for avenues to perform their professionalism. Chapter 3 also showed that the Soeharto Government was concerned about the potential of regional conflicts and disputes for disturbing Indonesia's development program. Under all these circumstances, the diplomats proposed informal diplomacy as an alternative means to deal with these regional problems comprehensively and informal diplomacy assimilated some principles closely associated with Track Two diplomacy. Hence, this study has argued that Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics were the two most important conceptions to better understand the Indonesian's adoption of informal diplomacy in addressing the three problems of conflicts and disputes outlined in the case studies.

The first section of this chapter assesses hypotheses derived from propositions of Track Two diplomacy and bureaucratic politics discussed in Chapter 2. The second section draws further lessons from the informal diplomacy based on the case study materials.

VIII.1. The linkage between the analytical framework of informal diplomacy and the empirical findings from case study materials

The analytical framework for this study (Chapter 2) consisted of three main parts. The first part explored the notion of order in the regional context to show that a country's interest in regional order could be obtained through a number of ways. Diplomacy is one of the primary instruments available to the state in seeking to achieve that interest, but the traditional practice or form of diplomacy is inherently limited when dealing with some conflicts and disputes. Innovation in diplomacy was, therefore, necessary to address the problems in a non-conventional way. The second part of the analytical framework outlined the non-conventional mode of addressing conflicts and disputes based on the perspectives of Track Two diplomacy. The third section explored the aspect of bureaucratic politics in Indonesian Foreign Policy, proposing that the informal diplomacy was the outcome of bureaucratic politics. Chapter 3 discussed the evidence for this proposal. Bureaucratic politics and the Ministry internal dynamics, as outlined in the three case studies chapters, also influenced the way in which informal diplomacy was implemented.

In a number of contexts, as shown in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, Indonesian informal diplomacy displayed principles closely associated with Track Two diplomacy. Overall, as a chain of peace process informal diplomacy moved from informal to formal processes. However, as a diplomatic technique informal diplomacy was used interchangeably, both within formal and informal settings. These facts gave rise a number of questions, such as whether or not the informal diplomacy was guided by principles grounded in Track Two diplomacy, and what aspects of the Track Two diplomacy were utilised and what aspects were not observed by the Indonesians and why. This section of the conclusion summarises the linkage

between the Track Two diplomacy and informal diplomacy, and discusses some hypotheses which were set out in Chapter 2.

1.1. Hypothesis no 1:

A third party's adherence to principles, assumptions and techniques derived from Track Two diplomacy will ensure positive results.

This hypothesis was derived from proponents of Track Two diplomacy on the efficacy of informal workshops to deal with conflicts.[1] The main principles of Track Two diplomacy revolve around the notion of unofficial, informal and non-structured interaction and the overall exercise is designed to establish the pre-negotiation stage. At the same time, the Track Two diplomacy's process works with the assumptions that it is preferable that the third party has no special knowledge of the area or of the parties involved.[2] Regarding the process, the assumption is that parties should analyse their problems exhaustively before moving to a discussion of possible solutions to the problems. However, equally important, Track Two diplomacy was developed mainly to deal with conflicts and not disputes.[3] The case study materials show that while, on some occasions, Indonesia adhered to Track Two principles, assumptions and techniques, this was not always the case. Dynamics surrounding bureaucratic politics forced the Indonesians who oversaw the informal diplomacy process to focus more on achieving results and, therefore, their adherence to Track Two principles, assumptions and techniques was influenced by such motives and also by their assessment of the circumstances during the informal diplomacy. Hence, they did not follow the ideals of Track Two diplomacy when they thought their informal diplomacy would not profit from adopting Track Two ideals. Thus, adherence to principles, assumptions and techniques derived from Track Two diplomacy does not necessarily guarantee positive results.

From the very outset, it is important to highlight that a major contrast between Indonesian informal diplomacy and the pure model of the Track Two diplomacy is the notion of the status of those who lead the informal process. While the Track Two scholars urge strongly that the third party should be unofficial and have no

prior knowledge of the parties, the Indonesian case shows the opposite. The ideal of the Track Two scholars of impartial non-state actors acting as a third party in informal diplomacy has its own merit, particularly because the scholars and also the conflicting parties and disputants used to question the neutrality of a state who, in their eyes, mainly served its national interests rather than the interests of the conflicting parties or the disputants.

Indonesian informal diplomacy took the form of informal and non-structured interaction, but the notion of 'unofficial' was ambiguous. The informal diplomacy was sponsored by a state and therefore, it would be difficult to de-link the informal exercises with the aspect of formality and status, which were accredited to a state. In fact, although the meeting setting itself was informal and the rules of recognition as well as protocols were very flexible, some participants insisted on having their status and credentials recognised. This was observable during JIM of Cambodia and to a certain extent in the Moro case.

This reality suggests that status is an important factor, certainly within the Asian tradition. The conflicting parties and the disputants were willing to take part in the informal diplomacy because they knew that their status and credentials were upheld. Even in the South China Sea, the informal workshop put Taiwan on an equal basis with other participants. Hence, the notion of status and symbolism attached to it remain essential in the Asian tradition and in the contexts of the regional conflicts and disputes.

In general, Paul Salem's proposition - in the third world context an increase in the level of formality is desirable[4] - is helpful in understanding Indonesian informal diplomacy. However, his suggestion was not applicable in the case of informal South China Sea workshop, simply because China and other participants did not recognise the status of Taiwan. Therefore, there were conditions where increasing the level of formality is not always desirable, especially when the nature of the problems necessitate unqualified observance of informality. Formalising the informal workshop meant excluding Taiwan from the process, a step contrary to the inclusiveness of informal diplomacy.

The Indonesians were also familiar with the issues and the main parties or actors in the conflicts and disputes. The Indonesians had known some individuals who took part in the informal diplomacy processes from their previous encounters in different settings. Again, Salem's opinion on the importance, in the third world context, of having a third party whom the conflicting parties and the disputants had recognised[5] is proved useful in Indonesia's case. Arguably, the notion of knowing those who assist the informal diplomacy process is a critical factor within the Asian tradition. Generally, the participants would have felt more at ease speaking about their problems in the presence of somebody they knew and not 'a total stranger.' There is also a notion of understanding about culture specifics that is not always obvious to those unfamiliar with local customs. For instance, Mr. Misuari often spoke out of context to address his gallery during the informal diplomacy process to deal with the Moro problem. To follow the procedures of Track two diplomacy, the third party should have redirected Mr. Misuari to the topic of discussion. However, allowing Mr. Misuari to speak at length and not interrupt him - despite the distraction he made to the overall discussions - sustained his standing and status before his local people.

However, despite the fact that the Indonesian practice was in line with Salem's proposition, the end result of their knowledge of the people and local cultures was not always desirable. As shown in Chapter 4, some Indonesians responsible for JIM knew some of the participants from their previous diplomatic assignments in Cambodia and Vietnam. The case study of Moro in Chapter 5 showed that familiarity with the issues and acquaintances with influential leaders from the parties turned out to be one of the assets of the third party in informal diplomacy. The Indonesians were able to follow up the results of the discussion during the informal diplomacy process directly with the respective authorities through the formal track. Hence, the informal diplomacy process to deal with the Moro problem benefited from the direct channel the Indonesians had with leaders of the parties in the conflict, especially with the Philippines Government.

In contrast, JIM provided the Indonesians with a different lesson where their personal knowledge of the Cambodian participants in JIM did not guarantee a smooth process during the informal diplomacy. This reality bemused the

Indonesians because they thought that they knew the Cambodians quite well, in terms of the culture and their ways of thinking. Yet, as long as the Cambodians were not prepared to reconcile their deep-seated distrust and hatred of each other any diplomatic initiative aimed to improve their relationship was bound to fail. In the end, the Cambodians were prepared to reconcile their differences only after they realised that the international community had lost patience with them and the new regional configuration, including the rapprochement between China and Vietnam, left them with no other option other than to settle their differences.

The notion of analysing the problems thoroughly before discussing a possible solution is proposed by a number of Track Two scholars[6] which was not always practical during the informal diplomacy process. The factors responsible for this were participants' lack interest and some participants' efforts to avoid analysing their problems. This lack of interest constrained the dynamics of the analytical process in JIM. In the case of the informal workshop, some participants tried to avoid discussing the main problems of their disputes. Track Two diplomacy scholars have yet to give any solution on how best to deal with the problems of participants' lack of interest and participants' efforts to avoid analysing the problems. If a state sponsored informal diplomacy faced difficulty in dealing with these problems, the non-state actors with lesser authority would have been more difficult.

Overall, it was only in the Moro case where the analytical process helped the parties move forward and deduce options to resolve their problems. Essentially the parties had long agreed that they interpreted the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 differently. Indonesia facilitated a process whereby the parties reconsidered the Agreement and from that stage onward, all discussions were centred on their common understanding of issues that they still did not agree upon. The Indonesian Chair facilitated the discussion process by clustering the problems into manageable components and left discussion on the most difficult subject toward the end of the informal diplomacy process, when the relationship among the parties had improved. In the case of Cambodia, the analytical process of the problem was not achieved because the participants were not willing to move from their positions and, therefore, were not prepared to analyse their problem

thoroughly or from a different perspective. In the end, during participants' discussions (the analytical stage) the Indonesians led the discussion process, summarising what they perceived as the definition of the problems.

The analytical process in the informal workshops was rather different in essence because the participants avoided discussion of the main issues of the overlapping territorial claims. The process consisted of the participants merely outlining their positions on the disputes with no further discussion permitted. What participants analysed was possible functional co-operation in the areas under dispute. Indonesia considered the informal workshop process more as confidence-building measures and a forum for developing policy options for authorities in the South China Sea areas. The Indonesians hoped that in the long run the process would help the parties better understand the concerns of the regional countries and therefore, would help reduce the tensions. Hence the informal workshop limited discussion on the main issues, but discussed issues 'outside the square' of the problems.

Achieving peace through co-operative processes outside the negotiation frameworks of formal diplomacy and mediation is one of the main principles of Track Two diplomacy. Obviously, the informal diplomacy as practised by Indonesia subscribed to this ideal because the approaches were co-operative, rather than those of formal diplomacy and mediation. The approach was of gaining better understanding and reaching consensus through discussion. In particular, informal diplomacy was concerned with process. In this case the process was to develop the level of comfort among the participants so that they would be prepared to elevate their level of interaction into a formal negotiating framework. However, there was a discrepancy among the Indonesians between allowing the exploratory and consultation process run its own course and taking an active role to set the direction of the discussion. Bureaucratic politics was a factor that challenged the consistency of the Indonesians in adopting the principles of Track Two diplomacy. Those who lead the informal diplomacy process faced the dilemma between being process oriented or result oriented. They knew that concentrating on process or making gradual progress would tend to sustain a peace agreement, but they needed results in order to maintain the support of other

bureaucratic institutions, such as securing continued finance. This kind of dilemma was observable during JIM and the informal workshop dealing with the South China Sea disputes. This reality suggests two facts: first it did not negate the essential nature of the co-operative process derived from Track Two diplomacy and second, the adoption of Track Two principle took place in a bureaucratic politics setting.

The strength of pre-negotiation stage from Track Two diplomacy[7] can be subdued by participants' interests to secure their position and, therefore, hindered the chance for exploring the issues and options exhaustively. The informal workshop showed a case where the notion of pre-negotiation was rather blurred because during the process the participants, some times, were engaged in negotiating a position. The participants were worried that the workshop statements would be treated as if they were an indication of intent because some authorities, at times, referred to the workshop statements in a formal forum, such as in ASEAN meetings. Hence, the informal workshop played down the idea of workshops as a forum for exploration and not for bargaining.[8] However, from a different perspective, the bargaining took place because the participants felt comfortable with the informal workshop and interacting with other participants and facilitators, some of them for more than a decade.

Overall, the structure of informal diplomacy proposed by Harold Saunders, that is, building strategy from a combination of options and from the broadest possible choice among instruments proved helpful to understand the Indonesian informal diplomacy.[9] However, Saunders argument also suggested an element of trial and error, contrary to the ideals of Nadim Rouhana who prefers a well-structured approach.[10] An example of a trial and error exercise occurred during the JIM when Indonesia encouraged interactions among the participants inside and outside the meeting forums. On some occasions, Indonesia let the Cambodians meet among themselves, a strategy not recommended by Track Two diplomacy's scholars who maintain that the third party should be present in every meeting, at all times. However, this effort to allow an inclusive meeting among Cambodians did not achieve the objective of gaining the commitment of the Cambodians to the

informal process. During the informal diplomacy process of Moro, Indonesia always took part in the various meetings, at all levels.

In the end, the informal diplomacy did help the participants, especially the Moro and informal workshops, overcome the problem of stereotyping each other. However, in these two cases, the key factor that helped change such perceptions was regular and continuous meetings, inside and outside the meeting forums. Hence, it was the sustained processes of interactions that altered participants' perceptions, and not a specific technique or a well-designed structure.

One of the Track Two diplomacy principles that Indonesia did not adhere to was using informal diplomacy to deal with conflicts and disputes. Although not all scholars of Track Two diplomacy rigidly separate disputes and conflicts, such as Hugo van der Merwe and Scimecca,[11] scholars like John Burton disagree with using the techniques interchangeably.[12] This reality suggests that state sponsored informal diplomacy was more concerned about ways and means to address the problems. They gave little consideration to the ontological classification between disputes and conflicts made by Track Two diplomacy scholars. On the one hand, this reality could mean that the Indonesians lacked understanding of the underlying principles separating disputes and conflicts. On the other hand, the Indonesians could have been aware of the principles, but been more interested in using the Track Two diplomacy as a diplomatic technique.

Finally, it is not a third party's adherence to principles, assumptions and techniques derived from Track Two diplomacy which guarantee positive results of informal diplomacy, but a combination of factors. One of the factors was pragmatism, that is, adopting the Track Two diplomacy's principles, assumptions and techniques according to the circumstances during the diplomatic exercises while, at the same time, carefully observing developments at regional and international levels which have a direct bearing on the problems.

1.2. Hypothesis no 2:

The non-binding character of informal diplomacy and a third party's discipline in upholding its facilitation function are positively correlated with the participants' willingness to explore options.

Although claiming that they were performing a facilitation function, the Indonesians responsible for informal diplomacy did not confine their role to that of a facilitator. The case studies showed that the Indonesians considered playing an active role was necessary to stimulate both discussion and the dynamics during the informal meetings and, therefore, they made the most of their role when the opportunities arose. The non-binding character of the process was not enough to make the participants more willing to explore options, which prompted the Indonesians to play a more active role.

During the informal discussions, the Indonesians on a number of occasions intervened, not to provide theoretical inputs as suggested by Herbert Kelman,[13] but to direct the discussion. On the one hand, taking an active role was a consequence of Indonesia's interest in having tangible results from the informal process. In this case, the notion of bureaucratic politics played some role because the diplomats wished to impress other bureaucracies of the efficacy of the informal diplomacy. On the other hand, the dynamics during the informal process required a third party to drive the discussion. An example of this was during JIM where the Cambodian participants were reluctant to embark on substantive discussion and explore options among themselves. The failure of the Cambodians to move beyond their mutual hatred forced the Indonesians to set the directions for the discussion during the two JIM. In fact, during the Second JIM the plenary format of the meeting was not considered suitable because the participants tended to embark on negative interactions. Although such negative interactions were inevitable - in fact were acceptable as a learning process from Track Two diplomacy process - the Indonesians did not want to further imperil the momentum of a first ever meeting among the Cambodians. The plenary meeting was only assembled after the contentious issues had been discussed in separate

discussion, on a one to one basis, and after the Indonesian Chair had met with leaders from each group of participants in JIM separately.

This practice of separate meetings between the Indonesian Chair and the participants contravened the ideal of Track Two diplomacy. Kelman, for instance, asserts that any ideas to resolve the problems must emerge from the interactions between the parties themselves.[14] All inclusiveness is important to maintaining the participants' trust of third party impartiality. However, in the case of JIM the ability of the third party to bring all parties to the conflict together was already an achievement considering that the parties had never wanted to meet together inclusively in the past. For the sake of maintaining the momentum of their willingness to meet, the Indonesians were prepared to compromise some of the ideals of Track Two diplomacy. Hence, it was the symbolism of the all inclusiveness of the meetings and not the principles of Track Two diplomacy that the Indonesians prioritised during JIM.

However, as showed in the other two case studies, Indonesia avoided separate meetings with the parties to the conflict. The meetings to discuss substantive matters between the Philippines Government and the Moro were held in the presence of Indonesians. The Indonesians always took part in (in fact encouraged) caucus meetings between the parties to the conflict to discuss contentious issues thoroughly. In the case of the informal workshops to deal with the South China Sea disputes, all meetings were held in plenary and the participants had the freedom to explore various issues of possible co-operation in the South China Sea. However, from 1994 onward, the informal workshop was restrained from discussing politico-security issues because of China's insistence that the informal workshops were not mandated to discuss such issues as they fell under government jurisdiction. Clearly, restricting discussion under the notion of mandate hampered the opportunity for exploratory interaction as suggested by Kelman and for looking unconventionally at old problems as suggested by John McDonald.[15] Therefore, there are cases where the ideal of open discussions, which is supposedly not to be troubled by formal procedures such as mandate, are not possible in a real situation of conflicts and disputes.

This issue of participants' insistence on rules of procedures to avoid discussing substantive issues during informal diplomacy has yet to achieve much attention from scholars of Track Two diplomacy. This fact suggests that scholars look on their approach from idealism and hope that the participants will set aside formal attributes for the sake of achieving solutions to their problems. In the real world, as demonstrated in this study, it is difficult for participants to dissociate themselves from the positions and interests of their government or groups, even when they take part in the informal diplomacy process as individuals.

Altogether, the non-binding characters of informal diplomacy did not necessarily influence the participants to embark on exploring options. From the case studies, it is clear that there were conditions where the third party must assume a responsibility more than as a facilitator in order to instigate interactions among the participants, leading to exploring options.

1.3. Hypothesis no 3:

The participants' commitment to the informal diplomacy process is positively correlated with their preparedness for, and interests in, change.

The willingness of the respective authority and organisation or parties to the conflict and disputes to participate fully in the informal diplomacy was a factor that determined the outcomes of informal diplomacy. From the three case studies, only in the Moro case did the Indonesians encounter a willingness among the parties to participate positively in the informal diplomacy process. The kind of willingness was not shared equally among parties to the Cambodian conflict and the South China Sea disputes. In the Cambodian conflict, Vietnam and the Hun Sen led-government responded positively to the informal diplomacy because they really wanted to break the international isolation, whereas the rest of the Cambodian parties were not committed to this. Some participants in the informal workshop were clearly not prepared to reverse the status quo in their disputes. As explained in Chapter 6, although willing to partake in the informal workshop, China's aim was to stall the process because China was comfortable with the status quo of the territorial disputes. Hence, the willingness to participate in

informal diplomacy was one factor that influenced the informal diplomacy, as was the parties' motivation.

The aspects of parties' motivation were beyond Indonesia's capacity to influence. The ability of informal diplomacy to affect the dynamics within the external factor, including the aspect of motivation, only happened when informal diplomacy was being conducted at the right time. When Indonesia hosted JIM, the timing was relatively prudent because, as noted in Chapter 4, Vietnam and the Hun Sen led-government wanted to break their international isolation. At the same time, Vietnam's statement in 1988 to immediately pull its troops from Cambodia increased the urgency of informal diplomacy because the regional countries were worried about the prospect of a new civil war in Cambodia. However, China - the main party in the conflict - preferred the status quo and maintained its support of the hard-liners in the Cambodians so they could continue their war efforts. Therefore, although the timing was right, the incompatibility of interests among the parties hampered the informal diplomacy during JIM. In the case of Moro, the timing of informal diplomacy was right. At one level, the new government in the Philippines under President Ramos had expressed its interest in ending all internal hostilities and considered internal stability as a prerequisite for the Philippines national development. At another level, Misuari of the MNLF noted the declining support from Libya as well as Saudi Arabia and the decline in his popularity among the Moro in the Philippines. Thus, the informal diplomacy took place at the right time when the parties to the Moro conflict were desperately wanting to end their problem, albeit for differing reasons.

In the case of informal workshops, the timing for the informal diplomacy was also prudent. On the one hand, countries in the region were concerned with the armed skirmish in 1988 between two claimants, China and Vietnam. The regional countries were also alarmed that some claimants had raced to secure more islets as a means to establish more strongholds in the South China Sea. On the other hand, some claimants were not very enthusiastic about reversing the status quo in the disputes. China and Malaysia also were not very supportive about multilateral efforts through informal diplomacy and preferred instead a bilateral approach. Therefore, the timing for informal workshop needs to consider the interplay

between the interests for such a meeting and the reluctance of the participants. However, at times, the timing of the informal workshop was also influenced by the element of context. There were moments during the annual informal workshop when the profile of the exercise had increased, such as in 1993 when China developed fortifications structures in islets close to the Philippines' territory. International concerns about China's unilateral action did increase international interest and hope for the informal workshop, but to no avail. The failure of the informal diplomacy to address the affair was mainly because some participants insisted that the informal workshop was not a suitable forum for discussing politico-security matters.

Overall, the participants' preparedness and interests for change was a factor that induced them to contribute positively to the informal diplomacy process. Hence, the scholars' notions of conflict ripeness, leadership changes and asymmetry proved essential to understand the dynamics during the overall diplomacy process.[16] These are factors that had influenced the informal diplomacy for positive or negative results.

1.4. Hypothesis no 4:

A third party's creativity and innovation is derived from their scholarship and stature as private citizens, not from their official status or authority.

The Indonesians responsible for informal diplomacy were competent in their field of diplomacy, but none of them had any formal training in human behaviour. The case study materials showed that the skills of the Indonesian diplomats were not always in conformity with the notion of third party skills that scholars and practitioners of Track Two diplomacy emphasise. However, the criteria of creativity and innovation, such as approaching the issues unconventionally, were observable in the three case studies (especially during the informal workshop). Overall, the make up of the Indonesian teams responsible for informal diplomacy combined skilful diplomats and some members familiar with the issues mostly because of their portfolios in the Ministry.

The case studies also showed that the Indonesians performed their role as third party based on their long experiences in diplomacy and in dealing with negotiations. Hence, they took their individual skills from formal diplomacy into the informal diplomacy settings. However, at times the 'old habit' as negotiator saw the Indonesians cross the boundary between performing a role mainly as facilitator and, instead, they became active participants. Although, to a certain extent this change of role was observable in the three case studies, the most obvious one was in the informal workshops where, on several occasions, the Indonesians engaged in discussion.

In general, with reference to Jacob Bercovitch's proposition,[17] the Indonesians had utilised their competence, credibility and experience to create contexts and occasions in which communication may be facilitated, and a better understanding of a conflict gained. However, the Indonesians did not approach the disputes and the conflicts as private citizens as suggested by Bercovitch. The informal diplomacy was a state sponsored exercise and, therefore, the Indonesians who acted as third party performed their role as governmental officials. Only in the informal workshop was the notion of acting in private capacity dominant. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, some participants to the informal workshop always maintained their official positions and, as a consequence, clouded the notion of private capacity.

Overall, creativity and innovation are important attributes for those practising Track Two diplomacy. An official status or authority is not a handicap for a third party in performing a role in informal diplomacy. In fact, in the Asian context the notion of official status elevates the importance of informal diplomacy in the eyes of the participants. It is evident from this study that participants were able to send a message to their respective constituents back home that they were involved in an important and prestigious exercise. At the same time, the apparent support from the Indonesian President had assured the participants and the Indonesians who lead the informal diplomacy process that the process carried a similar authority as those of formal diplomacy. These notions of prestige and authority are important in the context of Asian traditions.

1.5. Hypothesis no 5:

Those practising informal diplomacy should set altruistic objectives and strive for the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organising human and material resources, as well as their interests.

In general, the Indonesian informal diplomacy was far from altruistic and this was a logical consequence of having a state sponsoring informal diplomacy. Indonesia pursued informal diplomacy to serve its interests of having peace and stability in its immediate region, Southeast Asia. This objective was more observable during the informal workshop because Indonesia tried to achieve its undisclosed interests of generating international interest on the South China Sea disputes and in this Indonesia was successful. Hence, the element of influencing public opinion, at regional and international levels, was one of the objectives of the informal workshop.

However, in dealing with the Cambodian and the Moro problems Indonesia attempted to develop strategies and organise human and material resources to help resolve the conflict. The efforts also contributed to Indonesia's interest because the issues were dealt with comprehensively, reducing the potential for further conflict after the problems had been resolved. Indonesia's strategy with regard to Cambodia was to have the issues dealt with, firstly, at the regional level and to have the non-regional countries endorse the outcomes at a later stage in international conferences or forums, such as the UN. In the case of Moro, the strategy was to have the party re-look at the Tripoli agreement of 1976. By approaching the Cambodian and the Moro problems comprehensively, Indonesia promoted discussion on how to generate resources when the conflict had been resolved.

1.6. Hypotheses no 6:

The level of support from bureaucratic and military institutions for informal diplomacy depends on the interest of the President in informal diplomatic initiatives. The more these institutions are aware of the President's support, the more forthcoming is their support for informal diplomacy.

From the domestic perspective of Indonesia's political system, bureaucratic politics was dynamic behind the adoption of informal diplomacy. Having to compete with other bureaucracies and the military establishment on international relations issues of the Ministry's domain, the Ministry proposed informal diplomacy as an alternative to the diplomatic approach for some regional conflicts and disputes. Informal diplomacy gave the Ministry an advantage over other bureaucracies and the military establishment because of the Ministry's familiarity with the approach. At the same time, the Ministry also had the human resources capable of implementing informal diplomacy. Hence, new ideas were the only relative power that the Ministry had in their competition with other institutions.

Although President Soeharto intentionally let his subordinates compete in order to protect his own personal power, the informal diplomacy showed a case where the foreign policy elite became involved in some kind of co-operation for the sake of supporting Soeharto's interest. Hence, Harold Crouch's argument of a weak internal coherence[18] did not fully materialise in cases where the bureaucracies found that the President has shown interest to some diplomatic initiatives at a regional level. The President was able to give more attention to foreign related affairs because he was confident that his supremacy at domestic level was unchallenged. At the same time, he was confident that the economic and development programs that he had pursued were already in place and, therefore, he could turn his attention to regional issues.

Overall, the notion of inter-elite competition from bureaucratic politics was a critical factor that supported or impeded the implementation of informal diplomacy. Inter bureaucracy co-operation was optimal in the case of JIM and Moro because the bureaucracy were aware that the Ministry had gained the

confidence of the President, and they also wanted to gain credit for their informal diplomacy activities. In contrast, support for the informal workshop from other bureaucracies and the military was moderate because the President did not express his interest in the informal workshop openly. Hence, these variations in degree of support are a logical consequence of bureaucratic politics. Therefore, for the sake of maintaining the President's support, those who pursued the diplomatic initiatives were very concerned with tangible results from the informal diplomacy process.

Bureaucratic politics explains not only the reason behind the adoption of informal diplomacy but also the degree of support from the domestic institutions on diplomatic initiatives. Hence, the Indonesian informal diplomacy was a case where a state adopted Track Two diplomacy principles, assumptions and techniques within the setting of bureaucratic politics.

VIII.2. Further lessons from informal diplomacy

The case study materials show that the informal diplomacy paved the way for the resolution of the Cambodian and the Moro conflicts, but the informal workshops on the South China Sea disputes have yet to achieve any concrete results. Nevertheless, for the latter, the informal workshop was able to produce a number of project proposals and generate international community interest in the territorial dispute. The contribution of informal diplomacy to the overall peace process - combining formal and informal diplomacy as well as involving countries other than Indonesia - was moderate in the case of Cambodia, high in the case of Moro, but low in the case of the informal workshop. Nevertheless, informal diplomacy helped achieve Indonesia's interest to have peace and stability in the region because the Cambodian and Moro problems were resolved. In the case of the South China Sea disputes, the informal workshop helped increase the international community's interest in and concern about the issue and Indonesia hoped that this would prevent the disputants from destabilising the region in their efforts to assert their territorial claim.

Overall, as outlined in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, the success of informal diplomacy was subject to a number of factors, internal and external to Indonesia. The internal factors that contributed to the effectiveness of informal diplomacy revolved around the way in which the Indonesians conducted the informal diplomacy. The discussions in the three case studies highlighted that the effectiveness of informal diplomacy was enhanced by the skills of the Indonesians leading the process, the cohesiveness of the Indonesian team, and the co-ordination between the work of the team in Jakarta and the Indonesian Missions overseas. The informal diplomacy was also dependent on the ability of the Ministry to win support from other bureaucracies within Indonesia and from the military establishment. The confidence of President Soeharto also played an important role in the implementation of informal diplomacy because his explicit support guaranteed continuous flows of budget for informal diplomacy. In contrast, the lack of the President's clear support for the informal workshop of South China Sea limited the flexibility of the Ministry's officials in pursuing the informal diplomacy objectives. There is no clear evidence to substantiate the reasons behind Soeharto's unexpressed support for the informal workshop. The most logical explanation was that the President was aware of the complexity of the issues and China's strong stand on the matter and therefore, he had already anticipated the process would be difficult. Hence, the best option for the President was to maintain a low profile stand in the overall workshop process. Moreover, the workshops were dependent on the financial support of Canada.

The study shows that in term of skills, all those responsible for informal diplomacy had extensive experience in international negotiations. The majority of then had a background in international law,[19] but none of the team's members were experts in behavioural studies. The study also shows that the Ministry's team dealing with the Cambodia and the Moro problems were cohesive, whereas the team responsible with the informal workshop lacked cohesiveness. The cohesiveness of the team was influenced by the degree of the Foreign Minister's involvement in the informal diplomacy process. Hence, the direct involvement of the Foreign Minister in the informal diplomacy processes resulted in the cohesiveness within the team. The cohesiveness of the team was also reflected in the aspect of co-ordination. Again, the internal and external co-ordination of the

teams responsible for Cambodian and Moro were strong, whereas in the case of informal workshop they were weak.

The aspects of skills, cohesiveness and co-ordination influenced the dynamics during the informal diplomacy. Arguably, skilful facilitators who gained maximum support from a cohesive team would perform their role more effectively. They were fully briefed on issues affecting the informal diplomacy, either substantive or non-substantive matters, and therefore were able to concentrate on their role in the process. In contrast, a lack of cohesiveness hampered the role of the facilitator at times because however skilful the person was he/she could not be sure about the level of support that he/she would receive from members of the team. Similarly, co-ordination affected the dynamics during the informal diplomacy. Good co-ordination meant that members of the team were fully abreast of the context of the discussion and the kind of role that they should perform during the informal diplomacy. Clarity of responsibility prevented the member from presenting contradictory statements during the informal diplomacy, as was the case during the South China Sea informal workshop. As shown in Chapter 6, the opening remarks of Minister Alatas for making synergy between informal and formal tracks was understood differently among the Indonesian teams.

Good co-ordination also means that the outcomes of the informal diplomacy were followed thoroughly by the Indonesian Missions overseas. The three case studies showed that those from overseas posts had responded to all queries and tasks from the Indonesian team in Jakarta. However, the Missions that supported the informal diplomacy of Cambodia, at times, had difficulty following up some issues because they had no direct access to some parties to the conflict. This difficulty of access did not occur in the case of Moro. In the informal workshop, although the Missions faced no difficulty with access to their respective authority, the preparedness of the respective authority to follow up the matters was beyond the capacity of the Mission to pursue. Hence, direct access to the main parties in conflicts and disputes was a factor in informal diplomacy. Direct access coupled with the willingness of the respective authority to follow up the matters

guaranteed successful outcomes of informal diplomacy, as was the case in the Moro case.

The external factors that influenced the outcomes of informal diplomacy are outlined in the discussion of Hypothesis number 3. Furthermore, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 showed that the element of context was significant in the three case studies. The informal diplomacy process post-JIM under the Co-Chair (Indonesia and France) was enhanced after the rapprochement between China and Vietnam and after the Permanent Five put their 'muscle' in the overall peace process. In the case of Moro, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) set a context at the international level, where the OIC gave Indonesia fullest support in its dealings with the Moro problem. In the case of informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes, the participants were hardly able to dissociate the exploratory nature of the workshops with the position of their respective governments.

Participants' links to their respective decision-makers did not always guarantee successful outcomes for the informal process. What really mattered was the parties' willingness to seriously move beyond their differences. The case studies show that those who took part in the informal diplomacy had significant links with the decision-makers in their respective organisations and, indeed some of them were themselves decision-makers. However, of all the three case studies, only participants to the informal diplomacy process on Moro confirmed the ideal of Track Two diplomacy by having participants' objectives of reducing or de-escalating their conflict. The significant link between parties to the Moro conflict and decision-makers in their respective organisations enhanced the process of transferring the new knowledge or agreement reached during the informal diplomacy to their constituents. As a third party, Indonesia reinforced the process by accommodating as many participants as possible from the MNLF side. This strategy stemmed from an assumption that the more exposure the factions within the MNLF had to the informal diplomacy process, the greater the likelihood they would accept an agreement.[20]

Participants to JIM were mostly decision-makers within the Cambodian parties, but they came to Jakarta without clear objectives to de-escalate their conflict. In

the case of the informal workshop, as shown in Chapter 6, although almost all participants had access to decision makers in their respective authorities, they took part in the informal meetings with differing objectives. Some participants were willing to ponder on alternative co-operation, but some other participants were reluctant to let the process move forward. For instance, China always vetoed proposals that had implications for joint co-operation in the disputes' areas. Some participants of the informal workshops derailed discussion on issues not to their liking based on the consensus ruling of the proceedings being observed by the informal workshop. Similarly, some parties to the Cambodian conflict used the unanimity ruling of the meetings as a means to block the progress of discussion on issues of their own concerns. For instance, the Informal Meeting on Cambodia in Jakarta, 26-28 February 1990, failed to reach broad based agreements, because of the Khmer Rouge's insistence on omitting the word genocide from the meeting's document. Hence, a ground rule agreed upon by all parties can turn out to be a barrier to the informal diplomacy process. As the Chair, Indonesia had no option but to adhere to the ground rules of unanimity in Cambodia and consensus ruling in the informal workshops. In the case of Moro, the consensus ruling did not pose a problem because the parties were motivated by common desire to resolve their problems. However, their long years of hostility and distrust at times prevented the participants to reach a smooth consensus during the Moro's peace process.

Another major finding of this study is that Indonesia had to accommodate the social particularities of the participants in its informal diplomacy process. Although, the informal diplomacy observed the Track Two diplomacy principle of maintaining very flexible rules of recognition and protocol, the notion of flexibility did not mean that the aspect of participants' status became secondary. This aspect of status was difficult to put aside during the informal diplomacy process because the participants were very sensitive about their status. This was very obvious in the case of JIM where some participants were members of Royal families. In the case of Moro, Misuari was very conscious about his status because he was representing the MNLF, an organisation recognised by the OIC but not recognised by the Philippines Government. To deal with this issue of status, the Indonesians intentionally arranged the two meetings on Cambodia and Moro in the Presidential Palace. The selection of a palace was tactful because all the

parties to the conflict felt that they were being treated equally and their status was being recognised.

In final analysis the case studies show that:

1. The effectiveness of informal diplomacy was dependent on how the Indonesians conducted informal diplomacy of which the issues of skills, teamwork and co-ordination were essential to the successful outcomes of informal diplomacy. However, the effectiveness of informal diplomacy was also subject to the willingness or motivation to resolve their problems on the part of the parties to the conflicts and disputes, and whether or not they seriously wanted to resolve their problems. The aspect of timing of the informal diplomacy and the context surrounding the problems were also essential to the successful outcomes of informal diplomacy.

2. In Indonesia's case, informal diplomacy should also be seen within the context of bureaucratic politics. A convergence of interest between the President and the Ministry helped increase the profile of informal diplomacy at domestic and regional levels. Internally, bureaucracies within Indonesia and the military establishment supported the diplomatic initiatives because they wanted to share the credit should informal diplomacy be successful. Externally, the interest of the President increased the confidence of the participants in informal diplomacy and brought status to the endeavours, an important value in the Asian context.

3. The informal meetings influenced the overall informal diplomacy processes in four main ways. First, the informal meetings were able to improve relationships between the participants. Minimally, the informal forum provided the parties with the opportunity to meet face to face and break the psychological barrier that had prevented them in the past from sitting together around the table. Second, the informal forum provided the parties with the opportunity to listen to the point of view of other participants. Third, the informality of the process gave the participants the opportunity to explore options, exchange ideas, and better understand the position of other parties and

their concerns. Fourth, the informal diplomacy process gave the participants the opportunity to develop personal rapport and establish networks. Nevertheless, not all the case studies subscribed to all of these characteristics.

4. Indonesia used Track Two diplomacy to complement the diplomatic efforts held in formal diplomatic spheres. Hence, the Track Two diplomacy was used within the bigger picture of diplomacy and therefore, in the three case studies there was a linkage or synergy between informal and formal diplomatic processes. JIM was linked with the Paris Peace process and the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council. The informal diplomacy process of the Moro was linked with the OIC. The informal workshop on the South China Sea received acknowledgment in some ASEAN meetings and in the UN. It was therefore desirable to those exercising informal diplomacy or pure model of Track Two diplomacy to look for such a linkage between their works and the bigger framework of diplomacy, to ensure continuation and success or at the least, a receptive audience.

5. In conducting informal diplomacy government officials should be aware and have cognisance of some principles derived from the Track Two diplomacy, but at the same time, they should be prepared to adapt the principles to the circumstances that they encounter during the process. Principles from Track Two diplomacy provided the government officials with more insights on how to deal with protracted conflicts and on how to innovate and develop co-operation among the disputants. However, to be effective, Track Two diplomacy needs the support or political commitment from those involved. This study shows that although the non-binding character of the informal diplomacy gave the participants much more leeway in their discussions, the participants were easily able to backtrack from what they had agreed in the informal diplomacy whenever they moved to formal negotiations. Ideally, despite of the non-binding character of their discussions under informal diplomacy, the parties should consider any agreement reached from the discussion during the informal process as carrying a moral obligation.

6. This study has confirmed the usefulness and relevance of Track two diplomacy in understanding Indonesian informal diplomacy. However the case studies have revealed some weaknesses in the propositions derived from Track Two diplomacy in the real life situation. This study shows that there were context factors that have influenced the overall informal diplomacy processes. The implication of this is that in adopting principles from Track Two diplomacy, the third party should give more consideration to the domestic contexts of the third party: in Indonesia's experience, these include the dynamics internal of the Ministry, the notion of bureaucratic politics and the extent of the President's interests in the diplomatic initiatives. Attention should also be given to the dynamics in the context where the informal diplomacy will be operating, that is, the contexts of the conflicts or the disputes, the parties involved, and the political settings where the problems take place, including developments at regional and international levels. In any case, more case studies are needed in different political and cultural settings to confirm these findings.

7. Overall some propositions derived from Track two diplomacy are relevant tools for states conducting informal diplomacy. However, the real life situation, culture specifics and problems particularities prevented the third party in this study from implementing the Track Two propositions in the manner suggested by the scholars and practitioners. Therefore, in the process of applying the propositions derived from Track Two diplomacy, the third party should also take into consideration the dynamics of the situation at that point. Hence the third party should maintain flexibility and prepare to adjust or modify the format of Track Two diplomacy in response to the dynamics, internal or external of the informal diplomacy processes. In Indonesia's experience, adjustments were required at each stage of the processes. The diplomatic, negotiation and mediation experiences of those involved in implementing informal diplomacy were the assets of those Indonesians in deciding what kind of adjustment necessary to further the informal diplomacy process.

Notes

[1] See Chapter 2, notes 87 & 88.
[2] See Chapter 2, note 109.
[3] See Chapter 2, notes 120 & 121.
[4] See Chapter 2, note 115.
[5] See Chapter 2, notes 110 & 111.
[6] See Chapter 2, notes 49, 54, 58 & 140.
[7] See Chapter 2, notes 49 to 54.
[8] See Chapter 2, note 58.
[9] See Chapter 2, note 62.
[10] See Chapter 2, note 61.
[11] See Chapter 2, notes 124 & 125.
[12] See Chapter 2, note 121.
[13] See Chapter 2, note 99.
[14] See Chapter 2, note 100.
[15] See Chapter 2, note 106.
[16] See Chapter 2, notes 77 to 84.
[17] See Chapter 2, note 144.
[18] See Chapter 2, note 178.
[19] Those with a background in international law included the two former Foreign Ministers, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas; the Foreign Minister at the time of the writing of this thesis, Minister Hassan Wirajuda; and the proponent of the informal workshop, Dr. Hasjim Djalal.
[20] See Chapter 6, discussion under the heading of "The first formal peace talks in Jakarta, 25 October to 7 November 1993: setting the direction."

Postscript

Between 1998 to 2003, the Indonesian political system went through political turmoil and, in the span of these five years, Indonesia experienced three successive administrations. These administrations prioritised economic recovery programs and, at the same time, tried to deal with the pressing issues of separatism and interethnic conflicts. However, the slow progress of Indonesia's economic recovery was shaken by the terrorism act in Bali in 2002 allegedly linked to international terrorism groups. Hence, from 2002 onward Indonesia's domestic problem included the issue of international terrorism.

With the acuteness of the domestic problems, the aims of Indonesian foreign policy and diplomacy were focused on helping to achieve Indonesia's interests at the domestic level. As a consequence, Indonesia's attention to issues affecting peace and stability at the regional level was relatively modest. The degree of attention was also dependent on the particular interests of the government in power. For instance, President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) expressed a desire to assist the Government of the Philippines (GRP) in its dealing with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under Hashim Salamat. Apparently, Indonesia's domestic constituents and perhaps the GRP itself did not see the offer as feasible because at the time of the offer Indonesia still was struggling with its own problem of separatism. Between 1998 and 2003, the only contribution Indonesia made towards regional peace efforts was through the informal workshop dealing with the South China Sea disputes.

Similar to other bureaucratic institutions in Indonesia, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry (the Ministry) also had to adjust its position and role in the post-Soeharto political environment. Democratisation processes in Indonesia, including the re-emergence of political parties and the rise of civil society in domestic politics, had direct repercussions on foreign policy. The conduct of diplomacy came under close scrutiny of the domestic constituents and any diplomatic mishap was prone to domestic backlash to discredit the government in power. For example, President Abdurrahman Wahid was criticised for his frequent official visits overseas and was accused of neglecting the pressing domestic issues. Moreover,

the opposition and political analysts made a case that there was no clear evidence that Indonesia had gained economic or political advantages from those visits.[1] The controversy surrounding his travels was one of the factors that led to his removal from office in 2001. A similar allegation was directed against President Megawati who made a number of official visits overseas in 2002. Hence, the various administrations and the Ministry were very cautious about their performance within the realm of foreign policy.

To adjust to the new political environment, the Ministry introduced a new structure in 2002. Although the restructuring of the Ministry had been discussed since the mid-1990s, more serious discussion took place only in the late 1990s. The new structure reflected the Ministry's interest in developing a channel of communication with the legislative branch of government and the domestic constituents. A special liaison position at the level of Director General was established for consulting with the legislative branch on a regular basis.[2] A special Directorate to deal with the domestic constituents was established (Directorate for Public Diplomacy) and the position of Ministry's spokesperson was reintroduced. Clearly the intention was to keep the domestic public informed about foreign policy and diplomatic matters.

The focus on performance made the Ministry's personnel appear very cautious in proposing policy options. This could have been the result of the transitional process within the new structure, which integrated the previously divided political, economic and social branches of the Ministry. The Ministry is, therefore, still undergoing the transitional stage of its internal consolidation. However, such caution could also be the result of the greatly tightened budget of the Ministry. Hence, the Ministry has pursued diplomatic initiatives according to the priority and availability of funds. However, besides addressing the pressing domestic issues, under Minister Hasan Wirajuda,[3] Indonesia has again given particular attention to basic issues, such as ASEAN and maintaining good bilateral relationships with Indonesia's close neighbours. For the first time, the Ministry became involved directly in the domestic issue of separatism. In the past, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the military establishment had handled this issue.

The Ministry's experience in pursuing informal diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts and disputes between 1985 to 1998 was noted by the two successive governments of President Wahid and President Megawati. President Wahid took a bold decision by permitting the Indonesian Mission in Geneva to open contact with the Aceh separatist group, the GAM (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or the Free Aceh Movement). The person responsible for the contact was Dr. Hasan Wirajuda who was involved in the Moro peace process between 1993 to 1996 and at the time of that contact was Indonesian Ambassador for the UN Mission in Geneva. With the help of conflict resolution experts from the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), Indonesia and the GAM were able to reach a peace agreement in late 2002. During the political negotiation in 2002, the Indonesian team was led by another veteran of the informal diplomacy process to deal with the Moro problem, Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo.

The involvement of Dr. Hasan Wirajuda and Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo in the Aceh peace process can be explained in two ways. First, it was recognition of their individual performance in the Moro case and of the Ministry's capacity as an institution. In Dr. Hasan Wirajuda's opinion there was no alternative institution in Indonesia that could engage in constructive dialogue with the separatist groups, including GAM.[4] Indeed, the Soeharto Government's legacy had been a political system where the use of force to settle domestic problems had been more common than the use of constructive dialogue. Hence, Indonesia still lacked negotiators who could deal effectively with domestic issues, from labour disputes to separatism issues. Second, from a wider perspective, both the Wahid and Megawati governments would have hoped that the Ministry team would have brought their experience in facilitating the informal diplomacy process into the context of the separatism issue in Indonesia. In this case the HDC played a role as neutral third party which facilitated the peace process. The Aceh peace process modelled the informal diplomacy process of Cambodia and Moro. It evolved from informal contacts, followed by a confidence building process among the participants and the two conflicting parties. At a latter stage the participants were engaged in substantive discussion.

Another case where Indonesia used informal diplomacy in dealing with conflict was in the post referendum East Timor. According to Dr. Marti Natalegawa, informal diplomacy was used to solve residual issues, including the reconciliation process among the East Timorese. The informal approach allowed for a 'low profile' contact necessary because of the sensitivity of some East Timorese and some factions within the Indonesian society, especially the military, to any notion of direct contact. Indonesia facilitated contacts and dialogues between the pro-Indonesian East Timorese and the new East Timor government.[5] Clearly, this was not an easy diplomatic exercise because Indonesia would have had difficulty in appearing neutral due to Indonesia's complicity in the East Timor issue in the past. However, Indonesia was interested in finding a solution because there were many other domestic problems requiring the Indonesian Government's close attention.

The above cases show that informal diplomacy has been an essential and effective diplomatic approach for Indonesia. However, in these cases Indonesia was involved as a participant on the peace process. In the case of Aceh, Indonesia was a party to the conflict and in the case of East Timor, Indonesia's role as facilitator was clouded by the history of East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia by force. Hence, it would not have been easy for Indonesia to disentangle its past history and assume a third party role. Indonesia was indeed an interested third party in the East Timor case. The only case where Indonesia was able to maintain a role as a disinterested third party was in the informal workshops dealing with the South China Sea disputes.

The termination of Canada's funding officially ended the South China Sea informal workshop in 2001 (the 11th workshop). However, the termination did not stop Indonesia from approaching regional countries to continue the informal diplomacy process. The continuation of the workshop series in 2002 suggests that the regional countries found the exercise worthwhile, although the process was not as comprehensive as that funded by Canada. The regional countries' participation in the 12th informal workshop was not simply a token gesture. Not only were they prepared to cover the cost of their representative participation in the workshops, but also during the informal meeting the participants were willing

to ponder on how to establish a regional fund to sustain the informal workshop process. As well, the participants' enthusiasm to discuss special funding for the workshop suggests that they valued the informal workshop and wish to maintain the process. It may be the case that after their long years of involvement in the workshop, they have developed a sense of belonging to the informal diplomacy process and consider themselves as an integral part of the peace endeavours.

The regional countries' positive response has convinced Indonesia of the efficacy of the informal workshop as a forum to address issues of mutual interest in the South China Sea. However, the success of the forum to address issues of mutual interest does not necessarily mean that the present workshop format is adequate. The eleven years of annual workshops show that the process was handicapped by the regional countries' disinterest in implementing the workshops' recommendations and project proposals. It is also yet to be proven whether or not the Indonesian team can co-operate closely without the Canadian's involvement in the process. In any case, Indonesia was pleased with the positive response toward the workshop because it was the only forum where Indonesia could show the international community that, despite all its domestic difficulties, it was still a responsible country. The informal workshop was Indonesia's avenue to engage the regional countries in discussion to prevent the region from being engulfed in armed conflicts.

However, the efficacy of the informal diplomacy to deal with conflict comprehensively was challenged by the deterioration of the peace agreement between the GRP and MNLF in late 2001. Both Mr. Nur Misuari and the new GRP administration under President Joseph Estrada, and later on President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, blamed the other party for the deterioration. Mr. Nur Misuari accused the GRP of not acting in good faith, whereas the GRP accused Mr. Nur Misuari of mismanagement in running the autonomous region during the transitional administration prior to the vote in 2000 to decide on the expansion of the region. This episode involving MNLF was also clouded by the MILF's earlier declaration in 1999 to annul the peace agreement of 1998. At the same time, another Moro splinter group, the Abu Sayyaf, was involved in a series of hostage taking for ransom. This reality suggests a fragility in the informal diplomacy

process when the parties involved were frustrated because they were unable to fulfill the earlier expectation during the dialogue process. The informal diplomacy was easily shaken by the denial of its existence by the splinter groups who were not involved in the peace process and wished to benefit from its failure. For example, groups like MILF and Abu Sayyaf wished to benefit from the decline of MNLF popularity among the Moro people.

In retrospect, the breakdown of the agreement was a result of a combination of factors. The MNLF failed to manage the autonomous region properly because the GRP was not able to supply the region with sufficient funding. The GRP, by then, was experiencing a financial crisis that had depleted their reserves and economic capability. At the same time, Mr. Misuari was also unable to attract OIC countries to invest in the region, contrary to his promises to the Moro people in the past. As a third party assisting the peace process, Indonesia was no longer able to assist the parties because the implementation process was essentially a domestic affair of the Philippines. Although Indonesia was trusted with the responsibility of leading the OIC monitoring team during the implementation stage, Indonesia was not interested in involving itself deeply in the internal matters of the Philippines. Indonesia was also not able to sustain the agreement financially, such as by investing in the Mindanao, because of its own financial crisis in the late 1990s.

The Moro case serves as a lesson that what is achieved during the informal diplomacy process can only be sustained if all parties are committed to the agreement's success. There were factors behind expectations such as financial crises that impeded the implementation of the agreement thoroughly. Another influential factor that impeded the implementation stage was the regime change from President Ramos to President Estrada. In this case, the new administration did not sustain their predecessor's special interest in the issue.

Notes

[1] "Politik Luar Negeri No Profile," *Kompas*, 30 Juni 2001.

[2] Former Foreign Minister Dr. Alwi Shihab, under President Wahid (1999-2001) initiated this new post and appointed Mr. Abdul Naser to act as the Ministry liaison. As a political appointee and party member, Minister Shihab was clearly aware on the importance of maintaining close contact with the parliamentarians.

[3] President Megawati appointed Dr. Hasan Wirajuda as Foreign Minister in August 2001.
[4] Interview, 3 November 2001.
[5] Interview, 5 December 2001.

List of Interviewees and Date of Interview

1. Mr. Sunu Mahadi (Deputy Director overseeing Indochina Affairs, Directorate for Asia and the Pacific Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM and in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 24 and 26 September 2001.
2. Mr. Andreas Sitepu (Deputy Director, Directorate for Policy Analysis, Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Former Head of Information Section, Indonesian Embassy in Manila. Involved in Moro peace process), 2 October 2001.
3. Mr. Budiman Darmosutanto (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Ottawa and former Director for International Treaty of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 3 October 2001.
4. Mr. Kusnadi (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Bandar Seri Begawan and former Director for Asia and the Pacific of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in post-JIM and Moro peace process), 3 and 9 October 2001.
5. Mr. Rahardjo Mustajab (Director for Functional Co-operation of the Directorate General for ASEAN of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Former Head of Political Section, Indonesian Embassy in Manila. Involved in Moro peace process), 4 October and 30 November 2001.
6. Mr. John P. Louhanapessy (Former Director General for Political Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 16 October 2001.
7. Mr. Juwana (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Hanoi and Beijing. Involved in JIM and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 19 October 2001.
8. Mr. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Paris and Canberra, and also former Director General for Political Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in post-JIM and in Moro peace process), 22 October 2001.
9. Maj. Gen (ret.) Pieter Damanik (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila and former Director General for Social, Cultural, and Information Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM and in Moro peace process), 23 October 2001.
10. Dr. Ben Perkasa Drajat (Desk officer for APEC of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry), 24 October 2001.
11. Mr. Ahmad Jatmiko (Staff at the Foreign Minister Office of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 30 October 2001.
12. Mr. Wahid Suprijadi (Acting Director for Information of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry until early 2002), informal consultation, 30 October 2001.
13. Rear Admiral (ret.) R. M. Sunardi (Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 31 October 2001.
14. Mr. Soendaroe Rachmad (Former Head, Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in pre-JIM and in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 1 November 2001.
15. Dr. Hasan Wirajuda (Indonesia's Foreign Minister - appointed in 2001. Involved in Moro peace process), 3 November 2001.

16. Mr. Ali Alatas (Former Indonesia's Foreign Minister, from 1988 to 1999. Personally involved in JIM and post-JIM as well as in Moro peace process), 14 November 2001.
17. Mr. Rizali (Deputy Director, Protocol Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 15 November 2001.
18. Dr. Boer Mauna (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Cairo and former Director for Political Research, Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 15 November 2001.
19. Mr. Dian Triansyah Djanie (Deputy Director, Directorate for Economic Relations among Developing Countries of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM), 16 November 2001.
20. Mr. Bantarto Bandoro, CSIS, 21 November 2001.
21. Dr. Soejatmiko (Deputy Director, Directorate for Policy Analysis, Directorate General for ASEAN Affairs of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 22 November 2001.
22. Dr. Rizal Sukma, CSIS, 22 November 2001.
23. Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono, CSIS, 22 November 2001.
24. Mr. Mangantar Hutagalung (Desk officer for Southeast Asian Countries of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 23 November 2001.
25. Dr. Hasjim Djalal (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Ottawa and Head, Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 23 November and 7 December 2001.
26. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, LIPI, 28 November 2001.
27. Mr. Abu Hartono (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Manila. Involved in Moro peace process), 28 November 2001.
28. Mr. Abdul Naser (Special Advisor to the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 29 November 2001.
29. Dr. C. F. Luhulima, CSIS, 4 December 2001.
30. Dr. Marti Natalegawa (Director for International Organization of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in JIM, Moro peace process and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 5 December 2001.
31. Mr. Darmawan Ronodipuro (Former Director for Information, State Secretariat, during President Abdurrahman Wahid. Involved in JIM), 12 December 2001.
32. Mr. Suparno (Prof. Fuad Hassan's personal secretary in the Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry in mid-1980s), 12 December 2001.
33. Prof. Fuad Hassan (Former Head, Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry), informal consultation, 21 December 2001.
34. Mr. Ridwan Wahab (Director for Political Research, Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 26 December 2001.
35. Mr. Mohammad Jusuf (Head, Research and Development Agency of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in post-JIM and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), informal consultation, 26 December 2001.
36. Mr. Teuku Rezasyah, University of Padjadjaran in Bandung, 28 December 2001.

37. Mr. Fikri Cassidy (Desk officer for Disarmament of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry), 31 December 2001.
38. Mr. Chalief Akbar (Head of Political Section, Indonesian Embassy in Dili – East Timor. Involved in Moro peace process), 31 December 2001 and several informal consultation thorough e-mail.
39. Mr. Yusbar Jamil (Director for Asia and the Pacific of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Involved in informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 10 January 2002.
40. Mr. Taufik Soedarpo (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Phnom Penh. Involved in post-JIM), 13 January 2002.
41. Mr. Abdurahman Gunadirdja (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Beijing. Involved in JIM), 14 January 2002.
42. Mr. Asep Setiawan (Former journalist from the daily *Kompas* – Indonesia. Reporter for the BBC London. He covered the Moro peace process and informal workshop on the South China Sea disputes), 15 August 2002.

- Mr. Ali Alatas was interviewed by reporter from *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Tokyo, from 24 to 28 January 2000.
- Ambassador Oscar Valenzuela, the Philippines' Ambassador to Jakarta, was interviewed by a reporter from *The Jakarta Post*, 26 April 1993.

THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

(As amended by the First Amendment of 1999, the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002)

Unofficial translation

THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION

Whereas independence is the inalienable right of all nations, therefore, all colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice;

And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle of the Indonesian independence movement to guide the people safely and well to the gate of the independence of the state of Indonesia which shall be independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous;

By the grace of God Almighty and motivated by the noble desire to live a free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

Subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of Indonesia and all the independence and the land that has been struggled for, and to improve public welfare, to educate the life of the people and to participate toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice, therefore the independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall be built into a sovereign state based on a belief in the One and Only God, just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and democratic life led by wisdom of thoughts in deliberation amongst representatives of the people, and achieving social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING[1]

With the concurrence of the participants of the Meeting I have the pleasure to make the following statement:

1. The Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) was held in the City of Bogor from 25 - 28 July 1988. The Meeting comprised two stages. At the first stage the participants were the four factions of Kampuchea. While at the second stage the four Kampuchean factions were joined by Brunei Darussalam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Indonesia.

2. The purpose of JIM was to provide a framework for informal discussions among the parties directly involved and other concerned countries in the search for a comprehensive, just and durable solution of the Kampuchean problem, taking into account the legitimate interests of all concerned. The Meeting was organized and conducted in accordance with the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding, concluded between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Vietnam on July 29, 1987.

3. The discussions throughout the meeting were marked by a friendly and constructive atmosphere and covered a wide range of issues and aspects relevant to the Kampuchean problem. There was

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1. Two participants, H.E. Mr. Son Sann and H.E. Mr. Khieu Samphan have expressed their reservations.

sincere Willingness on all sides to exert efforts to identify areas of common ground and convergencies of view on the issues discussed.

4. All the participants agreed on the need to solve the Kampuchean problem through political means and thereby contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

5. During the discussions there was a common understanding on the urgent need to end the sufferings of the Kampuchean people and to work towards the establishment of an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea on the basis of self-determination and national reconciliation.

6. All participants shared the view that the two key issues of the Kampuchean problem which are interlinked are the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, to be carried out within the context of an overall political solution and the prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure the cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces. They also saw the need to set definite time-tables and to provide an effective international presence to supervise these processes.

7. The participants recognized the complexities of the Kampuchean problem in its many dimensions and aspects and in its ramifications which are both regional and international in scope. They, therefore, concurred on the need to have further discussions on issues on which there were still

divergencies of view and those which still require further detailed consideration. In this connection I refer to a decision taken by the Meeting to establish a Working Group to examine specific aspects of a political solution.

The City of Bogor, 28 July 1988.

CONSENSUS STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JAKARTA INFORMAL MEETING[1]

1. The second Jakarta Informal Meeting was held from 19-21 February, 1989, preceded by the second meeting of the Working Group of the J.I.M which convened from 16-18 February 1989. Both meetings were attended by Delegations from Brunei Darussalam, the four parties of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Indonesia.

2. As during the first J.I.M., the second Jakarta Informal Meeting was organized and conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Ho Chi Minh City Understanding, concluded between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Vietnam on 29 July 1987.

3. The proceedings throughout the Meeting were characterized by a frank and constructive atmosphere, with all sides showing seriousness of purpose and effort to identify areas of common ground and to promote convergencies of view on the issues discussed.

4. All participants agreed to build upon the progress already achieved at the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in terms of agreed understandings and approaches towards solution and, hence, to direct their further efforts towards addressing and resolving those substantive issues and aspects on which there were still divergencies of view among them.

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1. Three participants, HRH Prince Ranariddh, H.E. Mr. Son Sann and H.E. Mr. Khieu Samphan have expressed their reservations.

5. Accordingly, they reiterated their common understandings that:

a) the Kampuchea question should be resolved through political means, thereby contributing to the establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia;

b) the ultimate objective to strive for is the establishment of an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea on the basis of self-determination and national reconciliation; this would ensure a Kampuchea at peace within itself, free from foreign interference by any quarter and posing no threat to any of its neighbours;

c) there should be a comprehensive, just and durable solution, encompassing all aspects of the question and taking into account the legitimate concerns of all parties involved.

6. Participants also reiterated the view that the two key issues of the Kampuchea question which are inter-linked are the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, to be carried out within the context of an overall political solution and the prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and to ensure the cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces. They also saw the need to set definite time-tables and to provide an effective international presence to supervise these processes.

Withdrawal of Vietnamese forces within the context of an overall solution.

On this issue, participants concurred on the following general understandings:

a. a cease-fire throughout Kampuchea would take effect on the date of entry into force of an agreement on the solution of the Kampuchea question. Its modalities and detailed aspects would be further worked out;

b. immediately following cease-fire, the withdrawal from Kampuchea of all Vietnamese troops, military advisors and personnel, armaments and other war materials would begin, with the entire process of withdrawal being completed no later than 30 September 1989;

c. the manner of withdrawal, whether numerically or territorially based and whether phased or not, as well as all other practical modalities would be the subject of further negotiations;

d. The process of withdrawal and all other aspects related to it as referred to in paragraph 6 above, would be under the adequate and effective supervision of an International Control Mechanism, which would be in-place and deployed prior to the start of withdrawal;

Prevention of the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime

Participants shared the view that concrete measures will have to be taken to prevent the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime and the resumption of armed hostilities. Such concrete measures needed to be further discussed.

Cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces

9. To cease all foreign interference and external arms supplies to the opposing Kampuchean forces, the participants concurred that concrete measures should be taken, the details of which required further discussions.

10. The time-table of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in the context of a comprehensive solution of the Kampuchean question and the time-table for cessation of all foreign interference and external arms supplies to all Kampuchean parties would be synchronized. The modalities of the synchronization will be further discussed and worked out.

International Control Mechanism

11. On this issue, participants concurred on the following general understandings:

a) an International Control Mechanism (I.C.M) would be established, having the required components so as to ensure its operational effectiveness, and equipped with necessary arms for self-defence and for the discharge of its duties;

b) with due respect to the sovereignty of Kampuchea, the mandate/scope of functions of the I.C.M would be, inter alia, to monitor, supervise and verify the processes of withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and all other aspects related to it as referred to in paragraph 6 above, the prevention of a resumption of armed hostilities and the conduct of the general elections;

c) the nature (civilian, military or both), composition, size, operational principles and time-frame of operation of the I.C.M., as well as auspices under which the I.C.M.

would operate (whether under the UN or other auspices), would be the subject of further negotiations.

Internal aspects of the Kampuchea question

12. Participants supported the principle agreed by the Kampuchean parties that in the exercise of the right of self-determination of the people of Kampuchea, general elections would be held in a free and democratic fashion under the supervision of an International Control Mechanism. The electoral provisions and other organizational modalities for the general elections would be the subject of further discussions among the four Kampuchean parties.

13. Noting that there are disagreements in the positions of the Kampuchean parties on the internal aspects of the Kampuchea question, notably on the establishment of an interim quadripartite authority of national reconciliation under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the participants reaffirmed the universally recognized principle of people's right of self-determination and that the internal affairs of Kampuchea must be settled by the Kampuchean people themselves. They welcomed the continuation of talks between the four Kampuchean parties to settle the internal aspects. The participants proposed that within four months or sooner, the four Kampuchean parties will inform the JIM Chairman of the results of the talks.

The establishment of peace and stability in Southeast Asia

14. All participants shared the view that a comprehensive solution of the Kampuchea question should contribute to the establishment of durable peace, stability and mutual cooperation in Southeast Asia. Having studied the provisions contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, concluded at Bali on 24 February 1976 and open for accession by all States in Southeast Asia, participants

agreed that an undertaking by all Southeast Asian countries to become party to this Treaty, would serve to manifest in a concrete way their common desire to achieve that goal.

15. Participants also shared the view that a comprehensive political solution of the Kampuchea question would accelerate the realization of ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia.

The International Conference

16. Participants agreed that after achieving broad consensus on the various elements and aspects of a comprehensive solution to the Kampuchea question within the J.I.M. process, there would be a need to convene an International Conference.

17. There was a common understanding that the main purpose of such an International Conference would be, inter alia, to obtain:

a) guarantees by all participant of the Conference of full compliance with all agreements on the solution of the Kampuchea question;

b) international endorsement of the declared status of Kampuchea as a sovereign, independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned State within its territorial integrity;

c) the adoption and initiation of an international programme of economic reconstruction and development for Kampuchea and other countries of the region;

d) the necessary funding for the implementation of the Kampuchean peace process.

18. Questions with regard to date, venue and participants of the International Conference, as well as under whose auspices

such a Conference is to be convened, would be the subject o further consultations.

19. Participants agreed to await the results of the talks amon the four Kampuchean parties as referred to in paragraph 13 in the light of those results, the JIM Chairman will consul with all participants with a view to deciding what furthe action to take.

Jakarta, 21 February 1989.

THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT

In the Name of God, the Omnipotent, the Merciful.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL COMMISSION MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

In accordance with the Resolution No. IV Para. V adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Islamic Conference in its Fourth Session held in Benghazi, Libyan Arab Republic during the month of Safar 1393 H. corresponding to March 1973, calling for the formation of Quadripartite Ministerial Commission representing the Libyan Arab Republic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal and the Republic of Somalia, to enter into discussions with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the situation of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines.

And in accordance with the Resolution No. (18) adopted by the Islamic Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in Jumada Alakhir 1393 H. corresponding to June 1974 A.D. which recommends the searching for a just and peaceful

political solution to the problem of the Muslims in the South of the Philippines through the negotiations.

And in accordance with the Resolution No. 12/7/S adopted by the Islamic Conference held in Istanbul in Jumada El-Ula 1396 H. corresponding to May 1976 A.D. empowering the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference to take the necessary steps for the resumption of negotiations.

And following the task undertaken by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference and the discussions held with H.E. President Marcos, President of the Republic of the Philippines.

And in realization of the contents of Para. (VI) of the Joint Communique issued in Tripoli on the 25th Zulgeda 1396 H. corresponding to 17th November 1976 A.D. following the official visit paid by the delegation of the Government of the Philippines headed by the First Lady of the Philippines, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, to the Libyan Arab Republic and which calls for the resumption of negotiations between the two parties concerned in Tripoli on the 15th of December 1976 A.D.

Negotiations were held in the City of Tripoli during the period between 24th Zulhijja 1396 H. to Second to Moharram 1397 H. corresponding to the period from 15th to 23rd December 1976 A.D. at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presided over by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic, and comprising of the Delegations of:

1. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, led by Honorable Carmelo Z. Barbero, Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations.

2. Moro National Liberation Front, led by Mr. Nur Misuari, Chief of the Front.

And with the participation of the representatives of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission:

The Libyan Arab Republic—represented by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—H.E. Salah Abdalla El-Fadl, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Libyan Arab Republic.

The Republic of Senegal—Mr. Abubakar Othman Si, Representative of the Republic of Senegal and Charge d' Affaires of Senegal in Cairo.

Democratic Republic of Somalia—H.E. Bazi Mohamed Sufi, Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, Libyan Arab Republic.

With the aid of H.E. Dr. Ahmed Karim Gaye, Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and a delegation from the Secretariat General of the Conference composed of Mr. Qasim Zuheri, Assistant Secretary General and Mr. Aref Ben Musa, Director of Political Department.

During these negotiations which were marked by a spirit of conciliation and understanding, it has been agreed on the following:

First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines shall comprise the following:

1. Basilan
2. Sulu
3. Tawi-Tawi
4. Zamboanga del Sur
5. Zamboanga del Norte
6. North Cotabato
7. Maguindanao
8. Sultan Kudarat
9. Lanao del Norte
10. Lanao del Sur
11. Davao del Sur
12. South Cotabato
13. Palawan
14. All the cities and villages situated in the above-mentioned areas.

Third:

1 Foreign Policy shall be of the competence of the Central Government of the Philippines.

2 The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the Central Authority provided that the arrangements for the joining of the forces of the Moro National Liberation Front with the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed later.

3 In the areas of the autonomy, the Muslims shall have the right to set up their own Courts which implement the Islamic Shari'a laws. The Muslims shall be represented in all Courts including the Supreme Court. The representation of the Muslims in the Supreme Court shall be upon the recommendation from the authorities of the Autonomy and the Supreme Court. Decrees will be issued by the President of the Republic of their appointments taking into consideration all necessary qualifications of the candidates.

4 Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have the right to set up schools, colleges and universities, provided that matters pertaining to the relationship between these educational and scientific organs and the general education system in the State shall be subject of discussion later on.

5 The Muslims shall have their own administrative system in compliance with the objectives of the autonomy and its institutions. The relationship between this administrative system and the Central administrative system to be discussed later.

6 The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have their own economic and financial system. The relationship between this system and the Central economic and financial system of the State shall be discussed later.

7 The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall enjoy the right of representation and participation in the Central Government and in all other organs of the State. The number of representatives and ways of participation shall be fixed later.

8 Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in the area of the Autonomy for the Muslims in the South of the Philippines. The relationship between these forces and the Central security forces shall be fixed later.

9 A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council shall be formed in the areas of the Autonomy for the Muslims. The setting up of the Legislative Assembly shall be constituted through a direct election, and the formation of the Executive Council shall take place through appointments by the Legislative Assembly. A decree for their formation shall be enacted by the President of the Republic respectively. The number of members of each assembly shall be determined later on.

10 Mines and mineral resources fall within the competence of the Central Government, and a reasonable percentage deriving from the revenues of the mines and minerals be fixed for the benefit of the areas of the autonomy.

11 A mixed Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Central Government of the Republic of the Philippines and representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front. The mixed Committee shall meet in Tripoli during the period from the Fifth of February to a date not later than the Third of March 1977. The task of the said Committee shall be charged to study in detail the points left for discussion in order to reach a solution thereof in conformity with the provisions of this agreement.

12 Cease-fire shall be declared immediately after the signature of this agreement, provided that its coming into effect should not exceed the 20th January 1977. A Joint Committee shall be composed of the two parties with the help of the Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire.

The said Joint Committee shall also be charged with supervising the following:

a A complete amnesty in the areas of the autonomy and the renunciation of all legal claims and codes resulting from events which took place in the South of the Philippines.

b The release of all the political prisoners who had relations with the events in the South of the Philippines.

c The return of all refugees who have abandoned their areas in the South of the Philippines.

d To guarantee the freedom of movements and meetings.

13 A joint meeting be held in Jeddah during the first week of the month of March 1977 to initial what has been concluded by the Committee referred to in Para. 11.

14 The final agreement concerning the setting up of the autonomy referred to in the first and second paragraphs

shall be signed in the City of Manila, Republic of the Philippines, between the Government of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front, and the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference.

15 Immediately after the signature of the Agreement in Manila, a Provisional Government shall be established in the areas of the autonomy to be appointed by the President of the Philippines; and be charged with the task of preparing for the elections of the Legislative Assembly in the territories of the Autonomy; and administer the areas in accordance with the provisions of this agreement until a Government is formed by the elected Legislative Assembly.

16 The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement.

Fourth: This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date of its signature.

Done in the City of Tripoli on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. corresponding to 23rd December 1976 A.D. in three original copies in Arabic, English, French languages, all equal in legal power.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:

HON. CARMELO. Z. BARBERO
Undersecretary of National Defense for Civilian Relations

DR. ALI ABDUSSALAM TREKI
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Libyan Arab Republic and Chairman of the Negotiations

FOR THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT:

MR. NUR MISUARI
Chairman of the Front

DR. AHMED KARIM GAYE
Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

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